Military losses and civilian casualties. Is the war with Georgia the same “small victorious war”? She helped the Russian authorities raise their rating

After the occupation of part of Georgia by Russian troops and ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages around South Ossetia, a ceasefire was reached with the participation of international mediators. According to the agreements reached, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory was to be completed by October 1, 2008.

1. Background to the conflict

Ethnolinguistic map of the Caucasus.

Map of Georgia, 1993

2. Military actions

2.1. Beginning of the conflict

Protests in front of the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi.

The aggravation of the situation on the border between the autonomy and Georgia began at the end of July and beginning of August of this year. Each side blamed the other for the outbreak of hostilities. A significant deterioration occurred on August 1, when six Georgian police officers were wounded as a result of a terrorist attack. In response to this, shelling of Tskhinvali began from the Georgian side, which caused an escalation of the conflict and shelling of enemy positions from both sides. On August 3, South Ossetia began evacuating the civilian population from Tskhinvali - about 2.5 thousand people were evacuated.

2.2. Russian intervention

Georgia unilaterally stopped the offensive to allow civilians to leave the war zone. In turn, the South Ossetian government announced the death of 1,400 people, mostly civilians in the region. Meanwhile, regular troops of the Russian Federation with a total number of about 150 tanks and other equipment were introduced into South Ossetia. By the end of August 8 Russian troops and Ossetian forces controlled large parts of Tskhinvali, while Russian aircraft continued to bomb military bases near Tbilisi and destroy Georgian aircraft. There were also direct clashes between Russian and Georgian troops in the military area around Tskhinvali.

2.3. Escalation of the conflict

On the night of August 8-9 and into the morning, fighting continued between Georgian and Russian troops around the capital Tskhinvali. At the same time, information was received about Russian aircraft bombing the Georgian port of Poti on the country’s Black Sea coast. Military bases in different cities of Georgia were also bombed; in particular, residential buildings were bombed in the city of Gori, where about 60 civilians were killed. Also, airborne units and special forces units began to arrive to reinforce Russian troops in South Ossetia, in particular the formation of the Seventy-sixth and 98th Airborne Divisions. Already at about 8 o'clock in the morning, the Russian side announced the capture of Tskhinvali - this information was denied by the Georgian side, which insisted that Georgian troops still controlled parts of the capital of the autonomy. Georgia also reported 10 Russian aircraft shot down, but Russia admitted the loss of only two. After the fact, Russia admitted the loss of six aircraft, three of which were hit by Russian air defense forces: three Su-25 attack aircraft, a Tu-22M3 bomber and two Su-24M front-line bombers.

The main battle in the first days took place in the air of Georgia. The Georgian air defense system offered fierce resistance to Russian aircraft - and it also served as the main target of air strikes. After Russian aviation managed to destroy the main radars and air defense systems of the Georgians, and it completely took over the skies over Georgia, organized armed resistance to the invasion virtually ceased. Russian military units advanced without resistance to their designated positions. The Georgian command withdrew its units and began to prepare for the defense of Tbilisi.

The escalation of the conflict spread to another separatist region, Abkhazia, where troops of the unrecognized republic and Russian mercenaries (in the Russian press - "volunteers") began attacks on Georgian positions in the Kodori Gorge. On the same day, on the proposal of President Saakashvili, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution on a “state of war” in Georgia for a period of 15 days. The Georgian President also proposed a ceasefire between the parties and the withdrawal of troops, but this proposal was rejected by Russia, which insisted on the withdrawal of Georgian troops from South Ossetia as a precondition for the ceasefire. The UN Security Council also failed to make a decision on a solution to this conflict, and Russia stated that it was conducting an “operation to force Georgia to peace.”

The situation deteriorated significantly on August 11, when Russia expanded the range of its attacks not only against targets in the immediate vicinity of the theater of operations, but also launched an offensive against the town of Gore on the way to Tbilisi and captured the Georgian cities of Zugdidi and Senaki in the west of the country. Russian troops also captured the central highway that connects eastern and western Georgia. As the front approached Tbilisi, panic began in the city and residents began to flee the combat area. Mikheil Saakashvili tried to reassure the population and assured that Georgian troops were ready to defend the capital. Meanwhile, Russia reported that it does not intend to attack Tbilisi.

2.4. Participation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet

A group of ships of the Russian fleet, led by the flagship missile cruiser Moskva, took direct part in the conflict; the detachment included large landing ships Yamal and Saratov and others. The marines of the Black Sea Fleet occupied the main port of Georgia, Poti, and destroyed all Georgian boats and ships that had military markings, including border ones, in the roadstead, planting explosives in them.

Back on August 10, Ukraine warned the Russian side against the participation of ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the conflict around South Ossetia. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine noted “In order to prevent the emergence of circumstances in which Ukraine could be drawn into an armed conflict and hostilities due to the participation in them of military formations of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which is temporarily based on the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainian side reserves the right in accordance with the norms international law and the legislation of Ukraine, prohibit the return to the territory of Ukraine until the conflict is resolved of ships and vessels that may take part in the above actions." However, the Ukrainian side subsequently admitted that interstate agreements regulating the presence of the Russian fleet in Ukraine do not contain restrictions on the military use of the fleet.

3. Sarkozy's plan

Press conference between Medvedev and Sarkozy after negotiations on the six-point truce plan

On August 10, Georgian troops announced the withdrawal of troops from Tskhinvali and a unilateral ceasefire. Mikheil Saakashvili signed the truce plan proposed by the European Union, the initiative was taken by France, which presides over the EU. The agreement was achieved in Tbilisi by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who later visited Moscow and had negotiations with Russian President Medvedev.

On August 12, French President Nicolas Sarkozy also joined the peace process and proposed a six-point plan for a peaceful settlement. He also secured the support of the Georgian and Russian presidents for this plan, according to which each side pledged to:

In the previous plan there was a point about international discussion the future status of the unrecognized republics, however, at the request of Georgia it was slightly changed. This deal was called the “Sarkozy plan”; in Russia they called it the “Medvedev-Sarkozy plan”. Moscow did not enter into a direct negotiation process with Tbilisi; they chose the path of ignoring Mikheil Saakashvili. All negotiations were actually carried out through the mediation of the French side.

3.1. Occupation of Georgian territories

On August 11, President Medvedev said “A significant part of the operation to force Georgia to peace has been completed.” In Russian propaganda terminology, the invasion of Georgia was called “peace enforcement.” The next day, Prime Minister Putin corrected the president’s statement, noting that “Russia will bring its peacekeeping mission to logical conclusion" .

Despite the agreement signed on August 12, Russian troops began to actively advance deeper into Georgian territory. In particular, the cities of Gori, Senaki, and Poti were occupied, and the road connecting western and eastern Georgia was cut. Roadblocks were set up on the roads. Russia used serious strategic weapons in the conflict, in particular, military missions were carried out by the Tu-22 bomber, and the Tochka-U missile system was delivered through the Roki tunnel. On a hundred-kilometer section of the road between Tbilisi and Gori on August 16-17, a column of heavy equipment was observed moving towards the Georgian capital: “Urals” with infantry and “Grad” installations, self-propelled guns, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Nogovitsyn, said at a press conference on September 17 that the Russians are observing how Georgian troops are concentrating around Tbilisi.

In turn, Georgia also accused Russia of targeted attacks on civilian targets, bombing residential buildings in Gori and Poti and Tbilisi International Airport. With the threat of Russian troops attacking the capital, refugees appeared who tried to leave Tbilisi. Ossetian units, according to the Georgian side, shelled Georgian villages around Tskhinvali, which led to the emergence of refugees from these regions. Due to the offensive of Russian troops, the city of Gori was almost deserted - most of the residents became refugees. Eyewitnesses blamed South Ossetian rebels for a campaign of terror against Gori residents. There were also accusations of ethnic cleansing on both sides. The President of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, generally openly spoke about ethnic cleansing and boasted about the destruction of Georgian villages in the autonomy; the fact of ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia was confirmed by international human rights organizations.

