Cuba. 1961 The young Republic and the young Revolution immediately became disliked by their huge and not kind neighbor. Losing a familiar vacation spot, losing a pan-Caribbean brothel, this was unacceptable for America. So these incomprehensible barbudos gained the impudence and swung at the private property of American citizens. And trouble began to approach the flourishing island.

The then US President John Kennedy was a good and honest guy. A typical BAP (White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant), from a wealthy clan, commanded a torpedo boat during the war, was seriously wounded and twice decorated for bravery. John truly believed in America, Democracy and Capitalism. But the CIA, the Pentagon, Vice President Johnson and the fugitives from Cuba, told him that Cuba was groaning under the yoke of the Castro gang and all Cubans could not wait for the liberators who had sailed from Miami. And the President gave the go-ahead for funding Operation Pluto. If John had known that the Cubans call refugees in Miami “gusanos” (worms), he would have thought about it, but the CIA did not burden the president with unnecessary information.

Mercenaries were trained in secret CIA camps: in Guatemala (Rotaluleo and San Jose), in Nicaragua (Puerto Cabezas) and in the United States (New Orleans, Fort Myer and Miami). About 1,500 people were recruited. Each mercenary was assigned a number; for greater importance, the numbering began with No. 2000, and this entire formation was named “Brigade 2506.” It was a full-blooded, reinforced brigade. It included: four infantry, one motorized and one parachute battalion, a company of tanks, an armored detachment and an artillery division. “Brigade 2506” was commanded by former Batista army captain San Roman.

In the port of Puerto Cabezas, a “special CIA maritime tactical group” was formed, which included 5 armed ships confiscated from the Cuban shipping company Garcia Line Corporation (Houston, Lake Charles, Rio Escandido, Caribe and "Atlantic"), 2 infantry landing blocks ("Barbara Jane" and "Blagar") and 7 tank landing ships from the US Navy.

Eight C-46 and six C-54 military transport aircraft were allocated from the US Air Force. The combat component of the Gusano Air Force was represented by 24 B-26 bombers. All this was based at the Puerto Cabezas airfield.

The concept of Operation Pluto envisaged a sudden landing on the southern coast of Cuba, where the creation of a provisional government was quickly announced, which would ask for recognition and help from the United States, and immediately everyone would be happy. According to Washington's plan, immediately after the counter-revolutionaries asked for help, the American Marines landed in Cuba and, for legitimacy, also a military contingent from the countries of the Organization of American States, numbering up to 15 thousand people. The OAS was then under complete US control and this decision could be considered made in advance. The main thing is that the Gusanos capture at least the regional center and hold out for at least three days. The CIA understood that there would be absolutely no mass uprisings against Fidel, and therefore groups of saboteurs and provocateurs were sent to Cuba. On the day the mercenaries landed, a series of sabotage was to begin, which included explosions of railway lines, bridges, transformer stations, fuel storage facilities, etc.

It must be said that John Kennedy all the time continued to doubt the success of the operation, and in order to force him to stop hesitating, the CIA inspired an ultimatum from the brother of the Guatemalan ambassador to the United States, who was the owner of a coffee plantation, on the territory of which there was a training center for Cuban mercenaries. The planter demanded that the Cubans leave his possessions by the end of April 1961. In this case, as Dulles explained to the president, the mercenaries would have to be transported to the United States, where they would scatter like cockroaches and it would be impossible to reassemble them again, and information about the invasion would definitely get out. The CIA, knowing Kennedy, was confident that John, a supporter of democratic values, would not order the neutralization of the diplomat’s family, which was getting in the way of their adult uncles, and so it happened.
Convinced by these arguments, Kennedy authorized the operation to begin. However, on April 12, 1961, on the eve of its start, he called a press conference at which he declared that: “Under no circumstances will the Armed Forces of the United States of America begin an intervention in Cuba.”

The amphibious landing was to be preceded by bombing strikes on the main military airfields of Cuba. Eight bombers, piloted by American pilots, were supposed to carry out an air strike at dawn on April 15 on three airfields, where, according to the CIA, all the small Cuban military aircraft were concentrated.

The Bay of Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) was chosen for the amphibious landing. There was no anti-landing defense here, there was an area on the shore that could be used as an airfield, 10 km from the coastline there was a swampy area through which only one road led into the interior of the island. This contributed to the successful defense of the captured bridgehead in order to accumulate a sufficient number of troops on it. Well, the sandy beaches were very convenient for landing troops. The Bay of Cochinos was divided into three landing areas: the “blue” and “green” beaches in the Playa Giron area, and the “red” beach in the Playa Larga area.

It was also planned to drop parachute troops in order to block the only road through the swamps along which Cuban troops could approach.

Only 4 people from among the leadership of the Cuban emigrants knew in detail about the plan for Operation Pluto, but as Pope Muller said, what three people know, a pig knows.

The ships and husano vessels moved to the landing area under the flag of Liberia. In order to divert the attention of Cuban intelligence, American ships maneuvered along the entire coast of Cuba, repeatedly invading the country's territorial waters.

The landing date was set for the night of April 17. The Cubans were aware of the preparations for the invasion. The headquarters of the revolutionary armed forces took a number of measures to prepare to repel the landing of numerous groups in different parts of the country. But there were too many dangerous landing areas on Liberty Island, and the fortified areas created everywhere attracted many soldiers from the already small Cuban army. Yes, there was little equipment and weapons. A good help was the arrival of two steamships a few months ago, with Czech small arms and a small number of Soviet tanks, self-propelled guns and artillery. There were very few of our advisers, but they helped as much as they could.

The aggression against Cuba began exactly according to the plan developed by the CIA. On April 14, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographed the entire territory of Cuba. Photo reconnaissance confirmed the presence of up to 15 aircraft at the airfields. The next day, 8 B-26 bombers, cynically bearing the insignia of the Cuban Air Force, struck the airfields of San Antonio le Los Banos, Campo Colombia and Santiago de Cuba. CIA leaders recognized these bombings as successful, considering most of the Cuban aircraft destroyed...

Now! Let's run away! On the eve of the treacherous raid, on “someone’s” wise advice, the Cubans removed the planes from their usual parking areas and replaced them with dummies. So out of 24 Cuban Air Force aircraft, the Americans managed to destroy only 2 aircraft...

And with this raid, the Americans only made it worse for themselves politically. By this time, Fidel had not yet fully determined the path of Cuba's development, and this raid finally confirmed him as to who were Cuba's friends and who were his enemies.

At the mourning ceremony for the seven Cubans killed on April 16 by American bombs, Fidel Castro gave a fiery speech, calling the revolution he and his comrades carried out socialist and thereby confirming that Cuba is choosing the path of Socialism. And air raids and sabotage only united the Cubans even more and many doubters already clearly knew where the enemy was.

