Making forecasts in the cycle of Ukrainian events is a thankless task. Based on the input data alone, the analyst draws up a scenario, and a week later the initial parameters change, and the scenario has to be significantly adjusted. But certain aspects remain unchanged throughout the conflict. In particular, this is the US policy of inciting a big war. Not a civil war in Ukraine, but a war between Ukraine and Russia, into which Europe will inevitably be drawn. Judging by latest events, Washington has lost hope of dragging the Russian Federation into the war through Donbass and is preparing a radical turnaround. Several signs signal such a change.
First. Sharp criticism in the Ukrainian media and social networks of the Chief of the General Staff Muzhenko and his immediate patron President Poroshenko, who in turn is a protégé of the Europeans. Europe is aimed at freezing the conflict, unlike the Americans, who want war at any cost. Therefore, attacks on Muzhenko and Poroshenko are a blow to the strategy of reconciling the parties at least on some terms. The demolition of Poroshenko and the coming to power of Turchynov will finally put an end to any attempts to conclude even the worst peace.
Second. Changing the rhetoric of the Ukrainian media themselves. In short, it is this: “Let’s abandon this rotten Donbass, the main thing is Crimea.” It would seem, where is the logic? A country that cannot cope with the militia wants to fight with Russia. But there is logic, and the logic is not Ukrainian, but American. An attack on Crimea will be a guaranteed reason for the Russian Federation to enter the war against Ukraine.
Third. Directly related to the first two points. Ukraine cannot fight in both Donbass and Perekop at the same time. Therefore, you need to fence yourself off from the militia with a reliable barrier. Western peacekeepers should become such a barrier, the idea of bringing them in is now being actively promoted in Kyiv.
Fourth. Even taking into account the enormous losses in armored vehicles and artillery, Ukraine should still have considerable reserves. In addition, after August we practically do not see Ukrainian aviation. There is reason to believe that all this is being carefully saved for a massive strike specifically on Crimea. The constant lamentations of Ukrainian officials about technical hunger should not mislead anyone - the losses have not yet become critical.
Fifth. Yesterday's news about the deployment of S-300 systems in Odessa gives reason to assume that a provocation is being prepared at the level of the Malaysian Boeing, if not higher. It will no longer be the militias that will be blamed, but Russia itself, or more precisely, its air defense forces in Crimea.
So, a blow to Crimea may come closer to autumn. Let's ask ourselves how the Russian leadership will react if Ukrainian shells start falling on Armyansk? And not isolated ones, like last summer in the Rostov region, but en masse, like those shellings that constantly cover Donetsk and Gorlovka. With hundreds of victims and destruction worth millions of rubles.
Of course, the firing points will be suppressed. But what next? Logic dictates that it will be necessary to occupy at least the adjacent part of the Kherson region in order to avoid new attacks. And this, in turn, will give the Ukrainian authorities a reason to announce direct aggression from the Russian Federation. That is, Russia still finds itself drawn into the war, but under conditions disproportionately worse than in April 2014 and under all possible sanctions, up to and including a complete embargo. The logical result of Kyiv’s mediocre diplomacy and “policy of appeasement”, which has been carried out throughout the last year.
After the attack on Crimea Russian society, fueled by events in the Donbass this year, will demand the toughest possible response. If Vladimir Putin refuses to give such an answer this time, he risks repeating the path, at best, of Yanukovych and Gorbachev. We must not forget that all this will happen in conditions of extreme aggravation of the socio-economic situation in the Russian Federation, against the backdrop of a worsening crisis, a decrease in real incomes of the population and rising prices and unemployment.
One way or another, after the Ukrainian strike on Crimea, the Russian leadership will face an unpleasant fork in the road: 1) ignore it, and receive direct accusations of treason; 2) give a limited answer and provoke accusations of cowardice and indecisiveness; 3) decide on a full-scale invasion to the bitter end.
Each option has its pros and cons, but all of them are, in general, bad. Let's look at each more closely.
