The Russians won the information war: how to deal with them now. Russia's wars won and lost

Viktor Marakhovsky, for RIA Novosti

The global community of irreconcilable Russian oppositionists is comprehending the new reality.

In general, the Russian irreconcilable opposition is perhaps the most international of all oppositions. It includes not only residents of Russia and citizens of the Russian Federation living abroad, but also former citizens of the Russian Federation who have long become subjects of other countries. In its ranks there are even citizens of one country that claims that it is at war with Russia (and try to kick them out of the ranks of the opposition guard).

…So. The question that this world community now has to resolve is harsh: why did the protest campaign launched on the RuNet not work at all?

The presence of irreconcilable anti-Putinists in online media and social networks was, if not overwhelming, then at least equal to “pro-Putin.” And the total output of the protest efforts of the “anti-system candidates” and the boycotting “politician whom Putin is afraid of” turned out to be somehow pathetic.

No, their result is pathetic not in the sense that the couple of million of our fellow citizens who voted for K. A. Sobchak and G. A. Yavlinsky are pathetic, insignificant individuals. And not in the sense that tens or maybe even hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens who really consciously obeyed the call to “boycott the farce” are pathetic. No, they are all full citizens of the country.

Their problem is different. Despite the fact that these people represent a minority, they are, so to speak, an informationally hyperactive minority. And therefore this minority usually considers itself not just full-fledged, but something more.

This is for an ordinary user and the Internet is normal. That is, for personal purposes - mainly for correspondence with loved ones, watching movies and storing music.

And an advanced anti-Putin user, even if he is an elderly Israeli housewife, is a daily factory of likes, comments and reposts, producing and distributing political content in kilotons. Not to mention the army of Baltic, Ukrainian, Transcaucasian and Central Asian armchair fighters against the empire. Not to mention the sofa corps of anti-imperial resistance in Russia itself - Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ural and Siberian.

But the main thing is that this minority is accustomed to considering itself not just active, but also informationally effective. Due to its near-intellectual diplomas and simply class traditions, it is accustomed to thinking that it has much greater skill in presenting its political position. Finds words much more convincingly and brightly. He knows how to “get through” much better.

And therefore the conclusion was drawn: each representative of this intellectual minority is certainly worth hundreds of ordinary passive users of the information space. Simply by the level of information noise it produces and the influence it exerts.

And it’s not that they had absolutely no reason to expect success. At least limited.

Firstly, on the side of the global international of Russian oppositionists there was a rather impressive media package. Starting from the British and American, who with desperate persistence repeated the mantra about “Putin’s main competitor, who called for a boycott of the elections,” to the Germans, who thoughtfully explained to the Russian reader how best to express their protest against the Kremlin: “Stay at home, as Navalny calls, or spoil the ballot , as Khodorkovsky advises? How does a boycott differ from a protest vote and how? decision will it affect the election process?

(At this point it was necessary to ask rhetorically: do these people accuse Russia of trying to interfere in their elections? But this question has long been answered. Correct countries interfere in other people’s elections correctly, for the sake of good. Wrong countries like Russia - in the name of evil. )

Secondly, the informationally hyperactive minority is also mastering new media spaces at a faster pace. For example, of the popular political telegram channels, the clear majority are clearly oppositional in nature.

Thirdly, the audience of this minority is the Russian “media class” - including a fairly large stratum of official media workers who are accustomed to walking around with figs in their pockets and considering themselves victims of circumstances. And therefore those who like and repost information that castigates modern Russia, with renewed enthusiasm.

…So.

As practice has shown, all this Internet self-esteem of a hyperactive anti-state minority turned out to be exaggerated. That is, it failed to convert into either a boycott or a protest vote. It read, liked and reposted itself a lot, but for some reason it remained in its three percent ghetto.

I have a version why this is so.

The whole point is that there is probably no society on the planet that would be more resistant to information pressure than Russian society.

Even before the massive advent of the Internet (and the onset of the established “Putin era”), the Russian voter/reader/TV viewer lived for a decade and a half under a natural information dictatorship. From morning to night, the Russian citizen was told from every voice that his country was falling apart and that it was good, that his past was criminal, his pride was false and his best prospects were to go to a normal country. And if it doesn’t work out, sit and not twitch.