6. Information war

From the first day of the confrontation, mass information dissemination channels, television channels in Russia and Georgia, were mobilized to provide information support for military operations. So in Russia, where the main television channels are controlled by the state, a continuous telethon was actually organized, the main slogans of which were repeated by voice hundreds of times a day and were always displayed in large letters on the screens. These slogans were “Genocide in South Ossetia” and “Forcing Georgia to peace.” Russian society in agreement with the country's authorities, supported the introduction of troops into South Ossetia and fighting on Georgian territory, such decisive actions were approved by more than 70% of Russians.

In Georgia, having presented itself as a victim of aggression from its northern neighbor, support for President Mikheil Saakashvili has grown.

6.1. Cyberwar

During the war, objective information coming from the scene played a major role. Russian, Georgian and foreign media information that came from the scene was covered differently. The real information war unfolded on the Internet, long before the start of hostilities. Russian channels were switched off on Georgian territory, which Georgia accused of operating information war. Internet connections to sites with the “ru” domain were also blocked. As with the Bronze Soldier controversy in Estonia, Georgia and its institutions have also received hacker attacks. In particular, the website of the Georgian Foreign Ministry, where photographs of Hitler were posted, was attacked. Due to hacker attacks, other government websites of the republic also did not work. The attacks from Russia on the websites of the parliament, government and the Ministry of Defense turned out to be very organized and massive; even the websites of Georgian news agencies were blocked. Russian hackers spread the call: “Hackers and bloggers of all countries unite,” “Sites will be blocked completely! No one will be able to read the nonsense that Russia attacked Georgia.” At the same time, Estonia, which suffered similar attacks, sent a team of experts to help Georgia.

The government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia also reported attacks on its websites government agencies and news agencies of the republic. Reporters Without Borders condemned these actions.

6.2. Mass media

Attitudes to the conflict were polarized both in Ukraine and abroad. Georgia unconditionally condemned the aggression; its position was supported by a number of Ukrainian politicians and international organizations, which called Russia’s actions an aggression against sovereign Georgia. Numerous Western politicians, in particular US Vice President Dick Cheney and Lithuanian President Adamkus and others, called Russia’s actions military aggression. At the same time, some international and Ukrainian politicians supported Russia’s actions. In particular, the Chairman of the Communist Party of Ukraine Simonenko called these events Georgian aggression against South Ossetia. The Supreme Council of the Crimean Autonomy expressed the same attitude towards the conflict in its appeal and called on Kyiv to recognize Abkhazia and Pv. Ossetia. The Chairman of the UN General Assembly, Miguel Brockmann, also condemned Georgia’s actions in the conflict.

In turn, Russia accused Western news agencies of biased coverage of events in Georgia. It was indicated that in news releases Western media the events in Tskhinvali and the destruction of the city were almost completely ignored, and in return a lot of attention was paid to the comments of the Georgian side, in particular Mikheil Saakashvili.

Russian media have also been criticized for censoring their coverage of events in Georgia. In particular, British journalist William Dunbar resigned in protest from the English-language channel Russia Today, where, according to him, there is censorship. According to the journalist, he was not allowed to go on air after reporting on the bombing of Russian aircraft in Georgia.

7. Diplomatic relations

8. Statements by parties to the conflict

9. Reaction of the world community

9.1. PACE Commission

The Commission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) believes that Moscow and Tbilisi bear equal responsibility for the August military actions. This conclusion is contained in the report of the head of the PACE special commission, Luc van der Brande, released on September 29. During the period from September 21 to 26, Luc van der Brande visited South Ossetia, buffer zones in Georgia, Tbilisi and Moscow in order to clarify the causes and consequences of the August armed conflict. According to the report, the delegation is “extremely concerned” that two members of the Council of Europe have violated their commitments within the organization to peacefully resolve all differences, including old conflicts. This behavior will not be tolerated and both countries "share responsibility for the escalation of this conflict into full-scale war," the statement said.

The report also notes that the completely opposite points of view and versions of the parties, as well as the short duration of the commission’s visit to the conflict zone, make it very difficult to determine the sequence of events on August 7 and 8 and the circumstances that led to them.

However, "it is quite clear that both sides did not make sufficient efforts to prevent war," and since then numerous human rights violations have been - and still are - committed in the region. PACE called for the investigation of all such cases and punishment of the perpetrators in court, while especially emphasizing that the Russian Federation bears responsibility for those crimes that are committed in the territory currently under its control.

The report also noted that the Council of Europe is surprised that Russia and the United States do not have satellite images that could clarify the situation about the beginning of the conflict in Georgia. The parliamentarians noted that Moscow and Tbilisi adhere to diametrically opposed versions of the start of full-scale military operations. Thus, the Russian side insists that it brought in tanks and armored vehicles after Georgian troops invaded the Tskhinvali region and began fighting there. The Georgian side, in turn, claims that its intelligence reported a concentration of Russian troops and armored vehicles entering South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel, and a military operation was launched to repel the attack of the Russian army that had invaded Georgian territory.

9.2. international Court

According to international affairs lawyer Akhmat Glashev, “the court made a purely political decision, which, first of all, is beneficial to Russia. The court actually refused to satisfy the complaint of the Georgian side, and at the same time refrained from making any clear decision. The court ruling does not say Russia violated the international convention on the elimination of racial discrimination."

9.3. European Parliament

The war in Georgia had significant economic consequences: with the outbreak of hostilities, shares of Russian companies fell sharply and affected not only the Russian, but also the world market. There was also some correction in the ruble exchange rate against the US dollar when foreign investors began to sell rubles on the domestic market. Trading on the main Russian stock exchanges MICEX and RTS was stopped several times during August due to falling indices to prevent panic among traders: the overall drop in the PCT and MICEX indices for a month and a half after the war was more than 40%. The continuous growth of Russia's foreign exchange reserves against the backdrop of the oil boom gave way to a decline: over 30 working days, the volume of gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Russia decreased by $38 billion, or 6.8%.

Notes

1. Comparison of the combat potential of the ARMED forces of Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia in the conflict zone - lenta.ru/articles/2008/08/08/forces /
2. General Staff: The Russian Armed Forces lost 64 servicemen in South Ossetia - gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2008/08/20/n_1260079.shtml
3. UPC clarified Russian losses during the war in South Ossetia - lenta.ru/news/2009/08/07/losses /
4. Russian General Staff: Russian troops lost 74 people - ua.korrespondent.net/world/552715
5. Georgia confirms the withdrawal of Russian troops - www.polit.ru/news/2008/09/13/151.html
6. South Ossetia chose independence and Kokoity (Russian)- Newsru.com/world/13nov2006/osetia1.html
7. S.Ik: Russia has double standards regarding the conflict in the Caucasus. - www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/indepth/story/2008/08/080808_eke_ie_om.shtml
8. Kulik about the Caucasus: Ukraine needs to draw conclusions. - www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/indepth/story/2008/08/080809_kulyk_is_is.shtml
9. Terrorist attack in South Ossetia: six Georgian police officers were wounded. - novynar.com.ua/world/33571
10. More than 2.5 thousand people left the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone - novynar.com.ua/world/33715
11. Georgia announced the start of war with South Ossetia - novynar.com.ua/world/34135
12. Saakashvili did not give a reason to start hostilities - maidan.org.ua/static/news/2007/1218543889.html
13. Russia left Georgia no choice - maidan.org.ua/static/news/2007/1219242475.html
14. Vladimir Gorbach. Provocation - Prostration - Occupation - pravda.com.ua/news/2008/8/20/80141.htm
15. Kokoity: The assault on Tskhinvali has begun - ua.korrespondent.net/world/547055
16. BBC Ukrainian: Georgia offers rebels a truce - www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/news/story/2008/08/080807_georgia_ob.shtml
17. Saakashvili gave the order for the full mobilization of reservists - novynar.com.ua/world/34153
18. ... We've been there since August 7th. Well, our entire 58th Army... - www.permnews.ru/story.asp?kt=2912&n=453
19. Russian tanks entered Tskhinvali: Georgia threatens Russia with war - ua.korrespondent.net/world/547700
20. Russian aircraft attacked a military base near Tbilisi - ua.korrespondent.net/world/547722

This is one of the best texts about the Russian-Georgian war of 2008.