First: ignoring the Ukrainian attack. Russian television with sympathy, he shows the victims in close-up, and the Foreign Ministry voices another strong protest. Our country is not receiving new sanctions from outside, but the authority of the authorities is rapidly sliding down, and calls for its change are becoming louder. At the same time, separatist movements are growing in Crimea under the motto “why do we need a country that cannot protect us?” To prevent new attacks, the Crimean leadership decides to hold secret separate negotiations with Kiev. Further forecasts are the most gloomy.
Second: limited answer. Ukrainian positions were swept away by return fire from the peninsula, and the planes were destroyed on approach. Possible lesson Russian troops Kherson part of Sivash, although not at all necessary. Russia is receiving new sanctions as this is presented to the international community as a “bloodthirsty bear” attack from one occupied Ukrainian territory to another. The severity of the sanctions is medium in the case of only a fire response and severe in the case of occupying the Kherson coast.
Third: full-scale invasion. Sanctions have been imposed to the maximum, the ruble is falling into unknown depths. On the one hand, the population is dissatisfied, on the other, the war dictates different rules. Russians are known for being willing to sacrifice a lot in the name of victory. There is no major dissatisfaction with the authorities, although the standard of living is falling quite significantly. An inevitable and quick victory gives the Kremlin: a land corridor to Crimea, full control over the gas transportation system and a decisive vote in determining the future fate of Ukraine. European military intervention is practically ruled out at any stage. As a result, bargaining with the West begins again, but on completely different terms.
The scenarios with heavy shelling, but without a ground invasion of Ukrainian units directly on Russian territory. And such an invasion, even if carried out by the forces of only 5-6 battalions (that is, initially without a chance of success), will put the conflict on a fundamentally different level. It will be impossible not to answer it.
The result is quite bleak. Attempts to avoid war led the Russian leadership to a complete strategic impasse. From the very beginning, the absurdity of trying to avoid the conflict was obvious to people even far from geopolitical structures. If the enemy has set a goal to drag Russia into a war, it will inevitably be drawn in, but on the most unfavorable terms. Or it will simply capitulate, finally strangled by sanctions and the frankly subversive actions of the Medvedev government. The Ukrainian issue of the Russian Federation will have to be resolved one way or another within the fifteenth year, even at the cost of the threat of a major war. Further prolongation of an absolutely unprofitable conflict creates new points of tension for Russia, which have every chance of becoming critical. There is little time left.
Forecasts about the likelihood of a split in Ukraine have been heard for quite some time. We have heard them especially often in the last year. One might even say, so often that they practically stopped believing them. However, the likelihood of the collapse of what was once one of the most developed Soviet republics is greater today than ever. And it will only increase, despite the active opposition of many parties to the conflict. President Poroshenko fell into a truly unique trap, which was simultaneously set for him by both the West and Moscow. The most unusual thing about the current situation is that this trap is not the fruit of anyone’s conspiracy or plan, but arose on its own. The very logic of the conflict leads to it, which operates independently of all plans of varying degrees of cunning.
The current post-Maidan Ukraine rests entirely on the shaky authority of the current president, just as pre-Maidan Ukraine rested on the authority of Yanukovych. Military defeats on the fronts and negotiated concessions for the DPR and LPR, both purely virtual and over and over again, undermine this authority among the population heated by military hysteria. “Special status” for “separatists,” again purely virtual, causes fits of rage and natural questions from residents of the western and central regions: if Donbass has a special status, then why can’t we have it. And the worse the economy feels, the more often calls will begin to be heard, first for isolation, and then for independence.
