The USSR collapsed not only thanks to politicians, but also for objective reasons, Russian historian Efim Pivovar is convinced.
On November 25, a presentation of the book by the famous Soviet and Russian historian, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, President of the Russian State Humanitarian University Efim Pivovar “The Eurasian integration project in the post-Soviet space: 1991 - 2015” took place in Astana. (Prerequisites, formation, development).” During the discussion, questions about the CIS flowed into a different direction - was the collapse of the USSR inevitable? Efim Pivovar, as a specialist in social history, is still inclined to believe that the collapse of the Union was due to the influence of inevitable and objective social processes.
The President of the Russian State University for the Humanities noted that the last stage of the development of the USSR coincided with the scientific and technological revolution (STR).
The growth of education played against the USSR
— Two elements of scientific and technological revolution are objective, they cannot be avoided. The first is the constant increase in the education of the population. What was the level of education in the 40s of the last century? At that time, the vast majority of the population had only completed primary school. After 1969, the whole country began to receive secondary education (we will not delve into the issue of its quality). It is no longer possible to convince a person who has a secondary education of clearly absurd things.
Education creates the need to constantly receive information, and the Soviet system was based on the fact that information needs to be dosed
or prevent its receipt,” explained Pivovar.
This, according to the scientist, was the first objective social process that led to the collapse of the Soviet system, which was unable to oppose anything to it.
The second thing the professor focused on was the creation of a consumer society thanks to scientific and technological revolution.
— Of course, in the USSR there was essentially pseudo-consumption. However, the process of formation of a consumer society began in Soviet time. For example, it was under the Union that the motorization of the population began, that is, the individualization of the family took place - having your own car made it possible to transport your relatives not on a bus, but in your own car, the historian explained.
Already in the late USSR, an understanding of the value of consumption arose, the Russian scientist emphasized. Soviet man I already wanted to have a house, a car, household appliances. It would seem - primitive needs, however
shortage of goods consumer consumption came into deep conflict with the emerging values of consumer society
And this became the second objective social process that undermined the Soviet system, the expert believes.
Urbanization of the Union has hit the agricultural sector
Finally, the third social process that contributed to the collapse of the USSR is the urbanization of the late Soviet Union.
— If in the early 60s every second citizen of the Union lived in a village, then in the 70s already 76% of the population lived in cities. Every fourth citizen lived in a city with a population of one million. Agriculture by this time had become completely inefficient,
distribution famine began when those who produced it went to the city to buy sausage
This is the third objective social process that ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR and the destruction of the system. The Stalinist regime could have closed information about another world and forced people to live as if on an island. But the system of the late USSR did not allow this,” the historian concluded.
However, the presence of these objective processes does not eliminate questions related to subjective factors: the activities of leaders, the clash between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which played a key role in the collapse of the USSR, says Efim Pivovar.
The famous German “Kremlin expert” Eberhard Schneider believes that Gorbachev initiated the Novo-Ogarevo process too late, and it was no longer possible to preserve the Soviet Union in any form. The USSR was doomed.
On April 23, 1991, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and the leaders of nine union republics began negotiations on the creation of a new state - the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics. These negotiations went down in history as the Novoogarevo process. In an interview with Deutsche Welle, Professor Eberhard Schneider from research center EU-Russia stated that Gorbachev's proposal to create a new federal state was belated and could no longer prevent the collapse of the USSR.
Deutsche Welle: From your point of view, was the collapse of the USSR inevitable 20 years ago?
Let's look at the situation in which the Soviet Union was then. From my point of view, there were economic, ideological, domestic and foreign policy problems, as well as the desire for independence of the union republics, which ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR. The collapse of the country was not predetermined, but in a situation where these problems were not resolved, it became inevitable.
The catalyst for the process of disintegration was the August 1991 putsch, which was a reaction to Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the country. The putsch sharply escalated internal problems The USSR accelerated the process of collapse. That is, the putschists, who actually tried to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union and stop Gorbachev’s reforms, achieved the opposite effect. So the collapse of the USSR had, on the one hand, objective prerequisites - unresolved internal problems, and on the other, an event that sharply accelerated this process.
It turns out that the Soviet Union collapsed as a result of a fatal combination of circumstances - economic, political, ideological. What reasons were decisive?
Take economics. It is obvious that the planned system had outlived its usefulness by that time. In a progressively developing industrial society - and the USSR was also on the way to it - it is impossible to prescribe 30 thousand national planning standards. It is impossible to spend 18% of gross domestic product on military purposes year after year.
Ideology. No one cared about the Politburo anymore, and no one believed in the official communist ideology. People received more and more information about the West and saw it as an alternative model, which further undermined faith in communism. If the country had passed then free elections, the communists would have received at most 10% of the votes.
Politically, Gorbachev began to transform the system, adapt it to new conditions, introduced the post of president of the country, thereby depriving the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee of some of the powers. Then the party itself found itself split both vertically and horizontally. Some communists strove for democracy, and horizontally the centrifugal tendencies of isolation of the national communist parties of the republics that were part of the USSR intensified.
The republics, in turn, also wanted independence from Moscow. Gorbachev’s proposal to create new federation(Novoogaryovsky process. - Ed.) was belated. But from a foreign policy point of view, the Soviet empire was at its limit; it could not maintain its previous positions on the world stage, in particular in Cuba, Vietnam, Mozambique or Angola.
Gorbachev's tragedy was that although he understood the need for change, in reality events developed faster than in his head. His own perestroika proceeded more slowly than that in the country. Gorbachev did not keep up with events and was late with his proposals.
The experience of Yugoslavia shows that the collapse of a multinational state can be very bloody. That is, it could have been much worse. But could it be better? Could the collapse of the USSR have occurred in a more civilized manner and with fewer economic losses?
If there had been no putsch, the process of disintegration would most likely have happened differently. Gorbachev led the way to transform the CPSU into a kind of social democratic party. With the new party program that he was going to propose to the next congress, if I’m not mistaken, in 1992, Gorbachev wanted to force conservatives to leave the party, based on the fact that they would refuse to vote for it.