Late in the evening of April 14, a flotilla of interventionists left the Puerto Cabezas base. She carried on board 2.5 thousand tons of weapons and ammunition, 5 M41 Sherman tanks, 10 armored personnel carriers, 18 anti-tank guns, 30 mortars, 70 bazooka anti-tank rifles. On the evening of April 16, the Americans delivered tank landing ships to the landing area. The American aircraft carriers Essex and Shangri La, as well as the landing helicopter carrier Boxer with marines on board, were also brought there.

On the night of April 17, the Gusano ships entered the Bay of Cochinos. At 1:15 from Swan Island, a prearranged signal was transmitted to CIA agents and the counter-revolutionary underground in Cuba that an armed invasion had begun, and that it was time to begin sabotage and rebellion, but mass uprisings did not happen on the ground; Cuban counterintelligence kept spies and traitors under cap and on the night of the landing, the spider nests were mostly crushed by a series of lightning operations.

At 3:00 the landing of the first echelon began. At dawn, a parachute landing was dropped on the road leading from the depths of the island to the shore. But the border guards and a detachment of the Cuban people's militia (milisianos) located in the landing area entered into battle with the mercenaries. The enemy outnumbered them by more than 10 times, but the Milisians grabbed the ground with their teeth and delayed the advance of the mercenaries.

Having received a message about the landing, the headquarters of the interventionists urgently disseminated a military report from the “Cuban Revolutionary Council”, which noted that “... the rebel forces have begun the invasion of Cuba and hundreds of people have already landed on the coast and the whole of Cuba is seething, preparing to meet their liberators... " And the whole of Cuba was really seething, militias hurried to the collection points, in cities they carried boxes with Czech machine guns and carbines right into the streets, and volunteers of all ages, arming themselves as they went, went towards the cannonade. The national impulse was so massive that there simply wasn’t enough weapons for the volunteers.

By this time, the Cuban leadership had understood the current situation and urgently sent sufficient forces to the area of ​​the actual landing of the troops to repel it (quite by chance, a few Soviet self-propelled guns and thirty-fours, as well as heavy 122 and 152 mm artillery, were not very far from "Bay of Pigs")

The landing Gusano troops began an offensive simultaneously in three directions: three battalions to Playa Giron, one to Playa Larga and a battalion of paratroopers to San Blas. Part of the forces was allocated to capture the airfield in the Playa Giron area and prepare it to receive their aircraft.

The main command of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba decided to stop the advance of the interventionists into the interior of the country, disrupt the landing of troops on the coast with air strikes, and then block the landing forces from sea and land and defeat them.

To solve this problem, 7 infantry battalions, 20 T-34 tanks, 10 self-propelled guns-100, 14 artillery and mortar batteries and patrol ships were allocated.

But these forces still had to be pulled up to the place of fighting, and the Milisianos, in the area of ​​​​the advance of enemy troops, held out with all their might. And when the cartridges were already running out, the roar of tank diesel engines was heard from behind. The enemy was hit by two thirty-fours and an SAU-100, on the armor there was a landing party of boy cadets of the people's militia school from the city of Matanzas, this was the last reserve that was found in this area, but in the commander's hatch of the first tank, the militias saw the figure of Fidel, and it was worth divisions. Young Cuban tank crews had not yet mastered Soviet equipment very well, and there were accidents, and there were mistakes, and not all of the equipment reached the battlefield. But they still managed to get three combat vehicles made of Ural steel and decided the fate of the battle. And then the main parts arrived.

At dawn, Cuban troops took up their starting positions. To the great surprise of the CIA, the resurrected Cuban air force struck the landing forces. The first thing that was sent to the bottom was the landing transport “Houston”, on which the shock battalion was in full force, and the ship “Rio Escandido”, which transported most of the ammunition and heavy weapons; during the second approach, two more ships were sunk. 5 American planes were shot down in air battles. By mid-day, in all directions, Cuban troops stopped the enemy’s advance and then began to push him towards the coast.

On the evening of April 18, it became obvious that the aggression against Cuba had failed. US President Kennedy. held an emergency meeting at which it was decided to use aircraft from the Essex aircraft carrier. They were supposed to, together with CIA B-25 bombers, strike the Cuban troops who were tightening the ring around the Gusanos. But by a strange coincidence, at the Puerto Cabezas airbase and on the Essex aircraft carrier, the difference in standard time was not taken into account, which is why the bombers and fighters did not meet at the specified point. The joint strike did not work out. Bomber aviation pilots did not dare to fly into the combat area without fighter escort.

And the Cuban troops on the morning of April 19, after a 30-minute artillery preparation, went on the offensive and finally broke the opposition of the enemy, who capitulated on the same day.

It took 72 hours to defeat the mercenaries who landed in the Bay of Cochinos.

Gusano losses amounted to 82 people killed and 1,200 prisoners. Cuban pilots and anti-aircraft gunners shot down 12 aircraft. 4 enemy ships were destroyed from the air. Trophies included 5 M41 tanks, 10 armored personnel carriers, mortars, guns and almost all small arms. In addition, the CIA lost ten of its full-time employees on Playa Giron. Well, the CIA residencies were still unable to recover for a long time after the defeat of the counterintelligence Barbudos inflicted by them.

To its credit, President Kennedy rejected the demands of Dulles and some of the generals for an open invasion of the island by US military forces, and Dulles was forced to resign.

The captives were then exchanged with the Americans for baby food and medicine. This is exactly what Cuba lacked at that time due to the American blockade. For some reason I remembered how Alexander Nevsky exchanged captured dog knights for soap.

And here’s what else I’ll tell you, dear readers. You can blame me for unhealthy romanticism, but I look at the faces of the companions in old photos. I watch how civilians of different ages, without hesitation, take up weapons and go into battle. And what beautiful and spiritual faces they still have. VIVA CUBA!

The United States suffered serious political damage, finding itself completely isolated in the international arena, and Cuba finally chose the socialist path of development.

Aviation in the Bay of Pigs

The Cuban government of dictator Batista, to fight the rebels, in the mid-50s purchased a batch of military equipment from England: 18 Sea Fury piston fighters, 12 Beaver communications aircraft, several Whirlwind helicopters, negotiations were held on jet fighters Hawker "Hunter" Concerned about competition, the US government agreed to sell a batch of jet aircraft to Cuba.

A group of Cuban pilots and technicians were trained in the United States on T-33A and F-84G aircraft, and in 1955 the first 8 T-ZZA arrived in Cuba. The former US Air Force base in San Antonio de Los Banos was restored especially for them. The rest of the ground aviation was located at the Columbia base near Havana, and the naval aviation was located at the Mariel base, 70 miles from Havana; there was also a large air base and training ground in San Julian on the western tip of the island.

