Chapter 39 History of money. The evolution of money - its properties, qualities and abilities. Integral system for the development of social relations Whoever wants to get rich in a day will be hanged within a year. Leonardo da Vinci “In modern consumer society, not only and not

V.L. Makarov (Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician-Secretary of the Department of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences)<Род. – 25.05.1937 (Новосибирск), Моск. гос. эк. ин-т, к.э.н. – 1965 (Линейные динамические модели производства больших экономических систем), д.ф.-м.н. – 1969 (Математические модели экономической

Chapter IV. On public passions If it is unpleasant and painful for us to share the above-mentioned passions due to the fact that our sympathy is divided between persons whose interests are in complete contradiction, then all the more pleasant and deserving of approval

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) was one of the founders of the new science of society, sociology. The term “sociology” was introduced in Comte’s Course of Positive Philosophy (Cours de philosophie positive. In six volumes, 1830–1842) as a replacement for the expression he had previously used, social physics (physique sociale).

Comte viewed the emergence of sociology as a science from a historical point of view. He believed that the intellectual development of mankind goes through three stages: theological, metaphysical and positive. Comte believed that mathematics, physics and biology, as sciences freed from theological and metaphysical thinking, were already at a positive stage, but the disciplines that study man were still characterized by theological and metaphysical speculation. Comte wanted to advance them to the positive (scientific) stage. In this sense, he becomes the father of sociology as a positive social science.

His use of the word “positive” (and “positivism”) is polemical. It is directed against theological and metaphysical speculation. Positive scientific discipline is, in Comte's understanding, empirical, objective and anti-speculative. It deals with phenomena as they are given to us and their ordered connections that can be discovered through empirical research. Classical mechanics can be a model of positive science, and sociology should, as far as possible, follow this model. Sociology must become a social science in the same sense in which physics is a natural science.

A positive way of thinking is also positive in the sense of its constructiveness, methodology and organization. Like the French restorationists, Comte believed that the ideas of the Enlightenment played a negative and destructive role. Criticism of traditions and authorities led not only to the elimination of an outdated political system, but also to a revolution that ended in terror and chaos. (Rousseau and Voltaire are called doctors of the guillotine (docteurs en guillotine). Like the philosophers of the restoration (in particular, Bonald and de Maistre), Comte was worried about the moral crisis of the post-revolutionary era. He saw its cause in the emerging individualism (“disease of the Western world”), which arose during the Reformation and culminating in the Age of Enlightenment, obvious symptoms of this “disease” were such ideas as the sovereignty of the people, equality and freedom of the individual, aggravated by a negative attitude towards family, religion, church and community. This individualism was also expressed in the form of “methodological”. individualism” characteristic of the tradition going from Hobbes to Kant. For these thinkers, the individual was the starting point of social philosophy (see social contract), and society was understood as an association of individuals. But, according to Comte, society cannot be reduced to individuals in the same way. , like a line, cannot be reduced to points. For the purpose of analysis, society can only be divided into groups and communities. The most fundamental of these groups is the family.

Two positions distinguish Comte from conservative supporters of the restoration.

First, he rejects Catholicism as a socially integrating force. Conservative French social philosophers wanted to return to the old feudal-Catholic principles of the old society. Comte dates these principles to the early era of human development and argues that they should be replaced by the principle of positivism. Positivism is the only principle that can take the place previously held by Catholicism. Positivism thus appears as a “unifying force” (religion, “religion”) [The etymology of the English word religion perhaps goes back to the French word religare, meaning to bind, fasten, unite. See Religion. - In Webster's Third New International Dictionary with Seven Language Dictionary. - Chicago, 1986. Vol. II. - P. 1918. - B.K.] modern society.

Secondly, Comte has a more positive assessment of natural science and the technology based on it than supporters of restoration. Therefore, as a natural science of society, sociology could perhaps provide the basis for a new effective social technology. Sociology should become a tool for managing society in such a way that it functions in an orderly and coordinated manner.

At the same time, according to Comte, sociology is not a science among others - it is the top of the scientific hierarchy. At the same time, it is a quasi-religious principle for unifying a new society, similar to medieval Catholicism. These ideas gradually became dominant in Comte’s teaching (see System of positive politics, Systeme de politique positive, 1851–1854). The balanced and anti-metaphysical spirit of his early work gives way to an ardent support for positivist "religion." At this stage, Comtean positivism represents a kind of restored Catholicism, formulated in a new and secular language. For Comte, society itself, as understood by positive sociology, became the Greatest Entity (Le Grand Etre). At the end of his life, Comte appears almost as the founder of a new humanistic religion, which enjoyed significant support. In France, England and the USA, even semblances of “churches” arose that preached this religion.

Supporters of Comte's program of scientific sociology (John Stuart Mill and Spencer) tended to ignore his neo-religious ideas from the Systeme de politique positive. However, in the 19th century. Comte's basic ideas about sociology as a "natural science" of society gained many supporters. The influence of this “high priest” of sociology is felt, for example, in Durkheim’s reformulation of the main features of the sociological method (Method of Sociology, Les regies de la mtthode sociologique, 1895). Durkheim used the works of the late Comte only to a small extent, but relied significantly on his Course in Positive Philosophy.

Comte's significance for the history of sociology can be briefly expressed in three points.

1. He developed a program of positive "natural science of society", which still has many supporters today.

2. He emphasized that “social facts” can be studied as objectively as natural phenomena.

3. He argued that the sociological understanding of regular social relationships opens up the possibility of developing a new social technology that would simplify the solution of socio-political problems.

The French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) is especially famous for his four-volume work on contemporary American democracy (Democracy in America, De la Democratic en Amerique, 1835–1840).

Tocqueville believed that there was an irresistible tendency towards increasing equality, both in behavior (and attitudes) and in politics (and institutions). The country that has gone furthest in terms of developing such democratic equality has been the United States. Europe must follow.

An aristocrat by birth, Tocqueville was ambivalent about this trend in political and legal democracy. But, like Montesquieu, who was intellectually close to him, he was a realist and an open-minded thinker. On the one hand, Tocqueville viewed this democracy as fairer than the old regime. On the other hand, he saw the danger of “equalization” in society. Each becomes more or less like the other, and this largely leads to an equation with mediocrity. According to Tocqueville, what keeps Americans together is primarily a shared interest in money and efficiency. Here he anticipates contemporary cultural criticism of so-called mass society.

However, according to Tocqueville, it was not only aristocratic and higher intellectual values ​​that were under threat. He also reflected on the difficulties of reconciling individualism and freedom with democratic equality. When power is held by a democratic majority in all areas of society, dissenting minorities and individuals are oppressed. This is not just about overt physical violence. What is even more dangerous is that public opinion suppresses dissident viewpoints in quiet and unnoticeable ways.

It is known that the slogan of the French Revolution was freedom, equality and fraternity. But Tocqueville believed that freedom and equality are incompatible with democracy and that equality tends to win at the expense of freedom.

In addition, Tocqueville believed that democracy based on equality would lead to strong state power, and the state would create equal material conditions of existence for people.

Tocqueville saw trends not only towards increasing equality, but also towards a new “class” stratification. This stratification was generated by industrialization. On the one hand, Tocqueville believed that democratic equality promoted industrialization. First, everyone's desire for material wealth creates a growing market for manufactured goods. Secondly, increasing equality makes it easier for able people to enter trade and industry. On the other hand, Tocqueville saw trends towards increasing inequality. Self-employed artisans turn into factory workers engaged in monotonous and boring work. Entrepreneurs create large companies in which their communication with workers is limited to the processes of hiring and issuing wages. The sense of responsibility that existed between the aristocrat and his servants disappears. In this Tocqueville saw a tendency towards a new type of inequality between entrepreneurs and their employees.

So, Tocqueville predicts trends towards both political equality and economic inequality.

