Belopol War. Soviet-Polish War (1919–1921)

Soviet-Polish War 1920-1921

On April 25, 1920, the Polish army invaded Soviet Ukraine and captured Kyiv on May 6. The main goal of the Polish leadership led by Józef Piłsudski was to restore Poland to the historical borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1772, establishing control over Belarus, Ukraine (including Donbass), Lithuania and geopolitical dominance in Eastern Europe.

However, already on May 14, a successful counter-offensive of Soviet troops began under the command of M. N. Tukhachevsky and A. I. Egorov. In mid-July they approached the borders of Poland. Poland agreed to recognize Curzon Line its eastern border.

"Curzon Line"- the conventional name of the line that was recommended on December 8, 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Entente as the eastern border of Poland. The line basically corresponds to the ethnographic principle: to the west of it there were lands with a predominance of the Polish population, to the east - territories with a predominance of non-Polish (Lithuanian, Belarusian, Ukrainian) populations.

On July 11, 1920, the British Foreign Minister J. Curzon sent a note to the Soviet government demanding that the Soviet offensive on this line be stopped (the line got its name from Lord Curzon), that Soviet troops withdraw 50 kilometers east of this line and conclude armistice with Poland.

However, the Soviet government decided to reject the note and attack Poland in order to Sovietize it, and subsequently incite a revolution in Germany and other countries of Western Europe.

12 August troops Western Front M. Tukhachevsky went on the offensive, the goal of which was to capture Warsaw. However, it ended in disaster. Soviet troops were completely defeated near Warsaw in August 1920, and began to retreat back. Many Soviet armies were destroyed, and more than 120 thousand Red Army soldiers were captured. This defeat of the Red Army is the most catastrophic in the history of the Civil War.

In October, the parties concluded a truce, and in March 1921 V Riga a peace treaty was signed. Under its terms, a significant part of the lands in western Ukraine and Belarus with 10 million Ukrainians and Belarusians went to Poland (see map on the right).

The result of the Soviet-Polish war

Neither side achieved its goals during the war:

Belarus and Ukraine were divided between Poland and the republics that became part of the Soviet Union in 1922.

The territory of Lithuania was divided between Poland and the independent state of Lithuania.

The RSFSR, for its part, recognized the independence of Poland and the legitimacy of the Pilsudski government, and temporarily abandoned plans for a “world revolution” and the elimination of the Versailles system. Despite the signing of a peace treaty, relations between the two countries remained tense for the next twenty years, which ultimately led to the Soviet participation in the partition of Poland in 1939.

On December 12-13, 1919, at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Entente, where the issue of future policy towards Soviet Russia was discussed, French Prime Minister J. Clemenceau proposed making the main bet on Poland, pitting it against the Bolsheviks. To this end, he called for military and financial assistance. The French prime minister was supported by his British colleague D. Lloyd George and US representative D. Davis. After it was not possible to create a broad anti-Soviet bloc of small states bordering Russia, the main hopes were placed on Poland and Wrangel’s troops.

FORWARD - TO THE EAST

It is known that back on December 8, 1919. The Supreme Council The Entente adopted the Declaration on the temporary eastern borders of Poland, which were established on the basis of the ethnic principle along a line that later became known as the “Curzon Line.” By guaranteeing Poland the undisputed Polish lands located to the west of this border, she was made to understand that she must solve the problem of the eastern territories herself by force of arms. Eastern Galicia (Western Ukraine) became the bargaining chip of the West for Poland's participation in the anti-Soviet military campaign.

Poland did not need to agitate for a long time for war with Russia. Having gained independence, this country, led by J. Pilsudski, the sworn enemy of everything Russian, took an extremely hostile position towards Russia. The Polish government sought to recreate “Greater Poland” - from sea to sea, within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772. In an effort to expand its borders as much as possible, the Polish state, as soon as it was born, started armed conflicts with almost all its neighbors. But main goal Polish expansionist policy were the territories of the former Russian Empire. By the autumn of 1919, the offensive in the east had gone far beyond the ethnic borders of Poland.