After the overthrow of the Batista regime at the end of 1959, all military equipment remaining in service became part of the revolutionary armed forces of the Republic of Cuba. The air force was called FAR, which stood for "Fuerza Aereas Revolutionary" - Revolutionary Air Force. Many specialists emigrated, but there were a sufficient number of pilots and technicians to operate the remaining equipment: only four T-33A, 12 Sea Fury, several B-26, transport, communications and helicopters could fly. The aircraft fleet was extremely worn out, so the new government resumed attempts to purchase 15 Hunter fighters from England. Negotiations were conducted on arms supplies with some other countries. This became known to the United States, which put pressure on arms supplying countries and actually achieved an embargo on the supply of military equipment to Cuba. And CIA agents simply blew up a ship with a shipment of Belgian ammunition in the port of Havana. Against this unfavorable background, in 1960, Cuba signed the first agreements on the supply of weapons and military equipment with the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Soon, the first batches of armored vehicles (approximately 30 T-34 and SU-100), anti-aircraft artillery and small arms, produced in Czechoslovakia under Soviet licenses, were sent to Cuba through Romanian and Bulgarian ports.

But no matter how the Cubans rushed, Soviet aviation technology was late for the start of serious hostilities. This became obvious when opponents of the Castro regime began to carry out air raids to bomb cities and sugar cane plantations, Cuba's only strategic raw material, and deliver weapons to groups of counter-revolutionaries. These raids used several B-25s and converted civilian aircraft based at various airfields in the US state of Florida, in particular Pampana Beach, 35 km from Miami.

A Piper Comanche 250 that took part in one of the raids crashed on February 18, 1960. Another plane of this type, trying to take the leader of one of the gangs out of Cuba, was shot down by an army patrol.

One C-46, delivering weapons to counter-revolutionaries, was captured at the landing site by security personnel, and a C-54 (DC-4), damaged by anti-aircraft fire, made an emergency landing in the Bahamas.

FAR could do nothing to prevent the raiders - there were no full-fledged fighters, radar installations, or communications equipment. The engine life of the last aircraft remaining in service was preserved to repel large-scale aggression, the preparation of which was reported by intelligence. Rumors that a small but experienced invasion air force was being trained at the CIA's Traque base in Guatemala appeared in the press as early as the end of 1960.

Their flight crew included several dozen Cuban emigrants, former military and civilian pilots, who had 16 B-26 bombers and 10 C-46 transports. But there weren’t enough people for the Air Force, and in January 1961 the CIA stepped up the recruitment of pilots who had experience flying the B-26.
By April 1961 "Brigade 2506" was finally formed, which included four infantry, one motorized and one parachute battalions, a tank company and a heavy weapons battalion - a total of about 1.5 thousand people. On April 13, 1961, the amphibious assault force of “Brigade 2506” boarded 7 large Liberty-class transport ships and moved towards Cuba.

Liberty-class transport ship

On April 16, 45 miles from the island, they were joined by two tank landing ships and landing barges, on board which were the brigade’s military equipment. The goal of the amphibious assault was to land on two (originally planned on three) beachheads in the Bay of Cochinos: two battalions on the coast of Playa Larga, the rest of the forces at Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs).

At the same time, a parachute landing was supposed to land near the village of San Bale. The goal of the operation was to capture a section of the coast and a small airstrip in Girona in order to relocate its air force there and deliver reinforcements. The air force of "Brigade 2506" entered the battle two days before the main landing. After midnight on April 15, 1961, 9 B-26 bombers took off from the Puerto Cubesas airfield in Nicaragua. Eight of them attacked the main FAR bases, and the ninth headed for Miami, where its pilot tried to assure reporters that a mutiny had begun in Cuban aviation.

The crews of the attack aircraft returned to the base without losses, although somewhat battered by anti-aircraft fire, and reported a major success: 8-10 aircraft were disabled at the San Antonio airbase, 8 at Ciudad Libertad (formerly Colombia), and Santiago de Cuba - 12, trucks with ammunition were blown up, airfield buildings were destroyed. But where could such loss figures come from, in total exceeding everything that FAR had at the time?

Probably, the point here is not the excessive boasting of the raid participants. Most likely, the blow fell on decommissioned aircraft stationed at airfields, which from the air could not be distinguished from serviceable ones. In fact, as a result of the raid, 1-2 B-26s, 2-3 Sea Furies and 1-2 transport and training aircraft were damaged, i.e. about half a dozen cars, some of which were later repaired.

Cuban Sea Fury

Repair work began at a feverish pace immediately after the end of the raid. All aircraft capable of “flying and shooting” were immediately relocated closer to the area where the invasion forces were supposed to land—to the San Antonio de Los Baños airbase. Only FAR aircraft could stop the counter-revolutionaries. The engines of most of them gave only half the power, the lights did not close, and for some the landing gear did not even retract. The pilots themselves nicknamed them “Motherland or Death” type aircraft - and they were really ready to win or die! This was the fate that befell the pilot Acosta, who took off on a reconnaissance flight over the sea on the night of April 14-15 in his T-33A. During landing, the landing gear failed to extend, and then the plane caught fire and fell into the sea. The dozen pilots FAR had were mostly young guys, among whom 39-year-old captain Enrique Carreras Rojas seemed like a “grandfather.” Most of them had no combat experience, although some began to fly in the partisan air force, and Lieutenant Alvaro Prendes Quintana was a career pilot of the Batista air force, who managed to undergo jet flying training in the United States and was imprisoned in 1957 for refusing bomb the rebels. At dawn on April 17, FAR pilots received orders to strike the invading ships. Of the eight aircraft that were in San Antonio, three were prepared for the first flight - a pair of Sea Furies and one B-26. Around noon, the strike troika took off. The group was led by Captain Rojas in a fighter, accompanied by Lieutenant Gustavo Bourzak in a second fighter and Captain Luis Silva in a bomber. In fact, Captain Jaquez Lagas Morrero was assigned to the B-26 for the first flight, but Silva voluntarily took a seat in the cockpit and went on a mission.

“We were over the target in 20 minutes. From two thousand meters, 7-8 large ships standing off the coast of Playa Giron, a mass of landing barges and boats scurrying between them and the shore were clearly visible,” Rojas recalled. Having dived to a height of 300 meters, he fired a missile salvo at the Houston ship. The helmsman from the Houston later described it this way: “On the morning of April 17, we had already unloaded the 2nd battalion and began unloading the 5th. Then three planes appeared over the bay. We did not pay attention to them - there were many planes circling over the bay, but they were ours. We were generally told that Cuba did not have aviation. And then one plane from this trio, a small single-engine fighter, descended and began to attack the ship from the deck, but it did not turn away and fired 4 missiles at us. Two of them hit the side near the stern. A fire started on the deck, and water began to flow into the hold through the holes...”

Two other aircraft also attacked targets without missing a beat, almost all of the missiles hit enemy ships. The trio returned to base, where by this time they managed to prepare two more aircraft. In addition to the previous crews, the second flight included Lieutenant Ulsa on the Sea Fury and the crew of Captain Lagas Morrero on the B-26. This time, Captain Rojas ordered eight missiles hung under the wing of his Sea Fury - and all of them hit the middle part of the Rio Escandio ship, loaded with fuel and ammunition. It also served as a headquarters ship and, having taken off into the air, took with it the main communications equipment of “Brigade 2506”. Other FAR pilots, breaking through the barrage of anti-aircraft fire, delivered sensitive blows to landing ships and boats.