It should be noted that Tocqueville is one of the first thinkers who questioned the belief in progress and tried to find a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of social development in the first half of the 19th century.

Let us now consider the so-called antithetical pairs of sociological concepts. (An example of this is the pair of concepts “closed, static society” and “open, dynamic society”). These pairs or “ideological blocks” can be understood as basic points of view, or original coordinate systems, which were accepted by classical sociology and based on which it reasoned about society. The most important conceptual pair was probably introduced by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies (1855–1936). It is included in the title of his main work Community and Society (Gemeinschqft und Gesellschaft, 1887). In this work he sought to develop a comprehensive conceptual system based on the concepts of community and society. Let us give a few examples that clarify the meaning of this conceptual pair and Tennis's point of view.

1 Tocqueville also argued that the majority in a democracy is often guaranteed an acceptable share of the product produced so that it does not seek benefits for itself in the revolution. Thanks to this, the minority, which would clearly benefit from the revolution, can be limited by the majority. Here Tocqueville confronts Marx's theory of impoverishment. See P. Eberts and R. Witton. "Recall from Anecdote: Alexis de Tocqueville and the Morphogenesis of America". American Sociological Review, 1970, 35. Pp. 1086–1087. Eberts and Witton view Tocqueville's work as an important basis (more fruitful than Marx's) for systems theory and a macrosociological model of structural change in democratic industrial societies.

2 We borrowed the term “idea-unit” from: R. Nisbet. The Sociological Tradition. - London, 1980.

The idea of ​​community (community) is as central in classical sociology as the ideas of the state of nature, the individual and the social contract in political philosophy (from Hobbes to Kant). The tradition begun by Hobbes used the idea of ​​contract to legitimize or justify existing social relations and political conditions. The treaty was the model for everything that was legal and fair in public life. All social relations that arose as a result of a contract, that is, a voluntary agreement, were legitimate and legal.

In the emerging in the 19th century. In sociology, "contract" as a basic category has been largely replaced by "community." At the same time, community was the model of a good society. According to Tönnies, community encompasses all forms of social relationships that are characterized by a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral responsibility, social cohesion and temporal extension. A typical example of such a community is the family. The connections and relationships that exist between family members are fundamentally different from the relationship, say, between a prostitute and a client or between a modern entrepreneur and an employee. In relationships based on community, emotional connections predominate, preserving love in both joy and sorrow, rather than the impersonal and anonymous relationships characteristic of “society” [cf. relationship between university teacher and student].

In the sociology of Tennis, society (Gesellschaft) is given a typological definition that it is associated with a special type of human relationships, namely relationships that are characterized by a high degree of individualism and impersonal formality. These relationships arise on the basis of a strong-willed decision and personal interest, and not on traditions and emotional ties that form the basis of community. Tennis views community as a lasting and genuine form of shared life, and society as a transitory, accidental and mechanical form of life.

We have already said that the prototype of community is the family. An individual is born into a family. Consanguinity and family ties are the main pillars of community. But the individual is also connected by various friendly relations with his local environment. The many manifestations of community include guilds, various professional and intellectual unions, religious associations, sects, etc. Typical community relationships used to exist between a master and an apprentice, or between the head of a household and members of the household (including servants).

Tennis emphasizes that the moral aspect occupies an important place in the usual understanding of community. A society characterized by communal relations often amazes us with the “cordiality,” “friendliness,” and “hospitality” of its members. These patriarchal (premodern) features appear especially clearly against the backdrop of widespread corruption, nepotism and significant legal and managerial shortcomings in our society. The distinction between society and community is expressed in ordinary usage. We say of a person that “he found himself in a bad society (Gesellschaft),” but we do not use the expression “he found himself in a bad society (Gemeinschqft).” (However, aren’t there criminal groups whose relationships between members are marked by “closeness” and “cordiality”?).

According to Tönnies, gender issues are also reflected in concepts of society and community. Women are traditionally guided by more “good values” than men. Women's emancipation leads to the fact that women find themselves in a “male world” based on relationships typical of society. Through the process of emancipation, women become more “tough,” “enlightened,” “conscious,” and “calculating,” just like men. It is the element of community in women and children that explains, according to Tönnies, the ease with which they were exploited in the early development of industrial society. If women tend to be more communal than men, this may be a major reason why it is generally more difficult for women to be leaders in rational and calculated struggles for higher wages. Perhaps for the same reason, there are far fewer criminals among women than among men?

The conceptual pair community and society is central to Tönnies's understanding of the major social changes that have occurred in recent European history. He emphasizes that European society has evolved from community-based forms of life to community-based forms, chief among which are agreements and treaties. This process created new connections between people. In particular, the basis of power was not the authority of tradition, but force. Competition and egotism (an exaggerated opinion of one’s personality) began to dominate. The core of society turned out to be rationality and economic calculation:

“The theory of society deals with an artificially created aggregate of human beings, which outwardly resembles a community in that individuals live peacefully and coexist with each other. However, in community they remain fundamentally united even in spite of all dividing factors, while in society they are divided in spite of all unifying factors... In society, everyone exists on his own and in isolation. It shows tension on the part of the individual in relation to everyone else. In society, the spheres of activity and power of individuals are sharply demarcated in such a way that each denies the other contact with and access to his sphere, that is, intrusion into it is regarded as a hostile act. Such a negative attitude towards the other becomes the norm and always underlies the relationship between individuals with power. It characterizes a society in a state of peace. In it, no one wants to transfer or produce anything for another individual, no one is inclined to be generous towards another, unless in exchange for a gift or labor he receives what he considers at least equal to what he gave.

Perhaps some will interpret this statement as a completely negative characteristic of modern tennis society. Did he see anything positive in society at all? Tennis was by no means reactionary and always emphasized that without society it would be impossible to imagine the emergence of modern liberality and culture. In the same way, the city and urban life are connected precisely with society. Along with the city, science is “followed” by trade, industry and everything that is meant by modern Western civilization. If we do experience nostalgic feelings in connection with the loss of community, then this is the nostalgia that permeates the “idea blocks”, or basic concepts of classical sociology. This nostalgia expresses a problem that still characterizes modern social life. According to Tennis, social life, of which society is the form, reached its peak in the distant past. As we move into modernity, the need for forms of life based on community relations increases. Thus, we can conclude that already in the 80s of the 19th century, attempts were made to include community relations and a kind of “security mechanisms” (social policy, “welfare state”, etc.) in society. The inherent focus of our time on personal life, local social environment, “tolerant” values ​​and decentralization demonstrates the relevance and importance of the problems posed by Tönnies.

We have tried to reveal how the conceptual pair community and society characterizes different types of social connections and how these types can be correlated with two different phases of European history. Apparently, it is more correct to consider community and society as two extreme states that have never existed in empirical-social reality in their pure form. In general, modern society is closer to the concept of society than community. Note that these concepts are ideal types, which will be described in more detail below when characterizing Weber’s views.

The conceptual pair introduced by Tönnies plays an important role in sociology. The American sociologist Charles H. Cooley (1864–1929) addressed it in his works. He distinguished between primary and secondary social groups. Primary groups are characterized by direct psychological contact and personal - “face to face” - relationships. They are primary in the sense that it is in them that the formation of the social nature of the individual and his ideals occurs. The most important primary groups are the family, the neighborhood community and adolescent groups. They form in various ways an individual’s “we-sense of self,” that is, his sense of identity with a particular group. Organizations and political parties are examples of secondary groups. While in primary groups the frequency and duration of direct contacts is high, and connections are emotional, personal in nature, in secondary groups contacts are arbitrary, formal and impersonal. The means of communication in primary groups are speech, imitation and gestures, and in secondary groups they are most often letters, circulars and telephone conversations.

The conceptual pair in question also figures prominently in criminologist Nils Christie's distinction between “tightly coupled” and “loosely coupled” societies [See N. Christie. Beyond Loneliness and Institutions: Communes for Extraordinary People. - Oslo, 1989].