Six years ago, the Russian-Georgian war broke out. It certainly created a new reality - in Georgia, Russia, the post-Soviet space and in the world in relation to Russia. But most of us know about it from myths created by massive Russian propaganda. Here are the most common ones

Myth No. 1: Saakashvili started the war

War is started by those who prepare for it in advance.

Who prepared for it and who tried to prevent it?

In June-July 2008, various information sources reported that a political decision on an imminent (presumably in August) war with Georgia had already been made in Moscow, with Putin personally overseeing the preparations. The official news agency Osinform will publish the formula for a future war: “a peacekeeping operation to force the aggressor to peace.”

On July 5, large-scale maneuvers of the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) "Caucasus-2008" begin. 8,000 military personnel, 700 armored vehicles, and ships of the Black Sea Fleet are taking part in them. The official purpose of the exercise is to prepare for a “peace enforcement operation.” The troops are distributing the leaflet “Warrior, know your probable enemy!” - with a description of the armed forces of Georgia.

The best landing units of the Russian army from different regions countries. They replace the motorized rifle units previously stationed there. At the Terskoye training ground of the 58th Army in the south of North Ossetia, a field military hospital is being set up, capable of treating 300 wounded per day.
After the end of the maneuvers, the field hospital is not dismantled. The troops participating in them do not return to their places of permanent deployment. Some of them seep into South Ossetia. Fortunately, just these days (coincidentally) the construction of a military base in Java was completed.

By the beginning of the war (that is, before 08/08/08 - the official date of the entry of Russian troops into hostilities), about 200 units of armored vehicles and advanced units of the 135th and 693rd regiments of the 58th Army - over 1,200 people - were concentrated in Java. Russia still does not recognize this (how can one admit that Russian troops were stationed in South Ossetia before the start of the aggression to repel Georgian aggression?), but the testimony of the soldiers and officers of the 58th Army themselves, which appeared in the media, does not leave this doubts (see, for example, selection).

Simultaneously with military training, information training took place. On July 20, hacker attacks began on Georgian government and information sites. It was the second in history famous case cyber warfare against the state. (The first was recorded in 2007, when, after the aggravation of relations between Russia and Estonia due to the relocation of a monument to Soviet soldiers in the center of Tallinn, the websites of Estonian government institutions were destroyed.) The final attack occurred on the morning of August 8 - against Russian-language information websites of Georgia.

But from August 1, people began to arrive from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali in an organized manner. Russian journalists. Soon their number increased to 50 people, but not a single foreigner (with the exception of a correspondent for the Ukrainian TV channel Inter) was among them. The Russian authorities established a strict access system: accreditation had to be obtained from both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Only the most trusted and trusted could pass through this double sieve.

This ensured that the conditions were not only for a massive invasion, but also that only what needed to be reported about it was ensured.

The most significant thing in this multi-step combination is that the war has actually begun
July 29, 2008.

It was on this day that hostilities began. And they were started, in accordance with plans from Moscow, by South Ossetian armed formations completely controlled by Russia.

They began massive and systematic shelling of villages in South Ossetia under Georgian jurisdiction and the positions of the Georgian peacekeeping contingent. The fire came from mortars and 120-mm guns, which are generally prohibited in the conflict zone. People died.

This is not a separate escalation in the long-standing confrontation between the separatists and the central government. This is a blatant prelude to war. Deliberate provocation with the aim of causing a response. So the city punks send a youngster to pick on a passer-by, only to then jump out from around the corner and pile on him shouting: “Don’t touch the kid!”

The Tbilisi authorities understood perfectly well what was expected of them. But it is impossible to bear the blows for long. By the evening of August 1, the Georgians begin returning artillery fire on militant positions in the vicinity of Tskhinvali. The Ossetians are responding by expanding the shelling zone of Georgian villages and increasing the intensity of fire. Large-caliber mortars and 122-mm guns are already in use.

Mass evacuation of the population to Russia begins from Tskhinvali. Over the course of several days, more than 20 thousand people were taken out. This is estimated to be half the actual population of the self-proclaimed republic. Tskhinvali becomes an almost deserted city.

And through the Roki tunnel - the only way for heavy equipment to pass from North Ossetia to South Ossetia - Russian armored vehicles and troops are moving.

The Georgian authorities are trying to the last to resolve the matter peacefully. Saakashvili's personal representative T. Yakobashvili arranges a meeting with the South Ossetian leadership in Tskhinvali on August 7 through the mediation of the Russian ambassador special assignments Yu. Popov.

He's coming. Popov is not there. It turns out that the tire got flat on the way. "So put on the spare tire!" - advises the Georgian minister Russian Ambassador. “And the spare tire is punctured,” the ambassador replies. Such a disaster. The representative of South Ossetia refuses to negotiate without a Russian mediator.

Yakobashvili is negotiating with whoever he has - the commander of the peacekeeping forces, General Kulakhmetov. He admits that he is “no longer able to control the Ossetian units.” What to do? “Announce a unilateral ceasefire,” Kulakhmetov advises.

Within an hour, Yakobashvili resolved the issue. At 17:00 he announces to Kulakhmetov that the Georgian government has agreed to a unilateral ceasefire. At 17:10 the Georgian guns fell silent. At 19:10 Saakashvili announces this in a live television address in Georgian and Ossetian and calls for negotiations.

The response is to intensify shelling of Georgian villages. By 23:00 they had reached their peak. And at the same time, a column of Russian troops with 100 units of armored vehicles emerges from the Roki tunnel. The invasion has begun.
In half an hour, Saakashvili will give the order to start a military operation.

Could he have done anything differently? Of course he could.

But to do this, you had to forget that you are the president of a sovereign country, that you are a man and that you are Georgian. And if he had done this, he would not have been one, or the other, or the third.

It was a Zugzwang situation: the rulers of Russia skillfully brought him into the war, leaving no other way out.
The one who wants war, the one who starts the war is the one who prepares for it, the one who does not give the enemy a chance to avoid it. It was Russia.

Myth No. 2: Russia started the war to stop the genocide of Ossetians

Where did this come from?

Already on August 8, the President of South Ossetia E. Kokoity reported that as a result of shelling and military operations in Tskhinvali alone, 1,400 people were killed - the figure is not final. The next day, August 9, the official representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic announced that 2,100 civilians had died in Tskhinvali.
This figure - more than 2,000 dead - appeared everywhere later: in reports, in media reports, and in online forums.

The number of victims was supplemented by examples of the atrocities of the Georgian military: direct fire from tanks at houses where civilians were hiding, targeted fire from machine guns at children and the elderly, burning of houses along with living people, decapitated corpses of girls...

But when they began to count, it turned out that everything was not quite like that. During the entire fighting in the city, the Tskhinvali hospital, where all the wounded and dead Ossetians were admitted, received 273 wounded and 44 killed, 90% of the victims were South Ossetian militias. The head of the Investigative Committee under the Russian Prosecutor's Office, A. Bastrykin, announced that 134 civilians of South Ossetia had died during the entire war, according to Yulia Latynina, “resurrecting 1,866 people in one fell swoop.”

But even after the official count, the number “2000” remained in the public consciousness, and even in speeches and interviews with officials, including Putin.

Although it is initially unrealistic. The official number of residents of Tskhinvali before the war was 42 thousand. After the evacuation in early August, half of them should have remained. The usual ratio of killed to wounded in military conflict zones is 1:3. This means, statistically, for every 2,000 killed there should have been another 6,000 wounded. That is, almost every second Tskhinvali resident would have been wounded or killed after the Georgian assault. And if it were so, would such a brave arithmetician as Kokoity be able to keep silent about it? But he didn't say.

How did 2,000 dead appear on the second day? And so - what genocide without thousands of victims! "Thousands" is at least two. So it turned out to be 2000. Modestly - to the minimum.

As for the Georgian atrocities, not a single fact was confirmed even after verification by such a demanding organization as Human Rights Watch. Not a single eyewitness account - only retellings of what was told. That's how rumors spread. Judging by their abundance and drama, these were deliberately spread rumors. Professional disinformation.