Gorbachev wanted to achieve modernization of both the CPSU and the country; even then he began to try out some forms of a market economy: he provided the opportunity for Komsomol members - that is, younger and more flexible communists - to create their own companies that received, for example, customs benefits. Khodorkovsky, by the way, was one of them. If not for the putsch, the process would have developed. But Gorbachev acted too slowly.
An alternative to the collapse of the USSR could have been the creation of a functioning union of independent states, but this concept failed. From my point of view, there will not be a closer integration of Russia and Belarus either. This was the idea of Yeltsin’s entourage, put forward in 1996, in order to clear Yeltsin of accusations of the collapse of the USSR and inattention to the threat of the collapse of Russia. This design was not fully thought out even then, and will not be implemented now - due to the positions of political leaders in Moscow and Minsk. Lukashenko is extremely distrustful of Moscow. If an alliance with Russia is created, he is afraid that he will be degraded, at best, to the level of the head of one of the Russian regions.
What has some promise are three- or four-sided designs of a common economic space - Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and, as Moscow hopes, someday Ukraine. Have a chance of success and attempts to create Customs Union, which already exists with known limitations. In the future, a union similar to the EU with free movement is possible work force, capital and services.
This design has a chance of success, but only individual states will participate in it former USSR. I consider the general reintegration of the former Soviet Union in any form to be a hopeless undertaking.
InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.
Every August after 1991, we remember the State Emergency Committee, the failed “putsch,” Mikhail Gorbachev, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, and ask the question: was there an alternative to the collapse of a great country?
Not long ago I came across a Soviet book of fairy tales of the peoples of the USSR with a remarkable picture on the cover. A Russian boy plays the harmonica, and children of different nations start dancing. We can say that all nationalities dance to the Russian accordion. Or you can look at it another way: while everyone is having fun, the Russian is working.
"Leninskaya national policy“built political, cultural and economic relations in the USSR in such a way that they most closely began to resemble the proverb “one with a fry, and seven with a spoon.” Moreover, this was not about an accidental mistake, not about a distortion, but about the conscious policy of the Bolsheviks, who believed that it was necessary to humiliate the Russian people in order to elevate others at the expense of their hated “great power.” Even the head of the Soviet government, Rykov, was dismissed from his post after declaring that he “considers it unacceptable that other nations live at the expense of the Russian peasant.”
By 1990, a situation had developed in the USSR with the distribution of contributions to production and income distribution across republics, which was reflected in the published table. Only two republics – the RSFSR and Belarus – were “competitive” and produced more than they consumed. The remaining thirteen “sisters” walked “with a spoon.”
Some people had a small spoon - Ukraine, and we understand that the east of Ukraine produced, and even in abundance, but the west consumed, and, at the same time, was striving for independence.
The Central Asian republics produced very little, but also consumed relatively little, although only in Kyrgyzstan the level of consumption was slightly lower than in the RSFSR.
The Baltic republics produced a lot, but consumed much more; in fact, the Soviet leaders tried to bribe them with a standard of living that was prohibitively high for the USSR.
But Transcaucasia found itself in the most astonishing situation. With relatively modest production, there was a huge volume of consumption, which was also noticeable visually to those who had to visit Georgia - personal houses, cars, carpets, feasts with barbecue and endless toasts...
At the same time, in all these republics they liked to speculate that it was they who fed “bottomless Russia” and the rest of the parasites of the large Soviet collective farm. And as soon as they separate, they will live even richer.
In fact, this entire magnificent banquet was paid for by the Russian peasant, worker and engineer. Each of the 147 million inhabitants of the RSFSR actually gave 6 thousand dollars annually to cover the difference between production and consumption of residents of other republics. Since there were a lot of Russians, there was enough for everyone, although for a truly fun life the republic had to be small, proud and passionately hate the “drunk and lazy Russian occupiers”, so that the comrades from the Politburo would have reason to douse the fire with money.
There was another problem with the huge population of the Central Asian republics. It was not particularly luxurious, but it was constantly increasing. At the same time, labor productivity in these republics practically did not increase. Inside the USSR, its own Third World was swelling.
The Russians (and by “Russians,” I, of course, mean all the peoples inhabiting Russia), who were the largest, most educated, and most professionally developed part of the population of the USSR, felt a deep discontent, although they did not fully understand its source. But constantly faced with the fact that seats in restaurants, all the first places in line for the Volga, are occupied by representatives of other nations, and if you are Russian, then access to the coveted feeding trough requires additional privileges from the party and government, Russians felt the Soviet system ever-increasing discomfort. There was a feeling that you were plowing and plowing, but not on yourself. But on who? In theory - for the state, for the common good, for the coming socialism. In practice, it turned out that they were cunning shop workers from Batumi and arrogant descendants of the SS men from Jurmala.
The Soviet system was designed in such a way that to produce within its framework national revolution, giving the Russian people more power, opportunities and material benefits was impossible. It was already unthinkable to abolish the republics in the 1970s and 80s. This means that the USSR was doomed, since the Russians were trotting around without any gratitude and with pokes in the back (and whoever did not live in 1989-91 cannot imagine the hatred Russians often faced in Georgia or Estonia, or Western Ukraine) agree not completely.
The collapse of the Union was arranged extremely vilely and not to our advantage. According to the mind, it was necessary to create a political and economic union of Russia, Belarus, Eastern Ukraine and Kazakhstan, sending the rest to seek happiness in free sailing. Instead, they split the country along Soviet administrative boundaries, resulting in the Russian people being cut into pieces. Crimea, industrial centers of Donbass, Nikolaev shipyards, and much more were cut off from us...