In what follows we will look at how Weber and Parsons developed the conceptual pairings proposed by Tönnies.

Georg Simmel (1858–1918), a German with Jewish roots, is the greatest essayist among the classics of sociology. Among his most important works are On Social Differentiation (Uber die soziale Differenzierung, 1890), Philosophy of Money (Philosophic des Geldes, 1900) and Sociology (Soziologie, 1908). In addition, he wrote several essays and books on philosophy, art, and cultural issues (Large cities and spiritual life, Die GroBstadte und das Geistesleben, 1902, The Concept and Tragedy of Culture, Der Begriffund die Tragodie der Kultur, Society of Two, Die Gesellschaft zu zweien , 1908, etc.).

Simmel viewed social life through the prism of social interaction (Wechselswirkung). According to Simmel, sociology is the science of interactions between individuals. Therefore, it implements relational thinking, that is, thinking in terms of relationships. The focus of sociology is on the forms of socialization of the individual. Social interaction can, so to speak, be “frozen” in objective supra-individual structures. They can be unifying symbols, timeless norms, etc. But they also appear as specific forms (an economy based on money circulation, cooperation, competition, etc.). For Simmel, interaction is “life as a process.” This implies that, in a broad sense, social reality is an open process. Simmel rejects the understanding of society as a more or less closed system (cf. his objections to thinking about society in systemic terms). At the same time, social life, understood as social interaction, excludes all monocausal theories of history and society (that is, theories that assume the existence of a single cause).

For Simmel, sociology is in many ways like a kind of social microscope. In a series of essays and large articles, he explains the interaction both between two individuals (Society of Two) and between a “stranger” (Fremden) and a larger social group. In the essay Man as Enemy (Der Mensch als Feind, 1908), Simmel tries to show that conflict between groups can unite group members in their struggle against a common enemy [cf. with a pair of sociological concepts “we-group” (in-group) and “they-group” (out-group)]. However, interactions between conflicting groups can also bring them closer together. In general, for Simmel, society is a “fabric” woven from innumerable interactions.

In his work Large Cities and Spiritual Life, Simmel shows that the modern city gives rise to both new forms of interaction and new people. He gives the following qualitative characteristic of modernity. In a big city we are under a barrage of impressions. The “nervous life” of each individual intensifies. We become hypersensitive. The intensity of life is so great that we are unable to cope with it and are forced to maintain a distance between us and the physical and social environment around us. To protect ourselves from an increasing number of impressions, we are forced to isolate ourselves from reality. As an understandable reaction to hypersensitivity, the modern blasiert attitude towards others arises. In order to survive, we become closed, experience antipathy towards our environment and distance ourselves from it. At the same time, we either stop reacting or react inadequately. Ultimately, hypersensitivity places us in a vacuum. The neurotic, according to Simmel, suffers both because he is too close to things and because he is too far from them.

Simmel begins not with macrosociological concepts, but with the changing “fragments” of social reality. According to Simmel, modernity has acquired a dynamic form of expression. The whole consists of small unstable fragments, and Simmel finds its “traces” in the little things of life. By examining these fragments, he also tries to identify the universal. For him, society is a labyrinth in which individuals and groups interact. To understand this interaction, sociology must examine the micro level. She needs to start with the simplest forms of interaction. At the same time, the search for invisible threads that connect individuals is a condition for understanding a social network. One can make sense of this labyrinth by collecting snapshots, fragments and private impressions, rather than by using systemic concepts. For example, a coin is a symbol of modern social relations, endless interaction. Understanding the coin as a fragment may be the key to social reality.

Often it was Simmel's ideas that were the source of inspiration for the developing sociology of the 20th century. Many sociologists, including Weber, relied on them. In his large monograph, The Philosophy of Money, Simmel describes the process of the expanding dissemination in modern life of thinking in terms of “means to ends.” Instrumental-target rationality displaces all other forms of rationality. Reason takes over and suppresses feelings [cf. with the concept of “emotional neutrality” in Parsons]. In this book, Simmel also developed an original theory of alienation, which later took a central place in the views of the Hungarian philosopher Lukacs (Gyorgy Lukacs, 1885–1971) and representatives of the so-called critical theory (Frankfurt School). Simmel analyzes both the continuous growth of “objective spirit” (in the Hegelian sense) and the way in which cultural objects render us increasingly powerless. The things we create become our masters (the process of reification). How many industrial workers, asks Simmel, are able to understand the principles of the functioning of the machines on which they work, that is, to understand, so to speak, the spirit materialized in the machines? Thus the spirit and its results become alien to man.

Simmel devotes very little attention to the discussion of sociological method. In his research he used a non-systematic or even anti-systematic approach. His works, at least at first glance, are surprising in their fragmentation. His sociology is largely "essayistic" and free of references and footnotes. Simmel's best known works are collections of essays rather than systematic studies. They are independent fragments of what Simmel considered as a science of society. The essay is a literary genre that corresponds to Simmel's desire to express his understanding of society in an anti-positivist, anti-academic and anti-systematic form. In his manner of presentation we will not find the use of a causal-analytical “method”. It is also important to understand that Simmel does not try to test his hypotheses experimentally. Nor does he use the hypothetico-deductive method. The essay form does not obey the rules of the game of systematic science. In many ways, Simmel's essays are a kind of “sociological poem”. Therefore, his sociological method of presentation has a “style” that is difficult to reproduce. His style evokes associations with the work of an artist and with philosophy as poetry (we observe the same phenomenon, for example, in Nietzsche, the late Heidegger and Adorno). This indicates that Simmel was trying to protect an intellectual whose creativity he felt was in danger. But at the same time, this “style” makes it difficult to translate the content of his works into modern sociological language. Simmel's essays lose something essential when they are presented in the form of an impersonal scientific report.

Lukács said that Simmel is in many ways an impressionistic social scientist. Just as the Impressionist artists placed less emphasis on the content of their paintings and more emphasis on the mode of representation, so Simmel developed a number of different themes in which point of view is more important than individual details. Among these topics were Japanese vases, Michelangelo, the poetry of Rilke, Nietzsche, Kant, loneliness and the “society of two” (Zweisamkeit), monetary economics and city life. Lukács said that Simmel was an “impressionist philosopher” and developed a conceptual formulation of the impressionist vision of the world.

Simmel managed to express with great insight the essence of many social relations and processes. He described everyday experience from a new, impressionistic point of view. Therefore, we should not be surprised that he teaches us to look at many things differently. His essays help us better understand how the social fabric is woven. By reading them, we develop the ability to follow the threads in the social maze. In many ways, Simmel became the “breaker of new roads” in sociology for those seeking a way through the fragmented terrain of modern life. However, the “fluid” picture of social life it provides also affects its inherent form of presentation. As a result, his arguments are often hypothetical and unconvincing. There is hardly a sociologist or philosopher who uses the word “perhaps” as often as Simmel. Therefore, it is not without reason that the German philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885–1977) called him “the thinker of the subjunctive style” (ein Vielleichtdenker).

Life. Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) was born in the city of Epinal in the region of France bordering Germany. Although his father was a rabbi, Durkheim took a rather agnostic position in relation to religion. He studied philosophy and political theory in Paris, taught pedagogy and social science at the University of Bordeaux, and later was a professor in Paris, first in pedagogy and then in sociology.

Durkheim was hardworking, serious and observant. He set his task to create a new science of society, sociology. He also took part in politics. Durkheim defended Alfred Dreyfus (1859–1935) and took part in the struggle against German militarism during the First World War.

Proceedings. Among his works we mention the following: On the division of social labor (De la division du travail social, 1893), The method of sociology (Les Regies de la methode sociologique, 1895), Suicide (Le Suicide, 1897), Elementary forms of religious life (Les Formes elementaires de la vie religieuse, 1912).