But ethnic cleansing of Georgians by South Ossetian armed forces is not a rumor. The Georgian population in South Ossetia, where Georgian villages interspersed with Ossetian ones almost in a checkerboard pattern, no longer exists. Robbed, expelled, killed - some Georgian villages were simply razed to the ground. This was done by the hands of the brave warriors of Kokoity. They did not distinguish themselves in battles and almost did not participate (and the warlike president himself, at the first reports of the advance of Georgian troops to Tskhinvali, fled from the capital under the shadow of Russian tanks to Java, and returned with them), but they took their souls in reprisals against civilians and looting.

Thanks to their efforts, there are no more Georgians in South Ossetia. But on the territory of Georgia, outside of South Ossetia, more than 60 thousand Ossetians lived and continue to live peacefully. What would happen to them if the Georgians really started genocide? Remember the Armenians in Baku during the Karabakh crisis.

But the fact is that there was no genocide of Ossetians in Georgia and by Georgians either before the war, or during it, or after it. There was no reason.

Myth #3: Russia went to war to protect its peacekeepers

The last thing the Georgians wanted was to fight with Russian peacekeepers.

The first thing they did when starting hostilities was to warn the Russian peacekeeping contingent.
At 23.35, President Saakashvili gives the order to begin the operation, and at 23.40, the commander of the Georgian peacekeeping forces, Brigadier General Mamuka Kurashvili, reports the advance of the troops to the commander of the Russian peacekeepers, General Kulakhmetov, and asks not to interfere.

“It’s not that simple,” the Russian general answered the Georgian.

Even before this, at the initial stage of hostilities, Ossetian artillerymen and mortarmen fired at Georgian villages near the peacekeepers’ deployment sites, using them as cover, or even using direct assistance to direct fire. Kulakhmetov did not consider it necessary to deny this in conversations with Georgian officials. During the offensive of the Georgian troops, key figures of the South Ossetian command hid in the main headquarters. According to international standards, this made it a legitimate target.

However, in the target map issued to Georgian artillerymen during artillery preparation, the peacekeepers' targets were marked as prohibited for fire.

In order to protect our peacekeepers, Russian leadership there was no need to send troops and spend money on the war. It was enough to prohibit Kokoity from using them as cover - and everyone would have remained safe. But the goal was different.

Myth #4: Russia started the war to protect its citizens

The Russian authorities themselves created their own artificial diaspora in South Ossetia, issuing Russian citizenship and Russian passports to thousands of residents of the self-proclaimed republic on Georgian territory. Legally, this is regarded as interference in the internal affairs of another state. As it turned out - and in fact. The artificial diaspora created an artificial reason for intervention: protecting our citizens is nothing like the newly minted ones, everyone is dear to us.
Ingenious, of course: this can provide justification for an invasion of any country.
But not original: in the same way, Hitler created a pretext for the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 under the pretext of protecting the rights of the Sudeten Germans and for making territorial claims to Poland. Milosevic tried to do the same thing in the 90s in dismembered Yugoslavia.
First of all, good company. Secondly, we know how this defense of their “oppressed compatriots” ultimately turned out.
Who really benefited from the almost uncontrolled issuance Russian passports residents of South Ossetia - the corrupt elite of the republic. Georgians discovered hundreds of Russian passports without the owners' signatures in captured Tskhinvali - these " dead Souls“Pensions and benefits were probably accrued from the Russian treasury.

Myth 5: Georgia bombed Tskhinvali

When Georgian troops approached Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, they only conducted barrage fire and shelled administrative buildings. There was no need for anything else. The Georgians entered an intact and half-empty city, which was abandoned not only by the majority of residents, but also by the main forces of the militia. Kokoity with the color of his army fled to the Russian military base in Java. The Georgian troops were opposed by a few scattered groups of partisans with small arms. They could only run away from the tanks.

Bombing and shelling of the city from "Grads" were needed in the next two days, when the Georgians were driven out of the city by Russian troops who arrived to help their Ossetian brothers. These were their bombs and shells. It is on their conscience that most of the dead civilians (see Myth No. 2) and the destroyed city are responsible.

Myth No. 6: Georgians fled shamefully

Most of us get an idea of ​​the course of modern wars from television pictures. From the picture of the August war, the viewer could remember how “timid Georgians fled,” leaving equipment and barracks with their beds made. And I couldn’t see what wasn’t shown.
For example, the defeat of a Russian column of armored vehicles by Georgian special forces on August 8. Then, out of 120 tanks and armored personnel carriers, more than half were destroyed, and the commander of the 58th Army, General Khrulev, was seriously wounded. According to Saakashvili, this episode delayed the advance of Russian troops for two days. And then the Russian command brought up such forces that in the event of a direct confrontation, the Georgian army would have been completely destroyed. And he gave the order to retreat so that there would be something to defend Tbilisi. You can't break the butt with a whip.
It is clear that the balance of forces between the Russian and Georgian armies is so disproportionate that there can be no talk of any real confrontation. But this rather relates to Myth No. 1 - about whether the Georgians wanted war.

Myth No. 7: The war ended in peace

Georgia lost 20% of its territory - lands that most Georgians consider theirs. Not a single Georgian president will dare to abandon them forever. And no one can guarantee that any of them will not dare to return what was lost - including by force.

Russia acquired two formally independent quasi-states as satellites, which, besides itself, were recognized only by such influential powers as Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru - for 50 million dollars, and Vanuatu is still bargaining, and Hamas, which itself is not a state. In fact, these are two forever subsidized regions of Russia, doomed to be black holes of the Russian budget, oases of wild corruption and crime. There will never be prosperity or even peace there, but there will always be the possibility of criminal and national conflicts.

Russia has regained its Soviet image of a brutal aggressor, which, of course, pleases national pride, but only harms business, diplomacy and, ultimately, the security of the country.

Russia and Georgia have become and will remain irreconcilable enemies. This will last a long time. After the war, a real “cold war” began between the two states, and as recent past experience shows, in “ cold war“The one who has more weapons and a stronger army does not always win.

Myth No. 8: South Ossetia is the land of Ossetia, not Georgia

The territory of South Ossetia is the original part of Georgia, as even the geographical names indicate. The same Tskhinvali, after the war in the Russian press and official documents was renamed Tskhinvali, did not become less Georgian because its root is from the ancient Georgian word meaning “hornbeam”. Ossetians in the capital of South Ossetia became the national majority only in 1990. Before the interethnic conflicts of the decline of the USSR and the wars of sovereignty caused by it, there was practically no antagonism between Georgians and Ossetians. This is not even the situation of Kosovo, where an overwhelming Albanian majority was formed on primordially Serbian soil. The ethnic cleansing carried out by Kokoity with the support of Putin in 2008 is too deep and too fresh a wound for it to heal and for Georgians to come to terms with it.

And finally, a lot of photos of destroyed Georgian villages

On the night of August 8, 2008, the Georgian army entered the territory of South Ossetia and partially destroyed its capital, Tskhinvali. The Russian Federation, protecting the residents of South Ossetia, most of them have Russian citizenship, sent its troops into the region and, within 5 days of fighting, ousted the Georgians from the conflict zone. Later, at the end of August, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in response to which Georgia called these two republics occupied territories. Let's figure out what losses in people and equipment the parties suffered during this fleeting conflict.

Losses in people, Russia

According to the Center for Analysis of Strategy and Technology, the Russian army lost 67 people killed during the conflict. This is exactly the figure that the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation Prosecutor’s Office named, analyzing past military operations. This figure also includes those killed after the period of active hostilities, that is, until the withdrawal of troops. The situation is somewhat blurred by the fact that neither the UPC nor the RF Ministry of Defense have ever published an official list of dead military personnel, which introduces some confusion into this issue and the appearance of different death tolls in the range from 48 to 74.

Of the 67 military personnel killed, 48 died directly from enemy fire, the remaining 19 were victims of road accidents, “friendly fire” and careless handling. TsAST classified them as “non-combat losses” of the Russian army in this conflict. The role of road accidents was especially great; they accounted for 9 deaths. Such high losses are explained by the objective difficulty of transferring large group troops, carried out at high speed along a narrow mountain serpentine, in some cases at night. Thus, out of 30 wounded in the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment, only two suffered from enemy fire, the rest were injured on the march (severe bruises, fractures, traumatic brain injuries). Of the 9 wounded of the 292nd mixed artillery regiment, 8 were injured as a result of an accident. At the same time, the 70th, 71st, 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments, well prepared for operations in mountainous terrain, reached their positions without suffering significant non-combat losses. The total number of Russian army soldiers wounded as a result of the conflict ranges from 170 to 340 people; it is difficult to determine more precisely.