AND Russian citizen survived this information occupation.

And then came the era of the mass Russian Internet. And although the “irreconcilables” certainly had a head start (the Internet first spread across megacities, where its founding fathers were individuals, later almost in full force who went to Bolotnaya) - the majority already in the 2010s began to inexorably catch up and overtake them. Simply because even very hyperactive minorities, asserting themselves at the expense of the majority, will not read or listen to the latter if given a choice.

And the majority now have a choice. Both in the form of “statist” media, and in the form of a self-made patriotic blogosphere.

And in the end it turned out that all the propaganda and propaganda powers of the opposition telegram and YouTube channels, and Facebook groups, and VK publics, and the mighty Prague and Riga Russian-language publications with advanced design and cool gadgets, and everything like that - are closed actually on yourself. To the international Russian-language opposition media class.

In particular, this also happened because this closed community was never able to develop a normal, respectful language of communication with the majority. They couldn’t come up with anything more creative than “pathetic” stories about how “I met an old woman in a store who was trying to buy two oranges at a special offer.” Basically, all of their political lyrics were based on mockery of the “obedient/gullible majority.” On tragic love to yourself, smart and beautiful. And on listing the differences between the smart and talented ourselves and the gray monochrome mass.

“You are voting wrong, Uncle Fyodor.” Western media about elections in RussiaRussian President Vladimir Putin confidently wins the elections: more than 56 million voters expressed support for his course. Russia has made its choice. But in the West, as usual, they do not agree with our choice.

That is, these guys have mastered some new media, new formats and new networks.

But the main thing is that they never learned anything. For example, a simple truth: “If you are addressing people who, for the most part, have voted for V.V. Putin for ten years, then why the hell are you mocking their choice? Are you sure that this is how they win hearts?”

...As a result, today the information troops, defeated during the next assault on the Kremlin, are discussing the future.

Some, as after every election in Russia, gloomily prophesy that now the stupid majority will cry, and we won’t even feel sorry for them, it’s our own fault.

Others are trying to steer into a constructive direction and propose, instead of fighting an irresistible force, to join it and change from within: “We all need to learn to sacrifice. Our pride, our affections, our love, our destiny and our lives. We cannot defeat Putin. No processions, no boycotts.” and notes. The regime can only be changed from the inside. If you want to change Russia, love Putin. Love him and remain faithful to him. In order to ever give you power, he must be sure that you will not betray him." etc.

The call is, of course, frightening (from the point of view of us, the majority). But it is unlikely to be implemented - after all, to achieve it, the militant, irreconcilable minority will have to abandon their own nature. And this is hardly possible.

Why didn’t the protest campaign launched on the RuNet work “at all”?

The global community of irreconcilable Russian oppositionists is comprehending the new reality.

…So. The question that this world community now has to resolve is harsh: why did the protest campaign launched on the RuNet not work at all?

No, their result is pathetic not in the sense that the couple of million of our fellow citizens who voted for K. A. Sobchak and G. A. Yavlinsky are pathetic insignificant individuals. And not in the sense that tens or maybe even hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens who really consciously obeyed the call to “boycott the farce” are pathetic. No, they are all full citizens of the country.

This is for an ordinary user and the Internet is normal. That is, for personal purposes - mainly for correspondence with loved ones, watching movies and storing music.

And it’s not that they had absolutely no reason to expect success. At least limited.

Firstly, on the side of the global international of Russian oppositionists there was a rather impressive media package. Starting from the British and American, who with desperate persistence repeated the mantra about “Putin’s main competitor, who called for a boycott of the elections,” to the Germans, who thoughtfully explained to the Russian reader how best to express their protest against the Kremlin: “Stay at home, as Navalny calls, or spoil the ballot , as Khodorkovsky advises? How is a boycott different from a protest vote and how will the decision made affect the election process?”

Thirdly, the audience of this minority is the Russian “media class” - including a fairly large stratum of official media workers who are accustomed to walking around with figs in their pockets and considering themselves victims of circumstances. And therefore, those who like and repost information that castigates modern Russia with redoubled enthusiasm.

