“It was simply pointless to talk about the secrecy of the first Soviet nuclear submarines. The Americans gave them the humiliating nickname “roaring cows.” The pursuit of Soviet engineers for other characteristics of boats (speed, diving depth, weapon power) did not save the situation. An airplane, helicopter or torpedo still turned out to be faster. And the boat, being discovered, turned into “game” without having time to become a “hunter”.
“The problem of noise reduction of Soviet submarines began to be solved in the eighties. True, they were still 3-4 times noisier than the American Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines.

Such statements are constantly found in Russian magazines and books devoted to domestic nuclear submarines (NPS). This information was taken not from any official sources, but from American and English articles. That is why the terrible noise of Soviet/Russian nuclear submarines is one of the myths of the United States.

It should be noted that not only Soviet shipbuilders faced noise problems, and while we were able to immediately create a combat nuclear submarine capable of serving, the Americans had more serious problems with their firstborn. "Nautilus" had many "childhood diseases" that are so characteristic of all experimental machines. Its engine produced such a noise level that the sonars - the main means of navigation under water - practically died out. As a result, during a hike in the Northern Seas in the area of ​​\u200b\u200b. Spitsbergen, echolocators “overlooked” a drifting ice floe, which damaged the only periscope. Subsequently, the Americans launched a struggle to reduce noise. To achieve this, they abandoned double-hull boats, moving to one-and-a-half and single-hull boats, sacrificing important characteristics submarines: survivability, diving depth, speed. In our country they built double-hulled ones. But were the Soviet designers wrong, and were double-hull nuclear submarines so noisy that their combat use would have become pointless?

It would, of course, be good to take noise data from domestic and foreign nuclear submarines and compare them. But this is impossible to do, because official information on this issue is still considered secret (just remember the Iowa battleships, for which the real characteristics were revealed only after 50 years). There is no information at all on American boats (and if it appears, it should be treated with the same caution as information about booking the Iowa ship). There are sometimes scattered data on domestic nuclear submarines. But what is this information? Here are four examples from different articles:

1) When designing the first Soviet nuclear submarine, a set of measures was created to ensure acoustic stealth...... However, shock absorbers for the main turbines were never created. As a result, the underwater noise of the nuclear submarine Project 627 at increased speeds increased to 110 decibels.
2) The Project 670 SSGN had a very low level of acoustic visibility for that time (among the second-generation Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, this submarine was considered the quietest). Its noise level at full speed in the ultrasonic frequency range was less than 80, in the infrasound - 100, in the sound - 110 decibels.

3) When creating the third generation nuclear submarines, it was possible to achieve a reduction in noise compared to the previous generation boats by 12 decibels, or 3.4 times.

4) Since the 70s of the last century, nuclear submarines have reduced their noise by an average of 1 dB every two years. Over the past 19 years alone - from 1990 to the present - the average noise level of US nuclear submarines has decreased tenfold, from 0.1 Pa to 0.01 Pa.

It is in principle impossible to draw any reasonable and logical conclusion from these data on noise levels. Therefore, we have only one way left - to analyze real facts services. Here are the most known cases from the service of domestic nuclear submarines.

1) During an autonomous cruise in the South China Sea in 1968, the K-10 submarine, one of the first generation of nuclear-powered missile carriers of the USSR (Project 675), received an order to intercept an aircraft carrier formation of the US Navy. The aircraft carrier Enterprise covered the guided-missile cruiser Long Beach, frigates and support ships. At the calculated point, Captain 1st Rank R.V. Mazin took the submarine through the defensive lines of the American order directly under the bottom of the Enterprise. Hiding behind the noise of the gigantic ship's propellers, the submarine accompanied the attack force for thirteen hours. During this time, training torpedo attacks were practiced on all pennants of the order and acoustic profiles (characteristic noises of various ships) were taken. After which the K-10 successfully left the order and carried out a training missile attack at a distance. In the event of a real war, the entire formation would have been destroyed by choice: conventional torpedoes or a nuclear strike. It is interesting to note that American experts rated Project 675 extremely low. It was these submarines that they dubbed “Roaring Cows.” And it was them that the ships of the US aircraft carrier force could not detect. Project 675 boats were used not only to track surface ships, but sometimes “ruined the lives” of American nuclear-powered ships on duty. Thus, in 1967, K-135 continuously monitored the Patrick Henry SSBN for 5.5 hours, remaining undetected itself.

2) In 1979, during another aggravation of Soviet-American relations, the nuclear submarines K-38 and K-481 (Project 671) carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf, where at that time there were up to 50 US Navy ships. The campaign lasted 6 months. Campaign participant A.N. Shporko reported that Soviet nuclear submarines operated in Persian Gulf very secretly: if the US Navy detected them for a short time, they could not correctly classify them, much less organize a pursuit and carry out conditional destruction. These conclusions were subsequently confirmed by intelligence data. At the same time, tracking of US Navy ships was carried out at weapons range and, if an order was received, they would be sent to the bottom with a probability close to 100%

3) In March 1984, the United States and South Korea held their regular annual naval exercises, Team Spirit. Moscow and Pyongyang closely followed the exercises. To monitor the American carrier strike group, consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and seven US warships, the K-314 nuclear torpedo submarine (Project 671, this is the second generation of nuclear submarines, also reproached for noise) and six warships were sent. Four days later, K-314 managed to detect a US Navy carrier strike group. Monitoring of the aircraft carrier was carried out over the next 7 days, then after the discovery of the Soviet nuclear submarine, the aircraft carrier entered the territorial waters of South Korea. "K-314" remained outside territorial waters.

Having lost hydroacoustic contact with the aircraft carrier, the boat under the command of Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Evseenko continued the search. The Soviet submarine headed to the supposed location of the aircraft carrier, but it was not there. The American side maintained radio silence.
On March 21, a Soviet submarine detected strange noises. To clarify the situation, the boat surfaced to periscope depth. It was already eleven o'clock. According to Vladimir Evseenko, several American ships were spotted coming towards them. The decision was made to dive, but it was too late. Unnoticed by the crew of the submarine, the aircraft carrier with its running lights turned off was moving at a speed of about 30 km/h. K-314 was ahead of Kitty Hawk. There was a blow, followed by another. At first, the team decided that the wheelhouse was damaged, but when checking, they did not find any water in the compartments. As it turned out, the stabilizer was bent in the first collision, and the propeller was damaged in the second. A huge tug "Mashuk" was sent to her aid. The boat was towed to Chazhma Bay, 50 km east of Vladivostok, where it was to undergo repairs.