But let's look at the selfish consumer result that came out of this disaster. For the first time in their history for tens, and maybe hundreds of years, Russians began to work for themselves. And with the advent of the Putin era, a real consumer boom began. As a result, today we scold the government, sitting in front of our brand new MacBooks, we curse the Moscow traffic jams ourselves, creating them with expensive foreign cars, and some cry bitterly over the burning parmesan without doubting for a second their ability to buy it.
Yes, this consumerism was lopsided, because while some lived in luxurious mansions on Rublyovka, others barely scraped together enough for a mortgage, but everyone got it from the common table. Without feeding “seven with a spoon,” the Russians were able to afford, if not luxurious life, then certainly more prosperous than those of the fallen outskirts.
And those, for the most part, fell into economic, social and political hell. Even the Baltics, where a relatively decent life is now ensured by EU subsidies and, most importantly, by a rapid population decline, feels that it has seriously lost compared to the Soviet era. For the most part, the former republics are entirely dependent on handouts from Russia in the form of the purchase of goods or money sent from our Moscow towns by guest workers.
Introduction
Disintegration processes began in the Soviet Union already in the mid-1980s. During this period, in the conditions of weakening ideological dictatorship and the omnipotence of the CPSU, a crisis of the national-state structure of the country manifested itself. It turned out that there are many ethnic conflicts in the country that, in the context of glasnost, surfaced (for example, Georgian-Abkhazian, Armenian-Azerbaijani). Nationalist movements were gaining strength in the republics, which were partly supported by the republican leadership, who feared for their fate in the light of the uncertain prospects of the CPSU. In a number of republics, relations between the titular nations and the Russians worsened. The leadership of the Soviet Union tried to take control of the nationalist movements, encouraging the “growth national identity of all nations." But, as it turned out, the country’s leadership did not have a program for solving national problems or the ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to the aggravation of ethnic conflicts. As a result, armed clashes escalated into interethnic wars. Attempts to solve the problem of nationalism with the help of troops did not lead to positive results, and further pushed national movements into the struggle to secede from the USSR.
The weakening of the union was facilitated by the growing economic crisis. M. Gorbachev and the central government, clearly unable to cope with the task of overcoming the economic downturn and reforming the economy, lost authority every year both among the people and the leadership of the union republics.
The center was unable to develop a new unifying ideology to replace the outdated communist one. As a result of all this, the national center, left without a supranational idea, objectively worked against a single state.
In this work we will try to trace the main stages of the collapse of the USSR and its consequences.
1. Socio-economic prerequisites for the collapse of the USSR
1.1 Disintegration processes in the USSR
Nationalism and separatism appeared in the very first years of perestroika. On December 17–19, 1986, in Almaty, under the pretext that Kolbin was appointed to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan instead of Kunaev, thousands of young Kazakhs created chaos. Two Russian warriors died, over a thousand people turned to medical institutions for help. Troops were used to restore order. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region has escalated into war. All attempts to stop this conflict came to nothing.
Along with spontaneous manifestations of nationalism, nationalist organizations, the so-called Popular Fronts, were created. The movement for national independence gained its greatest scope in the Baltic republics.
One of the forms of this struggle was criticism Soviet history. In August 1987, in connection with the anniversary of the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, demonstrations took place in the Baltic states demanding the publication of secret protocols and the public being told about the mass deportations of Stalin’s times. On November 16, 1988, the Supreme Council of Estonia approved amendments and additions to the Constitution of the republic, allowing its highest authorities to suspend the operation of legislative acts of the USSR. At the same time, a declaration on the sovereignty of the republic was adopted. On November 17–18, the Supreme Council of Lithuania introduced an addition to the Constitution on giving Lithuanian language state status. Similar additions were made to the Constitutions of Estonia (December 1988) and Latvia (May 1989). In 1989, the Baltic People's Fronts declared the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact illegal, and therefore the inclusion of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the USSR illegal. The leader of the Lithuanian People's Front "Sąjūdis" V. Landsbergis in "Manifestelite Freedom" announced that his organization aims the conquest of power in the republic and the proclamation of its complete independence. The same goals were proclaimed by the Popular Fronts of Estonia and Latvia.
In April 1989, a rally took place in Tbilisi under the slogans “Independence of Georgia” and “Down with the Russian Empire.” The Georgian leadership was at a loss. The Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Republic appealed to the Central Committee of the CPSU with a request to introduce a state of emergency. It was decided to send troops to Tbilisi. On the night of April 8-9, the meeting was dispersed by troops. 16 people died. These events gave a powerful impetus to the development of the national movement in Georgia. In May-June 1989, the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was held. At it, the most radically minded deputies demanded the dismantling of the “unitary imperial state” and the formation of a new voluntary federation. But at this congress, representatives of national movements did not receive support for their demands. Having been defeated at the congress, the nationalists tried to resolve the issue of independence in the Supreme Soviets of their republics. The political struggle in the republics reached unprecedented severity. Republican communist parties tried to resist the national movements that were gaining strength, but they lost their former influence and solidity, and the Lithuanian Communist Party split into two independent parties. The desire of the leadership of some republican communist parties to rely on the support of the center undermined their authority and played into the hands of the nationalists. The results of the elections to the Supreme Councils of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, and Armenia were unsuccessful for the communists. In the Supreme Councils of these republics, supporters of national independence received a majority, who began to take steps to secede from the USSR. But even in the republics in which the communists received a majority of votes in the elections, the Supreme Soviets, one after another, began to adopt Declarations of National Sovereignty, which proclaimed, first of all, the supremacy of republican laws over those of the Union.
In the spring of 1990, the Supreme Councils of the Baltic republics adopted a declaration of independence. The Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse. The Union authorities, who did not want the expansion of the rights and independence of the republics, tried to stop the processes of sovereignization.