In just one year, Ukraine underwent complete deindustrialization, which is an indispensable condition for “European integration.” What the proud Baltic republics did for almost 20 years, their southern brothers in mind completed in just a year. One-time financial injections from Washington and the EU are aimed almost exclusively at servicing Kyiv’s payments on external debts. A small part of the trenches goes to the war with Donbass or goes into pockets. Multi-billion-dollar IMF loans, which were announced by the Ukrainian authorities with excessive optimism, will be issued under very strict conditions, including a sharp reduction in spending on the population while simultaneously increasing the price of gas and heating. But if the West cares little about the problems of the Ukrainian natives, who will literally be thrown into poverty, then Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk are in no hurry to comply with the IMF’s demands, knowing full well what this could mean for them personally. After all, Obama is far away, but Maidan is nearby. At best, cuts in salaries, pensions and various social benefits while simultaneously increasing prices utilities will lead to the fact that people will stop paying for them en masse, which will lead to the natural bankruptcy of public utilities.
Since the war has not been canceled, the army will continue to require fuels and lubricants, medicines, and much more, purchased with foreign currency. The post-default government will no longer be able to pay off suppliers even with promissory notes, and will be forced to resort to expropriations. Forced weaning, for all its attractiveness, has one significant drawback - it can only be done once. After this, suppliers, taught by bitter experience, will simply abandon all activities within the country and hide the remaining capital, and gas stations, shops and pharmacies will be empty.
In conditions of collapse of any financial assistance Centrifugal tendencies will inevitably begin to grow from the center, when Kyiv will abandon not only individual people, but also entire regions to the mercy of fate. And the regional elites will inevitably begin to think about Yeltsin’s “take as much sovereignty as they can swallow.”
The regions of Western Ukraine will be the first to demand autonomy. First, it is autonomy, not independence, and autonomy is primarily economic. The second to wish for special rights will be the Dnepropetrovsk Kaganate of Kolomoisky. Having received economic leverage, regional elites will inevitably come to the need to consolidate the new status politically so that the Center cannot take away rights as easily as it gave them.
This is where the numerous territorial battalions, carefully raised by Kolomoisky and other oligarchs, come in handy. Regions that have their own armies (nonsense in any normal country) may demand broad rights of independence from the capital, and Poroshenko, who is already waging one war, will not be able to prevent this. Here, in fact, is where federal, or rather confederal, Ukraine begins. One fine day, well-dressed people will come to the local commanders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the heads of the Security Service of Ukraine and other security forces who have not received their salaries for months with a simple proposal. They say that there is no salary from Kyiv and there will not be, but there is an option to work for the Dnepropetrovsk (Kherson, Vinnitsa, etc.) republic. That is, as in the case of the USSR, the seizure of power on the ground will begin, through the nationalization of local security forces and the most delicious pieces of property.
In parallel, the new states will almost immediately renounce the debts of the Ukrainian government through a simple explanation: “Kyiv took it, let it pay.”
Those regions that have the opportunity to receive foreign exchange earnings through the sale of their goods to the foreign market, for example steel and, especially, grain, will most actively strive for independence. Just look at the statistics on which regions are the breadbaskets of Square. Last year, Ukraine received rich foreign exchange earnings from the sale of grain, but this became possible only thanks to Yanukovych’s “bloody legacy”, under which farmers could receive loans for sowing on relatively acceptable terms. This year, loan conditions are much more stringent, which means that the acreage under cultivation will be much more modest. Fewer crops means less foreign exchange earnings, not to mention domestic needs. For Russia, the unexpected dropout of its neighbor from the global grain market will turn out to be a blessing: overall prices will increase and market share will be freed up.
The situation could also be aggravated by a sudden offensive by the DPR/LPR, which have their own logic. The giant cities and enterprises of Donbass have been destroyed and funds are needed to restore them. Such funds can only be provided by new territories that have not yet been devastated by war. With approximately the same chances, the next offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will begin in the spring, which will follow the principle of “doom or miss.” If the militia manages to defeat it (and the likelihood of such an outcome is high), then another political crisis in Kyiv has every chance of moving into the acute phase
The result is disappointing. The overthrow of Yanukovych led to the separation of Crimea, the emergence of the DPR and LPR and the start of a civil war. The overthrow of Poroshenko could finally destroy Ukraine as a single state, because the new Kyiv authorities will have no authority at all and can be overthrown by any exactly the same gang. Each person thus proclaimed acting President of Ukraine will find himself with the actual powers of the sacred mayor of Kyiv, and even then only in daytime days and not in all areas. Any attempt to restore unity to the country will lead to a clash with regions that have already felt the taste of their own “independence.” It will be possible to return them to Kyiv only through force and the most severe terror. And this, in turn, guarantees a new war, which will finally turn the once prosperous country into a European Somalia.