Durkheim's main idea is that society is based on the solidarity of people. A society becomes sick when social solidarity weakens. Therefore, it is necessary to find the right therapy to restore this vital solidarity.

Sociology, according to Durkheim, is the science of this solidarity, its foundations, causes of weakening and ways of strengthening.

Durkheim believed that contemporary France was a society with weakened solidarity, that is, a sick society.

He rejected the idea that sociology should use the same social concepts that members of society use to understand their own social interactions (see Winch, Chapter 29). According to Durkheim, sociology must find other and better concepts. He illustrates this point with the concept of suicide. Starting from everyday language and everyday life, Durkheim tries to develop a concept of suicide that could be processed statistically, establishing a connection between the frequency of suicides and various social conditions, that is, conditions of a non-psychological nature. By abstracting from the various emotional and individual aspects of suicide - what people feel and think about suicide - Durkheim, as a sociologist, distances himself from psychology. He tries to find statistical changes in the rate of suicide depending on gender, age, marital status, religion, nationality, social class, etc. The statistical data collected forms the basis for Durkheim's theoretical work as a sociologist. (He doesn't stop at statistics, though.) Based on them, Durkheim formulates a theory of society, that is, a theory of social solidarity. According to this theory, a high suicide rate is an indicator of a weakened sense of solidarity.

Durkheim's method is sometimes called positivist. However, this word is so ambiguous that every time it is used it is necessary to explain what is meant by it. Durkheim is not a positivist in the sense of logical positivism. He is a positivist in the sense that he is interested in what is given (given = "positive") and wants to understand how society functions when it functions. He does not try to carry out radical changes (“to deny”, cf. Hegel, Marx, Sartre: critical, changing = “negating”). In order to find a cure for unhealthy social disintegration, that is, to provide a cure, Durkheim wants to understand things as they are. (Note that he largely viewed contemporary social changes as leading to a weakening of society.)

Arguing that a sociologist must consider social phenomena as things, Durkheim tries, with the help of refined everyday concepts, to collect statistical material that can later be theoretically processed. This approach represents a break with the tradition of social research that is entirely based on understanding. But the naturalistic reduction, according to which social phenomena, so to speak, have the same ontological status as natural objects, is not a necessary part of such a statistical theoretical approach.

Based on statistical material on suicide, Durkheim believed that he was able to explain social solidarity and indicate the reasons for its weakening. He calls this weakening of social solidarity anomie (Greek a-nomi, absence of law, norm), that is, “no norm.” In short, a state of anomie is a state in which the bonds that bind people together are weakened. In a state of anomie, individuals become less resistant to hardships and difficulties, which leads to an increase in the frequency of suicide.

Durkheim believed that it was statistically sound to say that anomie is less (the stronger the social solidarity, the less suicide) among the married than among the unmarried; among married couples with children than among childless couples; among Catholics than among Protestants; among people from small communities than among people from large cities, etc. Marriage, family and religion (as a social form of life), especially Catholicism, are thus strengthening factors for society.

The economy, according to Durkheim, is just one and not a decisive institution that interacts with others. In this he differs from Marx, who gave primacy to economics.

Durkheim did not believe that in order to humanize society, the division of labor should be abolished. On the contrary, a comprehensive division of labor would make it possible for society to become harmonious again in the future. With an undeveloped division of labor, equality reigns among people, but their individuality is in its infancy. What prevails here, in Durkheim’s words, is “mechanical solidarity.” As the division of labor deepens, individuals become more dependent on each other, leading to the emergence of “organic solidarity.” Each depends on the other, like parts of one organism. This deepening division of labor leads to both specialization and individualization.

According to Durkheim, a society based on the division of labor can be either healthy or sick. The state of society is determined by whether the economy functions according to norms or not. If not, then anomie arises (for example, an intensification of class struggle). Durkheim is not looking back, not to a society without division of labor, but forward, to a harmonious society based on the division of labor.

The strengthening of the norms of socio-economic life necessary to eliminate anomie cannot be achieved through mere moralizing or the exercise of state power alone. The state must have institutions for harmonious economic management - corporations. Durkheim substantiates the idea of ​​a corporate state in which the economy is skillfully and skillfully managed by cooperative organizations. But this state differs from fascist corporatism because corporations are assumed to have a certain political autonomy.

Durkheim (like Hegel) offers a kind of “social democratic” solution. He opposes the uncontrolled expansionism of pure liberalism and Marx's theory of radical change. Durkheim's therapy is largely directed against what liberalism, socialism and Marxism have in common, that is, against the common political inheritance of the Enlightenment, namely the ideas of development, liberation and progress. Some theorists place extremely strong emphasis on these ideas. But Durkheim interprets them as components of a dangerous tendency towards social decline. Society must be stable, although not static. Durkheim questions concepts such as development and progress. If these concepts are applied to all types of change, they may in fact represent only a beautiful redescription of destructive anomie. For example, according to Durkheim, we should not “liberate” ourselves from everything, but try to achieve social solidarity, which is a prerequisite for our social security and happiness.

However, it is debatable whether Durkheim succeeded in reconciling hierarchy and harmony.

Currently, it is customary to distinguish between two types of social theories. Some consider conflict as the basis, others - harmony. In this sense, Durkheim is undoubtedly a theorist of harmony, and Marx, in relation to class society, is a theorist of conflict.

Historically, the roots of Durkheim's teachings go back to pre-Renaissance political theory - in particular, to the political theories of Plato and Aristotle, which emphasized the importance of social cohesion and stability. Nowadays, his teaching seems to be of interest also from an environmental aspect. It is a kind of contribution to the possible sociology of a society in a state of ecological equilibrium.

Considering the relationship between the individual and the community, Durkheim gives a certain priority to community and solidarity. Individuals must adapt to the norms and rules that are necessary in a well-functioning society. The alternative to this, in principle, is anarchy (anomie), which ultimately does not benefit the individual.

However, the following question remains open. Can values ​​such as individuality and liberality be guaranteed in a functioning society through, in Hegel's words, the dialectical mediation of the unique and the universal? The problems of this mediation of the individual and the social are difficult to solve both theoretically and practically. By the way, this is also true for Hegel’s own approach. But some scholars still believe that Durkheim did not pay enough attention to this issue.

Max Weber (1864–1920), one of the classics of sociology who had the greatest influence on its problems, models, basic concepts and structure. Let us first consider his philosophy of science and his view of “ideal types.”

According to Weber, there is a fundamental difference between facts and values, that is, between what is and what ought to be. As scientists we can only talk about facts, not about values. Of course, we can explore what values ​​people actually recognize. This is an empirical question. Weber is not saying that we cannot (or should not) take certain political and moral positions regarding values. But this is our position as citizens, not scientists. Consequently, we should not confuse these two spheres - for example, conduct political propaganda in lectures under the guise of presenting a scientific point of view. Science can, of course, tell us something about what means are suitable for achieving a particular end. It can also tell us something about the “cost” of achieving this goal. But once such information is provided, the actor must personally make a choice. This is the essence of Weber's thesis about the value freedom (die Wertfreiheit) of science. Science as a science can only assert something about what is, but not about what should be. In science we are looking for a truth that is universally valid for everyone: “It is correct and will always remain so that methodically correct scientific argumentation in the field of social sciences, if it wants to achieve its goal, must be recognized as correct by the Chinese” [M. Weber. “Objectivity” of socio-scientific and socio-political knowledge. Translation by M. Levin. - In the book. M. Weber. Selected works. - M., 1990. - P. 354.].