For the Americans, the collision was also unexpected. According to them, after the strike they saw the retreating silhouette of a submarine without navigation lights. Two American SH-3H anti-submarine helicopters were scrambled. Having escorted the Soviet submarine, they did not find any visible serious damage to it. However, upon impact, the submarine's propeller was disabled and it began to lose speed. The propeller also damaged the hull of the aircraft carrier. It turned out that its bottom was pierced by 40 m. Fortunately, no one was injured in this incident. Kitty Hawk was forced to go to Naval Station Subic Bay in the Philippines for repairs before returning to San Diego. During an inspection of the aircraft carrier, a fragment of a K-314 propeller was found stuck in the hull, as well as pieces of the submarine’s sound-absorbing coating. The exercises were curtailed. The incident caused a lot of noise: the American press actively discussed how a submarine was able to sail undetected at such a close distance to a US Navy aircraft carrier group conducting exercises, including anti-submarine exercises.

4) In the winter of 1996, 150 miles from the Hebrides. On February 29, the Russian Embassy in London appealed to the command of the British Navy with a request to provide assistance to a crew member of the submarine 671RTM (code "Pike", second generation+), who underwent surgery on board the ship to remove appendicitis, followed by peritonitis (its treatment is possible only in conditions hospital). Soon the patient was redirected to the shore by a Lynx helicopter from the destroyer Glasgow. However, the British media were not so much moved by the manifestation of naval cooperation between Russia and Great Britain, as they expressed bewilderment at the fact that while negotiations were being held in London, NATO meetings were taking place in the North Atlantic, in the area where the Russian Navy submarine was located. anti-submarine maneuvers (by the way, the Glasgow EM also took part in them). But the nuclear-powered submarine was detected only after it floated to the surface to transfer the sailor to the helicopter. According to The Times, the Russian submarine demonstrated its stealth while tracking anti-submarine forces conducting an active search. It is noteworthy that the British, in an official statement made to the media, initially attributed the “Pike” to the more modern (lower noise) Project 971, and only later admitted that they could not notice, according to their own statements, the noisy Soviet boat Project 671RTM.

5) In one of the Northern Fleet training grounds near the Kola Bay on May 23, 1981, a collision occurred between the Soviet nuclear submarine K-211 (SSBN 667-BDR) and the American Sturgeon-class submarine. An American submarine rammed its conning tower into the aft section of the K-211 while it was practicing elements of combat training. The American submarine did not surface in the area of ​​the collision. However, a few days later, an American nuclear submarine appeared in the area of ​​the English naval base of Holy Loch with pronounced damage to the conning tower. Our submarine surfaced and arrived at the base under its own power. Here the submarine was awaited by a commission consisting of specialists from industry, navy, designer and science. K-211 was docked, and during the inspection, holes were discovered in two aft tanks of the main ballast, damage to the horizontal stabilizer and the right propeller blades. In damaged tanks, they found bolts with countersunk heads and pieces of plexi and metal from the wheelhouse of a US Navy submarine. Moreover, the commission was able to establish from individual details that the Soviet submarine collided with an American submarine of the Sturgeon type. The huge SSBN pr 667, like all SSBNs, was not designed for sharp maneuvers that an American nuclear submarine could not dodge, so the only explanation for this incident is that Sturgeon did not see or even suspect that it was in the immediate vicinity of K- 211. It should be noted that the Sturgeon-class boats were intended specifically to combat submarines and carried appropriate modern search equipment.

It should be noted that submarine collisions are not that rare. The last collision for domestic and American nuclear submarines was near Kildin Island, in Russian territorial waters. On February 11, 1992, the nuclear submarine K-276 (entered service in 1982), under the command of captain of the second rank I. Lokt, collided with an American nuclear submarine. Baton Rouge"(Los Angeles), which, while tracking Russian Navy ships in the exercise area, missed the Russian nuclear submarine. As a result of the collision, the Crab's wheelhouse was damaged. The situation of the American nuclear submarine turned out to be more difficult; it barely managed to reach the base, after which they decided not to repair the boat, but to remove it from the fleet.

6)Perhaps the most striking fragment in the biography of Project 671RTM ships was their participation in the major operations “Aport” and “Atrina”, carried out by the forces of the 33rd Division in the Atlantic and which significantly shook the confidence of the United States in the ability of its Navy to solve anti-submarine missions.
On May 29, 1985, three submarines of Project 671RTM (K-502, K-324, K-299), as well as the submarine K-488 (Project 671RT), simultaneously left Zapadnaya Litsa on May 29, 1985. Later they were joined by the Project 671 nuclear submarine K-147. Of course, the entry of a whole group of nuclear submarines into the ocean could not go unnoticed by US naval intelligence. An intensive search began, but it did not bring the expected results. At the same time, Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, operating secretly, themselves monitored the missile submarines of the US Navy in the area of ​​their combat patrol (for example, the K-324 nuclear submarine had three hydroacoustic contacts with the US nuclear submarine, for a total duration of 28 hours. And the K-147 equipped the latest system tracking a nuclear submarine along its wake, using the specified system and acoustic means, carried out six-day (!!!) tracking of the American SSBN Simon Bolivar. In addition, the submarines also studied the tactics of American anti-submarine aircraft. The Americans managed to establish contact only with K-488, which was already returning to the base. On July 1, Operation Aport ended.