Captain Morrero, in his B-26, attacked a tank landing ship: “I attacked one of the ships south of Playa Giron. They were unloading tanks and other equipment onto barges. I fired a rocket that hit a fuel tank on the upper deck... Everything below shattered to pieces!"

By this time, fighting was in full swing below. Fierce battles also broke out in the air. The pilots of the anti-Castro aviation, confident of the defeat of the FAR, prepared only for relatively safe attacks on scattered units of government troops. But even with this task they coped unsatisfactorily, often wasting ammunition on secondary targets and civilian objects. A meeting with Republican aviation in the air was not included in their calculations. At first, they mistook the FAR planes for their own. It cost them dearly. Having completed one of the attacks on the ships, Rojas discovered a B-26 bomber in the air next to him. “At first I thought it was L. Silva’s plane, but then I determined by the tail number that it was an enemy plane. I got behind him and opened fire.” Shot by bursts from the Sea Fury, the B-26 caught fire and fell into the sea not far from one of the ships. This was FAR's first aerial victory. Following Rojas that day, Morrero, Silva and Ulsa each shot down one B-26, and in total on April 17, the Gusanos lost five aircraft.

FAR also suffered significant losses. Two B-26s pinned K. Ulsa's fighter in the air and shot him at point-blank range with machine guns, killing the pilot. And L. Silva’s “Invader” with a crew of four exploded in the air from a direct hit by an anti-aircraft shell on the gas tank. There is information about serious damage to another Sea Fury. The tiny revolutionary air force lost a third of its aircraft and half of its flight personnel within 24 hours.

But the main goal was achieved. Half of the invasion ships were sunk, and a large amount of heavy weapons and ammunition went to the bottom with them. The command of the invasion forces, stunned by unexpected losses, was forced to withdraw the remaining ships 30-40 miles into the open sea, under the cover of the American fleet. Thus, the landing units not only lost a significant part of their reinforcements, but were also left without fire support from naval artillery (the transport ships had 1-2 127 mm guns and 5-10 anti-aircraft guns for this purpose). From the second day, the supply of “Brigade 2506” had to be carried out only from the air - by parachute.

However, the Air Force operational report of the invasion force on the morning of April 18 sounded cheerful: “On April 17, a B-26 FAR ("903") was shot down and one Sea Fury was so damaged that it would not be usable for a week." Pilot Fallier reported about the destruction of a truck with 20-30 people, 18 of whom were killed. Infantry units destroyed one Sea Fury and knocked out the second. Now the enemy probably has two T-33A jets, two Sea Furies, 1 or 2 B. -26. Today, from 3:30 a.m. to 4 a.m., our Air Force is guarding the landing zone, and six aircraft will try to destroy the remnants of the Castro Air Force.”

For its part, the FAR command assigned lieutenants Quintana, Diaz and Molet the task of destroying in the air the aircraft of the “2506 brigade” that were over Cuban territory. Thus, April 18 became the decisive day in the struggle for air superiority.

Quintana and Diaz, who had only brought their T-ZZA jets from Havana the evening before and had not yet had time to take part in hostilities, flew ahead, Mole in the Sea Fury was a little behind due to lower speed. This is how Quintana himself described this flight: “We are going in formation. On the right is Del Pino’s car, at a distance is Douglas’ plane. The altitude is 7 thousand feet and we are in a hurry to intercept the mercenary bombers.

- The plane is below right! – Del Pino Diaz’s voice is heard in the headphones. I see two B-26s, which, having dropped bombs, go towards the sea.
I order my wingmen by radio to attack the wingman of the enemy pair, and I myself attack the leader.

Here I made my first mistake - I forgot about the B-26 bow machine gun battery and attacked the enemy head-on. From a dive I went head-on to the B-26, which was below me. The enemy turned the car and we are rushing head-on to each other.

We open fire almost simultaneously, the B-26 pilot shoots inaccurately - the tracks fly over the canopy of my cockpit. I missed too. I turn to the right, the B-26 flashes to the left below me. I make a sharp combat turn and, in afterburner, attack him in the tail. There is a battle going on all around, excited voices are screaming in the headphones. The B-26 begins to maneuver energetically. I press the trigger, the tracks pass above the target. I attack again - and miss again. In despair, I no longer notice that the oxygen mask has moved to the side, I am preparing for a new attack. B-26 leaves over the sea towards Honduras, apparently I am sure that I have run out of ammunition or fuel. I catch up with the target again at an angle of 80 degrees and catch it in the sight frame. The track pierces the B-26 from nose to tail, but it does not fall.

I turn away sharply. I pass so close to him that I can see the rivets and faces of the pilots.

New surprise: this B-26 has gunners - they shoot back! Fortunately, the tracks pass by. I make a turn and climb for a new attack. B-26 leaves. Eh, I wish I had eight machine guns! Alas, our T-33A are just training aircraft used as combat vehicles...

On the radio I hear the voices of Del Pino and Douglas - they are attacking the enemy in vain. Their B-26 is running away; they failed to shoot it down. I'm catching up with my B-26. To shoot him down, I am now ready to do anything... I catch the enemy in my sights, shoot all the remaining ammunition from a minimum distance and turn away, almost crashing into the tail of the B-26. On the bomber, my hits cause the left engine to burst into flames and the gunner's cockpit canopy shatters.
I have no cartridges, zero fuel; I don’t know if I’ll make it to San Antonio. The B-26 is on fire, its left wing is on fire, and a long plume of smoke trails behind the aircraft. On the right side of the fuselage, the B-26 co-pilot falls out through the emergency hatch, and a parachute opens above him...

The B-26 finally crashes into the waves of the Bay of Cochinos. In the headphones I hear Del Pino’s joyful voice: You knocked him down, you knocked him down!

He and Douglas continue to pursue the second B-26. I'm leaving for the base. The fight exhausted all my strength. I only have enough fuel for a few minutes..."
On April 18, T-33As intercepted several more B-26s and C-46s, while Sea Furies and B-26s of the revolutionary air force bombed the positions of the 2506 brigade.

The anti-aircraft gunners also distinguished themselves: using quadruple 12.7-mm DShK machine-gun mounts delivered overnight, they shot down two B-26s of the invasion force, reliably covering their ground troops. The superiority of government troops by this time was so great that the Gusanos defended themselves without any enthusiasm. The mercenary air forces could no longer help their ground forces. By the evening of April 18, they had lost two-thirds of their aircraft and half of their personnel. Based on these disappointing results, the commander of the anti-Castro Air Force, Luis Cosme, said: “We have had enough losses. In my opinion, the operation was a failure and I see no point in continuing the flights. Not a single plane with Cubans on board will fly again!” There is information that on the evening of April 18, US Air Force and Navy aircraft attacked the positions of Cuban troops, but this is unlikely - the decision to participate in the hostilities of American aviation was made only on the night of April 18-19.

President John Kennedy authorized the use of fighters from the aircraft carrier Essex (but without insignia) to cover the evacuation of the remnants of Brigade 2506 from the bridgehead on the morning of April 19.