Loss of life, Georgia

As the head of TsAST, Ruslan Pukhov, noted, unlike us, the Georgian Defense Ministry published a list of dead and missing people by name less than a month after the conflict. Subsequently, it was regularly updated and clarified as the fate of the missing was clarified and the remains were identified. In addition to first and last names, this list contains military ranks and belonging to military units. According to the director of CAST, the data presented in it is quite complete and accurate.

Losses in technology, Russia

The most complete list of losses of Russian equipment is also provided by the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. From August 8 to 12, our units on the territory of South Ossetia lost 3 tanks, up to 20 light armored vehicles and 6 aircraft, this information is based on the study of photo and video materials from the conflict zone, media materials, and memories of combatants.

So during the conflict, Russia lost three tanks: T72B(M), T-72B and one T-62. All of them were destroyed by enemy fire. Light tracked and wheeled armored vehicles suffered more significant losses - about 20 units. Among them are nine BMP-1, three BMP-2, two BTR-80, one BMD-2, three BRDM-2 and one MT-LB6 tractor. No artillery, MLRS or air defense systems were lost.

During the fighting, three Su-25, two Su-24 and one Tu-22M3 were lost; after the end of the conflict, two Mi-24 and Mi-8 MTKO helicopters crashed as a result of accidents. Of these aircraft, 2 were reliably shot down by enemy air defense systems, 3 became victims of “friendly fire”, and it was not possible to determine who shot down the last one. In addition, 4 more Russian Su-25 attack aircraft were seriously damaged, but were able to return to their bases.

Losses in equipment, Georgia

During the active phase of hostilities, the Georgian battle fleet was completely destroyed, losses amounted to 2 missile boats, 5 patrol boats and a number of smaller ships. Aviation lost three An-2 transport helicopters, three Mi-24 helicopters and one Mi-14, while Mi-24 helicopters were occasionally used by the Georgian army until the end of the conflict. Georgia has not lost a single combat or training aircraft, and there is an explanation for this. Georgian aviation appeared over the battlefield only once on the morning of August 8, after which the planes did not take off and were dispersed and camouflaged at airfields.

15 Georgian tanks were destroyed in the battles, about 20 more were burned after being captured on the battlefield, the Russian army kept about 30 tanks as trophies, most of them T-72s. In addition to tanks, the Georgians lost four BMP-2s, four Turkish-made Cobra armored vehicles and three BTR-80s. Russia captured fifteen BMP-1U and two BMP-2 as trophies. The Georgian artillery lost four self-propelled 203 mm. howitzers "Pion" and two "Dana" of Czech production. One "Pion", two "Dana" and about 20 non-self-propelled guns of various calibers were captured by the Russian army as trophies.

Four years ago, on the night of August 8, 2008, Georgian troops attacked South Ossetia and destroyed part of its capital Tskhinvali.

After an armed conflict that lasted until the summer of 1992, Georgia lost control over South Ossetia. Since then, Tskhinvali has sought recognition of the independent status of South Ossetia, while Tbilisi continued to consider this territory an integral part of Georgia, offering only autonomy to the Ossetians.

The situation in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict on the evening of August 1. The city of Tskhinvali and a number of other settlements were subjected to massive shelling from the Georgian side. In the conflict zone, a battle raged for several hours using small arms, grenade launchers and mortars. The first casualties and significant destruction appeared. South Ossetia began evacuating its residents to North Ossetia; in the first two days after the shelling, 2.5 thousand residents left their homes.

August 2 Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili, who visited South Ossetia, after meetings with representatives of the OSCE observer mission, with the Chief of Staff of Peacekeeping Operations of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, General Mamuka Kurashvili, and the Commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), General Marat Kulakhmetov, said that the Georgian authorities do not see an alternative to direct negotiations between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali and express their readiness to conduct negotiations without preconditions. The Georgian authorities, Yakobashvili said, will accept all situations.

August 3rd Georgian side to the borders of South Ossetia. From the military base in Gori, an artillery column consisting of one division of D-30 artillery mounts and two mortar batteries, which are part of the fourth motorized infantry brigade of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, advanced towards Tskhinvali.

August 16 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a plan to resolve the conflict in Georgia.

August 17 A state of emergency was introduced in the unrecognized republic for a period of one month. A curfew was introduced on the territory of Tskhinvali, that is, a ban on citizens being on the streets and in other places. in public places without specially issued passes and identification documents, from 21:00 to 6:00.

August 20 from 21:00 there is a state of emergency throughout South Ossetia and a curfew in Tskhinvali “in connection with the stabilization of the situation in South Ossetia.”

August 21 Abkhazia and South Ossetia based on the results of “nationwide gatherings” of the presidents and parliaments of the republics with a request to recognize the independence of the self-proclaimed states.

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources

Little victorious war (tm)
About the Russian-Georgian war of August 8-12, 2008.
This war is just an echo of the confrontation between two powers - the Empire of Good (USA) and the Empire of Evil (Russia).
The United States pursued largely political goals, namely, the implementation of the previous administration’s program to “promote democracy” in the East. If we consider the military component, the Pentagon was interested in assessing the effectiveness of the GSSOP II training program for puppet armies in the post-Soviet space. Well, a real assessment of the combat effectiveness of the Russian (as it sounds in all documents from American sources) army.

For our FSB and GRU, the task was set differently - to contribute to the defeat of the Georgian army and to seize objects of interest. Our GRU was interested in three modern electrical installations built by the Americans in Georgia. Radar station in Anaklia, air defense center near Gori, air defense radar on a mountain near Tbilisi. The first two were captured and taken away.

The plan for the American operation in Georgia was revealed in the spring, a few months before the war. It is known that Bush personally gave “permission” to the war, that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who arrived in Tbilisi a month before the war, discussed the details of the operation there, assuring that the Russians would not dare to attack Georgia.

Back in 2006, there was a plan in Georgia code-named “Throw the Tiger,” which envisaged, by May 1, 2006, with the support of the United States and the OSCE, forcing Russia to withdraw its peacekeepers from South Ossetia. Following this, in order to destabilize the situation in the region, several high-profile provocations were to be organized within a week against the population of Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia. At the same time, under the pretext of localizing the conflict area and ensuring the safety of the Georgian population living in close proximity to it, it was planned to create groups of Georgian troops on the border with South Ossetia. On May 6, formations, military units and divisions of law enforcement agencies of Georgia with different directions all major settlements of South Ossetia were to be captured while simultaneously completely blocking the border with Russian Federation. Next, according to the plan, was the arrest of the actual leadership of South Ossetia and their bringing to trial. Then martial law was to be introduced in the republic, a provisional government was appointed and a curfew was established. In total, the Georgian military was given 7 days for this operation. The existence of such a plan was confirmed in an interview with Reuters former minister Defense of Georgia Irakli Okruashvili.

In 2007, President Saakashvili demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. The largest base was Akhalkalaki. The troops were withdrawn ahead of schedule - on November 15, 2007, although the withdrawal was planned during 2008. Only Russian peacekeepers remained, acting under the CIS mandate in Abkhazia and under the Dagomys agreements in South Ossetia.

During Saakashvili's presidency, Georgia set a world record for military budget growth, increasing it more than 33 times from 2003 to 2008. The Georgian leadership sharply increased its military budget, trying to bring its armed forces to NATO standards. The Georgian budget for 2008 planned expenditures for the Ministry of Defense equivalent to $0.99 billion, which amounted to more than 25% of all Georgian budget revenues for 2008.