…So.

I have a version why this is so.

The whole point is that there is probably no society on the planet that would be more resistant to information pressure than Russian society.

Even before the massive advent of the Internet (and the onset of the established “Putin era”), the Russian voter/reader/TV viewer lived for a decade and a half under a natural information dictatorship. From morning to night, the Russian citizen was told from every source that his country was falling apart and that it was good, that his past was criminal, his pride was false and his best prospects were to go to a normal country. And if it doesn’t work out, sit and not twitch.

And the Russian citizen withstood this information occupation.

And then came the era of the mass Russian Internet. And although the “irreconcilables” certainly had a head start (the Internet first spread across megacities, where its founding fathers were the people who later went to Bolotnaya in almost full force) - the majority already in the 2010s began to inexorably catch up with them and overtake. Simply because even very hyperactive minorities, asserting themselves at the expense of the majority, will not read or listen to the latter if given a choice.

And the majority now have a choice. Both in the form of “statist” media, and in the form of a self-made patriotic blogosphere.

In particular, this also happened because this closed community was never able to develop a normal, respectful language of communication with the majority. They couldn’t come up with anything more creative than “pathetic” stories about how “I met an old woman in a store who was trying to buy two oranges at a special offer.” Basically, all of their political lyrics were based on mockery of the “obedient/gullible majority.” On tragic self-love, smart and beautiful. And on listing the differences between the smart and talented ourselves and the gray monochrome mass.

That is, these guys have mastered some new media, new formats and new networks.

...As a result, today the information troops, defeated during the next assault on the Kremlin, are discussing the future.

Some, as after every election in Russia, gloomily prophesy that now the stupid majority will cry, and we won’t even feel sorry for them, it’s our own fault.

The call is, of course, frightening (from the point of view of us, the majority). But it is hardly feasible - after all, to achieve it, the militant, irreconcilable minority will have to abandon their own nature. And this is hardly possible.

There is no country in the world that would win all its wars, and the statement that Russia has never lost them is not a declaration of love for the Motherland - it is a confession of one’s own ignorance.
Below are ten wars in which Russia, alas and ah, was defeated.

Livonian War (1558-1583)

Jan Matejko "Stephan Batory near Pskov"

This painting depicts the embassy of Tsar Ivan the Terrible to Stefan Batory asking for peace. It is with the elections to the Polish kingship of this talented commander that the defeat of the Muscovite kingdom in this war, which began very successfully for Russia, is associated. And also with the raids of the Crimean Khanate, and the progressive paranoia of Ivan the Terrible “ The Tsar committed oprichnina...».
According to the Yam-Zapolsky truce with Poland, Russia renounced Livonia and a number of Russian cities, although some border lands were returned to it. According to the Truce of Plus with Sweden, Russia lost Russian cities adjacent to the Baltic coast, retaining only a narrow access to the Baltic Sea at the mouth of the Neva. In addition, this war led to Porukha - a severe economic crisis recent years reign of Ivan the Terrible.

Russian-Polish War (1609-1618)

Sergey Ivanov " Time of Troubles" Intervention camp.

One of the main events of the Time of Troubles, and one of its main causes. At the end of this war, according to the shameful Deulin truce, Russia ceded to Poland the Smolensk, Chernigov and Novgorod-Seversk lands, in which there were 29 cities, and renounced claims to Livonia. The Polish-Russian border came so close to Moscow that the distance from it to the border Vyazma was only 250 versts, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth set the largest dimensions in its history for 50 years.
They kept the jewelry taken by the Poles from Moscow for themselves. At the same time, Poland refused to recognize Mikhail Romanov as Tsar (the Polish King Vladislav retained the title of Moscow Tsar until 1634, and during receptions put on the Moscow crown).