7) In March-June 1987, Operation Atrina, similar in scope, was carried out, in which five Project 671RTM submarines took part - K-244 (under the command of captain of the second rank V. Alikov), K-255 (under the command of captain of the second rank B.Yu. Muratov), ​​K-298 (under the command of captain of the second rank Popkov), K-299 (under the command of captain of the second rank N.I. Klyuev) and K-524 (under the command of captain of the second rank A.F. Smelkov) . Although the Americans learned about the departure of nuclear submarines from Western Litsa, they lost the ships in the North Atlantic. The “underwater hunt” began again, which involved almost all the anti-submarine forces of the American Atlantic Fleet - shore- and deck-based aircraft, six anti-submarine nuclear submarines (in addition to the submarines already deployed by the United States Navy in the Atlantic), 3 powerful ship-based search engines group and 3 of the latest Stallworth-class vessels (hydroacoustic observation ships), which used powerful underwater explosions to generate a hydroacoustic pulse. Ships of the English fleet were involved in the search operation. According to the stories of commanders of domestic submarines, the concentration of anti-submarine forces was so large that it seemed impossible to surface for air pumping and a radio communication session. For the Americans, those who failed in 1985 needed to regain their face. Despite the fact that all possible anti-submarine forces of the US Navy and its allies were pulled into the area, nuclear submarines managed to reach the Sargasso Sea area undetected, where the Soviet “veil” was finally discovered. The Americans managed to establish their first short contacts with submarines only eight days after Operation Atrina began. Project 671RTM nuclear submarines were mistakenly mistaken for strategic missile submarines, which only increased the concern of the US naval command and the country's political leadership (it must be recalled that these events occurred at the peak of the Cold War, which at any time could turn into "hot") During the return to base to separate from the anti-submarine weapons of the American Navy, the submarine commanders were allowed to use secret hydroacoustic countermeasures; until that moment, Soviet nuclear submarines had successfully hidden from anti-submarine forces solely due to the characteristics of the submarines themselves.

The success of Operations Atrina and Aport confirmed the assumption that the United States Navy, given the massive use of modern nuclear submarines by the Soviet Union, would not be able to organize any effective countermeasures against them.

As we see from the available facts, American anti-submarine forces were not able to detect Soviet nuclear submarines, including the first generations, and protect their Navy from sudden attacks from the depths. And all the statements that “It was simply pointless to talk about the secrecy of the first Soviet nuclear submarines” have no basis.

Now let’s examine the myth that high speeds, maneuverability and diving depth do not provide any advantages. Let's look again at the known facts:

1) In September-December 1971, the Soviet nuclear submarine of Project 661 (number K-162) made its first voyage to full autonomy with a combat route from the Greenland Sea to the Brazilian Trench. In October, the submarine stood up to intercept an aircraft carrier strike force of the US Navy, during headed by the aircraft carrier Saratoga. They were able to spot the submarine on the cover ships and tried to drive it away. Under normal conditions, spotting a submarine would mean the failure of a combat mission, but not in this case. K-162 developed a speed of over 44 knots in a submerged position. Attempts to drive away the K-162, or to break away at speed, were unsuccessful. The Saratoga had no chance at a maximum speed of 35 knots. During the hours-long chase, the Soviet submarine practiced torpedo attacks and several times reached an advantageous angle to launch Amethyst missiles. But the most interesting thing is that the submarine maneuvered so quickly that the Americans were sure that they were being pursued by a “wolf pack” - a group of submarines. What does it mean? This suggests that the appearance of the boat in the new square was so unexpected for the Americans, or rather unexpected, that they considered it contact with a new submarine. Consequently, in the event of hostilities, the Americans would search and strike to kill in a completely different square. Thus, it is almost impossible not to escape an attack or to destroy a submarine in the presence of a high speed nuclear submarine.

2) Early 1980s. One of the USSR nuclear submarines, which operated in the North Atlantic, set a kind of record; it monitored the nuclear-powered ship of a “potential enemy” for 22 hours, being in the aft sector of the tracking object. Despite all the attempts of the commander of the NATO submarine to change the situation, it was not possible to throw the enemy “off the tail”: tracking was stopped only after the commander of the Soviet submarine received the appropriate orders from the shore. This incident happened with the Project 705 nuclear submarine, perhaps the most controversial and striking vessel in the history of Soviet submarine shipbuilding. This project deserves a separate article. Project 705 nuclear submarines had a maximum speed that was comparable to the speed of universal and anti-submarine torpedoes of “potential enemies”, but most importantly, due to the peculiarities of the power plant (there was no need for a special transition to increased parameters of the main power plant when increasing speed, as was the case on submarines with water-water reactors), were able to develop full speed in minutes, having almost “airplane” acceleration characteristics. Considerable speed allowed for a short time enter the “shadow” sector of a submarine or surface ship, even if the Alpha was previously detected by enemy hydroacoustics. According to the memoirs of Rear Admiral Bogatyrev, a former commander of the K-123 (Project 705K), the submarine could turn around “on the spot,” which is especially important during active tracking of the “enemy” and friendly submarines one after another. “Alpha” did not allow other submarines to enter their heading stern corners (that is, into the hydroacoustic shadow zone), which are especially favorable for tracking and launching sudden torpedo strikes.

The high maneuverability and speed characteristics of the Project 705 nuclear submarine made it possible to practice effective maneuvers to evade enemy torpedoes with a further counterattack. In particular, the submarine could circulate 180 degrees at maximum speed and begin moving in the opposite direction after 42 seconds. Commanders of nuclear submarines of Project 705 A.F. Zagryadsky and A.U. Abbasov said that such a maneuver made it possible, by gradually increasing speed to maximum and simultaneously performing a turn with a change in depth, to force the enemy watching them in the noise direction finding mode to lose the target, and for the Soviet nuclear submarine to go “at the tail” of the enemy “in fighter style.”

3) On August 4, 1984, the nuclear submarine K-278 Komsomolets made an unprecedented dive in the history of world military navigation - the needles of its depth gauges first froze at the 1000-meter mark, and then crossed it. K-278 sailed and maneuvered at a depth of 1027 m, and fired torpedoes at a depth of 1000 meters. To journalists, this seems like a common whim of the Soviet military and designers. They don’t understand why it is necessary to reach such depths, if the Americans at that time limited themselves to 450 meters. To do this you need to know ocean hydroacoustics. Increasing depth does not reduce detection capability linearly. Between the upper, highly heated layer of ocean water and the lower, colder layer lies the so-called temperature jump layer. If, say, the sound source is in a cold, dense layer, above which there is a warm, less dense layer, the sound is reflected from the boundary of the upper layer and propagates only in the lower cold layer. The top layer in this case represents a “silent zone”, a “shadow zone” into which noise from the submarine’s propellers does not penetrate. Simple direction finders of a surface anti-submarine ship will not be able to find it, and the submarine can feel safe. There can be several such layers in the ocean, and each layer additionally hides the submarine. The axis of the earth's sound channel below which was the working depth of K-278 has an even greater hiding effect. Even the Americans admitted that it was impossible to detect nuclear submarines at a depth of 800 m or more by any means. And anti-submarine torpedoes are not designed for such a depth. Thus, the K-278 traveling at working depth was invisible and invulnerable.

Do questions then arise about the importance maximum speeds, diving depth and maneuverability for submarines?