Thus, there can only be two ways out of the crisis.
The first way. Confederation, if not in form, then in essence. In it, the regions will be more connected with neighboring states than with each other and Kiev.
The second way. Complete collapse. Fragmentation of the state not into large regions, like Novorossiya or Galicia, but into administrative units within the current or slightly changed borders.
This scenario is beneficial for Russia’s national interests because it:
1) Finally resolves the issue with Crimea. If there is no subject claiming the peninsula, then the issue of its ownership is resolved automatically.
2) Opens up wide scope for further collection of lands. Small states within the boundaries of regions are unlikely to be viable.
At the same time, this scenario is not beneficial for the Russian oligarchy, which in Ukraine has financial and ideological solidarity with the Ukrainian oligarchy. Not to mention the blood tie to the West, which needs to preserve the unity of Independence at any cost, as anti-Russia. That’s why we hear talk about a “united Ukraine” from the highest rostrums. However, the inertia of events may once again throw even the most cunning plans into the trash. The arrest of the former head of the Party of Regions, Alexander Efremov, and Poroshenko’s statements about the possibility of introducing martial law put an end to the current truce no less surely than the shelling of Donbass cities.
Now in Ukraine we are seeing the same systemic growth of the crisis that was in the USSR. It can last several months, or it can last up to two or three years. But the ending is inevitable, although now it is absolutely not clear where the point of no return is, beyond which the destruction of everything begins. Anything can be the impetus for this fatal path, and there is only one possible scenario for preventing it - a brutal dictatorship against any manifestations of discontent, not only in the east of the country, but also in the center and west. But it may turn out that the time to create such a dictatorship has already been irretrievably lost.
Only a military victory over the DPR and LPR can delay, but not stop, the collapse of the Ukrainian state. Such a victory will increase Poroshenko’s rating and influence, however, it will inevitably put him in the position of fulfilling his promise to return Crimea, which is already backed by a war with Russia. The Americans will also try to prevent the collapse by putting pressure on the regional elites in order to preserve the unity of Ukraine for the coming war with the Russian Federation. But at the same time, the separatism of the western regions will likely be supported by Europe, which will need a buffer against the “walk-a-field” in the rest of Ukraine.
Despite the joint efforts of most global players, the state of Ukraine is inevitably moving towards collapse. Petro Poroshenko is not the creator of the situation, but rushes along its waves in the direction set in Washington. Turning away from this American course towards the war of the “chocolate king” is like death, because when Ukraine collapses, the only thing left to do is to flee to the West.
Igor Kabardin
Some time ago, the respected economist Sergei Yuryevich Glazyev proposed his plan to protect the domestic economy from sanctions (by maximizing its isolation from the influence of speculators and locking up resources in the domestic market, thereby protecting economic sovereignty). While experts are discussing the program itself, the public’s attention was attracted by the violent reaction of influential liberal circles, which with manic persistence began to throw mud at it even at the stage of its appearance in the form of a group of theses.
The persecution in the press continued even when the Kremlin, through the presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, officially disowned Glazyev’s proposals: We know that he is an economist, we know that he sometimes comes from his academic background and expresses an expert point of view on certain points. And this point of view is not always an expression of the official position of the president or the presidential administration.