Russo-Swedish War (1610-1617)

King Gustav II Adolf. Prayer before battle

During the Time of Troubles, the Novgorodians called the son of the Swedish king to the Russian throne and surrendered Novgorod to the Swedes; later the Swedes also captured Staraya Russa, Ladoga, Gdov, Oreshek, Ivangorod and a number of other Russian cities. But the interests of the Swedes in Russia were limited only to turning the Baltic Sea into their inland sea; moreover, Sweden, simultaneously with Russia, was waging wars with Poland, Denmark and Germany.
Therefore, King Gustav II Adolf agreed to the Stolbovo Peace Treaty, under the terms of which Russia paid reparations to the Swedes in the amount of 20 thousand rubles and regained part of Russian cities. But Sweden ceded territory with cities and fortresses from Ivangorod to Lake Ladoga and completely lost access to the Baltic Sea. Which only 100 years later was Peter I able to return.
.

Russo-Swedish War (1656-1658)

Nikolai Sverchkov “Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich’s departure to review the troops”

However, after 50 years, Russia tried to regain its lost lands and access to the Baltic Sea, taking advantage of the fact that Sweden entered the Northern War and had no time for Russia. At first, the war developed successfully, part of Livonia and Karelia was recaptured, Riga was besieged, Tartu, Shlisselburg and several other cities were captured. However, in 1657-58. Swedish troops received reinforcements and inflicted a number of defeats on the Russian troops, forcing the conclusion of the Valiesar Truce for a period of three years.
By that time, Bogdan Khmelnitsky had died, Ivan Vygovsky, who opposed the alliance with the Russians, had been elected Ukrainian hetman, the Ruin had begun, and Russia was drawn into the war in Ukraine. Not wanting to lose Ukrainian lands by getting bogged down in the North, Russia, according to the Treaty of Kardis, returned to Sweden everything it had won in that war, restoring the border established by the Stolbovo Treaty without access to the Baltic Sea. And Sweden, I repeat, was no longer interested in anything in Russia.

Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713)

Arseniy Chernyshov fragment of the diorama “The Capture Turkish fortress Azov by the troops of Peter I"

Peter I began and ended this war with one disastrous Prut campaign, the goal of which was rather petty - to capture Charles XII. As a result, Peter I, together with Catherine I, were not captured themselves only because they bribed the vizier and a number of Turkish military leaders.
According to the Prut Peace Treaty, Russia returned Azov, captured in 1696, to Turkey, sold all its ships on the Sea of Azov to Turkey, tore down the fortifications of Taganrog and other fortresses in the south, the Zaporozhye Sich and the Cossacks on the western side of the Dnieper, on which Russia only Kyiv remained.
But the main result of this stupid war was Russia’s loss of access to Sea of Azov and the newly built southern fleet. Azov was again captured by the Russian army only 25 years later under Empress Anna Ioannovna.

Russian-Prussian-French War (1806-1807)

Gioachino Serangeli "Farewell of Napoleon to Alexander I in Tilsit"

Russia participated in this war against Napoleonic France on the side of the Fourth Coalition of Powers (Russia, Prussia, England), while fighting its own Russian-Turkish war(1806-1812). Russia could not fight two wars at the same time, and after a series of heavy defeats from Napoleon, Alexander I was forced to conclude the Peace of Tilsit.
In Russia, Tilsit was treated as a national disgrace and unheard of dishonor - it meant recognizing yesterday’s enemy as an ally as defeated, and yesterday’s ally as an enemy. In addition to a painful blow to pride, joining the continental blockade of England hit the Russian economy hard, and unleashed the Anglo-Russian War of 1807-1812.

Crimean War (1853-1856)

Robert Gibb "The Thin Red Line"

The war started by Russia against Turkey for dominance in the Black Sea straits and the Balkans, which turned into a war against the coalition of England, France, Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia. In fact, Nicholas I dragged economically backward, feudal-serf Russia into a military conflict with strong European powers, which could not end in victory.
The signed Paris Peace Treaty demanded that Russia return all occupied territories to Turkey, it was prohibited from having a navy in the Black Sea, Russia lost its influence in the Balkans. But there were also positive consequences from the defeat in that war - it served as an impetus for the reforms of Alexander II and the abolition of serfdom.

Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)

The war between the Russian and Japanese empires was conceived by Nicholas II as a “small victorious war"to distract the masses from purely internal Russian problems, plus establishing control over Manchuria and Korea. And which eventually became the standard of a lost war in the presence of overwhelming superiority in human and material resources.
The Portsmouth Peace Treaty provided for the cession by Russia of half of Sakhalin to Japan, lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur and to part of the South Manchurian Railway. Russia also recognized Korea as a Japanese zone of influence, and Japan's right to fishing along the Russian coast.