Now let’s look at the statements of officials and institutions, which for some reason domestic journalists prefer to ignore.

According to data from scientists from MIPT cited in the work “The Future of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussion and Arguments” (ed. Dolgoprudny, 1995). even under the most favorable hydrological conditions (the probability of their occurrence in the northern seas is no more than 0.03) nuclear submarine pr. 971 (for reference: serial construction began back in 1980) can be detected by the American Los Angeles nuclear submarines with GAKAN/BQQ-5 at ranges of no more than 10 km. Under less favorable conditions (i.e., under 97% of weather conditions in the northern seas), it is impossible to detect Russian nuclear submarines.

There is also a statement by a prominent American naval analyst, N. Polmoran, made at a hearing in the National Security Committee of the US House of Representatives: “The appearance of Russian 3rd generation boats demonstrated that Soviet shipbuilders closed the noise gap much earlier than we could have imagined.” . According to the US Navy, at operational speeds of about 5-7 knots, the noise of Russian 3rd generation boats, recorded by US hydroacoustic reconnaissance, was lower than the noise of the most advanced nuclear submarines of the US Navy, the Improved Los Angeles type.

According to the Chief of Operations of the US Navy, Admiral Jeremi Boorda, made in 1995, American ships are not able to accompany third-generation Russian nuclear submarines at speeds of 6-9 knots.

This is probably enough to assert that the Russian “roaring cows” are able to carry out the tasks facing them despite any enemy opposition.

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websiteoften writes aboutaccidentIondomestic submarines. The goal is clear: to pay tribute to the dead and injured sailors and their courage. But if you look at it, the most dangerous fleet in the world Abelongs to the USA. And not only because it is the largest in the world. Or, as the American people like to saynojournalists, "The most powerful".

Or, as even some US economists say, the most expensive. Or the funniest fleet in the world - this is how regulars of Russian naval Internet forums very often express themselves. At the same time, among the, so to speak, global naval community, the phrase is very often heard in many languages ​​that the US fleet is the most stupid and ineffective among similar forces of other developed countries (meaning the ratio of financial costs and combat effectiveness). It also seems that respected Yankees in uniform have a rare talent for making mistakes that are inexplicable from the point of view of the logic of an ordinary military man.

This became clear, by the way, during the Second World War. Thus, the Americans did not notice the flash and did not hear the thunder of volleys of Japanese 203-mm guns from a distance of 20 miles. After this, the so-called night pogrom at Savo Island occurred, better known in the history of the war in the Pacific as the “second Pearl Harbor.” The Japanese simply walked around the island counterclockwise, shooting down the sleeping US Navy cruisers one after another.

Or how is it possible, after successful defensive battles, having every chance of victory, to suddenly surrender the impregnable “concrete battleship” Corregidor to an enemy ten times inferior in number? For 43 years, the Americans prepared for this battle, concreted and armored a small island, almost won... and surrendered to the mercy of the Japanese. To their genuine amazement, he also fulfilled many very strict conditions of surrender. Of course, this is a tragedy, and eternal memory to all citizens of the United States and other countries who fought for peace. But this is some kind of strange, absurd tragedy...

But let's return to the submarine fleet. “Real open statistics on the accident rate of the US Navy in general and in the nuclear submarine fleet of this country in particular simply do not exist, says longtime Pravda contributor. Ru, expert on International Maritime Law, publicist and historian captainIrank Sergey Aprelev. — The fact is that for three decades in the United States practically no data on accidents in the fleet has been published; press access to such facts is prohibited. Of course, there are information leaks, but most often they are accidental.

And the leadership of the Navy still comments on what happened only when it is no longer possible not to do so, when the facts themselves are already becoming known to the general public. Freedom of speech there is very unique. Publications that publish “inconsistent” data about incidents in the fleet can run into big trouble. That is why the open press contains only very scant information about the accident rate of the US Navy, and we really know little about it...”

But although we don’t know much about the Americans, according to at least the available statistics, Russia is still inferior to the US Navy in the total number of known incidents and accidents of its nuclear submarines. If we take another additional criterion - the accident rate, that is, the ratio of the total number of submarine accidents to the number of those built, then for the American Navy the result looks even more pessimistic.

In the Russian submarine fleet this coefficient is 0.2, and in the American fleet it is 0.3. In other words, for every 100 nuclear submarines in the Russian fleet there are about 20 accidents and incidents, and in the American fleet - about 30. The ratio, you see, is not in favor of the United States. And if the Americans “open” their “closed” emergency statistics, we will add them to the already existing data...

American shipyards built more than 190 submarines with nuclear power plants in the 20th century. For comparison: during the same period, 261 nuclear submarines left Soviet shipyards, 25 in Great Britain, 12 in France, and six in China. By the way, the US abandoned the construction of diesel submarines more than half a century ago.

Traditionally, the submarine fleet enjoys special favor from the top officials of the United States. For example, US Vice President Al Gore himself made a trip to the Arctic in 1993 on the nuclear submarine Pargo. At the same time, over the entire period of operation of submarines with nuclear power plants in the US Navy, in addition to two disasters that ended in the death of nuclear submarines, about 60 serious incidents and accidents also occurred. As a result, the ships received various damage to their hulls, mechanisms and outboard devices.

The largest number of accidents “they have” are caused by navigational reasons, including violation of navigation safety, loss of position by operators in difficult hydrological conditions, errors in use technical means.

Finally, just a few selected US Navy accidents and incidents that made history. Some of the facts below are only in the English-language press, and Pravda. Ru publishes them for the Russian-speaking audience for the first time.

In 1963, the thickness of sea water crushed the most modern American submarine Thrasher. Who could have imagined that a simple two-day test voyage accompanied by the rescue tug Skylark could end in such a disaster? The cause of the Thrasher's death remains a mystery.

The main hypothesis: when diving to the maximum depth, water entered the durable hull of the boat - the reactor was automatically shut down, and the submarine, unable to move, fell into the abyss, taking with it 129 human lives.

Soon the terrible story continued - the Americans lost another nuclear-powered ship with its crew: in 1968, the Scorpion multi-purpose nuclear submarine disappeared without a trace in the Atlantic. Official version connects the death of the boat with the detonation of torpedo ammunition (almost like our Kursk!).

There is a more exotic legend, according to which the Scorpion was sunk by the Russians in retaliation for the death of the K-129 submarine. The mystery of the death of the Scorpion still haunts the minds of sailors - for example, in November 2012, the Organization of Veteran Submariners of the US Navy proposed launching a new investigation to establish the truth about the death of the American boat.