We are talking about real institutions of a liberal economy, where local authorities, having found themselves in high positions, bring with them a whole pack of protégés, students, etc. In total, there are thousands, if not tens of thousands of people in positions, with liberal and Russophobic views, not capable of any activity other than general theft.
For decades, sitting on the distribution of financial flows, this entire large friendly team has ensured an exceptionally comfortable existence for itself. The arrival of a person with the views of Glazyev (not necessarily Sergei Yuryevich personally) to any of the key posts will mean removal from the trough for the vast majority of system liberals, since completely different people will begin to build the new economy. Glazyev’s plan, no matter what shortcomings it may have, is a real alternative to the prevailing neoliberal economic course. Not by clarification, editing or correction, but by a complete alternative.
It is possible that the Kremlin is increasingly aware of the catastrophic consequences of following the previous path. The fall in Russia's GDP, according to the Ministry of Economic Development, for January-August amounted to 3.9%, and the trends are becoming less and less joyful: if in June the year-on-year decline (according to the same Ministry of Economic Development) was 4.2%, then in July it was already 4.6%.
To be fair, it should be noted that the fall itself, of course, began long before the events around Ukraine and all the sanctions. Back in November 2013, the then head of Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, reported to the president that by the end of the year, the drop in rail freight traffic (which is one of the indirect indicators of the health of the economy) was expected to be 3.3%. And other figures did not shine with optimism. After the introduction of sanctions against our country and the fall in oil prices, the situation only got worse.
There is no doubt that liberal economists, who occupied all positions of any significance, have repeatedly promised the head of state, if not to stabilize the system, then at least to keep the decline to acceptable levels. However, the situation is such that these same indicators are now not just falling, but simply flying down uncontrollably. Of course, the liberal bloc can explain what is happening as much as they like by saying that the measures, they say, have not yet had an effect, and we must wait, but the fact remains a fact. In Russia, any serious economic crisis almost always entails a political crisis. A complete collapse of the economy will inevitably be the end of the country. Obviously, it was precisely this circumstance that forced the first person of the state to turn to Glazyev’s theses, albeit in the form of general information.
So far, the liberals of the financial bloc are doing everything to worsen the situation as much as possible. As a countermeasure against the crisis they themselves created, they propose saving in every possible way. But save not on oligarchs, top managers and the state apparatus, but on social sphere, as well as in the Armed Forces. It is difficult to come up with a more effective plan for an agent of influence thrust into the highest echelons of power.
Proposing his plan at the Security Council, Glazyev could not help but understand that the upper class, closely tied to the West, would initially be in fierce opposition to his ideas. Now a simple thought reigns in oligarchic circles: let’s make peace with the United States, and everything will be as before. Apparently, the Russian “tops” are not at all familiar with the simple axiom that geopolitical interests are always above economic interests.
In February 2014, Moscow encroached on the exclusive right of the world hegemon to interfere in the affairs of other countries, and this cannot be forgiven. Since it is not yet possible to bomb Russia like Yugoslavia or Iraq, the bet is on compradors. The latter are faced with the task of collapsing the socio-economic sphere in the shortest possible time, bringing it to complete paralysis, and weakening Russian defense capabilities. In such conditions, if Glazyev and his program are invited, it will be just before the collapse, in order to blame all the consequences of many years of destructive activity on him. Sergei Yuryevich obviously understands this and is unlikely to want to take the helm of a sinking ship, preferring to watch the collapse from the sidelines and then propose his program again, but in completely different political conditions.
Glazyev's plan is a rescue plan, desperate and risky, but necessary. Now it’s not too late to change course, although the price of such a reversal will be completely different from what it was a year or two years ago. No one can now predict what this price will be in 2016.
Dangers of 2015
Igor Kabardin
Our country enters 2015 with a whole range of external and internal problems and contradictions. And while some threats can be considered largely hypothetical, others are real. Despite the fact that now a direct invasion of the territory of the Russian Federation by a foreign power or group of countries is hardly possible, in the event of a collapse of the central government it becomes more likely. However, this is only one of the threats.