First World War (1914-1918)

Pyotr Karyagin “The Horror of War. We’ve arrived!” Russian infantry attack on German trenches

Beginning with an unprecedented patriotic upsurge, supported by all layers Russian society, this absolutely useless war for Russia led to revolution and collapse Russian Empire. And to a unique defeat in history for the losing side in the war.
Having signed the separate Treaty of Brest-Litovsk literally six months before Germany’s surrender, Russia renounced a territory of 780 thousand square meters. km. with the loss of a significant part of the country's agricultural and industrial base, with a population of one third of the total population of the Russian Empire. And with the recognition of the payment of billions of reparations and other humiliating conditions.
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was annulled by Soviet Russia immediately after the surrender of Germany, but there was no place among the victors - this peace allowed the losing German Empire to drag out its agony, transferring its forces from the Eastern Front to the Western Front.

Soviet-Polish War (1919-1921)

Jerzy Kossak "Miracle on the Vistula"

The USSR had not yet been created, but immediately after the surrender of Germany in the First World War Soviet Russia wanted to regain part of the territories of the former Russian Empire and establish on them “a springboard for the world revolution.” In the USSR they really didn’t like to remember that shamefully lost war.
According to the Riga Peace Treaty, Poland received Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Russia also pledged to return all cultural values, taken from its territory since 1772, and pay reparations to the Poles in the amount of 30 million gold rubles.

I didn’t remember later wars, because the USSR, sorry, is not Russia. As he left aside the wars of distant antiquity - Kievan Rus and appanage Russian principalities, this is also not Russia.
However, even to the Russian Empire the modern Russian Federation has a rather distant relationship - in its 25-year history on this moment so far only the lost First one is available Chechen War, won the Second Chechen and Russian-Georgian War of 2008.

Bismarck believed that the Russians could not be defeated. Attempts at military expansion of our country were made more than once, but ended in the same thing - the defeat of the aggressor.

Theater of war

There has not been an enemy in the history of wars with Russia who did not complain about its vast expanses, frosts and impassability. For wars before the beginning of the 20th century, when losses from disease, as a rule, exceeded combat losses several times, this was an important factor. Frost became one of the reasons for the death of the first-class for its time, but small-numbered Swedish army in Russia during the Northern War. To the moment Battle of Poltava Charles XII did not have 30 thousand people in the ranks; The Swedes also abandoned the use of artillery due to a lack of gunpowder. In fact, Poltava became the logical final point of action for the Swedish troops, who found themselves hundreds of kilometers from supply bases, deprived of reinforcements, food and equipment. Any long-term campaign is a war of attrition, and prolongation of hostilities leads to inevitable non-combat losses. Events are indicative here Patriotic War 1812. Thus, the number of French troops that invaded Russia is estimated differently by different experts, but no less than 500 thousand people. A month and a half later, Napoleon had about 135 thousand people on the Borodino field. The army was reduced by more than two-thirds without the general battle that the French commander so desired. Some troops were left as garrisons and to guard communications. Losses from disease were also enormous - typhus decimated the French units and the troops of their allies. The French mounted cavalry suffered heavy losses, where a third of the cavalrymen had already turned into infantry by the Battle of Smolensk. Off-road conditions and the likelihood of encountering a powerful guerrilla war stopped Russia’s opponents during the period Crimean War from incursions into the internal provinces of Russia, and were forced to limit themselves to actions in coastal zone. Although here, too, epidemics, primarily cholera, wiped out much more in the ranks of the French and British than the Allies lost in all the bloody deeds on the bastions of Sevastopol. Thus, for 22 thousand French soldiers who died in battle and died from wounds, more than 75 thousand people died from disease. During the First World War, German troops, having occupied Poland, part of the Baltic states and Belarus, were in no hurry to carry out serious offensive operations on the territory of Russia, fearing to leave the dense network railways and lose mobility, which in a war on two fronts threatened to turn into a disaster.