Doing this with military force turned out to be problematic for the center. In cases where troops were used, the country's leadership acted inconsistently and indecisively. The Tbilisi events of 1989, and then attempts by force to prevent the Baltic republics from leaving the USSR (clashes between protesters and riot police units in January 1991 in Vilnius and Riga; 14 people were killed in the capital of Lithuania) ended human sacrifices and attempts by the political leadership to shift all the blame onto the military. M. Gorbachev stated that he was not informed about the upcoming military operations. Regarding the events in the Baltic states, the President of the USSR made an ambiguous statement, from which it followed that the clashes occurred spontaneously, the military acted without instructions from above: “The events that took place in Vilnius and Riga , are in no way an expression of the line of presidential power for which it was created. And therefore I resolutely reject all speculation, all suspicions and slander about this matter... Events in the Baltic states arose in an atmosphere of severe crisis. Illegal acts, gross violation civil rights, discrimination against people of other nationalities, irresponsible behavior towards the army, military personnel and their families have created an environment, an atmosphere where this kind of skirmishes and massacres can easily arise for the most unexpected reasons.
These events actually led to the separation of the Baltic republics and a sharp decline in the authority of M.S. Gorbachev, who was given full responsibility for the massacre.
In Uzbekistan, in the Fergana Valley, clashes began between the local population of the Meskhetian Turks, who were resettled there during the years of Stalin’s repressions. The first flows of refugees from Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia appeared.
The tendency towards separatism has intensified. As a result, in any region - Russian or non-Russian - the idea appeared and began to make its way that the center was plundering territories, spending money on defense and meeting the needs of the bureaucracy, that each republic would live much better if it did not share its wealth with the center.
In response to separatist tendencies, Russian nationalism quickly began to spread. The Russians, in response to accusations of exploitation of other peoples, put forward the slogan of the robbery of Russia by the republics. Indeed, in 1990 Russia produced 60.5% of the gross national product of the USSR, provided 90% of oil, 70% of gas, 56% of coal, 92% of wood, etc. The idea arose that in order to improve the lives of Russians, it was necessary to throw off the ballast of the Union republics. A.I. was the first to formulate this idea. Solzhenitsyn. In the letter “How can we arrange Russia?” he called on the Russians to leave the other peoples of the USSR to their own fate, maintaining an alliance only with Ukraine and Belarus - the Slavic peoples.
1.2 Reforms of the political system in the USSR
Early 80s Without exception, all layers of Soviet society suffered from lack of freedom and experienced psychological discomfort. The intelligentsia wanted true democracy and individual freedom.
Most workers and employees associated the need for change with better organization and wages, a more equitable distribution of social wealth. Part of the peasantry hoped to become the true masters of their land and their labor.
However, ultimately, completely different forces determined the direction and nature of the reform of the Soviet system. These forces were the Soviet nomenclature, burdened by communist conventions and the dependence of personal well-being on official position.
Thus, by the beginning of the 80s. the Soviet totalitarian system actually loses support in society and ceases to be legitimate. Its collapse becomes a matter of time.
Death in November 1982 of L.I. Brezhnev and the rise to power of a more sensible politician Yu.V. Andropov awakened hopes in society for a possible change in life for the better. However, these hopes were not destined to come true.
Attempts by Yu.V. Andropov’s efforts to make the bureaucratic system more effective without structural changes, increased demands and control, and the fight against individual vices did not bring the country out of the crisis.
Elections in March 1985 M.S. Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee again revived hope for the possibility of real changes in the life of society. The energetic speeches of the new General Secretary showed his determination to begin to renovate the country.
Under the conditions of monopoly domination in society by one party - the CPSU, and the presence of a powerful repressive apparatus, changes could not begin “from below”; the people were waiting for changes “from above” and were ready to support them.
Gorbachev was convinced that after the reform carried out “from above”, the country would gain a second wind. The core of economic transformations was the concept of accelerating the socio-economic development of the country based on the use of the latest achievements scientific and technological progress. Proclaiming an accelerated course, M.S. Gorbachev hoped to achieve an economic recovery in a short time using minimal costs through “hidden reserves.” As a result of the transformations carried out in the USSR by the end of the 80s. the country had certain achievements in domestic and foreign policy - these successes were mainly associated with the democratization of public life.
And yet, by 1989–1990. it became obvious that the country was experiencing deep economic and political crisis, tending to deepen. Under these conditions, the confrontation between the two main political forces intensified. On the one hand, these are the “democrats” who advocated a transition to market relations. On the other hand, there is the so-called conservative wing, which is focused on saturating the goods market without creating capital and labor markets, restructuring the planned economy, actively protecting public property, etc. During the confrontation, various kinds of program documents were developed, which were not found in various kinds reasons for practical implementation. But all of them, to one degree or another, brought the country’s transition closer to market economy. Thus, the final document of the 27th Congress of the CPSU stated that “... the only alternative to the outdated administrative-command system... is a market economy.” Under the leadership of S.S. Shatalin and G.A. Yavlinsky, a project designed to transition to the market in 500 days was prepared, but was not accepted due to great dubiousness. The same fate befell the program for the transition of the USSR to a market economy for the period up to 1997, prepared by a group of Soviet economists led by the Yavlinskys, already designed for the help of the West.
The difficulties associated with the country's transition to a market economy were associated with an ambiguous political situation. The bloody events in Vilnius and the resignation of Foreign Minister E.A. were regarded as signs of a right turn. Shevardnadze.
The suddenness of all these transformations led to the emergence of crisis phenomena in the very democratic camp of Russia. Political forces, initially focused on a long-term struggle for power with a strong opponent, having received it overnight, did not have any well-thought-out options for further actions. Only a few months later, the renewed government took real steps leading to a market economy: it liberalized prices and began privatization. Moreover, it has now been openly stated that the transition to a market economy requires a transition to a new model of social development. Moreover, it is impossible to carry out this process without the help of the West, since we are talking about the return of a huge state to the orbit of world economic relations. This is where the IMF recommendations came from and continue to come from.