They were supposed to establish control over the airspace and destroy FAR aircraft, and a special group of B-26 bombers with American crews was intended to attack ground targets, since only one Cuban pilot agreed to take the risk for an additional fee.

At about three o'clock in the morning on April 19, four B-26s took off from the Puerto Cabezas airfield for the “last parade.” They were supposed to appear over the Bay of Cochinos at 6.30 in the morning, when the escort fighters had already arrived in the battle area. But when planning the operation, another hiccup occurred: the big bosses from the CIA and the Navy headquarters forgot about the difference in time zones. As a result, the last flight of the bombers took place two hours earlier than the fighters, and ended in complete defeat. The B-26s simply did not have time to provide any assistance to “Brigade 2506” - both T-33As of the revolutionary Air Force attacked them.

Two B-26s were shot down instantly, the third broke away from the pursuit and poured bombs on the premises of the Australia sugar factory, where the brigade headquarters was located, but was shot down by anti-aircraft gunners. The fourth bomber was damaged in an air battle, dropped bombs into the bay, but still did not reach the base and fell into the sea. During the battle, one of the American pilots shouted on the radio: “We are being attacked by MIGs! MIGs are attacking!” Subsequently, this information gave rise to the legend about the participation of Soviet aircraft in repelling aggression. Fidel Castro commented on these rumors: “On the day our territory was bombed by B-26 planes based in Nicaragua, the counter-revolutionaries said that we were bombed by our own planes, claiming that our air force consisted of planes that the Americans supplied to Batista. When will we, with the help of these old worn-out planes, they began to destroy their aircraft, they declared that our Air Force was armed with MIGs, but we did not have MIGs...

The adventure in the Bay of Cochinos ended in great disgrace for the United States and Cuban counter-revolutionaries. “Brigade 2506” lost 458 people as prisoners alone (out of one and a half thousand intended for landing!), and left half of its watercraft and all its weapons on the coast. The invasion force lost up to 12 B-26 aircraft and at least 4 C-46 transports.

FAR losses amounted to two aircraft. In addition, almost every Cuban pilot had sunk ships and landing boats to his credit (large transports were sunk by Morrero, Rojas and Silva).

The command of the revolutionary armed forces drew the appropriate conclusions from the experience of the battles on Playa Giron, and the first of them was the need to re-equip all branches of the military, and primarily aviation, with modern equipment (of course, Soviet-made). Already in 1962, during the May Day parade, three squadrons of MiG-15 and MiG-19 passed over Havana.

And by the beginning of the Caribbean crisis in August 1962, the FAR had several well-trained squadrons equipped with MiG-15, MiG-17F, MiG-19PF and MiG-19S. Fortunately, the “war of nerves” in the fall of 1962 did not develop into a real war, and these planes took to the air only for training and patrol flights.

“Our revolution is a revolution of the dispossessed, carried out by the dispossessed for the dispossessed. We are ready to give our lives for her! Homeland or Death!"
Fidel Castro

On January 1, 1959, revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba. The victory of the Cuban socialists could not help but alarm Washington, American commercial and industrial corporations and, of course, the American mafia, which lost its real estate in Cuba and lost colossal income. In addition, in a short period of time, all the former political and business elite, who enjoyed the patronage of the former dictator Fulgencio Batista, immigrated from Cuba. As a result, many Cubans settled in American Miami: students, members of the intelligentsia, bandits - a real small Cuba was formed in Florida, living according to the usual capitalist laws, a kind of Cuban abroad.

Counting on the support of Cuban emigrants, the American leadership decided to overthrow Castro by military means. To solve this problem, the US command developed Operation Pluto, which provided for a sudden landing on the southern coast of Cuba in April 1961. At the same time, it was assumed in advance that the Cuban counter-revolutionaries would announce the creation of a provisional government on the island, which would ask for help from the United States. The American landing was to take place immediately after the interim government of Cuba applied for help. In addition, to confirm the justice of the invasion, the Americans planned to take advantage of the support of the countries of the Organization of American States (OAS), a purely pro-American international organization. The OAS had to provide its military contingent, which could number up to 15,000 people. To prepare for the operation, several groups of CIA saboteurs and provocateurs were sent to Cuba, preparing a series of sabotage acts on the island designed to destabilize the situation in the country on the eve and directly on the day of the American invasion.

It was planned to prepare the amphibious landing operation by bombing the three largest military airfields in Cuba, where all military aviation of the Cuban revolution was concentrated. Eight bombers were prepared for the bombing, and the strike was planned for April 15.

The amphibious landing was planned to take place in the Bay of Cochinos (translated into Russian as the Bay of Pigs). The landing site was not chosen by chance: a significant part of the bay coast can be used as an airfield, and landing on a flat sandy beach, which is the gulf coast, given the complete absence of anti-landing defense, seemed to the Americans an easy and pleasant adventure. In addition, the area has excellent defensive capabilities: a huge swamp begins a few kilometers from the sea. The coast of the bay was connected with the rest of the island by only one road. These circumstances, of course, were considered by the Americans to be conducive to their consolidation on the island, as well as the accumulation of troops for further advance deeper into Cuba.

The landing date was set for the night of April 17th. It would be naive to believe that the impending American landing was a surprise to the Cubans. It is reasonable to assume that Soviet intelligence played a significant role in this. However, this is a topic for another conversation, as well as a topic for a separate discussion for military historians.

On April 14, 1961, a U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft took photographs of all of Cuba. According to the data received, up to 15 aircraft were stationed at Cuban airfields. The next day, according to the planned plan, 8 American B-26 bombers bombed the airfields of Campo Colombia, San Antonio le Los Banos and Santiago de Cuba. As a result of the strikes, most of the aircraft of the revolutionary air force were declared destroyed. However, the Cubans, who knew about the impending aggression in advance, replaced the combat aircraft with dummies. Therefore, out of 24 aircraft that the Cubans had, only 2 aircraft were lost.

Fidel Castro and Cuban tank crews in the Bay of Pigs (photo http://komiunity.ru)

The US bomber raid, among other things, had very specific political consequences, bringing only one harm to the Americans. On April 16, a mourning ceremony was held in Cuba for the seven Cubans killed as a result of the American bombing, at which Fidel Castro made a fiery speech and once again confirmed that Cuba is choosing the socialist path of development. American bombing and sabotage only united the Cubans, finally defining the image of the enemy.

The ships of the interventionist flotilla, which set out in the direction of Liberty Island, carried about 2.5 thousand tons of weapons and ammunition. At 1:15 a.m., an encrypted radio message was transmitted to the Cuban counter-revolutionaries and CIA agents that the invasion had begun and the time had come for active action to organize large-scale sabotage. However, Cuban counterintelligence managed to nip in the bud all attempts to destabilize the situation in the country, and thus, American plans to create at least a semblance of a provisional government in Cuba were doomed to failure.

At dawn on April 17, the landing of the first echelon of troops began. A parachute landing was dropped on the road connecting the coast of the bay with the rest of the island. The battle has begun. Cuban border guards and militia fighters numbering about 100 people delayed the advance of the enemy, who had almost a tenfold superiority over the defenders.