On February 11, 1998, the American submarine La Jolla, seven kilometers off the coast of the Republic of Korea, sank the South Korean fishing vessel Yang Chang as a result of a collision.

On March 19, 1998, the Kentucky and San Juan collided near Long Island, New York. Both boats were sent to the Groton base for dock repairs.

The USS Port Royal, a billion-dollar cruiser, ran aground off Hawaii on February 5, 2009. The investigation established the causes of the accident: the navigation equipment on the ship was faulty, the watchmen lost their vigilance, the echo sounder did not work, and no one was able to determine the depth under the keel.

On February 9, 2001, the US Navy multi-purpose nuclear submarine Greenville rammed the Japanese fishing schooner Ehime Maru. Nine Japanese fishermen were killed, and the US Navy submarine fled the scene without providing any assistance to those in distress.

In 1986, the US Navy strategic missile carrier Nathaniel Greene crashed on rocks in the Irish Sea. The damage to the hull, rudders and ballast tanks was so great that the boat had to be scrapped.

On February 11, 1992, in the Barents Sea, the multipurpose nuclear submarine Baton Rouge collided with the Russian titanium Barracuda. The boats collided successfully - the repair of our ship took six months, but the story of the American submarine turned out to be much sadder. The collision with a Russian titanium boat led to the appearance of stresses and microcracks in the submarine’s durable hull. "Baton Rouge" hobbled to the base and soon ceased to exist.

In 1969, the American nuclear submarine USS Guitarro sank at a depth of 10 meters right next to the quay wall. The accident occurred as a result of uncoordinated actions of two groups of specialists: one of them filled the bow ballast tanks with water, and the other filled the stern tanks. Each of these standard operations is necessary to calibrate the instruments, but performing them simultaneously by crews unaware of each other led to the sinking of the ship. The operation to raise and restore the submarine cost the United States $20 million. It’s interesting that this submarine bore tail number 665 - almost, excuse me, “three sixes”...

On February 9, 2001, the multipurpose nuclear submarine Greenville, while practicing an emergency ascent (which was not necessary) near the Hawaiian island of Oahu, collided with the Japanese training fishing schooner Exie Maru. The schooner sank, but the Americans did nothing to save the drowning fishermen.

On March 20, 1993, a Russian strategic submarine and an American multi-purpose submarine collided in the Barents Sea. Despite serious damage, both were able to return to base on their own. After minor repairs, the Russian boat returned to service, but the American submarine was removed from the fleet and scrapped due to the impracticality of restoration.

On May 14, 1989, the nuclear submarine of the Los Angeles project, returning, interestingly, after filming “The Hunt for Red October” to the base near Santa Catalina Island in California, hooked a cable on which a small tug was pulling barges. The boat then sank, dragging the tug along with it, killing one of the crew. According to the court decision, the relatives of the deceased received $1.4 million from the Navy...

In 1959, the Soviet diesel-electric submarine S-360 in the Mediterranean Sea secretly penetrated the combat maneuvering area of ​​the aircraft carrier Roosevelt, remaining undetected. In the same campaign, our submariners literally put the entire US Sixth Fleet on their ears: the S-360 freely “walked” under the combat escort ships of the heavy cruiser Des Moines.

The collision of the nuclear submarine K-276 with the American nuclear submarine Baton Rouge.

On February 11, 1992, our nuclear submarine K-276, later called Kostroma, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Igor Lokt, collided with the American Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine Baton Rouge.

In 1992, when the Cold War seemed to have already ended, the geopolitical and ideological confrontation between Russia and the United States had ceased (at least on our part), we withdrew our boats from American shores, and the plans for operations of the US Navy submarine forces remained virtually unchanged. The American nuclear boat Baton Rouge with a displacement of 6,000 tons, armed with Tomahawk missiles, was collecting intelligence information about the naval activity of the Soviet Navy in the Kola Peninsula area.

The American boat, after detecting the Soviet boat, positioned itself behind it in its aft sector, in the acoustic shadow zone, and on a parallel
course crossed the border of Russian territorial waters together with our boat.

After some time, the K-276 acoustics detected some unclear noises. Commander Captain 2nd Rank twisted his elbow so that
enable acousticians to more accurately determine the source of noise. The American boat missed this maneuver and lost contact.
The commander of the American boat, Commander Gordon Kremer, began to rush about, began to ascend, in the hope of inspecting the clarity of the horizon, and maybe discovering
there is a submarine under the periscope. To clarify the situation, he mindlessly swam to periscope depth, thereby completely losing the opportunity
detection of K-276 by hydroacoustic means, and he himself found himself in the dead zone of its surveillance equipment (almost above it).

Since the time had come for the next radio communication session with the fleet command post, Igor Lokot was forced to begin ascent to periscope depth without additional clarification of the situation on the surface. At this time, at 20.16, a collision occurred. When approaching the periscope depth, the K-276 hit the American nuclear submarine with the front part of the conning tower fence into the strong hull, which created several relatively small holes in it, which allowed the Baton Rouge to independently reach its naval base. But her hull received internal stresses that made repairs to the boat impractical, and she was decommissioned from the US Navy, and her commander was removed from his post, which happens extremely rarely. According to unofficial data, that ram cost American submariners five lives. Our participant in this incident was already doing combat service in the ocean a year later. If the K-276 had started to ascend 7-10 seconds earlier, it would have hit the American submarine with its bow, which has a powerful hull, and would have broken its side, which would have led to the sinking of the US Navy nuclear submarine. In another case, the combat torpedoes in the K-276 torpedo tubes could have detonated, and then both nuclear boats would have died at the entrance to the Kola Bay, 10 miles from the coast, in the area through which all ships and vessels going to Murmansk pass, Severomorsk and from them.

"Kostroma" is now part of the same 7th division as "Kursk". On the conning tower of this boat there is a red five-pointed star with the number “1” in the center. So during the years of the Great Patriotic War Our submariners kept count of their victories. Traditions among submariners are alive. Kostroma commander Vladimir Sokolov answered the question of whether his superiors swear at such symbolism: “At first, of course, they frowned, saying that the Americans are now our friends, then they seemed to get used to it, but after Kursk, who can tell me what? about this? Is it just that the number is not very large!”