The Soviet government, trying to avoid a large-scale clash with Poland, repeatedly invited it to establish good neighborly relations. On October 10, 1919, Pilsudski reluctantly, but still went to peace negotiations, which he interrupted on December 13. Then twice Poland rejected proposals to resume them, and on conditions that were more than favorable to it. The Soviet government was ready to recognize Poland's right to the already captured lands, drawing the border 250-300 km east of the one established by the Treaty of Versailles. But Pilsudski considered this insufficient to change the “overall geostrategic balance of power in the region.”

And suddenly, on March 27, he announced his agreement to enter into peace negotiations with the RSFSR on April 10. However, in reality this was just a clever move to disguise the preparations for a general offensive. Having perceived Soviet Russia's proposals for peace as a clear weakness, the Polish government decided to go all in, confident that with the help of the Western powers it would be able to defeat Russia, exhausted by the civil war, and expand its possessions at its expense.

HAND OF THE ENTENTE

The plan for arming the Polish army for a campaign against Soviet Russia was unanimously adopted by Western countries on September 15, 1919 at a meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. Already at the end of 1919 - beginning of 1920. Western powers began to intensively “feed” Poland, and by the fall France provided it with a loan of 169.2 million francs, England - 292.5 thousand pounds. sterling, USA - 169 million dollars, Italy - 7.3 million liras, Holland - 17.8 million guilders, Norway - 14 million crowns. The USA and France especially distinguished themselves. A wide river of American aid flowed into Poland even before it formally made a request to the Western powers. The US was far ahead of its allies. From February to August 1919 alone, 260,202 tons of food worth $51.67 million were sent from overseas to Poland. By the end of April 1920, 20 thousand machine guns, over 200 tanks, more than 300 aircraft, 3 million sets of uniforms, 4 million pairs of soldiers’ boots, medicines and various military equipment were delivered from the USA. total amount 1700 million dollars. By the spring of 1920, France had supplied Poland with 2,800 machine guns, 327,700 rifles, 1,494 cannons, 291 aircraft, 1,050 cars and trucks, a huge amount of uniforms.

Foreign military specialists were sent to Poland to ensure army training. From France alone, 9 generals, 29 colonels, 63 battalion commanders, 196 captains, 435 lieutenants and 2,120 privates arrived. “The Polish army is for the most part organized and trained by French officers,” J. Clemenceau boastfully declared in the Chamber of Deputies. The war plan against Russia was developed by the Polish command with the participation of Marshal F. Foch and the head of the French military mission in Warsaw, General Henris. The Polish offensive was to be supported by Wrangel's White Army. Petliura’s troops also turned out to be his closest assistants. On April 21, 1920, the Polish government signed a secret political convention with the Ukrainian Directory, and on April 24, a military convention, together known as Warsaw Pact. According to these documents, the Directory, for its recognition by the supreme government of independent Ukraine, gave the go-ahead for the annexation of Eastern Galicia, Western Volyn and part of Polesie to Poland. The Ukrainian People's Army came under the command of the Polish command. S. Petlyura, in exchange for help, was ready to make Ukraine a vassal of Poland.

BEGINNING OF THE WAR

By the beginning of the war, the Polish army numbered 738 thousand soldiers and officers well trained and armed by the Entente countries. The strike group consisted of five armies, united in two fronts: the North-Eastern (1st and 4th armies) in Belarus and the South-East (3rd, 2nd and 6th armies) in Ukraine under the overall command of J. Pilsudski. They consisted of 148.5 thousand bayonets and sabers, 4157 machine guns, 894 guns, 302 mortars and 51 aircraft.