Thus, socialist reformism in our country failed. Having failed to create powerful incentives for economic, scientific, technical and social progress on a socialist basis, our society underwent a turn towards radical changes in the entire system of economic and social relations. At the same time, the emphasis is on the use of all forms of property, and especially private property, entrepreneurship and competition. It is assumed that in this way, taking into account proven world experience, it will be possible to finally solve the problems of increasing the efficiency of the economy.
1.3 Attempt to strengthen executive power
In order to strengthen executive power, the post of President of the USSR was established. He becomes M.S. Gorbachev. Presidents also appear in most union and autonomous republics. There is a need to sign a new Union Treaty between the republics that have declared their sovereignty. The meeting held in the spring of 1991 in Novo-Ogarevo (near Moscow) between the President of the USSR and the leaders of the republics seemed to mark the beginning of the process of stabilizing the situation in the country.
The signing of the new Union Treaty, scheduled for August 20, 1991, prompted conservatives to take decisive action, since the agreement deprived the top of the CPSU of real power, posts and privileges. According to the secret agreement of M. Gorbachev with B. Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, which became known to the Chairman of the KGB V. Kryuchkov, after the signing of the agreement it was planned to replace the Prime Minister of the USSR V. PavlovN. Nazarbayev. The same fate awaited the Minister of Defense, Kryuchkov himself, and a number of other high-ranking officials.
Another immediate reason for the development of events was the decree Russian President dated July 20, 1991 on the departition of state institutions in the RSFSR, which dealt a strong blow to the monopoly of the CPSU. Locally, the party nomenclature of iso-regional structures began to be ousted and replaced with a new one.
On the eve of the signing of a new union treaty in the absence of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, who was at that time on vacation in Foros, on the morning of August 19, television and radio announced the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), which included Vice President Yanaev, Prime Minister Pavlov, KGB Chairman Kryuchkov, and a number of other senior officials. The State Emergency Committee declared its intention to restore order in the country and prevent the collapse of the Union. A state of emergency was introduced in the country, democratic newspapers were closed, and censorship was tightened.
By introducing a state of emergency, the “Gekachepists” hoped to bring the country back: to eliminate glasnost, the multi-party system, and commercial structures. In the address “To the Soviet People”, the State Emergency Committee declared itself a true defender of democracy and reforms, and generously promised to benefit all layers of Soviet society - from pensioners to entrepreneurs - in the shortest possible time.
The main events of these days unfolded in Moscow. On August 19, tanks and armored personnel carriers were brought into the capital, blocking the main highways of the city. A curfew was announced. However, these actions caused a backlash. The putschists miscalculated the main thing - during the years of perestroika, Soviet society changed a lot. Freedom has become the highest value for people, fear has finally disappeared. The majority of the country's population refused to support unconstitutional methods of overcoming the crisis. By the evening of August 19, tens of thousands of Muscovites rushed to the House of Soviets of the RSFSR; the townspeople were promised land plots.
The resistance to the State Emergency Committee was headed by B.N. Yeltsin and the Russian leadership. They organized their supporters for protest rallies and construction of barricades near the parliament building. The troops brought into Moscow refused to shoot at the people. Given the virtual inaction of the State Emergency Committee, Yeltsin’s supporters managed to quickly turn the situation in their favor. On August 22, members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.
Analysis of the events of August 19–21, 1991 shows that their outcome was influenced not so much by force factors or the legal validity of the positions of the parties, but by a sense of the political situation, the ability to gather one’s supporters at the right time and in the right place and put the enemy in conditions in which even numerical or force superiority will not bring him victory.
One of the main goals of the State Emergency Committee was to “put pressure” on the Russian leadership, force them to sit down at the negotiating table and formulate conditions for the future Union Treaty that would be acceptable for preserving the USSR and leading the country out of the crisis. At the same time, his leaders, not without reason, counted on the rejection of M.S. by the majority of the population. Gorbachev and the lack of a mass stable political base in Yeltsin, as well as those subordinate to them, the allied leaders, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SA of the USSR. However, they underestimated the informational, political and organizational “mobilization”, the uncompromising position, the willingness of opponents to go “to the end”, as well as the population’s rejection of military intervention.
The Tbilisi, Baku and Vilnius “syndromes”, when the army was used against extremists, but was subjected to blasphemy for raising arms against the “civilian population”, made it difficult and even made it almost impossible to attract them active actions in Moscow. But in those cases, the use of the Armed Forces was still preceded by major provocations, and in the capital everything took on the appearance of a “top showdown.” In the State Emergency Committee, the position of those who proposed to involve the army to exert psychological pressure prevailed. As Marshal D.T. later said. Yazov, he agreed to join the Committee with the firm reservation that the army would be assigned the role of a passive pressing force. The reluctance of the security forces (army, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs) to participate in political “showdowns”, the active rejection of the State Emergency Committee by a number of high-ranking military personnel largely determined the outcome of the confrontation that began on August 19.
On the night of August 20-21, an incident occurred that was destined to have a significant impact on the development of the political situation. Under strange circumstances, three young men from among the “defenders” of the White House died.
The subsequent investigation of these events showed that what happened was, most likely, not an accident, but the result of a premeditated provocation. Nevertheless, the fact of shedding the blood of “civilian” residents by the military forces subordinate to the State Emergency Committee has become the last straw, which predetermined the end of the hesitations of the already unstable supporters of the Committee, allowing Russian leadership launch a full-scale political offensive against your opponents and win a complete and unconditional victory.
On the morning of August 21, the Board of the USSR Ministry of Defense spoke out about the withdrawal of troops from Moscow and the abolition of high alert.
The August events and the victory of the Russian leadership contributed to a sharp acceleration of the development of political processes and a change in the balance of power in the country. The Communist Party, which had compromised itself through the participation of members of its highest bodies in the coup, was banned. USSR President Gorbachev essentially began to play a decorative role. Most of the republics refused to sign the Union Treaty after the coup attempt. The question of the continued existence of the USSR was on the agenda.
In an attempt to get rid of the discredited center, in December 1991 the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus met in Minsk and announced the termination of the 1922 Union Treaty and their intention to create the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It united 11 former Soviet republics (without Georgia and the Baltic states.