Oddly enough, during that underwater incident, neither Norwegian environmentalists nor the international Greenpeace said a word about the danger of an environmental disaster threatening radioactive contamination not only on the northern shores of Russia, but throughout Scandinavia.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin then accused the United States of continuing to deploy its submarine forces in close proximity to Russian shores. To settle the scandal, the then President of America George Bush Sr. (his son, Bush Jr., is now also the American President) flew to Moscow, and, promising a large loan, managed to somehow settle the matter. But the Americans stubbornly hid this fact of their boat’s collision from the world community for several years.

Valery Aleksin, who dealt with this collision, came to the conclusion that both commanders had no desire to collide, it was not intentional. But the American commander committed a number of violations, such as entering the territorial waters of the Russian Federation and sending the ship to the combat training area, the coordinates of which were brought to the attention of all states as an extremely high-risk zone. And after he lost contact with our boat, he should have, as good seamanship requires,
the practice of steering a ship, in order to avoid a collision, do not perform feverish maneuvers, but stop the progress and look around, in more detail
listen to the horizon, assess the situation.

One may get the impression that American submariners have always acted as cats chasing helpless Soviet kittens. In April 1980, when checking the cleanliness of the area before a tactical exercise in the Kamchatka region, the commander of the K-314 nuclear submarine Valery Khorovenkov, having discovered an American nuclear submarine, pursued it for 11 hours at a speed of 30 knots and a distance of 12-15 cables (2-3 km) with using the active paths of the hydroacoustic complex until it was driven under the ice of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. The pursuit was stopped only by order of the Pacific Fleet command post. It is only necessary for everyone to clearly understand that such races without rules of underwater objects with a displacement of 5000 tons each at a speed of 55 km/h do not end well. With any misunderstood maneuver, both giants will crush each other, along with their 250 crew members, nuclear reactors and almost a hundred missiles and torpedoes. The commanders of our nuclear-powered ships are full of courage and will to win. Just don't test their patience.

After a boat collision in 1992, a former submariner from the first crew of the first nuclear submarine of the Soviet Union, retired Rear Admiral N. Mormul, wrote an article that was published in “ Komsomolskaya Pravda" entitled "Don't be a fool, America!" with the question in the subtitle: "Why don't we sue the US Navy?" In the article, he described this collision, concluding that “... the authorship of the clumsy maneuver belongs to the commander of the US submarine. Why shouldn’t the American side, in this case, pay the cost of repairing our damaged boat?” And then he expressed the idea that To the Navy The CIS should file a claim with the International Court of Justice and its restoration should be carried out at the expense of the US Navy.” “Restoring our boat will require serious material costs. Friendship is friendship, but if you are guilty, pay... If we remain silent today, if we do not act according to the laws accepted in a civilized society, we simply will not be understood – especially abroad.”

N. Mormul then addressed a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin. Got an answer. This was a report from the Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, Admiral K. Makarov, with the resolution of the Commander-in-Chief - “I agree.” This is the report to the Commander-in-Chief, it is cited in his book “Disasters Under Water” by N. Mormul.

“To the Commander of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin. I am reporting: an appeal to you from Rear Admiral of the Reserve N.G. Mormul. compensation for damages at the expense of the US Navy through the International Court of Justice for the collision of our submarine with the Baton Rouge submarine in February 1992 was considered.
The following has been established.

1. There are no international rules for preventing collisions between submarines while underwater. COLREG-72 ensures the safety of navigation of ships and vessels that are only on the surface, in visual or radar visibility of each other.

2. Considering that the issue of preventing submarine collisions is not regulated by international law, there are no grounds for appealing to an international court.

3. Both commanders are to blame for the collision of these submarines, as well as any other ships.
It is not possible to establish the degree of guilt of each of them in this case.

4. On the occasion of this clash, a note was presented to the US government on behalf of the Russian government. The main cause of the collision was the violation of Russian territorial waters by a US Navy submarine. The American side denies the fact of violating our border lines. The issue of this incident was discussed at the 6th Congress people's deputies RF.

5. The Russian and American sides recognized the existence of the problem of preventing incidents with submarines. In May 1992, the first working meeting of representatives of the Russian Navy and the US Navy on this issue took place in Moscow, during which we proposed specific measures to prevent collisions between submarines of our countries in the Navy’s combat training grounds.

The parties agreed to continue dialogue on this issue.

Regarding the establishment of mutually recognized boundaries of territorial waters, negotiations between experts of the two countries will begin in the near future through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Admiral of the Fleet K. Makarov.”

In 1992, after the collision of the K-276 nuclear submarine Kostroma and Baton Rouge, the Main Headquarters of the Navy prepared a draft “Agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of the United States of America on the prevention of incidents with submarines underwater outside the territorial water." It included organizational, technical, navigation and international legal measures. Since the fall of 1992, negotiations have been ongoing between the headquarters of the Russian Navy and the US Navy. According to eyewitnesses, in 1995 in Washington, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, were told: “Let this remain between us. We will not sign any agreements. You will never have questions from us about this problem again.” However, soon after this, the then Chief of Staff of the US Navy, Admiral Burda, shot himself, and NATO nuclear submarines continue to sail into the Barents Sea as if it were their own backyard, endangering Russian Navy submarines, the lives of their crews and threatening environmental disasters all Northern Europe. So this agreement was not signed, and questions about this problem with the death of the Kursk only increased.

Collision of the nuclear submarine K-276 (SF) with the nuclear submarine Baton Rouge (US Navy) on February 11, 1992.

Basic data of the nuclear submarine of project "945"Barracuda", "Sierra" class:

Displacement: 5300 t / 7100 t.
Main dimensions:
length - 112.7 m
width - 11.2 m
draft - 8.5 m
Armament: 4 - 650 mm TA 4 - 533 mm TA
Speed: 18/35 knots.
Crew: 60 people, incl. 31 officers

Basic data of the nuclear submarine Baton Rouge (No. 689), Los Angeles type:

Displacement: 6000 t / 6527 t.
Main dimensions: length - 109.7 m
width - 10.1 m
draft - 9.89 m.
Armament: 4 - 533 mm TA, anti-ship missile "Garpoon".
Speed: more than 30 knots underwater.
Crew: 133 people.