Islamic extremism. North Caucasus. middle Asia
The raid by militants in Grozny confirmed what had been said for a long time: the United States, through the hands of the Islamic State, began transporting the most uncontrollable part of the militants to the North Caucasus and Central Asia. Now the mountain passes are impassable, but in the spring a massive transfer of weapons and manpower will become possible. The Central Asian direction is more promising for militants for several reasons.
The first is space. There is scope for activity from the Caspian Sea to the interior of China. Wide possibilities for destabilizing the entire continent, including pipelines that go to the Russian Federation and China.
The second is the absence of external regulatory force. Russia can no longer be such a force, China cannot yet. If, when Islamists manifest themselves in the North Caucasus, Russia is able to move an army against them, citing its internal affairs, then Central Asia this will require permission from local rulers. And, given that Central Asian leaders fear their northern neighbor almost more than the Islamists, we can predict that none of them will give such permission. Or he will give when nothing can be done to help.
The third is huge social inequality and dissatisfaction with the authorities. Against the backdrop of disappointment in secular leaders, the authority of unofficial religious leaders is growing.
The only obstacle here may be the greatly underestimated factor of the Celestial Empire. Beijing may not like the idea of someone setting fire to its borders, and it may respond with a direct deployment of troops. In an open battle with the PLA, the Islamists have even less than zero chances. There is only one downside for Russia with this option: once they enter, the Chinese can stay in Central Asia for a very long time.
The North Caucasus is more convenient for Islamists in that there is already a ready-made underground, plus covered dense forests You can hide much more in the mountains than in the bare spaces of Central Asia.
The problem of Islamic extremism has long gone beyond the Caucasus, and is acute today, for example, in the Volgograd region. And this does not begin and end with the high-profile terrorist attacks of late 2013. Cases of distribution of extremist literature and recruitment of militants were recorded (a sensational case Alena Bykova) and other crimes. In neighboring Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus, the number of Salafist cells is growing. The youth of the Caucasus does not find its place in traditional Sufism, which does not represent its interests, and the rigid hierarchical barriers of traditional society suppress its initiative. Young people find a way out in Salafist groups, where emphasized equality and “brotherhood” are declared. It is to this soil that the Islamists, seasoned in battles for the Islamic State, will return.
Territorial disputes and other dangers
IN New Year Russia enters with two major territorial disputes (over the South Kuril Islands with Japan and Crimea with Ukraine) and one quasi-dispute (over Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Georgia). Individually, each of them did not pose much of a threat, but together they turn into a rather formidable chain of dangers.
As long as there is a stable political center from which orders for the RF Armed Forces come, no invasion, naturally, should be expected. But the situation becomes unstable in the event of a hypothetical uprising (or any other form of change of power) in Moscow, and then an invasion by neighbors becomes not just probable, but practically inevitable.
The strongest of the opponents in the dispute is Japan, but at the same time, it is the Japanese government that is more interested than others in a political settlement of the dispute, but only if a compromise is acceptable. If Moscow refuses to negotiate, then a military solution to the problem will be considered a priority. The military capabilities of the Land of the Rising Sun will be enough not only to capture the Southern Kuril Islands, but the Northern Kuril Islands, as well as all of Sakhalin and even the south of Kamchatka. This year it has already been announced about the re-establishment of the Marine Corps and the purchase for its needs of 52 AAV7 amphibious vehicles, as well as Osprey tiltrotors. Both the Japanese army and navy are technically and numerically at the level of the strongest NATO countries.
The situation with Georgia is also interesting. After defeat in the 2008 war, the country has recovered and is rebuilding its military capabilities. Appeared and own samples military equipment: Didgori armored vehicles, Lazika infantry fighting vehicles and ZCRS-122 MLRS. And this is not to mention hundreds of units of other equipment produced in the USSR, Israel, Turkey and Czechoslovakia. In general, Tbilisi clearly understands that its army is only capable of defeating Abkhazia and South Ossetia, provided that Russia does not intervene or is busy on other fronts. Armed forces of this Transcaucasian country are compact and optimized by eliminating the Navy and Air Force, the remnants of which were transferred to the coast guard and ground forces, respectively.