2.The collapse of the USSR and the “parade of sovereignties”
collapse political parade sovereignty
After the August crisis, a situation arose when the decisions made by leaders were determined not by the Constitution and laws of the USSR, but by the real balance of forces and differently understood “political expediency.” Republican authorities acted without regard to the Union Center. The State Emergency Committee's speech became a convenient reason for abandoning serious integration proposals. From the end of August, the dismantling of the union's political and state structures began at an ever-increasing pace. On this basis, some historians believe that in reality the Soviet Union “died” immediately after August, continuing to formally exist until the end of the year.
Immediately after the abolition of the State Emergency Committee, President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin suspended the activities of the CPSU in the territory Russian Federation, and in November 1991 he banned it altogether, which inevitably entailed the liquidation of the CPSU as a single all-Union party. After this, the process of fragmentation of the USSR became irreversible. Already in August, the three Baltic republics announced their secession from the USSR. President M.S. Gorbachev signed a decree recognizing this withdrawal.
The next Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (late August - early September 1991) announced self-dissolution.
M.S. Gorbachev, having refused the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, continued to fight for the Union Treaty, receiving limited support only from the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics. In September, on the initiative of Gorbachev, work began on the idea of forming a Union of sovereign states instead of the USSR, which was supposed to represent a de facto confederation, but with the institution of a single presidential power (very curtailed). In fact, this was the last attempt of the center, agonizing under the powerful pressure of the republican ruling elites striving for undivided power, prevent the uncontrolled collapse of the USSR and the inevitable disasters and suffering of millions of ordinary people in all parts of the former Union that would be inevitable with such a turn of events.
M.S. Gorbachev tried to start new negotiations with the republics, but most of their leaders after the events of August 1991 refused to sign the agreement. A new referendum was held in Ukraine, in which the majority of the population voted for independence.
On August 24, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR declared Ukraine an independent democratic state, stating that from that moment
Only the Constitution, laws, regulations and other acts of legislation of the republic are valid on the territory. On the same day, Belarus declared its independence, on August 27, Moldova did this, on the 30th - Azerbaijan, on the 31st - Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Georgian leader 3. Gamsakhurdia demanded that the world community actually and legally recognize the independence of Georgia. The Supreme Councils of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia announced their independence on August 20–21 and the restoration of the constitutions in force before 1940. The independence of the three latest Russia recognized already on August 24
The collapse of the Soviet Union prompted a “parade of sovereignties” of the former autonomous republics and even autonomous regions in Russia. In the fall of 1991, all autonomous republics declared themselves sovereign states.
The August events radically changed the balance of power in the country. B.N. Yeltsin became a folk hero for preventing a coup. M.S. Gorbachev lost virtually all influence. B.N. Yeltsin, one after another, took the levers of power into his hands. He signed a decree banning the CPSU, whose leadership was accused of preparing a coup. M.S. Gorbachev was forced to agree to this by resigning from the post of General Secretary. The reform of the KGB structures began.
On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (B.N. Yeltsin, L.M. Kravchuk, S.S. Shushkevich) announced the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This act went down in history as<Беловежское соглашение>.On December 21, the leaders of eight more republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), faced with a fait accompli, joined the CIS, thereby sanctioning the demise of the Union.
The liquidation of the USSR automatically meant the liquidation of the bodies of the former Union. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR was dissolved, and the Union ministries were liquidated. In December 1991, M.S. resigned as president. Gorbachev. The Soviet Union ceased to exist.
3. Consequences of the collapse of the USSR
3.1Economic consequences
1. In the economic field, the collapse of the USSR led to the collapse of most of the traditional ties between economic entities in former republics ah and a sharp reduction in production. The destruction of these connections was also predetermined by differences in the timing, depth and scale of market transformations, changes in the price structure, etc. in post-Soviet states. The economic and social cost of reforms in the economy for all states has increased sharply.
The separation of the Central Asian republics eliminated one of the traditional risks of accelerated modernization: agricultural overpopulation against the background of the post-industrial impossibility of using excess labor resources.
2. The collapse of the USSR significantly reduced both in Russia and in other CIS countries the opportunities for economic maneuver with financial, production, natural and other resources due to the isolation of economies and the widespread economic crisis.
In this situation, Russia lost less than others due to the comparative strength and diversification of its economy, and most importantly, the relative self-sufficiency of its economic potential. The “liberation” of Russia from the republics, as a rule, less prepared to introduce market relations, may have somewhat facilitated its transition to these relations (we do not assess the strategy of this transition).
3. Russia has benefited in a number of ways from both the gradual removal of the need to subsidize the former Soviet republics and the changing price structure.
At the same time, the accumulation of large - and tending to be gratuitous - debt for Russian energy resources and other products on the part of Ukraine and some other republics shows that Russia in a number of respects continues to play the role of a donor in the former Soviet space without any particular economic or political benefits for itself.
4. Russia's access to external markets for consumers of its energy resources has become less guaranteed. The situation with access to seaports has become more complicated
5. The state territory was reduced by a quarter, the population by half. The problem of underdeveloped infrastructure has worsened, especially in the new border regions of the country. The difference between resource and reproduction potentials has increased. The first is estimated at 27 trillion. dollars, several times higher than the US potential. The second is 87% lower than the American one (in terms of GDP in 1995).
6. For several years, access to the markets of neighboring states became difficult (some of them were lost irretrievably), which cost Russia significant losses in the form of lost income, and also had a serious social cost due to the temporary loss of the ability to supply the domestic Russian market with relatively cheaper consumer goods from the countries of the former USSR ( for example, some food products, especially seasonal vegetables, fruits, etc.).
3.2 Political consequences
1. In the political sphere, the collapse of the USSR marked the beginning of a long-term process of changing the global and regional balances of power: economic, political, military. The whole system international relations has become less stable and less predictable. The threat of a global outbreak has receded, including nuclear war, however, the likelihood of local wars and armed conflicts has increased.