In the forces opposing the Polish grouping of the Western (commander M.N. Tukhachevsky, members of the RVS I.S. Unshlikht, F.E. Dzerzhinsky) and Southwestern fronts (commander A.I. Egorov, members of the RVS I.V. Stalin, R .I. Berzin) there were 96.4 thousand bayonets, 7.5 thousand sabers, 2988 machine guns, 674 guns, 34 armored trains, 67 armored vehicles. Thus, the Poles had an overall numerical superiority, and in Ukraine, where the main attack was supposed to be delivered, an overwhelming superiority in strength. The plans of the Polish leadership envisaged the defeat of the troops of the Southwestern Front and the capture of Right Bank Ukraine. Then, after regrouping forces to the north, it was planned to strike the Western Front and capture Belarus.

The plan for the attack on Ukraine was the encirclement and destruction of the 12th Army of the Southwestern Front by the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Polish armies and the capture of Kyiv. Subsequent actions consisted of transferring the main attack to the 14th Army, capturing Odessa and access to the Dnieper in the entire zone of the South-Eastern Front. It was also planned that simultaneously with the offensive of the Polish army, Wrangel’s troops would strike from the Crimea.

The impending offensive was not a surprise to the Soviet leadership. The report of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front dated February 23, 1920 noted the concentration of Polish troops and made an assumption about the possibility of them starting offensive operation. Based on this, it was proposed to strengthen the 15th and 16th armies at the expense of the 6th and 7th separate armies. February 26 V.I. Lenin addressed the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic with instructions to transfer troops from Siberia, the Urals and the Caucasus to the Western Front and “give the slogan “prepare for war with Poland.” At the end of March, after the situation on the Soviet-Polish front sharply worsened, the Western Front was called “the most important front of the Republic,” and on April 8, the Commander-in-Chief gave the order to bring the troops of the Western and Southwestern Fronts to full combat readiness, however, due to various circumstances, mainly due to devastation. transport system, it was never possible to fully implement the instructions to strengthen the troops of these fronts: from March to May, only three rifle divisions were transferred to the Western Front, and one to the Southwestern Front.

On April 25, 1920, the Poles, together with Petliurist units, launched a full-scale offensive in Ukraine in the strip from Pripyat to the Dniester. In the direction of the main attack - towards Kyiv - they had almost threefold superiority. Advancing rapidly, the Polish divisions advanced in a short time 200 km deep into Ukraine. On May 7, Kyiv was captured. Soviet troops were forced to go on the defensive along the entire front until the 1st Cavalry Army arrived from the North Caucasus. In addition, in June, Wrangel’s army invaded Northern Tavria from Crimea, receiving powerful support from Western powers, primarily England and the United States.

But already on May 26, the troops of the Southwestern Front launched a powerful counteroffensive: on June 12, Kyiv was liberated, and by the end of the month, Novograd-Volynsky. Thus, favorable conditions were created for the launch of a counter-offensive by the Western Front in Belarus, whose troops liberated Minsk on July 11, and Vilna on July 14 (it was transferred to Lithuania by agreement). The Southwestern Front also continued its offensive at this time and, having successfully carried out the Rivne operation, captured the cities of Rovno and Dubno.

WARSAW OPERATION

Soviet troops, having inflicted significant losses on the enemy, fought more than 500 km in two and a half months. By July 22, the troops of M.N. Tukhachevsky reached the Grodno-Slonim line. Shortly before this, the political leadership of the country made a decision “to furiously intensify the offensive,” primarily on the Western Front, with the goal of capturing Warsaw and the final defeat of the Polish army. These tasks, according to the original plan, were supposed to be solved during the Warsaw offensive operation by forces of the Western and Southwestern Fronts in converging directions. However, in the directives of July 22 and 23, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic S.S. Kamenev suddenly changed the original plan, apparently overestimating the capabilities of the previously successfully advancing Western Front, and gave Tukhachevsky the order to continue the offensive without an operational pause, and no later than August 12 to cross the Vistula and capture Warsaw. The Southwestern Front was ordered to attack not Lublin, but Lvov with the ultimate task of liberating Galicia.