Stands apart warring Ukraine. Having enchantingly lost almost the entire fleet in the Crimea, and a significant part of the aviation in the Donbass, Square focused on the land component. The latter, however, also became quite thin in the spring-summer battles and therefore had to urgently rivet a replacement. The hits of the current military season include the BTR-4, BTR-3, as well as the Cougar, Dozor and Spartan armored vehicles. To date, this is all that Ukrainian industry has been able to master for mass production. With tanks it is much more difficult, and their production cycle is much longer. Judging by the purchases of T-72 from Hungary, more than one was elected shortcut. The time has come for Eastern European countries to get rid of the “Soviet legacy” and they decided to do it to their advantage.
Since the prospects for Novorossiya look very gloomy, we can expect the opening of hostilities in Crimea in the next six months. Ukraine has enough weapons (even taking into account losses) for two more such wars. For example, tanks are now assembled using the cannibalism method - out of three in “storage”, one is produced on the move. For a rush to Donetsk and Lugansk, and then to Perekop, Soviet reserves, plus the fact that factories in Kharkov and Kyiv will have time to urgently assemble them, will be quite enough. After all, the goal of these adventures is not victory, but the war itself and the further isolation of Russia.
Among other things, our country has two allies at once, with whom we not only do not have common borders, but even the ability to deliver aid by sea, since these countries also do not have access to the seas. We are, of course, talking about Transnistria and Armenia. In the event of an attack on any of these states, Russia will have to make a choice - either to force its way to their aid through the territories of third countries or to pretend that these problems do not concern it. The first option is fraught with military clashes with the countries through which the “transit” will take place. The second is the final loss of face Russian leadership, the loss of even those crumbs of geopolitical influence that are still available. Since both Moldova and Azerbaijan are clients of Washington and Brussels, pushing them towards war will not be difficult.
Here we must honestly say that Navalny’s populism initially appealed to those who were tired of corruption, tyranny and rampant ethnic crime. There is no need to write everyone down as liberals and traitors - those who sincerely believed in " honest hero The Internet was also enough.
There was also a psychological effect. The effect of novelty – yes, yes, those same notorious “new faces”. In addition, showman Navalny not only conveyed information, but American method entertained the audience. The audience liked it. And the ideas of fighting the vices of society could not but arouse support. Many adults sincerely believed in the modern Robin Hood, forgetting that they were not in a fairy tale.
And Navalny continued to win the minds of the Internet public with something that they would obviously like. Take, for example, the nationalistic part of his speeches or the proposal to legalize short-barreled guns. Moreover, these thoughts went inextricably - one along with the other, this is exactly how Navalny presented them.
The seeds fell on fertile soil. When you read almost every day that people from the Caucasus or Central Asia stabbed, raped or shot someone with impunity... you can understand what thoughts arise. Navalny played on these, undoubtedly fair, feelings.
Of course, he never said words like "shoot everyone to hell" or anything like that (he's too smart for that), but that's certainly what was meant. Just watch his performances. And, God knows, many agreed with him on this part, because against the backdrop of exhortations from official officials about “multinationality” and “tolerance,” the tough guy Lyosha offered a simple solution.
Another part of the image of Alexei Navalny is an uncompromising fighter against corruption and a rotten system. It got to the point that in 2011, many on both sides of the fence began to view him as a real alternative to Putin. Now it even sounds funny. However, corruption is truly the scourge of the country and Navalny’s revelations hit the target.
The third part of Navalny’s image is visual. Memorable appearance, athletic build, right family: beautiful wife and two beautiful children. Handsome, smart, racially correct... Now you understand that there was an image, Nice picture created using proven technologies. How the image of a pop star or a candidate for the US Congress is created. And political strategists, stylists, psychologists also worked on Navalny’s image. I'm sure they even picked out T-shirts for him. desired color so that the public remembers it better...