Georgia's arms suppliers included the United States, England, France, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Serbia and others, although the Serbian plant that produces Kalashnikov assault rifles denies direct deliveries and suggests that the assault rifles came to Georgia through Croatia and Bosnia . Ukraine supplied the following types of weapons to Georgia: Osa and Buk air defense systems, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, training aircraft L-39, self-propelled guns (including heavy 2S7 “Pion” 203 mm caliber) as well as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and small arms. Georgian special forces were trained by American specialists according to a program that was tested in Croatia in 1995 as part of the operation of the Croatian armed forces to capture the Serbska Krajina region, the majority of whose population were ethnic Serbs

The war, which began on the night of August 7-8, was preceded by a five-day escalation of the situation on the border of the then unrecognized South Ossetia. Starting on August 3, shootings broke out at night. Observers from the OSCE and Russian military observers worked to identify the instigators and tried to resolve the situation; tripartite negotiations were held.

Actually, from the very beginning it was clear that all the provocations were carefully planned and carried out precisely by the Georgian side. Involve the Ossetians in a shootout, and then make sad faces and shout to the whole world that the bandit Ossetians are not allowing peaceful Georgians to live. Control over the actions of Georgian saboteurs and their training was carried out by specialists from the CIA.

The words of Mikheil Saakashvili before the war testify to this. “I will add that the purpose of this attack was not only to liberate South Ossetia for Georgia, but also to “drive,” as Saakashvili put it in a conversation with Burjanadze, Russian troops “on rusty tanks” and demonstrate Russian “impotence” to the whole world. In other conversations, he said that he personally wanted to put Putin in his place..." Some may find it funny, but the Georgian generals and their commander-in-chief were going to drive our army all the way to Rostov.

At 23.45 on August 7, the Georgian side began massive shelling by the forces of the artillery brigade, and in the morning the Georgian offensive began: hourly arrangement and video.

Strengths of the parties

What was the Georgian army like by the night of August 8? The main force of the group consisted of special forces units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tbilisi and the regions:
1. Elite special forces unit of Shavnabad;
2. "Anti-terrorist" special squad;
3. Department for the protection of pipelines (under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs);
4. Divisions of the first and third departments of the Main Directorate for Special Affairs;
5. Parts of the Kakheti, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Kvemo-Kartli, Gori and other regional departments of the same Main Directorate;
6. Batumi Marine Battalion;
7. Special forces brigade of the joint headquarters of the Ministry of Defense.

Total - up to 15 thousand military personnel of the Ministry of Defense, 5 thousand employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 30 thousand reservists. According to other sources, the strength of all Georgian armed forces during the conflict was 29 thousand people, including reservists. Of these, 2 thousand were at that time in Iraq, and 17 thousand in South Ossetia, plus an unspecified number of employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other law enforcement agencies.

Infantry - 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, trained under the American GSSOP II program. The 2nd brigade was in reserve, the 4th (armed with M4, suffered the greatest losses) and the 3rd covered Tskhinvali with pincers through the Znaur region and the Prissky heights with the goal of reaching Java. The 1st Brigade was in Iraq. Only one battalion of the 1st brigade was the same Georgian peacekeeping battalion that opened fire on our peacekeepers at the beginning of the war.

A full-fledged Georgian brigade has at least 1,500 people on staff.

BTT - 120 T-72 tanks, modernized by Israeli specialists.

Artillery - 80 guns, 120 mortars, 27 MLRS "Larm" and "Grad" (according to other sources, LARM are unguided projectiles for the Israeli MLRS "Linx", produced by IMI under the designation "Pounder").

Aviation - 33 airplanes and 42 helicopters.

They were opposed by about 2 thousand Ossetian militias and 340 Russian military observers. Both did not have heavy weapons in the front zone. The Ossetians kept 4 T-55 tanks in the green area on the Zar road.

According to other sources, the armored forces of the Republic of South Ossetia consisted of 20 tanks and 25 self-propelled guns, and according to Novaya Gazeta, about 80 T-72 and T-55 tanks remained after the Russian exercises “Caucasus-2008”. Ambassador at Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry Valery Kenyakin argued back in January 2006 that all the weapons that are now in Tskhinvali are the equipment that was equipped with the armed forces of the USSR and that has remained there since Soviet Union. According to him, they were talking about four T-55 tanks, several howitzers and armored vehicles.

After the arrival of units of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District, the 76th “Pskov” Airborne Division, the “Vostok” battalion of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division and the Black Sea Fleet, the composition of the Russian Army group increased to 15 thousand people. From the Abkhaz side (Kodori Gorge), up to 5 thousand Abkhaz militia personnel could be involved.

"Yamadayevites" on the march:

Georgian and South Ossetian troops have been engaged in skirmishes and fire attacks of varying intensity since late July 2008. On the evening of August 7, the parties agreed on a ceasefire, which, however, was not actually done.

Ground operation

On August 7, the Georgian army tried to occupy the Pris Heights around Tskhinvali, but this attack was repulsed. On the same day, the American Ambassador to Georgia, John Teft, reported to Washington that Georgian troops, including units with Grad-type launchers, were moving towards South Ossetia.

On the afternoon of August 7, Secretary of the Security Council of South Ossetia Anatoly Barankevich said: “Georgian troops are active along the entire border with South Ossetia. All this suggests that Georgia is beginning large-scale aggression against our republic.” Barankevich also suggested that the Georgian military has plans to carry out an assault on Tskhinvali in the near future.

According to some reports, on the evening of August 7, part of the units of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District was alerted and received an order to advance to Tskhinvali. After the war, the Georgian side began to declare this, publishing its intelligence information in September 2008.

At 7 pm on August 7, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili made a special address on television: “... a few hours ago I issued an order, a very painful order, as commander in chief, so that not a single Georgian unit, not a single police and other unit subject to our control , did not return fire... I propose a ceasefire, I propose to immediately hold negotiations... I propose that the Russian Federation be the guarantor of South Ossetian autonomy on the territory of Georgia." “I am ready to take this step for the sake of peace, and I am ready for the Georgian state to forgive all the crimes that were committed over the past years, so that we achieve peace, and so that the peace process and negotiations move forward... for the sake of peace, we are ready to take to any compromise, to any agreement."

Half an hour before midnight, the artillery brigade begins a hurricane shelling of the positions of the Ossetians and our peacekeepers.

At 3.00 Spetsnaz, 1st, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades go on the offensive.

A traffic jam of advancing troops formed at the crossing and was hit by an Ossetian mortar battery. Unimaginable chaos began, some of the reservists, throwing down their weapons, began to retreat and came under fire from the special forces of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Many of the reservists were from the region bordering Armenia, ethnic Armenians, and they all fled.

Only Maxim Akopyan died, there were several wounded. This stalled the advance for an hour.

First day video:

All that is visible in the footage is the center of the city around the headquarters of the peacekeeping forces.

The heaviest fighting took place in the “upper town” of military observers. There, 140 Russian soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Timerman held the defense for almost two days. After the artillery attack, their communications failed, Georgian tanks went on the attack twice.

The car park is on fire:

By evening, a reconnaissance platoon made its way to the “upper town” to help, providing communications. It was Captain Ukhvatov’s reconnaissance platoon; in a night battle they destroyed the servants of the Grad installation and captured a spotter.

Two tanks broke through. The one standing near the barracks was burned by their own during the retreat (the ammunition was shot, the chassis was damaged), the retreat of the main forces was covered by the captain and 4 soldiers, by lunchtime the paratroopers of the 54th Airborne Battalion came out to them).

According to the recollections of Georgian soldiers, “artillery support was only available if you knew the numbers of the mobile artillery officers.” Often the gunner was an ordinary infantryman, who gave commands on his mobile phone like “a little further and to the right... no, no, I made a mistake a little to the left.”

In total, under different commands, at different times of 3 days, up to 2 thousand Ossetians fought in Tskhinvali (according to other estimates - no less than three thousand).

The battle for Tskhinvali continued until 16.00, then the Georgian units retreated to their original positions, losing 7 tanks (3 on the square in front of the parliament, 1 “upper town”, 3 “oak grove”), 2 “Cobra” armored cars (Turkish wheeled armored personnel carrier based on the American armored car HMMWV). In one of them they found a body with a Ukrainian passport with the surname Borisenko.