Thus, from the end of July, the offensive continued in diverging directions (Warsaw and Lvov), which, according to a number of military historians, was undoubtedly a mistake by the Soviet command. The changed plan was essentially a gamble. A gap formed between the fronts, which seriously disrupted interaction. In addition, the Red Army was extremely exhausted: on the approach to the Vistula, some divisions numbered no more than 500 people. The Western Front, according to some sources, had 52,763 bayonets and sabers (M.N. Tukhachevsky, “Campaign for the Vistula”), according to others - 86,500 (V.A. Melikov, “Marne, Vistula, Smyrna,” 1937). The number of opposing Polish troops was estimated from 107 thousand to 111.3 thousand bayonets and sabers (in the same works). Other authors provide slightly different figures. This scatter is mainly due to using different methods counting. One thing remains decisive: in the main direction of the counterattack, the Poles secured an overwhelming advantage for themselves (according to some sources, 38 thousand bayonets and sabers versus 6.1 thousand).

Soviet divisions stretched out in a thin strip along the entire front. On average, there were just over 100 fighters per 1 km. The rear and reserves fell behind. The troops had 10-12 rounds of ammunition per soldier and 2-3 rounds per battery. By August 10, units of the Western Front reached the Mława-Płtusk-Siedlce line. Tukhachevsky, believing that the Poles would retreat to Warsaw, decided to bypass Warsaw from the north with his main forces, cross the Vistula and capture the city with a blow from the northwest.

At such a critical moment for Poland Western countries strengthened their military-political assistance. On July 25, two special military-diplomatic missions - English and French - urgently arrived in Warsaw. French General M. Weygand was appointed chief military adviser, who immediately became involved in developing a plan for a counter-offensive operation. Poland was again provided with massive material assistance, primarily with weapons and military equipment. In this short period, the Entente countries supplied the Polish army with 600 guns, and in terms of the number of tanks it took 4th place in the world. The Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy, declared his Armed Forces to be the reserve of the Polish army. The Entente tried in every possible way to involve Romania in the war against Russia. For this purpose, the United States provided her with a large loan. Essentially, the Red Army had to fight not only with Poland, but with the entire Entente, which mobilized forces hostile to Russia in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania and supplied the Poles with everything necessary to wage war.

An unprecedented patriotic upsurge began in Poland itself. On July 24, a government of national defense was created in Warsaw with the participation of all political forces, with the exception of the communists. A powerful propaganda campaign unfolded under the slogan of resisting “Russian imperialism.” Even Polish workers, peasants and the poorest strata, on whose revolutionary solidarity the Soviet leadership hoped, stood up at Pilsudski’s call to defend their independence. In July alone, according to various sources, from 60 to 150 thousand people signed up as volunteers for the Polish army. In order to maintain order in the army and combat desertion, the Polish leadership introduced emergency and field courts on July 24, and barrage detachments on August 14. Poland managed not only to make up for the losses, but even to form a new army - the 5th. On August 6, instead of the previous two, three Polish fronts were created: Northern, Middle and Southern, two of which (Northern and Middle) were supposed to confront the troops of the Western Front.

To strengthen the Western Front, Commander-in-Chief S.S. On August 11, Kamenev ordered the commander of the Southwestern Front to transfer the 12th and 1st Cavalry Armies to the operational subordination of Tukhachevsky. The directive of August 13 already established the exact timing of this transfer (12 o'clock on August 14). In order to quickly stabilize the left flank of the Western Front, where the situation was becoming more and more complicated, Tukhachevsky, in an order dated August 15, ordered “the entire Cavalry Army, consisting of the 4th, 6th, 14th Cavalry Divisions, to move to the Vladimir-Volynsky area in four transitions.”

However, the commander of the Southwestern Front A.I. Egorov and member of the RVS I.V. On August 12, Stalin turned to Kamenev with a request to leave the 1st Cavalry Army as part of the front, citing the fact that it was drawn into the battles for Lvov, and it was simply impossible to immediately change the task assigned to it. In a word, Budyonny’s army belatedly began to carry out the order of the commander-in-chief. But in any case, the directive was clearly too late. The 1st Cavalry needed to cover too great a distance to come to the aid of the Western Front in time. The situation became even more complicated due to the fact that part of the forces from the Polish front were transferred to repel Wrangel’s offensive that began in the south.