The Russian nuclear torpedo submarine was at a combat training range near the Rybachy Peninsula, in Russian territorial waters. The submarine was commanded by Captain 2nd Rank I. Loktev. The crew of the boat passed the second course task (the so-called “L-2”) and the submarine followed at a depth of 22.8 meters. The American nuclear-powered submarine carried out reconnaissance missions and monitored its Russian “brother”, following at a depth of about 15 meters. In the process of maneuvering, the acoustics of the American boat lost contact with the Sierra, and since there were five fishing vessels in the area, the noise of the propellers of which was similar to the noise of the propellers of a nuclear submarine, the commander of the Baton Rouge decided at 20 hours 8 minutes to surface to periscope depth and figure out environment. At that moment, the Russian boat was lower than the American one and at 20:13 it also began to ascend to conduct a communication session with the shore. The fact that Russian hydroacoustics were tracking their ship was not detected, and at 20:16 a submarine collision occurred. During the collision, "Kostroma" rammed the bottom of the American "filer" with its wheelhouse. Only the low speed of the Russian boat and the shallow depth during ascent allowed the American submarine to avoid death. Traces of a collision remained on the deckhouse of the Kostroma, which made it possible to identify the violator of territorial waters. The Pentagon was forced to admit its involvement in the incident.
Photo of Kostroma after the collision:

As a result of the collision, Kostroma damaged its wheelhouse fence and was soon repaired. There were no casualties on our side. "Baton Rouge" was completely disabled. One American sailor died.
A good thing, however, is the titanium case. On this moment in the Northern Fleet there are 4 such buildings: Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod, Pskov and Karp.

And here is what our leaders, our professionals, wrote about the analysis of this incident:

Reasons for the collision of the submarine SF K - 276 with the submarine "BATON ROUGE" of the US Navy

1.Objective:

Violation of Russian territorial waters by foreign submarines

Incorrect classification of submarine noise due to the alleged use of equipment for masking the acoustic field as RT noise (GNATS).

2. Disadvantages in organizing surveillance:

Poor quality analysis of information on the OI and the recorder of the 7A-1 GAK MGK-500 device (the fact of observation of a collision object was not revealed - target N-14 at a minimum distance in terms of the S/P ratio in various frequency ranges)

Unjustifiably large (up to 10 min) gaps in measuring bearings to the target, which did not allow the use of methods for clarifying the distance to the target based on the VIP value

Incompetent use of active and passive means on the course of listening to stern heading angles, which led to the use of the entire time spent on this course only for the work of P/N echo direction finding, and in the ShP mode the horizon remained virtually unlistened

Weak leadership of the SAC operators on the part of the SAC commander, which led to an incomplete analysis of information and erroneous classification of the target.

3. Disadvantages in the activities of the crew "GKP-BIP-SHTURMAN":

The estimated time for clearing the horizon at courses of 160 and 310 degrees, which led to a short time spent on these courses and the creation of suboptimal conditions for the work of SAC operators;

Poor quality documentation of the situation and measured MPCs;

Lack of organization of secondary classification of goals;

The commander of the warhead-7 did not fulfill his responsibilities for issuing recommendations to the submarine commander for special maneuvering to clarify the control center in accordance with Article 59 of the RRTS-1;

The danger of a collision with a low-noise, short-range maneuvering target was not identified.
As always, our crews GKP-BIP-SHTURMAN are to blame. And no one cared about the technical capabilities of our acoustics at that time. Of course, conclusions were drawn from the accident. But they were made not in the direction of improving the quality of our technical means of observation, but in the direction of the appearance of a bunch of different “instructions” about what is allowed and what is not allowed, so that it would be better and so that suddenly again we would not accidentally ram our “friends” into our tervodakh.


An asterisk on the wheelhouse with a “one” inside indicates one damaged enemy ship. This is how stars were painted during World War II.

Titanium - element periodic table chemical elements D.E. Mendeleev, with atomic number 22. A light metal of a silvery hue with a density less than half that of iron and a melting point of +1660°C. Titanium is used for the manufacture of durable and high-quality things - reactor fittings, structural elements of aviation and space technology, body armor and expensive housings wristwatch, dental implants and special tools.
And the Soviet Union was so cool and rich that it “sculpted” submarine hulls entirely from titanium!

The unique submarine K-162 (Project 661 “Anchar”) is a record that was not reported by TASS. The underwater nuclear missile cruiser K-162 could accelerate at a depth of up to 44.85 knots (≈83 km/h). Special capabilities required special technical solutions - the K-162 hull was made entirely of titanium for the first time in the history of world shipbuilding.

Crystal Titanium Bar

Project 705K "underwater fighters" have often become the target of criticism for their excessive complexity and bad choice power plant– a reactor with a liquid metal coolant, despite its high power density, posed a mortal threat to the crew of the boat every second. Even at the base, the liquid metal reactor constantly required an external heat supply - the slightest accident on the heating main could lead to disaster. Nevertheless, the Lyras, in spite of all “probable opponents,” served honorably in the USSR Navy. Despite a number of serious accidents, not a single Lear was lost. And not a single person died in the struggle for their survival.

Another record holder is “Elusive Mike”. This is what American sailors called the Soviet experimental submarine K-278 “Komsomolets” (Project 685 “Plavnik”) with a maximum diving depth of more than 1 kilometer. The lightweight and durable titanium hull withstood monstrous water pressure - in August 1985, Komsomolets set an absolute world record for diving depth for submarines - 1027 meters! Sinking into the cold, impenetrable darkness, the K-278 became completely undetectable to enemy anti-submarine weapons. At the same time, already at a depth of 800 meters, still remaining undetectable and invulnerable, Komsomolets could use its torpedo weapons

Little merciless killers of project 705K (code "Lyra")

According to a statement published in early March, the Russian Ministry of Defense and JSC Zvyozdochka Ship Repair Center signed a contract to restore technical readiness through repairs and modernization of two nuclear submarines with titanium hulls B-239 Karp and B-276 Kostroma (formerly K -276 "Crab") of Project 945. In the future, the B-336 "Pskov" and B-534 "Nizhny Novgorod" - nuclear submarines of Project 945A - will undergo a similar modernization.

Modernization of titanium submarines should raise their combat capabilities to a new level. The boats will be equipped with a new modification of the OK-650 reactor (the unified power plant of all Russian nuclear-powered ships of the 3rd and 4th generations), the hydroacoustic complex of the submarines will be replaced, and the Caliber family of missiles will appear in the arsenal. Radio electronics will be radically updated, active noise dampers will appear, instead of the usual periscope, it is possible to install a multi-purpose mast with video cameras and laser rangefinders - the situation on the surface will be able to be observed on the monitor by everyone present in the central post, and not just the officer at the periscope eyepiece.