Unification of weapons

Any big war leads to a restructuring of the economy and its subordination to military needs. This was the case during the protracted Northern War, when the emphasis was placed on the development of production necessary for the needs of the army and navy: from cloth and canvas factories to weapons factories. An important factor in the conditions of the great war was the unification of production. When it was necessary to dress and arm the largest army in Europe, the emphasis was placed on mass production, simplicity in production and development of weapons. In order not to overload the material with a mass of statistical data, we will limit ourselves to a few examples. Shortly before the Patriotic War of 1812, the calibers of Russian artillery were unified, which made it possible to simplify and reduce the cost of production. During the First World War, unification affected, first of all, the production of small arms, when out of three samples of the famous “three-line” they focused on one - the dragoon. It is often said that this happened in Soviet time(and officially this is true) - and in fact even during the First World War. The factor of unification of weapons models manifested itself even more during the Great Patriotic War - in conditions when millions of armies with a high saturation of equipment acted against each other. At the same time, priority, as before, was given to a mass model, perhaps not ideal, but easy to produce and master. In Germany, everything was just the opposite and the emphasis was on creating superweapons - tanks, aircraft and small arms. Yes, the German Panthers were superior to the Soviet T-34 - but how many were there? Just under 6 thousand against several tens of thousands of Soviet medium tanks. And at the same time, having created a good medium tank, the enemy did not stop producing the same “fours” - and this is a large investment of time and resources. The same applies to small arms - the Germans managed to create the "Sturmgever" - essentially an automatic rifle, only they used it en masse already near Konigsberg and Berlin in 1945 - late, and this weapon did not play a serious role.

Allies of Russia?

Often Russia, and later Soviet Union fought a war in coalition against a common enemy. True, there is still a debate as to whether these allies brought more harm or benefit. The first great experience was gained during the Great Northern War, when Denmark and Poland were Russia's allies. The Swedes finished off the Danes before the Russian troops had time to complete their concentration, and although Poland and Saxony shackled the Swedes for a while, giving Peter the Great the opportunity to reorganize the army, in the military aspect Russia still had to fight one-on-one, albeit with a small , but was considered an exemplary Swedish army. Next big war, where Russia acted in alliance with European countries became the Seven Years' War, where France and Austria became Russia's allies. However, for two years, Russian troops, essentially acting in the interests of the Austrians, suffered heavy losses without a clear military-political result. And only when Saltykov, who showed enviable independence, was placed at the head of the army, the Prussian troops were dealt a devastating defeat near Kunersdorf. After him, the Prussian army for some time ceased to exist as an organized force. The road to Berlin was open for the allied Russian and Austrian troops. But then the Austrian allies refused to take the Prussian capital, fearing the strengthening of Russia’s position. And Saltykov, with his troops drained of blood by a heavy battle, had to abandon the campaign to Berlin alone. Similar trends can be noted in a series of Russian-Turkish and, above all, Napoleonic Wars, when the interests of the allies were placed above their own political goals and military expediency. In 1799, this almost ended in disaster for Suvorov’s army in Switzerland, where only the commander’s talent and tireless energy saved Russian troops from captivity or destruction. This is also the fourth coalition war, during which Russian troops entered the fight at a time when the main ally, Prussia, was defeated by the French, and after the bloody battles of Pultusk, Preussisch-Eylau and Friedland, the Peace of Tilsit, unfavorable for Russia, was concluded. After the victorious campaign of 1812, during foreign campaigns, there was absolutely no place for a single Russian military leader in the high command of the troops of the anti-Napoleonic coalition, which greatly affected the course of the struggle. The apogee of political independence in military operations for Russia was the First World War. It is no coincidence that a gloomy saying has developed that Marshal Foch is ready to fight until last straw Russian blood. And many Russian victories, be it Gumbinnen, the Battle of Galicia or the Brusilov breakthrough, were rather in the hands of the Entente allies, and the Russian army was promised the emergence of new German divisions, urgently transferred by the enemy from Western Front. Russian troops had greater independence on the Caucasian front, where the Russian army achieved truly outstanding successes. Separate is the participation of the Soviet Union in the anti-Hitler coalition. Here the picture was different, but similar to previous wars - until June 1944, the Soviet Union, in the most important land theater of military operations, fought Germany and its satellites virtually one on one. Neither El Alamein nor the landing on Sicily are comparable in scale to the Battle of Moscow, Stalingrad or Kursk Bulge. Apparently, there was a great deal of truth in the words of Alexander the Third, who said that Russia’s only allies were its army and navy.