The Poles immediately took advantage of the military-political situation unfavorable for Russia and launched a counteroffensive. Already on August 14, the 5th Polish Army launched a counterattack at the junction of the 3rd and 15th armies of the Western Front. And on August 16, south of Warsaw, a powerful offensive began by the 3rd and 4th Polish armies as part of the Middle Front, which, having broken through the front, created a threat to the rear of the Red Army. In two days, Polish troops advanced 60-80 km. On August 18, all Polish armies launched a general offensive. The next day, Polish troops under the command of French General M. Weygand struck the flank of the advancing units of the Western Front. It has become the last straw, which turned such a seemingly close victory of the Red Army into an unconditional defeat. Soviet troops retreated 200 km in 10 days. The Poles entered the lands of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. A considerable part of the Red Army soldiers were surrounded. The 4th Army, as well as two divisions of the 15th Army (40-50 thousand people) had to retreat to the territory of East Prussia, where they were interned. However, the Poles were unable to build on their success and went on the defensive at the achieved positions.

WAS THERE A "MIRACLE ON THE VISTA"?

Some Western historians equate the Battle of Warsaw with the decisive battles of the 20th century, believing that it “stopped the communist invasion of Europe.” In their opinion, if Warsaw fell, the road to Europe would be open. In this regard, J. Pilsudski in his book “1920” pathetically exclaims: “The fate of Europe was close to disaster.” “The miracle on the Vistula,” as the “chief of the Polish State” called the defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw, occurred as a result of a whole set of factors that are still being debated.

One of the reasons for the “miracle” was, undoubtedly, the patriotic upsurge of the Polish people. The rear of the Polish troops, not living up to the expectations of the Soviet leadership, turned out to be “homogeneous and nationally united,” and its predominant mood was the “feeling of the Fatherland.”

A number of Polish historians believe that the Battle of the Vistula was won solely thanks to Piłsudski’s military talent. By the way, he himself, in the book “1920,” mercilessly criticizing and ridiculing Tukhachevsky, denying the merits of the Polish and French generals, attributes all successes exclusively to himself. This is far from true, if we recall the contribution of experienced French and Polish generals. The only thing that is true is that, perhaps, without the “last nobleman of Poland” there would not have been the Battle of Warsaw itself. Indeed, at the end of July, many of the country’s top leadership called for leaving Warsaw without a fight and seeking salvation in former Prussian Poland. But the iron dictator Pilsudski insisted on his own.

In our opinion, the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw were serious miscalculations, on the one hand, of the Soviet leadership in assessing the political situation (hence the setting, as it turned out later, of the unattainable goal of capturing Warsaw and the Sovietization of Poland), and on the other, of the Soviet military command in assessing the military-strategic situation, the forces and capabilities of the enemy and one’s own when planning and conducting an operation. Note that there was no complete unity among Russian military and political leaders regarding military-political goals after the transfer of hostilities to Polish territory. Lenin and Trotsky insisted on continuing the offensive into the interior of Poland and further to the West, taking into account the revolutionary rise of the German proletariat and hoping to find the same response from Polish workers and peasants. status attack, proudly declares that they can make peace only in “red Soviet Warsaw.” He openly expressed his negative attitude towards the idea of ​​​​a campaign against Warsaw on July 11 in Pravda, as well as in the draft Circular Letter of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), believing that at that moment it was more important to strengthen the Crimean Front. This opposition (not only to the mentioned leaders, but also to the commander of the Western Front, Tukhachevsky) was clearly manifested in his subsequent refusal (as a member of the RVS of the Southwestern Front) to transfer the 1st Cavalry Army to the Western Front on time.

By the way, some domestic historians name this delay in fulfilling the order among the reasons for the defeat at Warsaw. However, in our opinion, even if it were carried out immediately, it would not have had a significant impact on the outcome of the battle. To really help the Western Front, it had to be given at least a week earlier. The confrontation in the top leadership over the advisability of the “march to Warsaw” is also evidenced by the heated debate that unfolded after the inglorious defeat of the Red Army in September 1920 at the IX Party Conference.