With the beginning of the intervention in Cuba, a general mobilization was organized. But the Cubans, who learned that the revolution was under threat, did not need special invitations. There were so many volunteers that there simply wasn’t enough for them; distribution points were set up right on the streets.

The offensive of the interventionists began in three directions simultaneously: three battalions went to Playa Giron, one to Playa Larga, and a battalion of paratroopers moved to San Blas. To capture the airfield in the Playa Giron area and prepare it to receive their aircraft, separate units were allocated.

To stop the advance of the invaders deep into the country, the main command of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba decided to use aviation to disrupt the landing of troops on the coast, as well as the subsequent blocking and defeat of the landing forces from sea and land. To solve this problem, the high command allocated 7 infantry battalions, 20 T-34 tanks and 10 self-propelled guns-100, as well as 14 mortar and artillery batteries.

The Cuban command only had to transfer these very impressive forces to the battlefield. The positions of the interventionists were hit by thirty-fours and self-propelled guns-100s. The lead thirty-four was commanded by Fidel himself, the fact of whose presence on the battlefield gave the young Cuban tank crews unprecedented enthusiasm.

By April 18, the initiative completely passed into the hands of the Cuban revolutionary troops, and during the general offensive that began, the Cubans sank four enemy ships, shot down five planes, pushing the invaders to the very coast of the bay, almost throwing them into the sea. Thus, by the evening of April 18, 1961, the operation to overthrow Castro, prepared by the CIA, was a complete failure.

Against the backdrop of the obvious failure of the landing operation, Kennedy gave the order to use aircraft. However, due to a ridiculous mistake related to confusion in time zones, the bombers missed the fighters and did not dare to attack.

On the morning of April 19, the Cuban revolutionary troops, after conducting half an hour of artillery preparation, finally broke the enemy's resistance. The interventionists tore off their uniforms and fled. The losses of the "gusanos" - mercenary interventionists - amounted to 82 people. 1197 people surrendered. The revolutionary forces lost 156 people killed and about 800 wounded.

CIA mercenaries defeated in the Bay of Pigs and captured by the Cubans (photo http://komiunity.ru)

Later, Fidel Castro appreciated the role of the Battle of Playa Giron in the Cuban people: “The Battle of Playa Giron did not allow the history of Cuba to turn back to earlier times, and saved the revolution.” In July 1961, the Cuban Council of Ministers established the Order of Playa Giron as one of the highest state awards.

The first intervention prepared by the United States in Latin America was a complete failure. Cuba managed to defend its right to freedom and independence. However, the American leadership was preparing revenge, and in November 1961 developed a plan for a new operation to change the regime in Cuba, codenamed “Mongoose,” which was supposed to begin on October 8-12, 1962. To prevent a new invasion of Cuba, the USSR secretly deployed medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads on board in Cuba. As a result, the Cuban missile crisis broke out - the greatest military-political confrontation of the 20th century.

On the coast of Cuba there is a pool with an intriguing name. The material will tell you what the Bay of Pigs is famous for and why it is so named.

Spanish riddle

Matanzas is one of the largest provinces of the Republic of Cuba. The area is home to dozens of sugar cane factories and several oil refineries. Thanks to this, the zone is considered the most industrialized region of the country. The capital of this province is the city of Matanzas.

However, most tourists who visited Liberty Island (as Cuba is called) remember the province of Matanzas thanks to its beautiful beaches. One of the most exotic corners of this region is the Bay of Cochinos, which is better known as the Bay of Pigs. This pool is located on the southern coast of Cuba, which overlooks the Caribbean Sea.

In Spanish, the name of the bay is Bahía de Cochinos and is translated as “Bay of Pigs.” However, the nickname is not actually related to animals. This is a homonym, that is, a word has different meanings, but the same sound. Therefore, from another translation, Cochino is the name of the tropical sea fish that is found in this area. The second name of this species is the Royal Triggerfish.

Prerequisites for the uprising

However, for most people who are interested in history, the Bay of Pigs serves as an example of international military strategy. Today, experts do not care why the bay is called this way. Instead, they want to know more details about the operation that took place on this island in 1961.

This unique event occurred because Fidel Castro and his supporters seized power in Cuba. The previous dictator, Batista, was forced to flee. Along with the former ruler, officials and rich people left the island, most of whom found refuge in Miami and Florida (USA). The intelligentsia and middle class were afraid of persecution and did not want to part with their acquired wealth.

If the top of the country did not support the new leader, then the poor liked him. Castro confiscated the land and property of the bourgeoisie and distributed it to the people. Therefore, his policy immediately took the side of the ideas of communism.

Preparing for an attack

In this regard, the CIA began organizing an attack that took place in the Bay of Cochinos (Bay of Pigs). What this pool became famous for and why the operation was a failure is described below.

America did not want Castro and his country to side with the Soviet Union. It was decided to take advantage of the indignation of Cuban emigrants, launch an offensive operation and overthrow Fidel. The US quickly found 1,400 disgruntled men who were willing to take part in the battle. The CIA was confident that the people would support the rebels and the communist regime would be overthrown. But America did not take into account the fact that the people who received the land supported Castro.

On April 15, 1961, the emigrants began carrying out air strikes using unmarked aircraft. Airfields were bombed. The goal is the destruction of aviation. However, this mission failed due to the inexperience of the rebels.

The next day, the Cubans expected an attack from America. The leader of the country tried to keep people as safe as possible. However, the attack took place only on April 17.

Instant War

The goal of the thousands of Cubans who landed on the island was to free their compatriots from communism. A not very good place was chosen to start the operation - a bay in the province of Matanzas, Bay of Pigs. This territory is limited by swamps, which were extremely difficult to move through. Wasting no time, the rebels asked for help from the United States. Additional forces arrived at a certain place within a few hours and immediately captured several points.

Castro decided that this battle could only be won by starting an instant war. Consequently, all revolutionary forces were immediately sent to this zone. Despite the fact that the United States was superior to the Cubans in military equipment, Fidel's young and inexperienced soldiers managed to shoot down several enemy aircraft and sink two ships with help on board. Already on April 18, the revolutionaries recaptured part of the occupied territories.

Unsuccessful ending

The next day the situation for the rebels deteriorated even further. The Bay of Pigs became a cage of sorts. On one side this territory was washed by the sea, and on the other it was surrounded by impassable swamps. In this regard, part of the rebel army surrendered. The other fled back to the USA on ships. In total, more than 200 people died in this battle. More than 1,000 American soldiers were captured. Very soon, Cuba's leaders accused Kennedy and the CIA of trying to take over the island. The United States subsequently ransomed its military for colossal sums.

The whole world is drawing conclusions from this battle. The operation was poorly planned and staged. If earlier Castro intended to cooperate with America, then after this event he categorically refused to deal with it. Moreover, he became closer to the Soviet Union and allowed nuclear weapons to be placed on his territory. All this led to

Entertainment for every taste

The Bay of Pigs has something to tempt the sophisticated foreign tourist today. On the right side of the bay there are unique coral reefs. The Zapata swamps are also located here. This is a valuable find for tourists who are interested in nature. The territory is protected by law. Hundreds of animals live freely here, which can only be found on this island. For example, here people see pink flamingos and avoce-billed woodpeckers.