Weber's concept of value freedom does not mean that values ​​play no role in science. According to Weber, all knowledge about culture and society is determined by value concepts. There are always some basic "viewpoints" and "perspectives" that determine which topics become the object of scientific research. Agreeing with the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), Weber characterizes such normative perspectives as value-based. Like Rickert, Weber distinguishes between the cultural sciences, based on understanding, and the natural sciences, based on explanation. The cultural sciences are characterized by the fact that they shape the objects of historical research in accordance with “cultural values.” But on one important point Weber disagrees with Rickert. The latter argued that there are objective cultural values. Weber's position is quite close to that of Nietzsche, who believed that there is a variety of subjective value points of view. Thanks to this diversity, the researcher is quite free to choose a research topic. So, the second premise of Weber's philosophy of science is the idea of ​​pluralism of values.

Weber argued that at first the world and life appear before the individual as an infinite variety, almost chaos, of events and actions. Anyone who wanted to describe the world “without value premises” would end up with an endless number of observations and judgments, a chaotic jumble of important and unimportant facts. (At this point, Weber's position has much in common with Popper's criticism of primitive fact-gathering.) We structure the chaos around us in such a way that only part of reality becomes meaningful to us. A specific subject of study, for example, the “French Revolution,” is significant for us only because it stands in a certain relation to the cultural values ​​from the perspective of which we look at the world. It is in the light of such cultural values ​​that we distinguish the essential from the non-essential as we see them. This is what makes phenomena relevant and gives them meaning. So, value concepts are quasi-transcendental prerequisites for the sciences of culture and society.

Weber recognized that the value concepts that ultimately define the relevant problems studied by scientists and the scientific community can change. Therefore, changes in the social sciences may be the result of profound shifts in the self-understanding of a given era and its views on value concepts. Weber describes such changes in almost the same words that we later find in Kuhn's characterization of scientific revolutions [see Ch. 29]. “Value concepts” are similar to Kuhn’s rather broad concept of “paradigm.” However, unlike Kuhn, Weber places greater emphasis on cultural changes outside the social sciences that influence the choice of problems within these sciences. Therefore, the main thing for him is changes in the value concepts of the era or the researcher.

“However, a moment will come when the colors will change: there will be uncertainty about the meaning of the unconsciously applied points of view, the path will be lost in the twilight. The light that illuminated important cultural problems will dissipate into the distance. Then science will change its position and its conceptual apparatus in order to look at the flow of events from the heights of human thought. She will follow those constellations that alone can give her work meaning and guide it along the proper path” [M. Weber. Selected works. - M., 1990. - P. 414.].

Following Dilthey and the German intellectual tradition (see Chapter 19), Weber argues that the social sciences must use the “method of understanding” (Verstehen). It is no coincidence that his main sociological work, Economy and Society (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1921), has the subtitle Essay on Understanding Sociology (GrundriR einer verstehenden Soziologie). Sociology should not limit itself to finding general rules that govern social actions. It must also try to understand the subjective intentions and motives of the actor. In the next stage, such subjective intentions and goals can be considered as causes of social action and can serve as the basis for sociological causal explanation. This corresponds to Weber's definition of sociology.

“Sociology (in the sense of this very ambiguous word that is meant here) is a science that seeks, through interpretation, to understand social action and thereby causally explain its process and impact” [M. Weber. Basic sociological concepts. Translation by MLevin. - In the book. M. Weber. Selected works. - M., 1990. - P. 602.].

Let us pay attention to two aspects of this definition. His starting point is the so-called "methodological individualism", which entails Weber's skepticism towards collective concepts in sociology. If concepts such as the spirit of the times and the character of the people cannot be traced to the level of social action, then they claim more than they can (“bite off more than they can chew”). However, if sociology limits itself only to the understanding inherent in the acting agent, then it will “bite off too little.” Weber's definition also contains an implicit distinction between action and event. Sociology is concerned with motivated actions, while natural science is concerned with unmotivated events (for example, planetary movements). The meaningful nature of human action has no analogue in nature. But this does not exclude the possibility of predictions in sociology. Action has a specific property that makes it more calculable than a natural process, namely, it has an understandable motive. Therefore, an action is less “irrational” than an event.

So, Weber emphasizes that “understanding” (Verstehen) does not exclude “explanation” (Erklaren). The hermeneutic method, understanding, is complementary to the method of causal explanation. Intuitive empathic penetration into the “horizon” of other people is not enough. The understanding interpretation of motive and purpose must be complemented and controlled by a causal explanation. Statistical statements that describe the process of human action (for example, the frequency of suicide) can, according to Weber, only receive a sufficient explanation when the meaning of the action is clarified. Therefore, social science must develop by clarifying the subjective horizon of the agent and his intentions.

We said that research topics are constituted with the help of value concepts and that science must be value-free. Weber sees no contradiction in this. Yes, it is through values ​​that something becomes a relevant topic of inquiry. But what we, as scientists, claim about this topic must be said without the aid of value judgments [The struggle for “value neutrality” is in fact a struggle for the place of “value judgments” in science (Werturteilsstreit).]. Here “ideal types” play a central role.

"Ideal types" can be interpreted as basic scientific concepts. Together they form, in a sense, a “model” of reality. For Weber, who mainly adhered to a nominalist position, ideal-typical concepts (for example, “economic man”) do not represent characteristics of reality. According to Rickert and the neo-Kantians, the ideal type is conceived only as a formal “tool” that is used to organize the meaningless diversity of reality. It highlights specific aspects of the subject of study and has no normative significance. (Ideal types have nothing to do with “ideals” in the normative sense.) For example, the “charismatic kingdom” ideal type describes a type of kingdom that will never be found in its pure form in any society. The same applies to such ideal-typical constructions as “Renaissance”, “Protestant ethics”, “spirit of capitalism”, “purposeful rational action”, etc.

Weber's view of ideal types can be understood in light of Kant's concept of categories. Just as Kant's categories are the conditions of any possible knowledge of reality, Weber's sociological ideal types act as a kind of networks that are supposed to capture something in the infinite variety of reality. However, in contrast to Kant's categories, ideal types are not eternal and unchangeable. They are designed by the researcher and can be redesigned. However, they must be logically consistent and “adequate” to the existing state of affairs [Here Weber faces a serious epistemological problem. We have already seen that for him empirical reality has an almost amorphous character (in this he follows Nietzsche and partly the neo-Kantians). Therefore, the difficulty is how to determine whether ideal-typical concepts are adequate or not to the empirical state of affairs. Weber seems to lack any mediating forms between the nominalistic sphere of ideal types (Weber adheres to the nominalistic theory of concepts) and the “unthought infinity” of the empirical world. As Nietzsche says, if reality is recognized from the very beginning as a “meaningless variety,” then don’t concepts and conceptual knowledge necessarily turn out to be “counterfeits” of reality? Weber, one might say, does not recognize that social reality is “almost always” interpreted and comprehended by social agents before the researcher begins to study it.].

Weber builds his sociology on four “pure” types of action (ideal types). 1) An action can be rationally oriented in relation to a given goal (target-rational action). 2) Action can be rationally oriented in relation to some absolute value (value-rational action). 3) An action can be caused by certain passions or emotional states of the agent (affective or emotional action). 4) Action can be determined by traditions and deeply rooted habits (traditional action).

Actions of the first two types are rational. The term "rational" here refers to certain criteria that are not met by the latter two types of action. Namely, the first two types are rational in the sense that they are aimed at achieving a consciously and unambiguously formulated goal and use means based on available knowledge that will lead to the realization of this goal.

Target rationality can be characterized as instrumental-target rationality (the use of means to achieve a goal). An example of purposeful action is the design and creation by Wernher von Braun (1912–1977) of the rockets that the Nazis used to destroy London and other major cities during the Second World War. Another example of goal-oriented action is a successful strategy for treating a disease.

The second type of action is rational in the sense that it is determined by the ethical or religious beliefs of the acting agent that the form of action has absolute significance regardless of the outcome. A captain who dies along with his ship for reasons of “sea honor” or “duty” acts in accordance with value rationality. Actions that are based on an “ethic of moral duty” will in most cases be value-rational. Specific examples show that an action that is value-rational for one agent may be “irrational” for another. Note that here “rationality” is defined in terms of the acting agent's goals, values, and knowledge, rather than in terms of what the social scientist regards as the relevant goals, values, and knowledge.