In the global community of irreconcilable Russian oppositionists, they are comprehending the new reality.

…So. The question that this world community now has to resolve is harsh: why did the protest campaign launched on the RuNet not work at all?

This is for an ordinary user and the Internet is normal. That is, for personal purposes - mainly for correspondence with loved ones, watching movies and storing music.

And an advanced anti-Putin user, even if he is an elderly Israeli housewife, is a daily factory of likes, comments and reposts, producing and distributing political content in kilotons. Not to mention the army of Baltic, Ukrainian, Transcaucasian and Central Asian armchair fighters against the empire. Not to mention the sofa corps of anti-imperial resistance in the Russian Federation itself - Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ural and Siberian.

But the main thing is that this minority is accustomed to considering itself not just active, but also informationally effective. Due to its near-intellectual diplomas and simple class traditions, it is accustomed to thinking that it has much greater skill in presenting its political position. Finds words much more convincingly and brightly. He knows how to “get through” much better.

And it’s not that they had absolutely no reason to expect success. At least limited.

Firstly, on the side of the global international of Russian oppositionists there was a rather impressive media package. Starting from the British and American, who with desperate persistence repeated the mantra about “Putin’s main competitor, who called for a boycott of the elections,” to the Germans, who thoughtfully explained to the Russian reader how best to express their protest against the Kremlin: “Stay at home, as Navalny calls, or spoil the ballot , as Khodorkovsky advises? How is a boycott different from a protest vote and how will the decision made affect the election process?”

(At this point it was necessary to ask rhetorically: do these people accuse Russia of trying to interfere in their elections? But this question has long been answered. Correct countries interfere in other people’s elections correctly, for the sake of good. Incorrect countries, like Russia, for the sake of evil).

Thirdly, the audience of this minority is the Russian “media class” - including a fairly large layer of official media workers who are accustomed to walking around with figs in their pockets and considering themselves victims of circumstances. And therefore, those who like and repost information that castigates modern Russia with redoubled enthusiasm.

…So.

I have a version why this is so.

The whole point is that there is probably no society on the planet that would be more resistant to information pressure than Russian society.

And the Russian citizen withstood this information occupation.

And then came the era of the mass Russian Internet. And although the “irreconcilables” certainly had a head start (the Internet first of all spread across megacities, where its founding fathers were the people who later went to Bolotnaya in almost full force) - the majority already in the 2010s began to inexorably catch up and overtake them . Simply because even very hyperactive minorities, asserting themselves at the expense of the majority, the latter, given the choice, will not read or listen.

And the majority now have a choice. Both in the form of “statist” media, and in the form of a self-made patriotic blogosphere.

And in the end it turned out that all the propaganda and propaganda powers of the opposition telegram and YouTube channels, and Facebook groups, and VK-publics, and the mighty Prague and Riga Russian-language publications with advanced design and cool gadgets, and everything like that - are closed actually on yourself. To the international Russian-language opposition media class.

In particular, this also happened because this closed community was never able to develop a normal, respectful language of communication with the majority. They couldn’t come up with anything more creative than “pathetic” stories about how “I met an old woman in a store who was trying to buy two oranges at a special offer.” Basically, all of their political lyrics were based on mockery of the “obedient/gullible majority.” On tragic self-love, smart and beautiful. And on listing the differences between the smart and talented ourselves and the gray monochrome mass.

That is, these guys have mastered some new media, new formats and new networks.

But the main thing is that they never learned anything. For example, a simple truth: “If you are addressing people who, for the most part, have voted for V.V. Putin for ten years, then why the hell are you mocking his choice? Are you sure that this is how they win hearts?”

...As a result, today the information troops, defeated during the next assault on the Kremlin, are discussing the future.

Some, as after every election in Russia, gloomily prophesy that now the stupid majority will cry, and we won’t even feel sorry for them, it’s our own fault.