In 15-20 minutes this Cobra will be shot down, trophy video:

12.00 Russia entered the war.

Russian aviation is bombing Georgian troops throughout the entire depth of the front line and rear bases. They bombed the roads to Tskhinvali, in one of these bombings, in the “oak grove” they burned 3 tanks, a truck, a Chevrolet of the medical service and 22 Georgian soldiers of the 42nd battalion of the 4th infantry brigade.

"Oak Grove" number 3:

The 42nd battalion fled in panic, the commanders and Americans jumped into their cars and rushed off. Those who did not have time to get into the cars fled at a run. All this army rushed past the 43rd battalion, which followed its comrades. The commander of the 42nd battalion died in battle the next day.

2 reinforced battalions (800 people) of the 58th Army under the command of General Khrulev begin to make their way to Tskhinvali. By the end of the day, they managed to recapture the village of Tbet and break the encirclement of the city.

On August 9, the Georgian parliament unanimously approved the decree of President Mikheil Saakashvili declaring martial law and full mobilization for a period of 15 days. In the text of the decree, the introduction of martial law was justified by the need to “prevent destabilization in the region, armed attacks on civilians and acts of violence, in order to protect human rights and freedoms.”

The first loss of the Russian Air Force in the August War. An SU-25BM aircraft of Colonel Oleg Terebunsky from the 368th Assault Aviation Regiment (Budennovsk airfield), shot down over the territory of South Ossetia in the Zarsky Pass area, between Java and Tskhinvali. He was hit by a MANPADS missile from South Ossetian militias at about 6 p.m. on August 8. The crash of the burning plane and its wreckage were recorded on video by a film crew from the Russian state TV channel Vesti and shown on television as the downing of a Georgian plane. The misidentification of the aircraft, which caused "friendly fire" and led to the first combat loss, likely occurred due to the fact that this was one of the first Russian aircraft sorties in the conflict, and the South Ossetian side was not yet aware of the participation of Russian aircraft in it.
In addition, just a few hours earlier, four Georgian Su-25 bombed a nearby area, after which the Ossetians had reason to assume that Georgian air raids would continue. Lieutenant Colonel Terebunsky successfully ejected and was quickly discovered and evacuated by the Russian side.
Anton Lavrov Torzhok

And here is what we managed to dig up from our colleagues from “Russia”. Consider the "source", with all the replicas.

Battle or “ambush of Khrulev’s column”:

At about 15.00, the BTG went on the offensive, the task was to reach the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali to the “upper town”. The BTG column passed what was a Georgian post, and the reservists and tank crew left the position without a fight. Moving through the city in the direction of the “Upper Town”, in the “Shanghai” microdistrict, the column literally “ran into” soldiers of the 2nd Georgian Infantry Brigade. In the ensuing oncoming battle, General Khrulev was wounded in the shin.

All 8 Georgian intelligence officers were killed, they were literally mowed down at point-blank range. The battle distances were almost 8-10 meters. But one of the Georgian soldiers managed to throw a grenade, a fragment of which wounded General Khrulev. Part of the column with the wounded retreated to the height of Sarabuk, 5 km away, the other went further, occupying the outskirts of the city at the foot of the "Upper Town" high-rise building.

The battle in the city lasted about seven hours.

The video clearly shows how the BTG enters the city, Major Denis Vetchinov blows up an abandoned Georgian tank in the “oak grove” area. Then the BTG walks through the city and on the very outskirts, a concrete fence on the left, enters into battle with the forward company of the 2nd Georgian Infantry Battalion entering the city.

Captain Semiletov's group in eight infantry fighting vehicles, having defeated the leading company of the Georgian 2nd Infantry Brigade at the brewery, walked another two blocks, reaching the outskirts. Here, in the area of ​​kindergarten 14, ours began a battle with the main forces of the 2nd Georgian Infantry Brigade, immediately losing 2 infantry fighting vehicles.

During a 7-hour battle in the Shanghai microdistrict, Russian soldiers destroyed a Georgian tank and armored personnel carrier. At the intersection, a Georgian jeep with a machine gun crawled under the tracks, and they were shot at point-blank range. By nightfall, having used up ammunition on all six infantry fighting vehicles, the group retreated. The scouts put about 30 civilians from nearby houses in the BMP, who had come running for help.

After the battle, the bodies of dead Georgians remained in the place of the notorious “ambush”.

By the end of August 9, the Georgians retreat to their strongholds and fortified positions. Behind them remain 4 mountains hanging over Tskhinvali, and fortified areas in Nikozi and surrounding Georgian villages.

At night, a powerful artillery attack on Tskhinvali followed again, and early in the morning, Georgian units repeated the assault attempt. This time they met more organized resistance, falling into the “fire bags” of the Ossetians, they were unable to advance to the center. The battle continued until the evening.

200 aircraft of the Transcaucasian Military District destroyed all airfields in Georgia, even bombed two fields of flying clubs.

August 8, 2008
(1) 9:45 2 Russian military fighters dropped about 3-5 bombs near the village of Shavshvebi, on the highway between Poti and Tbilisi and 300-500 meters from Georgian military radars (they bombed the radar, damaged antennas and a warehouse).
(2) 10:30 Russian Su-24s bombed the village of Variani in the Kareli region, 75 kilometers west of Tbilisi. Seven civilians were wounded (the rear base of the 4th brigade was bombed, the fuel depot and the ammunition depot were destroyed).
(3) 10:57 Two of the six Russian planes dropped three bombs in Gori. One of them fell near the stadium, the second near the Gorijvari slope and the third near the artillery brigade (reservists were bombed, the losses were listed as civilian).
(4) 15:05 Russian warplanes drop two bombs on the Vaziani military airport (reservists were bombed).
(5) (6) 16:30 30 Russian air bombs fell in Marneuli and Bolnisi, on the territory of military air bases, 20 km and 35 km south of Tbilisi, respectively. Two planes were destroyed on the ground. In addition, several buildings were destroyed and there were casualties.
(7) 17:00 Second bombing of the military air base in Marneuli (the runway was destroyed, 2 Su-25s were damaged, there were no more cars in the parking lot).
(8) 17:35 The military air base in Marneuli, 20 km south of Tbilisi, was bombed for the third time, resulting in 1 person killed and 4 injured. As a result of three explosions, three aircraft were destroyed (fuel tankers burned out).
(9) 18:45 The Georgian artillery brigade in Gori was bombed by five Russian aircraft.

August 9, 2008
(10) 00:12 The military port of Poti came under rocket fire, killing 4 civilians, one policeman, wounding 33 reservists, and killing Navy Corporal Pichhaya.
(11) 00:17 Bombing of the Senaki military base, 1 soldier and 5 reservists were killed. The railway station at Senaki was also bombed, killing eight.
(12) 00:20 Vaziani airfield, which is 2-3 kilometers from Tbilisi International Airport, was bombed again.
(13) 01:00 Poti, the port was hit by a Tochka-U tactical missile.
(14) 1:20 Bombing of Gatchiani in the Gardabani areas (not a clear fact, most likely a “free hunt”).
(15) 10:00 The Russian Air Force bombed the Kopitnari airfield a few kilometers from Kutaisi (a very successful bombing, half of the Georgian aircraft were destroyed).
(16) 10:22 The Russian Air Force continues to bomb Gori.
(17) 12:40 Kopitnari airfield was bombed again (finished off).
(18) 14:00 The Russian Air Force bombed the positions of the 5th brigade, including the airfield in the village of Omarishara
(19) 16:35 They bombed (no data).
(20) 22:30 The Russian Air Force bombed Chkhalta, the administrative center of Upper Abkhazia. No casualties have been reported.