2. Compared to the USSR, Russia's political potential and influence, as well as its ability to defend its interests, have sharply decreased. Having retained 4/5 of the territory of the USSR, it has a little more than half the population of the former Union, controls no more than half of the Union's gross national product in 1990 and has retained about 60% of its defense industry.
3. The problem of minorities living outside their national homelands has arisen. Their number as a result of the migration processes of the last ten years is about 50–55 million people, including 20–25 million Russians. Protecting their interests using traditional diplomacy methods in the long term is practically impossible and requires other, comprehensive strategies.
4. Millions of human connections have been severed. Many Russians and citizens of CIS countries have developed a “divided nation” complex. If processes begin to tighten the border regime between states, now officially rejected by the Commonwealth, then this could qualitatively worsen the feeling of separation of people and bring it to a crisis level.
5. The collapse of the USSR did not become a completed act, but only initiated a long - for several decades - process of building new independent states. This process will inevitably be characterized by significant instability. Some states may turn out to be unviable and will disintegrate and create new formations. Instability will have to be regulated, preferably through political methods.
6. The problem of new borders has arisen, which can cause aggravation of relations between states created on the territory of the former Soviet Union, where such a problem did not exist.
7. Internationally, the collapse of the USSR was accompanied by some positive changes. External world became less afraid of Russia compared to the USSR. The potential for the creation of an environment hostile to her has decreased relatively.
Conclusion
In this abstract, I tried to trace the complex process of the collapse of the USSR and determine the consequences of the collapse of the USSR.
The USSR ceased to exist on the eve of its 69th anniversary of its formation. Its collapse was the result of a series of circumstances. Subjective factors include miscalculations or, conversely, purposeful actions of certain political leaders in the process that led to the disappearance of the Soviet Union from the political map of the world.
But, of course, the main ones were the objective reasons for the collapse of the USSR. These researchers include the shortcomings of the national-territorial structure of the Union. States like the USSR are destroyed sooner or later. Peoples who have their own statehood within the framework of such “empires” strive to gain complete independence. Various sources draw attention to the fact that in 1917–1921 the majority of the national-territorial outskirts of the Russian Empire wished to become independent. It was possible to form a unified state only by force. A centralized authoritarian-totalitarian state was created in the country, which could not exist in conditions of political pluralism. The cementing element of the USSR was the autocracy of the CPSU. The loss of the Communist Party's monopoly on power as a result political changes events that occurred in the country contributed to the fact that the collapse of the Union became rapid.
One of the main factors in the collapse of the USSR was the economic crisis. People transferred their dissatisfaction with their constantly worsening socio-economic situation to the state and administrative apparatus that failed to cope with their functional responsibilities and were unable to offer new ones. effective forms economic and political development.
The overwhelming majority of resources were directed to the development of the military-industrial complex - the military-industrial complex. Although it was necessary to develop high-tech industries and invest in the field of computer technology. Instead, there was an excessive development of heavy industry.
In the field of foreign policy, the USSR made enormous expenditures on the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Waging the Cold War took huge amounts of money: the United States set its goal to exhaust the Soviet Union with a large-scale arms race.
1985 – election of M.S. Gorbachev - the declaration by the leadership of the CPSU of a course towards perestroika - a time of great changes, the scale of which is rightly compared with such events as the Great French Revolution or October 1917 in Russia. However, it was protracted, painful and ended, having virtually exhausted itself, revealing the fact that the totalitarian system is not amenable to reform.
The suddenness of the collapse of the USSR shocked the world. A great power, spread over the vast Eurasian space, with a population of more than 320 million, and a powerful military-strategic potential that was recently comparable to the United States, has disappeared from the political map of the world. Having liquidated the USSR, the former republics established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), immediately declaring that the latter was neither a state nor a national entity. The goal of the CIS is to facilitate the transition of the former republics to a qualitatively new state. Its main function is to harmonize the policies of states in areas of mutual interest.
Bibliography
1. A.S. Barsenkov, A.I. Vdovin. Russian history. 1917–2004: Study. manual for university students / – M.: Aspect Press, 2005.
2. History of Russia. Theories of learning. Book one. From ancient times to the end of the 19th century. Tutorial. /Under. ed. B.V. Leachman. Ekaterinburg: Publishing house "SV-96", 2001
3. Munchaev Sh.M., Ustinov V.M. Russian history. – M.: Publishing group INFRA M-NORMA, 1997
4. History of Russia. XX century / A.N. Bokhanov, M.M. Gorinov, V.P. Dmitrenko etc. – M.: ACT Publishing House LLC, 2001.
5. History of Russia (Russia in world civilization): Course of lectures / Comp. and resp. editor A.A. Radugin. – M.: Center, 2001.
In these August days, we traditionally hear from the lips of various anti-Soviet and anti-communists words about the supposed “inevitability” of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Here, in addition to outright lies and hatred of the Soviet past and socialism in general, we are faced with a deliberate confusion of concepts. It’s one thing, if we talk specifically about the situation that developed after Yeltsin’s coup on August 21-23, 1991 and the frank permanent connivance of the “democrats” on the part of the still President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev - then, perhaps, great country was truly doomed. But this was already the end of the tragic process that began with the breakthrough of the traitor Gorbachev to supreme power in the party and country in the spring of 1985. But is there any reason to assert that the Soviet Union was supposedly “doomed” even before the start of the disastrous “perestroika”?
WE WILL NOT dwell here on the frankly delusional fabrications of the remaining few “democrats” of the Yeltsin-Gaidar type regarding some supposedly “growing ethnic contradictions” in Soviet society in the 1970s - early 1980s. It is enough to remember that in any living, developing organism - be it a person or a society - certain contradictions are inevitable. Another thing is that if we compare individual conflicts that arose in Soviet times on national grounds at the everyday level with those that are now literally multiplying before our eyes in the “developed” West, then Soviet contradictions will have to be examined under a microscope! Moreover, no sane person would talk about any kind of “increase” of them - of course, before Gorbachev’s team came to power.