The defeat in the Warsaw operation was also largely due to the blind subordination of military strategy to politics. Clausewitz also wrote in his famous work “On War” that politicians outline the political goals of war, and the military, using certain means, achieves them. And if the military-strategic situation does not allow them to be achieved, politicians are advised to subject it to a “radical change” or even abandon it altogether. In this regard, the famous military historian and theorist A.A. Svechin in his work “Strategy,” analyzing the reasons for the failure of the Warsaw operation, first of all spoke about “strategic weakness.” Moreover, strategic mistakes, in his opinion, were “noticeable in the work of all authorities.” The actions of the Polish troops could be “absolutely clearly foreseen” as early as August 13, and the 16th Army “passively watched as one after another its divisions, taken in the flank, were destroyed by the enemy.”

Undoubtedly, the defeat near Warsaw was also influenced by the fatigue of the Soviet troops, who for three months waged a continuous offensive, a clear lack of forces, lack of reserves, and poor provision of troops with weapons, equipment and food. The troops moved forward too quickly, without consolidating their positions; the rear units were severely separated from the forward units, which as a result were deprived of normal supplies. Not the least role was played by the significant numerical superiority of the Poles and the continuous massive assistance of the Western powers. The command clearly overestimated the capabilities of the Soviet troops, who at the decisive moment simply did not have enough strength.

And these days the question is often raised: did Russia initially harbor plans to turn a defensive war into an offensive one, intending to “Sovietize” Poland and then “export” the revolution to other countries? European countries? Many historians, especially Polish and Western ones, answer unequivocally “yes”. To prove their point of view, they usually cite Tukhachevsky’s order to the troops of the Western Front No. 1423 of July 2, 1920 and the speech of V.I. Lenin at the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP (b) on September 22, 1920. From the order entitled “To the West!”, the following words are usually quoted: “In the West, the fate of the world revolution is being decided. Through the corpse of Belopa Poland lies the path to a world fire. We will carry it with bayonets happiness to working humanity!"

And from the text of Lenin’s speech, the following words are cited as the main argument: “We decided to use our military forces to help the Sovietization of Poland. This led to further general policy. We did not formulate this in an official resolution recorded in the protocol of the Central Committee and representing a law for party until the new congress, but among ourselves we said that we must test with bayonets whether it is ripe. social revolution proletariat in Poland."

But here it is important to pay attention to the date of order No. 1423 - July 2. More than two months have passed since the beginning of the Soviet-Polish war. Soviet troops, having by this time overcome the failures of the initial period, advanced successfully and rapidly. According to Trotsky, “a mood began to take shape and grow stronger in favor of turning the war, which began as a defensive one, into an offensive revolutionary war.” The successes turned their heads, and it was then, and not at the very beginning of the war (one should not forget who attacked whom!) that the desire arose to try to bring socialism to Poland “at bayonets.”

When analyzing Lenin’s speech, it is important to focus on the fact that it was made in September (and not before the war or at its beginning!). In it, he tried to analyze the reasons for failures, and did not give instructions for specific actions. It follows that ideas about an attempt to make Poland socialist did not arise immediately, but only as the Soviet troops achieved significant victories. Why not try to surround yourself with “comrade states”, creating a kind of buffer, given the extreme hostility and blind hatred of the Western powers?

IT WAS REQUIRED TO STOP ON TIME

Was there then a real possibility of converting Poland to the Bolshevik “faith”? The answer is clear - “no”. Even the poorest sections of Poland preferred the idea of ​​national independence to the idea of ​​class struggle. Even if the Red Army managed to take Warsaw, this victory would not lead to a revolution. It can be assumed that with such a development of events, Hungary, Romania, Latvia and the Entente countries themselves could enter the war, and this would most likely end sadly for Russia.