August 10, 2008
(21) 5:45 A Russian bomber entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan and dropped 3 bombs on the Tbilisi aircraft plant (they bombed the plant’s runway).
(22) 7:40 Russian bombs fell in the village of Urta in the Zugdidi region (preparing for an offensive, bombing the police and reservists).
(23) 8:45 Ten Russian planes attacked Upper Abkhazia.
(24) 11:15 In the village of Shavshvebi, between Gori and Kareli, a field airfield of attack helicopters was bombed, 3 MI-24s burned down.
(25) 15:00 The Russians bombed the village of Knolevi in ​​the northern region of Kareli (3rd brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces).
(26) 15:10 Russian troops and Abkhaz militias shell the Kodori Gorge.
(27) 16:05 Burn, military bases were bombed.
(28) 16:10 Russian aircraft fired at the only remaining bridge on the highway connecting the eastern and western parts of the country.
(29) 19:05 Tbilisi civil airport, radar destroyed by X-59 missile.
(30) 19:10 "Tbilaviamsheni" aviation plant, the runway was bombed.
(31) 19:35 Two bombers bombed Senaki (Western Georgia).
(32) 20:25 Two bombers bombed the Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia).

August 11, 2008
(33) 00:30 A radar station in the village of Shavshvebi, west of Gori, was hit by an airstrike.
(34) 00:31 Bombed the Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia).
(35) 3:05 Villages of Sharabidzhebi, Kapandichi and Makkhov near Batumi (Georgian-Turkish border). Batumi airport was bombed.
(36) 3:12 The territory of the military base in Khelvachauri (near the Georgian-Turkish border) was bombed.
(37) 3:26 Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia). Artillery fire from ships.
(38) 4:30 Central command center of the Georgian Air Force, bomb attack.
(39) 4:37 A civilian radar station in the village of Yeninisi, 5 kilometers from the center of Tbilisi, was partially destroyed by Russian bombing.
(40) 5:00 Russian planes bombed the Shiraki airfield in the Dedoplistskaro region in the east of the country.
(41) 6:10 The Gori tank battalion was bombed again (36 killed).
(42) 7:15 Senaki airport, runway and Senaki military base were bombed by Russian planes (3 helicopters were destroyed).

August 12, 2008
(43) 09:30 - 10:55 The central square and market in Gori (the collection point for Georgian reservists) were bombed.

Animated map of air bombing strikes of the Russian Air Force with a point-by-point layout:

There were 4 reconnaissance groups of the fleet operating on the shore - they did not suffer any losses, they completed their combat missions. An air defense radar damaged by aviation, an S-125 air defense division, 6 ships and a coastal radar station were blown up.

Currently Navy Georgia was disbanded, the surviving 2 "Vultures" were handed over to the coast guard, and two landing ships were decommissioned.

Ground operation

On the morning of August 10, advanced Russian units entered the city, the same BTGs of the 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments, a company of the Vostok battalion and paratroopers of the 76th division.

Junior Lieutenant V.V. Neff, the commander of the T-62 platoon, strategically positioned his tanks at the intersection of Moskovskaya and Chochiev streets and organized surveillance.

In the battle near school No. 12, tankers of junior lieutenant Neff burned a Georgian T-72 tank at point-blank range and shot the servants of a mortar battery in the school yard; in the battle on August 10, the tank was hit by two shots from an RPG (Vitaly Neff was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation).

By mid-day on August 10, the city and immediate surroundings were completely cleared of Georgian troops, the Georgians fled, leaving the corpses of their killed comrades on the streets

A network of battalion tactical groups began an operation to encircle the enemy. The air assault battalions of the Pskov division bypassed Tskhinvali along the “Likhvan corridor”, capturing Georgian villages.

On the night of August 11, the BTG broke through the front and reached Gori, capturing a height with a television tower and a Georgian battery of D-30 howitzers. The crews simply fled, coming under fire.

A rumor spread that the Russians were already in Gori, our aircraft were constantly flying over the city, the Georgians had no communications, the command had disappeared.

In the evening and at night, the Georgian army, huddled in a huge herd, ran along the Georgian Military Road to Tbilisi. The commander was the first to do this, “moved due to shell shock,” as he now explains. The others began to follow him.

Russian armored formations captured the 3rd and 4th brigades near Tskhinvali. The troops who found themselves surrounded abandoned their equipment and weapons and fled, dressed in civilian clothes.

Video of the fight.

On the morning of August 12, everything was over, President Medvedev announced the end of the “peace enforcement operation.”

Losses of the parties.

Aviation (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army) lost 4 aircraft: 1 Tu-22, 2 Su 25 and 1 Su-24 (according to some sources, another Su-24, although most likely the dispute is about the wreckage of a Georgian plane shot down over Gufta ).

Infantry
67 fighters (mostly those who were hit by artillery on August 8-9). Name list. Other sources call 71 dead and 340 wounded. According to Georgia - up to 400 killed.

Georgia

Aviation - 25 airplanes and 37 helicopters (see above).

Shot down and captured
68 T-72
25 BMP-1/2 (including Ukrainian BMP-1U Shkval)
14 BTR-70/80

65 tanks of the Georgian army and 15 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles were captured (21 captured tanks were destroyed).

The number of armored vehicles damaged and burned in battles is 19 T-72 tanks.

Air defense
5 Osa missile launchers (division), 4 Buk missile launchers (Ukraine), 2 Israeli-made Spider missile launchers were captured.

The S-125 division was destroyed near Poti.

11 trucks, 4 armored personnel carriers, 2 German mine clearance vehicles, 37 guns and 96 mortars were captured.

Infantry
Killed: 180 - army, 29 - Ministry of Internal Affairs, 111 - reservists, National Guard(all on the list of civilians).

Sanitary losses: 1964 wounded.

According to Georgia: 412 dead (including 170 military personnel and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 228 civilians), 1,747 wounded and 24 missing. According to other sources, the total losses are up to 3,000 people among the army and law enforcement officers.

South Ossetia

According to various estimates, from 162 to 1692 dead.

Abkhazia - 1 dead and two wounded.

US losses

2 killed instructors who were in Georgian combat formations in Tskhinvali (data closed). According to other sources, they were captured in the village. Kekhvi.

2 prisoners.
One was captured near Tskhinvali (data closed).

The second, Winston Fraserley, was wounded and left by the Georgians on the street of Tskhinvali, introducing himself as a journalist.

A year later, it became no clearer about American losses.

And here are the most curious revelations of Israeli military advisers.

08.08 morning, the 4th Infantry enters Tskhinvali in a slender crowd, walking along Heroes Street

www.youtube.com/v/6Cme25yYBcg?version=3
there's no time for fun here

The first day of the war in Tskhinvali
www.youtube.com/v/fUQ4DHvPGnQ?version=3
the assault was repulsed, the Georgians had already retreated, around 17.00

Hit "Dots"
www.youtube.com/v/F8XN0lPmg-A?version=3

This is Gori 10.08. at the end, you can see an explosion at a tank base http://mreporter.ru/reports/2108

Morning 08.08 Ossetian filming of the city http://mreporter.ru/reports/2559

Strike on 09.08 at 14.00 by our artillery brigade on Georgian batteries on the Prissky Heights http://mreporter.ru/reports/2522

Video of the “upper town” of MS, a broken barracks in which they held the defense.
www.youtube.com/v/85nD_kevQ-0?version=3
And
www.youtube.com/v/F8hZyjZtwBg?version=3
bombing of the "Upper Town" filmed from Eredvi.

Here, fighters from a position remove the burning car park of the upper town.
www.youtube.com/v/E8tMXQJIC1o?version=3

Amateur video, driving along Heroev Street
www.youtube.com/v/iEFDrXTcR38?version=3

The corpses of killed Georgian tank crews and soldiers of the 4th Infantry Brigade.

The first day of the war, the 42nd battalion is in the “oak grove”, the 41st is bombed, then everyone runs away.
www.youtube.com/v/uXASj0U_xPA?version=3

Those who have not yet managed to escape
www.youtube.com/v/N5lUELciC0o?version=3

Video, "oak grove", corpses.
www.youtube.com/v/I8LG5aiL2Mc?version=3
All 22 were killed after attack by attack aircraft 08/08/08

This one was luckier, he was captured by the Ossetians
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhZberA3o6A

These, too, sit in the Ossetian KGB
www.youtube.com/v/wBE54oks2AU?version=3

After the attack on Gori
www.youtube.com/v/iP8utJiO80k?version=3

Wounded Sladkov and Khrulev
www.youtube.com/v/T5r1BBBsnjU?version=3

Marneuli airfield, rocket debris
www.youtube.com/v/OI5F8A3eDAA?version=3