Near this reserve there is another tourist point. This Guam village is a model of an Indian settlement. Small huts are built on tiny islands connected by beautiful bridges. In general, this is a picturesque and soulful place.

Mangroves lie on the east coast. The ecosystem of this zone amazes scientists, but for the average tourist it can be boring and even dangerous. Today, many foreigners are attracted to the Bay of Pigs for its recreational diving opportunities.

The Edge of Eternal Summer

Besides the fact that Cuba is the Island of Freedom, it is also an endless summer. Even in January, the temperature here does not drop below 25-27 °C. The air warms up most in August. Then the levels reach 30-32 °C. The rainy season lasts from May to November. The most precipitation is recorded in June and October.

Cuba has a lot to offer vacationers. But the main thing that tourists come here for is that the Bay of Pigs has made the province of Matanzas popular. There are two beaches on the coast - Playa Giron and Playa Larga.

Recently, more and more tourists are interested in diving. This bay offers real underwater excursions. In addition, vacationers can visit the flooded caves.

The Bay of Cochinos is a unique natural reserve whose landscapes are mesmerizing and inspiring.

In 1959, revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro overthrew Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. After the socialists came to power, the “Island of Freedom” abruptly changed its foreign policy course and left the sphere of influence of the United States. America failed to quickly solve the “Cuban problem” with economic sanctions and political pressure, and the task of overthrowing the Castro regime was assigned to the security forces. What could the newly formed self-defense forces of the young Cuban Republic oppose to the American invasion? However, the mercenary landing on the Cuban beaches of Playa Giron failed in two days. Forty years later, details of the planning and execution of the landing on Playa Giron became known from declassified US archives.

Considering that under dictator Batista, American capital controlled about seventy percent of the Cuban economy, it can be understood that businessmen from the mainland could not simply abandon the extremely profitable business. Castro would later say: “They [the United States] cannot forgive us for the fact that we are under their nose, and that we carried out a socialist revolution under the nose of the United States.” Thus, the return of control over Cuba was motivated by both political and economic interests for the United States. US President Dwight Eisenhower assigned this task to the CIA and the Pentagon.

By order of March 17, 1960, CIA Director Allen Dulles was appointed responsible for the armed overthrow of the Cuban government, and his deputy for planning, General Richard Bissell, took over the development of the invasion. From the Pentagon, a sabotage specialist, Colonel Elcott, was involved. On the government side, Assistant Secretary of State Whiting Willauer oversaw the operation, for which the White House allocated $13 million.

The operation was called Operation Pluto, and at first its headquarters in Miami consisted of only a dozen specialists. With the coming to power of the new President John F. Kennedy, after a meeting with the participation of senior military officials and the political establishment, at which the time of invasion was determined for the spring of 1961, Pluto moved into the operational planning phase.

It was decided to attack Cuba with the forces of emigrant mercenaries. It was assumed that the landing force would seize part of the coastal territory and create a provisional government, which in turn would seek military assistance from the United States. In advance, the CIA began sending small groups of saboteurs to Cuba with the task of preparing military actions within the country for the landing day: blowing up communication lines, bridges and warehouses. To provide political cover for the operation, the Democratic Revolutionary Front was created under the leadership of Manuel Verona; the leaders of the “front” were supposed to form a new government of Cuba.

After John Kennedy criticized the CIA for the insufficient scale of the upcoming action, mercenary training camps were created in Nicaragua, Guatemala and the southern United States. The invasion group was named “Brigade 2506” and the number of fighters in it was doubled, to almost one and a half thousand people. They were given heavy equipment and bulldozers to organize fortified defenses and a temporary airfield. The fighters of the brigade were assigned a personal number, but the numbering began from 2000 to create the appearance of a large unit. In total, the invasion force consisted of four infantry, one artillery, parachute and motorized battalions and a company of M41 light tanks. San Roman, a former captain in the army of dictator Batista, was assigned to lead the brigade.

The Pentagon has concentrated sea and air support teams in the Nicaraguan port of Puerto Cabezas. Two World War II-era US Navy landing ships (the Blagar and the Barbara Jane), several hastily armed vessels from a former private Cuban shipping company, and seven tank landing craft to offload equipment at the landing area. From the air, the operation was to be covered by 14 military transport aircraft (C-46 Commando and C-54 Skymaster) and 24 B-26 tactical bombers transferred from the US Air Force.

Before the invasion, the Pentagon planned to carry out several bomb attacks on Cuban airfields, but just before the landing, the American command was afraid that a series of large-scale air raids would cause other states to accuse the United States of aggression against Cuba. As a result, a compromise was made, and as it turned out, an erroneous decision: to limit ourselves to eight sorties.

Despite the regime of total secrecy with which the CIA surrounded Operation Pluto, several months before it began, speculation about an impending landing appeared in the world press. And at the beginning of 1961, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba directly accused the US authorities of preparing an invasion. To hide its participation in the armed aggression, the United States postponed the landing to the night and changed the location - the choice fell on the deserted Bay of Cochinos (literally translated as “Bay of Pigs”). The operation to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro became known as “Zapata”.

Operation Bay of Pigs, landing at the Bay of Cochinos, Operation Zapata- a military operation, since 1960, prepared by the US government with the aim of overthrowing the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Background [ | ]

Evolution of the nature of the operation[ | ]

Essentially, a combination of guerrilla warfare and psychological warfare was proposed at this stage. The CIA immediately began training 300 guerrillas, first in the United States and the Panama Canal Zone, and then in Guatemala. The radio station on the island of Big Cisne began operating on 17 May, using equipment left on the island after being used for radio propaganda as part of Operation PBSUCCESS. In June, the CIA managed to form from the fragmented Cuban opposition (184 groups according to the CIA itself) (CDRF).

In the fall of 1960, the CIA realized that guerrilla warfare might not reach the critical mass needed to revolt against Castro, and the nature of the operation began to change from guerrilla warfare to amphibious landings. In September, a military adviser appeared in the WH/4 group involved in preparing the operation - Marine Colonel J. Hawkins (English). In CIA correspondence on October 31, 1960, it was indicated that, according to the not yet approved plan, the sabotage group would be no more than 60 people, and at least 1,500 people would participate in the landing operation, consisting of several battalions, and possibly US special forces.

After the failure of landing and resupplying guerrilla groups in October 1960, at a White House meeting on November 29, the CIA proposed a new plan for approval by the President, who was clearly irritated by the persistence of Castro's power in Cuba. None of those present objected to the new approach; Eisenhower still demanded that "the hand of America be kept out of sight." The decision to use an amphibious landing, like many others, was not written down on paper; as in other cases, the president did not become involved in the details of covert operations, which was necessary to preserve his possibility of plausible deniability.