Weber does not characterize actions of the third type as rational. They are a direct consequence of the emotional state of the acting agent. The neurotic type of actions, understood as an uncontrolled reaction to an unusual stimulus, can be called affective. Actions of this type are on the border between meaningful actions and meaningless behavior.

The fourth type of action covers everything that we do almost "unconsciously", due to customs and habits (or norms) of which we are not aware. This type of action also represents behavior that often goes beyond the boundaries of so-called “meaningful” action. (Our traditional actions approach value-oriented actions if we are aware of their connections with what is “deeply rooted” in us. When we consciously behave in a traditional way, then our actions are value-rational.)

For Weber, meaning is closely intertwined with rationality. Meaningful actions are associated with goal and value rationality. Traditional and affective actions are considered fanatic cases. The extreme manifestations include cases of meaningless behavior of the stimulus-response type. The other extreme is rational, free and meaningful actions. Let us note that Weber’s concept of “understanding sociology” is based on the idea of ​​“rational action.”

These four types of action make it possible to more precisely define what “rationalization” and “modernization” mean in the development of European culture. According to Weber, the specifically Western “process of rationalization” can be described as a development that leads to an increase in the number of areas of activity characterized by purposive rational actions. Actions within such areas as economics, law and management are close to the ideal type of “purposeful rational action”. If we consider goal rationality as a basic cultural value, then, therefore, we can talk about “progress” within each of these areas, that is, about its “rationalization” and “modernization” in the direction of increasing the degree of goal rationality. If, on the other hand, we regard the so-called religious “ethic of brotherhood” as a fundamental cultural value, we must, perhaps reluctantly, realize that due to the secularization of the world, the ethic of brotherhood is gradually losing its significance in an ever-increasing number of areas of action. These kinds of problems are central to Weber's diagnosis of modernity.

Weber's theory of action also throws light on phenomena like bureaucratization. Modern social life is accompanied by an increase in bureaucratization. The reason for this is the need of business and society as a whole for better calculations and planning. Science becomes part of the administrative system and thus permeates society as a whole. This process imparts a greater degree of purposive rationality to actions. Accordingly, the degree of calculated safety increases and the number of losses decreases compared to behavior consisting of random and unpredictable actions. Consequently, society simultaneously experiences bureaucratization, scientization, and an increasing degree of rationalization.

For Weber, such development combines both alienation and increasing rationality. He does not believe in qualitative changes in this area. The increase in democratization is accompanied by a simultaneous increase in bureaucratization. Here we see a clear divergence between Weber and Marx. Weber cannot imagine decisive changes in the structure of society. He argues that socialism will not lead to qualitative improvement, and the abolition of the market economy would mean a fairly strong strengthening of bureaucratization.

Weber develops three ideal types to describe the legitimation of state power: traditional, charismatic and legal. During the process of bureaucratization, the legitimation of the state also changes and, conversely, changes in the forms of legitimation lead to bureaucratization. In relatively static and traditional societies, the power of the state is never questioned. State power is based on tradition. But with the weakening of tradition (as a result of scientization and modernization), this type of power is also weakened. Weber calls an alternative type of legitimation (as an ideal type) charisma. Charismatic power is legitimized on the basis of emotional connections between the subjects and the ruler as an individual (see affective action). Such leaders are obeyed because of their personal qualities and not on the basis of law or tradition. “You have heard what was said to the ancients... But I will speak to you...” [Matt. 5:21–22]. On the contrary, in modern society it is bureaucratic rationalization that legitimizes state power. What happens is rational and fair. The actions of the state are rational and transparent. For example, a judicial verdict is not made on the basis of an arbitrary, unpredictable whim, but is based on unchanging, universal norms. Thus, Weber talks about the source of law (legal authority). As society distances itself from this ideal type and moves closer to charismatic authority, we can come up with some interesting social-scientific hypotheses. In this sense, we seem to “measure” reality using the ideal type.

The issue of legitimation of state power is also important because Weber views the state as an institution that can legitimately use physical violence. In other words, his concept of the state embraces the means that a modern state de facto possesses, rather than the tasks or functions it should or should not have (such as "the suppression of the people" or "being a cooperative administrative body for all members of society" ).

The four types of action and three forms of legitimation are Weber's generalized ideal types. They can, in principle, be used in the analysis of all social forms, regardless of time and place. Generalized ideal types can be said to be constructed as a bridge between the nomothetic and idiographic sciences (that is, the sciences that work with universal laws and the sciences that describe individual, unique facts). Other ideal types can be adapted to unique historical phenomena (what Rickert called “historical individuals”) - for example, to the “Protestant ethic”, “Renaissance”, etc. For the sake of simplicity, we can distinguish between general sociological ideals types and individualizing historical ideal types (see below).

Rationality and rationalization are common themes in Weber's historical sociological studies. Drawing on extensive empirical research, he attempts to explain the development of a special kind of rationality in the West. The central problem is formulated by him as follows:

“Modern man, a child of European culture, inevitably and with good reason considers universal historical problems from a very definite point of view. He is primarily interested in the following question: what combination of circumstances led to the fact that it was in the West, and only here, that such cultural phenomena arose that developed - at least as we tend to assume - in a direction that acquired universal significance" [M. Weber . Preliminary remarks. Translation by MLevin. - In the book. M. Weber. Selected works. - M., 1990. - P. 44. Preliminary remarks apply to the entire volume of the publication: M.Weber. Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie. Vol. 1. Tubingen, 1920. This "preface" is in many ways the key to Weber's sociology.]

So, Weber is looking for characteristic social and cultural characteristics of the West in comparison with other civilizations. Only in the West, he notes, did science emerge, which is assessed today as universally significant for all people. Empirical knowledge and philosophical and theological wisdom existed in other cultures, especially India, China, Persia and Egypt. But there the acquired knowledge was devoid of a mathematical basis, rational “proofs”, “experiments” and scientific concepts.

We see something similar in art. All peoples have a musical culture, but only in the West there is rational harmonic music (counterpoint and chord-harmonic texture), orchestras and musical notation. During the European Renaissance, rationalization within the fine arts was associated with the introduction of linear and aerial perspective.

Only in the West can one find the “state” as a political institution with a rationally designed and formal “constitution” and rational and formal laws. Only in the Western cultural circle do we find systematically trained (well-trained) experts and high-ranking specialist officials.

The same applies to what Weber calls “the most powerful factor in our modern life,” namely capitalism. The desire for economic gain is known to all eras and all nations of the world. Robbers, gamblers and beggars are obsessed with the passion for money. But neither this desire nor this passion is identical to capitalism. Only in the West did a rational capitalist economic system emerge, based on (formally) free wage labor. Modern Western capitalism depends on the calculability of decisive economic factors. Ultimately, it was made possible by rationally based science. Modern capitalism also requires a legal system and government bureaucracy that create a predictable field of activity based on law and justice. In general, only the West was able to offer such conditions for business activity.

Why did such processes of rationalization not develop outside the West? Or more specifically: why did modern capitalism originate in Europe?

Like Marx, Weber argued that capitalism is a special and fundamental phenomenon of Western social life. But he does not share Marx's idea that the bourgeoisie will lose the class struggle and that capitalism will be replaced by a qualitatively new mode of production (socialism). Half-jokingly, Weber calls himself a “class-conscious bourgeois.” According to Weber, the “bourgeois” personifies a unique type of action, purposive-rational action, which will permeate all societies for the foreseeable future. Then the decisive question arises. Why is this type of action particularly prevalent in the Western part of the world?