In general, it is very appropriate here to recall the more than indicative results of the all-Russian survey conducted by the Levada Center in December last year in connection with the 25th anniversary of the collapse of the USSR and the signing of the criminal Belovezhskaya Accords, published in the official “ Rossiyskaya newspaper" Of particular interest are the answers to the question about the main reasons for the collapse of the USSR.
So, the first three places - with a large gap from the rest - were taken by the following answer options: “it was an irresponsible and unfounded conspiracy between Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich”, “it was a conspiracy of foreign forces hostile to the USSR”, “population’s dissatisfaction with the leadership of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage." As we can see, all three main reasons named by the Russians, albeit not completely and systematically, but, as V.I. Lenin, from a political point of view, absolutely correctly reflect the opinion of the majority of the people about the absence of any “inevitability” of the collapse of the Union.
It is especially noteworthy that only in sixth place is the option “complete exhaustion of communist ideology.” But we constantly hear on state television channels, and from the mouths of high-ranking figures of the “party in power”, the exact opposite - that is, exactly the same “exhaustion” that allegedly gripped the entire society and even the majority of members of the CPSU. Some time ago, the leader of United Russia himself, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, “marked his mark” in this field, declaring at one of his meetings with United Russia activists that by the 1980s “nobody (meaning members of the Communist Party. - O.Ch.) didn’t believe in anything.” Well, if at the department of Professor A. Sobchak at Leningrad University people gathered, to put it mildly, insincere, then this is not at all a reason to attribute such a quality to the entire Soviet people... Moreover, as we see, even today’s Russians clearly spoke out in favor of the fact that in itself a great ideology - in contrast to the main ideologists of Gorbachev’s Central Committee themselves! - has not exhausted itself at all. And therefore, despite the existing individual difficulties, the activities of certain individuals who discredited the party, on this side there were no objective grounds for the collapse of the USSR by March 1985.
And now - about the economy. The incantations about the “scientific and technological lag” of the USSR have already set people on edge. But what about the indisputable fact that by the beginning of the 1980s, for example, the Soviet machine tool industry was at the world level - both in terms of organization of production and in terms of the quality of products? This is what a Cambridge University professor and director of the Center writes in the magazine “Free Economy” scientific research development problems of Cambridge Peter Nolan: “In the early 1990s, I was in Moscow at the Krasny Proletary plant.” The most complex world-class equipment, advanced systems with numerical program control (emphasis mine - O.Ch.) were installed there.”
Please note: the most important detail: one of the leading Moscow enterprises still had world-class equipment by the beginning of the 1990s, and yet it was installed just before the destructive processes of “perestroika”! Or, perhaps, for the gentlemen “democrats” in company with the “United Russia” members, the certificate from the University of Cambridge, in front of which they usually stand at attention, suddenly became unauthoritative?.. By the way, it would not be a bad idea to remember that only “Red” Proletarian" produced from its assembly lines monthly several thousand of the most advanced machines of various systems, some of which were exported to 32 countries of the world. Not crude oil and gas, mind you!.. For comparison: as Professor Yakov Mirkin from the Russian Academy of Sciences reminds, today all of Russia produces no more than 350 metal-cutting machines per month. Should I say something here or not?
Or maybe remind the “reformers” whose scientific discoveries underlie the actions of all mobile phones, all kinds of smartphones, iPhones and iPads that they, their wives and children use? So, these discoveries were made in the 1960s and 1970s by outstanding Soviet physicists, Nobel laureates Zhores Alferov - now alive and Vitaly Ginzburg - now deceased. Yes, the Soviet Union during the leadership of L.I. Brezhnev did not have the strength and opportunity to fully use these brilliant discoveries, but perhaps today’s, all “advanced” and “democratic” Russia is using them? Organized their production? But no, all these, as they say, fashionable gadgets, Russia, as well as almost the rest of the world, buys from China, led by Communist Party! So, someone, but not today’s “democrats,” should broadcast something about “Soviet technical and technological backwardness.”
And finally, another example concerning a subject that has become almost a symbol of life for today’s generations - the Internet. Benjamin Peters, professor of communication technologies at Tusla University (USA), testifies: “In the 60s of the 20th century, Soviet and American scientists almost simultaneously took important steps towards the development of computer technology. Moreover, the USSR often overtook the USA (emphasis added - O.Ch.).”
In his book, “How Not to Network a Country: The Complicated History of the Soviet Internet,” published in the United States, Professor Peters writes: “So, at the end of 1969, the ARPANET computer network (the progenitor of the Internet) was launched in the United States. And in the USSR, the idea of connecting computers with a single network was first expressed by the Soviet scientist Anatoly Kitov back in 1959, and the first developments in this area appeared in 1962, when academician Viktor Glushkov presented the project of the National Automated System for Accounting and Information Processing (OGAS), which was intended for automated management of the entire economy of the USSR (emphasis added - O.Ch.)."
“First proposed in 1962,” Professor Peters further writes, “OGAS was intended to be a nationwide real-time remote access computer network, built on existing telephone networks and their predecessors. The ambitious idea envisaged covering most of Eurasia - every factory, every enterprise of the Soviet planned economy with such a “nervous system” (emphasis added - O.Ch.).”
Yes, unfortunately, such brilliant proposals were not, as they say, put into production on time: they were in the way and insufficient - compared to the times of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin - the intellectual level of the post-Stalin leadership, which Pravda repeatedly wrote about, and the exorbitant burden of military expenditures necessary to confront the United States and its allies on a global scale. But there were such proposals and discoveries, which indicated highest level scientific and technological development of the USSR. The problems mentioned were, in principle, solvable, and none of them made the collapse of the Soviet Union “inevitable,” no matter how today’s anti-Sovietists in company with Russophobes fluttered about this topic.