And yet, something made me doubt Navalny. As Goebbels said, intelligence is the terrible enemy of any propaganda, and the more I thought about everything, the more questions arose for Lyosha.
The first thing that unpleasantly surprised me was Navalny’s closeness with liberals like Nemtsov and Kasyanov. Any decent person would not allow these “comrades” to come within range of a cannon shot, much less speak with them on the same podium. And if the first time Navalny could somehow justify himself (they say he didn’t know that they would be here), then the second and third times the doubts had already disappeared - they clearly had some common business.
Second unusual detail concerned the actual revelations of Navalny. Yes, he brought it to clean water many corrupt officials and this is commendable, but... Navalny himself would never physically be able to accumulate such a volume of classified information. What is needed here is not just a team, but an organization. A very serious organization with very serious connections. Attention: what kind of organization is this and for what purpose is it providing Navalny with this information?
Then the strangeness only grew. For example, the slogan “Stop feeding the Caucasus!” and its content. Navalny proposes to solve the problem simply by granting independence to the republics of the North Caucasus. Like, then huge amounts of money will no longer go into them and we will get rid of all criminal scum on our streets.
Stop, I thought, but this is complete nonsense. The republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia separated, and what did this give? Not only has national criminality only increased, but Moscow continues to generously finance local kinglets, buying their loyalty. If earlier, under the Union, there were ways to call the local elites to order, now you have to curry favor with them, because everyone knows that Moscow will not dare to send troops. That is, instead of carrots and sticks, there is only carrots, and this will corrupt anyone. Worse, the Caucasus republics, separated in Navalny’s style, could instantly turn into a semblance of Maskhadov’s Ichkeria, or a regular civil war could begin there.
Thus, the separation of the North Caucasus will not solve a single problem and will add new ones, which will only benefit the United States. What nonsense is this, Lyosha? You propose to create a bandit-terrorist state on the borders of the Russian Federation, a la Chechnya 1996-2000, only many times larger. Are you out of your mind?
Another example is Navalny’s dark affairs in Montenegro. If you build your reputation on the image of an uncompromising fighter against corruption, then your reputation should be as pure as a baby’s tear. Having property abroad is not a crime if you are not a government official and if you honestly earned it. If everything was fair in Montenegro, then why not admit: yes, mine? Like, I’ve been saving for ten years, eating one piece of crushed grain, but everything is fair, here are the receipts. Instead, we heard an indistinct bleating, like, either mine or not. It doesn’t take much intelligence to understand that this is something dirty.
These are just a few examples that got me thinking. In fact, Navalny began to bury his reputation long before the Crimean events. And by February 2014, he had become virtually a marginal clown without any particular political prospects. When he openly opposed the annexation of Crimea, he last doubts disappeared altogether. It was simply political suicide and Navalny could not help but understand this. But, obviously, Alexey is so dependent on his masters from Washington that he could not do it any other way. It’s scary to imagine what such a figure could do if he ended up in the chair of the President of the Russian Federation.
If his American handlers weren’t so incompetent, Navalny could have amassed enormous political capital this year. He could ostentatiously support with both hands the annexation of Crimea, and then the uprising in Donbass. Under the cries of “Putin betrayed Novorossiya!”, he would spectacularly collect aid for the DPR and LPR. Now this is impossible for him, and the Washington masters would not allow him to do this. To disconnect something from Russia, yes! But to join - a person who is on the payroll of the US Embassy cannot even admit such a thought.
Navalny is now a political corpse, although perhaps some will try to revive him. After all, we have a lot of living dead in politics. However, the very fact of exposing him as a liar and a traitor should not cast a shadow on the quite sound ideas of fighting corruption or ethnic crime, which are clearly destroying our country. But let them fight them without Navalny.