We have seen that Weber points to several external conditions for the emergence of capitalism in the West (science, jurisprudence, etc.). But he is also interested in what we might call “internal causes.” These are the reasons that are associated with a person’s ability to develop and his predisposition to certain forms of a “practical-rational lifestyle.” Weber emphasizes, not very different in this respect from Freud, that when such a way of life is opposed by psychological prohibitions, the development of rational capitalist business activity faces strong internal opposition [M. Weber. Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. Translation by M. Levin. In the book. M. Weber. Selected works. - M., 1990. - P. 61–70.]. Similar problems accompany industrialization processes in all countries. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Die protestanische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1904), Weber attempts to understand what specific factors during and after the Reformation broke down these prohibitions and made the emergence of modern society possible.

When answering the question: what psychological prohibitions block the bourgeois way of life? - the types of actions introduced by Weber are useful. Certain ethical and religious values, affective attitudes and deeply rooted habits “prohibit” a modern, practical-rational way of life (target rationality). Weber says that the ethics of each era are built into certain patterns of action and can function as an internal obstacle to the emergence of an economically rational way of life. (From Freud's theory we know that the ethics of a certain culture or era in a sense controls a person from within, through the superego).

The radical change in ethical ideas about duty, as a consequence of the theological and ethical transformations during the Reformation, breaks down these prohibitions and makes possible an ethics that legitimizes a new rational way of life. According to Weber, the Protestant ethic, for theological reasons, justifies a previously unknown work ethic and a new rational attitude to life. Moreover, such ethics and rational attitudes are even considered, for religious reasons, to be morally obligatory. This is what made the spirit of capitalism possible. According to Weber, the decisive factors here are the practical psychological consequences of the theological doctrines of the Reformation. Since systematic work acquired religious significance for Protestants and Calvinists, it became a “calling” for them. As a result, the prohibitions that previously in traditional society constrained a person’s efforts to find profit were destroyed. An individual's economic success began to be interpreted as a sign of his belonging to the “chosen few.” A negative attitude towards “flesh” and all “feelings” limited consumption and led to the accumulation of capital. Thus Protestantism created what Weber calls “worldly asceticism” (innerweltliche Askese). Worldly asceticism gives rise to a new personality structure. We have an internal rationalization of the personality, which orients it towards work and systematic self-control. At the next stage, internal rationalization is supported by external rationalization of economic life.

During this process, the acting agents are not necessarily aware that they are laying the internal or intellectual foundation of the bourgeois way of life and, therefore, of modern capitalism. Weber does not argue that Luther and Calvin's intention was to create the intellectual conditions for the emergence of capitalism. Capitalist ethics did not develop for this purpose either. Weber says that the emergence of capitalism in the West was an unintended result of the ethico-religious modus operandi developed in the Protestant sects. The bourgeois way of life and the capitalist spirit arise, as it were, behind the back of the acting agent.

Weber's theory has been the focus of intense debate throughout the twentieth century. Many saw it as the main alternative to the Marxist concept of the connection between the base (economics) and the superstructure (ideology and religion). In this context, it is important to recognize what Weber does not say. He does not argue that the Protestant ethic is a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of capitalism, but he refutes “monocausal models of explanation” and emphasizes that there were many reasons for the emergence of Western capitalism. Thus, the “Protestant ethic” is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the emergence of capitalism.

Like Nietzsche, Weber breaks with the Enlightenment belief in progress in many ways. Weber's concept of modernity and the future is influenced by Nietzsche's pessimistic diagnosis. The rationalization of business activity led to amazing economic growth, but also created what Weber calls the “iron cage” (“steel shell”) of capitalism, which, with mechanistic machine force, irresistibly sets the framework of our lives [M. Weber. Selected works. - M, 1990. - P. 206.]. All the “postulates of brotherhood” inevitably collapse in the “lifeless rationality” of the economic world. The development of modern science provides us with a fantastic understanding of natural processes, which, however, leads to the final “demystification of the world” (Entzauberung der Welt - disenchantment of the world). As science frees the world from religious-metaphysical “content,” our existential need for meaning increases. But she, Weber emphasizes, cannot be satisfied with science:

“The fate of a cultural era that has “tasted” the fruit of the tree of knowledge lies in the need to understand that the meaning of the universe is not revealed by research, no matter how perfect it may be, that we ourselves are called upon to create this meaning, that “worldviews” can never be the product of a developing experienced knowledge and, consequently, the highest ideals that most concern us, at all times find their expression only in the struggle with other ideals, as sacred for others as ours are for us" ["Objectivity" of socio-scientific and socio-political knowledge. - P. 352–353].

Scientific rationalization leads to what Weber calls “the loss of meaning and inner need” (Sinnverlust und innere Not). In his diagnosis of modernity, he thus faces problems of “meaninglessness.” In the sphere of values ​​there is a struggle of all against all. The result of this struggle cannot be predetermined by rational arguments and criteria. Like existential philosophers (Sartre and others), Weber argues that we must make choices in this struggle, which, however, can never be rationally justified. This is Weber's so-called decisionism.

According to Weber's own premises, irrational decisionism in the field of ethical and political issues is largely unsatisfactory. As we have seen, Weber emphasizes that certain fundamental values ​​are constitutive of scientific activity as a whole. Truth and general validity are fundamental to any research, regardless of what field the researcher chooses, based on his own or the value concepts inherent in his era. Doesn't this also happen when discussing ethical and political issues? By adhering to some values ​​and rejecting others, do we not assume that what we affirm is true and universally valid? At the very least, as Weber emphasizes, we are bound by “the norms of our thinking.” We will see later that such objections to “decisionism” and “ethical relativism/subjectivism” in the spirit of Weber are put forward by the German philosophers Apel and Habermas.

We have pointed out that Weber assessed the growth of rationality and bureaucratization as a threat to human freedom. He saw the only political alternative to this process in a charismatic “leader democracy” (Fuhrerdemokratie), that is, in a charismatic “leader” who could give the development of society a new direction. (In the light of the history of the 20th century, this thesis evokes unpleasant associations). After the First World War, Weber expressed his pessimism in the following vision of the future:

“It is not the blossoming of summer that awaits us, but first the polar night of icy darkness and severity, no matter which group appears to have won. For where there is nothing, not only the Kaiser, but also the proletarian has lost his right” [M. Weber. Politics as a vocation and profession. Translation by A. Filippov and P. Gaidenko. - In the book. M. Weber. Selected works. - M, 1990. - P. 705.].

Only by having a heroic attitude towards life can a modern person, according to Weber, learn to perceive the world and the prose of life as they really are [M. Weber. Politics as a vocation and profession. Translation by A. Filippov and P. Gaidenko. - In the book. M. Weber. Selected works. - M, 1990. - P. 706].

In moral terms, Weber resembles his contemporary Freud. The center of their dark moral vision is not the new society, but the new individual. This individual does not feel nostalgia for the lost “golden age” and does not hope to find a “millennial kingdom” in the near or distant future. But he has a painfully acquired and honest point of view on the world and is able to stoically perceive the realities of life.

North American Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) is the last major representative of “classical” sociology. Since the late 1930s. he tried to develop a general sociological theory (“conceptual apparatus”) that could be used to describe various social phenomena. In many ways, this complex and multifaceted theory is a “grand synthesis” of classical sociology, Freudianism and modern systems theory. In his later works, Parsons tried to rehabilitate the theory of universal features of social development. The concepts of modernization and differentiation occupy a central place in it.

Already in his first major work, The Structure of Social Action (1937), Parsons argued that such classical sociological thinkers as Durkheim, Weber and Pareto were converging towards a common theoretical position. Parsons tries to formulate this general goal in the form of a voluntarist theory of action. Among other things, the concept of action presupposes that the acting agent must act according to means and ends. At the same time, action acquires direction only on the basis of supra-individual norms and values. Strictly speaking, it is a coherent set of values ​​that makes interaction and society possible. So, in Parsons' sociology the sphere of culture becomes very important. At the same time, his theory of action is voluntarist, since we can talk about action only when the individual is able to freely choose between alternative means and ends (cf. the difference between action and event). This early theory of action was later incorporated into the so-called "structural-functional" approach in sociology.