New technologies in a durable “Soviet-hardened” titanium case should turn the modernized “Condors” and “Barracudas” into a thunderstorm of the seas; in terms of their overall characteristics, the old nuclear-powered submarines will not be inferior to the new, fourth generation submarines.

“This decision of the Navy High Command, supported by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, seems justified, since repairing and modernizing existing submarines, including titanium ones, is approximately two times faster than building new ones. This will require less financial costs"
- Ministry of Defense source

The representative of the Ministry of Defense emphasized that the decision to return titanium submarines to the permanent readiness forces of the Navy was made back in January, and the first stage of work on modernizing the B-239 Karp nuclear submarine will begin in the summer of 2013. It was noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense has returned to the idea of ​​restoring four titanium submarines due to the problems of saturating the Navy with new ships. First of all, this concerns delays in the construction of fourth-generation multi-purpose nuclear submarines of Project 885 Yasen.

"Carp" today. The boat was withdrawn from the Northern Fleet in 1998

Multipurpose nuclear submarine B-239 "Karp"(formerly K-239) project 945 “Barracuda” (Sierra-I according to NATO classification)

Laying - 1979, launching - 1981, commissioning - 1984;

Crew: 60 people;

Surface/underwater displacement – ​​6000/9600 tons;

Design waterline length (CSL) – 107.16 m;

Power plant: 1 OK-650A reactor, thermal power 180 MW, 4 steam generators, 2 turbogenerators, 2 battery groups, 2 diesel generators DG-300 750 hp each. with a fuel supply for 10 days, 1 main propeller, 2 trolling engines of 370 kW each, two trolling propellers.

Working diving depth – 480 meters;

Maximum diving depth – 550 meters;

Weapons:

2 torpedo tubes of 650 mm caliber, ammunition load of 12 “long” torpedoes and PLUR;
- 6 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition load of 28 torpedoes, Vodopad anti-missile guided missiles and Shkval high-speed missile torpedoes;
- MANPADS for self-defense.

“Barracuda” and “Condor” are not simple ships - the titanium hull opened up absolutely amazing prospects for Soviet submariners. First of all, the high strength and low density of titanium made it possible, with the usual ratio of load items (hull mass - about 40% of the standard displacement of the submarine), to achieve almost twice as much strength. As a result, the Barracuda had a working depth 1.5-2 times greater than any of the Soviet boats of the previous generation and promising foreign analogues - it could dive into the abyss to a depth of half a kilometer, while maintaining the possibility of using torpedo weapons in the entire range working depths and speeds! The Condor dived even deeper - up to 600 meters.

For comparison, their peers, the American Los Angeles-class multipurpose submarine, rarely operated at depths greater than 250 meters. The maximum depth for an American submarine is said to be within 450 meters.
Of course, the combat capabilities of modern boats are determined not only by the speed and depth of immersion, but the magnificent combination of large working depths and high underwater speeds of the Soviet “Condors” and “Barracudas” is worthy of all praise.

Separately, it is worth mentioning reliability and durability - titanium is not subject to corrosion, the titanium cases of 30-year-old Barracudas still retain their original “shine” under a layer of rotten sound-absorbing rubber coating.
Finally, another important advantage of a titanium hull is a radical reduction in the boat’s magnetic field.

There is only one drawback - the high price and complexity of manufacturing a titanium case... but, fortunately, we no longer face such a problem. The production of titanium hulls was carried out by the Soviet industry, the superboats were built many years ago - which means you just need to change the “filling” and thank the USSR for its great heritage.

The strength of these nuclear submarines is best described by the incident off the island of Kildin, which occurred in February 1992: the Russian submarine K-276 Kostroma (the same “titanium” project 945) accidentally collided with the American submarine Baton Rouge patrolling in the Barents Sea ( USS Baton Rouge SSN-689). At that moment, when the Baton Rouge was at periscope depth, it suddenly came under the ramming attack of a pop-up Soviet submarine - the Kostroma hit its wheelhouse directly in the center of the American spy’s hull.

Damage to Kostroma

The ending of the tragicomedy is obvious: “Kostroma” healed its lacerated wounds and again returned to fulfilling its tasks in the ocean. “Baton Rouge” independently reached its home base, but the damage received (primarily microcracks and internal stresses that arose in the hull) made repairing the boat impractical. Baton Rouge remained in reserve for a couple of years until it was finally decommissioned in 1995. Evil tongues claim that at the time of the collision a fire broke out on board the Baton Rouge, and there may have been casualties.

The international conflict was quickly resolved: the Americans stated that at the time of the collision, Baton Rouge was in neutral waters outside the 12-mile zone of the territorial waters of the Russian Federation. They agreed on this. And on the wheelhouse of the nuclear-powered icebreaker “Kostroma” a five-pointed star with the number “1” inscribed in it appeared - this is how submarine sailors counted their victories during the Great Patriotic War.

B-336 "Pskov" in Ara-Guba ( Kola Peninsula), 2004

The consequences of a fire in the SRZ-82 dock are visible on the starboard side

Multipurpose nuclear submarine B-336 "Pskov"(formerly K-336 "Perch") project 945A "Condor" (Sierra-II according to NATO classification)
Designed to search and track submarines and surface ships of a potential enemy, and strike naval targets.

Laying - 1989, launching - 1992, commissioning - 1993.

Crew: 60 people;

Surface/underwater displacement – ​​6500/10400 tons;

Design waterline length (CSL) – 110.5 m;

Double-hull design, durable body made of titanium, consists of 6 compartments;

Power plant: 1 reactor OK-650B thermal power 190 MW, 4 steam generators, 2 turbogenerators, 2 battery groups, 2 diesel generators DG-300 750 hp each. with a fuel supply for 10 days, 1 main propeller, 2 trolling engines of 370 kW each, two trolling propellers.

Maximum speed in submerged position – 35 knots;

Working diving depth – 520 meters;

Maximum diving depth – 600 meters;

Weapons:

2 torpedo tubes of 650 mm caliber, ammunition load of 8 “long” torpedoes and PLUR;
- 4 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition load of 32 torpedoes, Vodopad anti-ship missiles and Shkval high-speed missile torpedoes;
- MANPADS for self-defense.

* all data given is valid for a submarine that has not undergone modernization

On the front of the cabin there is a star with the number “1”. The account is open.