And considering the unfavorable conditions for Russia when the Treaty of Riga was concluded with Poland, the answer to the question: “Was the march to Warsaw necessary?” - becomes obvious. Neither for military nor for political purposes was it worth starting a campaign against Warsaw and aiming at a “Central European revolution.” If the victoriously advancing Soviet troops had stopped at the Versailles borders of Poland, then Russia would have dictated the terms of the peace treaty. And the forces would have been saved for the fight against Wrangel for the subsequent completion of the civil war and would not have given rise to endless talk about the “eternal aggressiveness” of Russia.

Massacre of the USSR - premeditated murder Andrey Mikhailovich Burovsky

Soviet-Polish War 1918–1920

As soon as a restored Poland emerged, Polish communists and anarchists immediately launched their uprisings. The first wanted to create their own state; others - to destroy the state as such. Both of them relied on Soviet Russia and expected help from it. It would seem that Polish nationalists had something to do in indigenous Poland itself. But not yet having had time to strengthen their own state, they rushed to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - that is, their empire of the 17th–18th centuries.

The war with Poland in the east was waged by the forces of Russian armies: and the Armed Forces of the South of Russia A.I. Denikin, and the Red Army.

You can describe this war for a long time, the exploits and crimes committed during it, tell how the front line rolled to the west and east many times... There was a moment when the Red Army stood almost on the Vistula, in the indigenous Polish lands, and was rapidly moving towards Warsaw. There was a moment when the Poles were in Kyiv, and Pilsudski was quite seriously planning a cavalry raid on Moscow.

For a long time, from April to December 9, 1919, Soviet-Polish negotiations on borders dragged on. They came to nothing.

But now this is not the main thing... For our topic, it must be emphasized that the Polish army attacked the positions of the Red Army every time the Red Army crushed Denikin and rolled south. And when Denikin beat the Reds and his army moved north, the Poles loomed menacingly over the rear of the White Army. Until the end of his days, A.I. Denikin was sure that the fateful campaign against Moscow in the fall of 1919 was thwarted precisely by the operations of the Poles: at the decisive moment they agreed with the Reds to conduct joint actions.

During Denikin's offensive, the Poles stopped the war with the Reds. Denikin negotiates with him: let Pilsudski continue operations against the 12th Army, at least sluggishly. At least for deterrence.

Pilsudski is negotiating with Denikin - obviously. And secretly he conducted negotiations with Lenin of a completely different kind. Through the head of the “Red Cross mission” Marchlewski, a personal friend of Pilsudski and his comrade-in-arms from the times of terrorism. Pilsudski's headquarters contacted Marchlewski and ordered an oral note to be conveyed to the government of the Soviet Republic. It said: “Assistance to Denikin in his struggle does not correspond to Polish state interests.” And he pointed out: the Polish army’s attack on Mozyr could be decisive in Denikin’s war with the Bolsheviks. But Poland did not deliver this blow. Let the Bolsheviks believe him... The communists assured Pilsudski that “the secret will be kept inviolably.” And it was stored until 1925. Only after Markhlewski’s death did the Soviet press let it slip: they spoke in many words about the merits of the deceased, including negotiations with Pilsudski.

The 12th Army was wedged between the positions of the Poles and the Whites - a very unstable, operationally losing position. The Poles stopped, and the 12th Army actively acted against the Whites in the Kiev direction. The Reds transferred 43 thousand bayonets from Volyn to Yelets to break the white front.

Only after the Whites abandoned Kyiv and the volunteers retreated to the south did General Listovsky begin to occupy the cities abandoned by the Whites. And in the north, the Polish army resumed its operations.

It turns out: the main goal of the Poles was to maintain as long and as cruel a time of unrest in Russia as possible... in order to snatch as many western regions as possible from the weakened country, including Ukrainian ones. This is really worth remembering.

Only after the Treaty of Riga in 1921 was the Polish-Soviet border finally established... Within Poland were the lands of the so-called Western Ukraine - that is, Volyn and Galicia. A state arose, which was officially called the “Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.”