Parsons' theory of action can be said to be a critique of utilitarianism. The latter does not take into account normative restrictions on the goals that various individuals set for themselves and on the choice of means to achieve them. After all, according to utilitarianism, the main thing is only the efficiency of means. In contrast to utilitarianism, Parsons argues that shared values ​​and norms constrain and coordinate the actions of the individual.

In his fundamental work Towards a General Theory of Action (1951), Parsons seeks to reveal the different types of our attitudes towards the world around us. First, we can relate to objects and people in a rational, cognitive way (cognitive or cognitive attitude). Secondly, we can have an emotional connection with phenomena (cathectic attitude). Thirdly, we can evaluate different options for action to achieve our goal (evaluative attitude). The evaluative approach becomes especially important when we are faced with various alternatives and their consequences.

Parsons's theory of action implies that we are always making choices between different alternatives, which appear to us as a sequence of dichotomies. So, the typical action variable (patterns variable of action), the values ​​​​of which we must choose, has the appearance of a dichotomy. The choice of its meaning is determined by the meaning of the situation in which we find ourselves. Parsons operates with five dichotomies.

[* The name of this pair of value attitudes (orientations) is sometimes translated into Russian as “affectivity - neutrality”. - VC.]

For example, when fulfilling his professional duties, a teacher must choose a normative pattern of behavior that prescribes emotional neutrality. He should not treat the student emotionally. The same applies to professional roles such as judge, psychologist, etc. On the other hand, the role of father or mother involves emotional involvement. In this regard, an interesting question arises: does modernization (rationalization and differentiation) not generate a normative pattern of behavior in which the number of emotionally neutral connections increases (see Tennys’ distinction between community and society)! While most people's work and professional activities are or should be emotionally neutral (see the debate about "sexual harassment" in the workplace), private life becomes the realm of emotional activities (tears, affection, etc.). Usually the family served as a cathartic function. However, nowadays there is a weakening of the emotional function of the family. This may be the reason why a new

a specialized (and expensive) field of “sensitivity-courses” for business people who need to understand their own feelings and the feelings of others.

Should phenomena in the sphere of action be assessed on the basis of some universal rules (cf. the Kantian categorical imperative) or on the basis of more particular situational moments? In modern society, we emphasize the importance of, for example, professional competence, rather than family relationships, ethnic origin, etc. According to Parsons, here we make assessments based on general rules. In this regard, the question arises whether modernization does not lead to an increase in the number of phenomena that are assessed on the basis of universal rather than specific rules (cf. the principle of “equality before the law”)?

There is a choice between caring for yourself and caring for others. Does the normative type of action allow the actor to use the situation for his own purposes or must he think first of all about the collective? A stock speculator, for example, must, according to his role, act in the name of his own interests or the interests of the company. At the same time, the doctor and psychologist must first of all take care of the interests of the patient. Following Durkheim, we could say that self-orientation (ego orientation) first becomes possible with the historical emergence of the “individual” and is characteristic of a society based on “organic solidarity” (Durkheim’s term for differentiation in traditional societies). A collective orientation, or altruism, is from this point of view characteristic of a society based on “mechanical solidarity” (Durkheim's term for differentiation in modern societies). The question again arises as to whether modernization entails the emergence of a normative pattern of behavior that privileges ego-orientation over collective-orientation (cf., for example, the debate about the recent rise of material selfishness and the post-World War II decline of collective solidarity).

This generic action variable is based on American anthropologist Ralph Linton's (1893–1953) distinction between an individual's inherent and self-acquired social characteristics as the basis of his social status. Should we, for example, give priority to characteristics such as gender, age and group membership, or to the personal achievements of the individual? We often believe that the process of modernization leads (or “should” lead) to the fact that realized characteristics should be of paramount importance (“the way should be open to talent”). For example, now many professions are not available exclusively to the aristocracy or a special caste (for example, “military”, “merchant”, etc.). On the other hand, there is now a tendency to place special emphasis on gender (for example, the introduction of “quotas for women”). However, attributing special characteristics to an individual based on their gender can have ambiguous consequences. “She’s just a girl, so...” “Of course, he’s a good guy, but...”

This dichotomy lies in the difference between a one-sided/specific and a multi-sided/diffuse attitude towards a phenomenon. Here, the normative type of action can prescribe either a limitation to one specific aspect of a phenomenon (cf. bureaucratic casuistry), or an expansion of the attitude towards it to a more comprehensive context (cf. pedagogical views on the modern teacher as a protector, friend, adviser, etc.) . At the social level, modernization seems to give rise to increasingly specific relationships. But there is another tendency, expressed in the requirement that the bureaucrat take into account “personal factors and circumstances” and study the case from all sides. Of course, "diffusion" is a characteristic of the sphere of community (Gemeinschaft) present in modern society, as exemplified by the relationship between parents and children.

We can say that in many ways Parsons' type variables of action represent an attempt to unify a number of basic concepts of classical sociology: Tönnies's concepts of community and society, Weber's types of action, and Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. These basic concepts tell us that social roles “predispose” to the choice of the value of a typical variable that corresponds to them. One professional role requires us to choose to be self-oriented; the other is team orientation. In relation to her children, for example, a mother must choose emotionality, diffuseness, particularism, predetermined belonging and collective orientation. If she is acting as a teacher, she should accordingly choose different values ​​for these typical dichotomous variables.

It is important to note that with the help of typical variables we can also describe what priorities are enshrined in the normative and value structures of society. Using generic variables, Parsons outlines several social structures. For example, modern industrial societies are characterized by universalistic patterns of result-oriented behavior. Other patterns characterize pre-modern societies. Thus, generic action variables form part of Parsons' theory of rationalization and differentiation.

In various ways, Parsons seeks to show that “social systems” face what he calls systemic problems. At the same time, he combines his basic concepts with some biological concepts. Thus, a social system has mechanisms that maintain its equilibrium in the event of changes in the environment (cf. the principle of homeostasis). Here we find the beginning of the functionalist model of explanation. The function of some social mechanisms is to maintain the balance of the social system. For example, role differentiation may be understood as an attempt to resolve “systemic problems” at the micro level. At the macro level there is also a corresponding functional differentiation (culture, politics and economics as subsystems). So, society has subsystems that provide solutions to problems of adaptation to nature, problems of social and normative integration, etc. If society concentrates exclusively on instrumental issues, then “value-community” suffers (for Parsons, culture turns out to be important: schools, universities, art institutions, etc.).

In later works, Parsons attempted to rehabilitate the theory of universal features of social evolution (evolutionary universals). The development of social stratification and various forms of differentiation is necessary, for example, to increase the long-term ability of society to adapt. Society must also be capable of legitimizing various forms of inequality. Effective management presupposes the development of bureaucracy. Political democracy is important to a society's capacity for solidarity. This is Parsons' attempt to develop Weber's theory of rationalization.

Parsons's sociology can also be seen as a serious response to what he calls "Hobbes' paradox." How is it possible for a society to emerge based on the principles of Hobbes's theory of the state of nature? How can we, given the current scarcity of resources, avoid a general struggle of all against all? Parsons argues that a well-ordered society can only be realized when there is an institutionalized system of norms governing the relationships between individuals (the "institutionalization of common norms"). The normative element is very important for the emergence of social stability. But how can we avoid such a society from becoming too “closed”, such as an unacceptable, fully regulated, fascist “new order”? Here we must again turn to typical action variables (universalism - particularism, etc.). However, Parsons does not explain how universal values ​​can be justified. This problem is at the center of Habermas's teaching (see Chapter 30).