On January 4, 1961, the CIA presented a new plan, according to historian P. Gleichesis (English), "the most realistic" and much more thoughtful than the subsequent Trinidad and Zapata plans. The plan included the following sequence of actions:

Under Eisenhower, the US military was used solely for support and was not used in planning; Although representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present at all key meetings and did not voice any objections, they were never asked to evaluate the CIA's plans or the quality of the paratroopers' training. Kennedy immediately involved the military in discussing the plans, revealing significant differences in positions at a meeting on January 28, 1961. Plans reported to the President changed at this point: Richard M. Bissell (English) The planner for the operation, in a February 8 memorandum to Kennedy, spoke of CIA and Defense Department optimism about the invasion: “at worst, the landing force will be able to make its way into the mountains, and at best, there will be a large-scale civil war in which we can openly support Castro’s opponents.” " At the same time, diplomat T. Mann (English) believed that there was no chance of a quick uprising against Castro, and the United States would essentially have to choose between the loss of troops, the difficulties of supplying guerrillas in the mountains, and direct intervention.

Plan Trinidad, recommended by the CIA on March 11, 1961, involved seizing and holding a beachhead near the city of Trinidad, repelling Cuban militia attacks, and creating the conditions for a large-scale insurrection. In case of failure, the paratroopers were to withdraw to the nearby mountains and switch to guerrilla warfare. The plan was silent on how the paratroopers - after defeat at the beachhead - would fight their way to the mountains through encirclement, but noted that "the provisional government should be landed immediately after the capture of the beachhead." If the operation was successful, the government was supposed to recognize it and thereby create conditions for at least non-state material support. Kennedy rejected the plan, demanding that it be changed to a less ambitious one that could more plausibly look like a purely Cuban operation.

• a smaller version of the Trinidad, with a night landing without airborne assault and air support;
• landing on the northeastern coast of Cuba;
• landing at the Bay of Pigs, which by March 16 became Plan Zapata.

US domestic political considerations[ | ]

Shortly after Eisenhower approved the amphibious assault plan, a change of administration occurred in the United States, and Kennedy became president. By the time the new president arrived, the practical details had not been clarified, and after the disaster, Eisenhower justified that under him only a small number of Cubans were being trained, “despite a lot of talk, there were no plans yet with a specific number, landing location or support.”

Kennedy was notified of the preparation of the operation during the election campaign. After his election victory, in November 1960, Dulles and Bissell briefed the future president on the details of the operation, Kennedy made no objections, and preparations continued. However, key members of the incoming administration were not informed, and Kennedy did not request additional information. The result, according to T. Mann, who unsuccessfully tried to arrange the transfer of affairs between administrations, was “stupidity - as if it [the operation] would disappear if it was not dealt with. Kennedy tried to ignore it when he still had many months to think."

The aforementioned CIA plan of January 4, 1961, explicitly mentioned the need to obtain the new president's consent for air support for the landing.

Kennedy's hands were tied by his position of confrontation with Castro during the election campaign. During the campaign, he attacked Eisenhower for allowing the possibility of a communist threat "90 miles from the United States." This position attracted voters to him, but, once in power, made reversing the operation almost impossible; according to Robert Kennedy, “everyone would say he chickened out... it was Eisenhower's plan; Eisenhower's people were confident of success."

Kennedy himself preferred the strategy of gradually increasing guerrilla warfare and repeatedly expressed this, but the CIA assessed such actions as impossible, including due to the position of Cuban emigrants trained for the landing, who believed that an open attack had a greater chance of direct military action. US support. Unconvinced by the CIA's assessments, Kennedy hesitated, but preparations for the operation were moving forward, and the delay brought the president closer to approving the landing.

Kennedy continued to have doubts about the chosen plan of operation. Thus, on April 4, he again reported that he would prefer to see an invasion force of 200-250 people; The CIA again responded that this was impossible.

"Second phase" [ | ]

In February 1961, discussion of what would happen after the landing and capture of the beachhead (the so-called “Phase 2”) was virtually abandoned, despite disagreements between Bissell and Mann. Bissell subsequently argued that planning for subsequent phases in covert operations is usually incomplete, since the outcome of the first phase is usually difficult to predict: "we had no agreement on what to do once the beachhead had been established."

Disagreements over Phase 2 occurred not only between the CIA and the State Department, but also within the CIA. Bissell and the people around him in the CIA believed that if the landing force could hold out for a few days, then it would be able to hold out for a month, and, in the meantime, while Castro could not recapture the bridgehead, the rebel air force controlled the skies, bombing without interruption and with increasing efficiency - something will happen. However, at the same time, Hawkins believed that the brigade would attract young people, strengthen itself and go to Havana, and Bissell himself thought that the more likely options were recognition of the provisional government and direct support for it either from the United States or the OAS. Mann's disbelief in the possibility of any success in Phase 2 did not go beyond the memorandum: finding himself essentially alone, at the decisive moment he did not object to the landing - but was eager to end his participation in the planning of the operation and left Washington before the landing; at the time of the disaster, Mann was ambassador to Mexico.

In fact, there was a fundamental divergence between the President and the CIA in their assessment of what would happen if the landing did not proceed according to the optimistic scenario: Dulles and Bissell believed that, given the choice between failure of the operation and direct US military intervention, the President would choose open invasion of Cuba. Kennedy made it clear several times during the planning process that he would not give such an order, but Bissell in particular suggested that, when confronted with the possibility of failure, Kennedy would change his mind. According to P. Gleichesis, Kennedy and the CIA at that moment resembled ships diverging at night on different courses, but not understanding it. To get the plan approved by the President, the CIA continued to describe the possibility of the landing force turning to guerrilla warfare and thus the impossibility of complete failure, although in fact it did not even plan for this option (singing a "lullaby" for the President in Gleichesis's estimation).

Preparing for the invasion[ | ]

The preparations took place in complete secrecy, in the words of Eisenhower himself, “everyone had to be ready to swear that he had not heard anything about it.” Planning for the operation was carried out similar to PBSUCCESS, a special unit within the Directorate of Plans (English), with virtually no participation from the Intelligence Directorate.

General management of the operation (codenamed Operation Pluto) was carried out by CIA Director Allen Dulles. Responsible for the development and implementation of the operation was General Richard M. Bissell, who served as the CIA Deputy Director for Planning (English). At the same time, Dulles gave Bissell wide freedom of action in operational matters. The State Department's efforts to prepare for the invasion were coordinated by US Assistant Secretary of State Whiting Willauer. The project manager (group WH/4) within the CIA was J. Esterline (English).

At the same time, significant efforts were made to consolidate Castro's political opponents (who had already created about 60 associations and groups). As a result, the Democratic Revolutionary Front was created (" Frente"), which included five groups, and Manuel A. Verona became its leader.

In November 1960, under the pretext of “protecting Nicaragua and Guatemala from a possible attack from Cuba,” the United States sent a group of US Navy warships to the coast of Cuba, which was the next stage of preparation for the landing operation in the Bay of Pigs.

The preparation for the operation did not go unnoticed. Individual references to the military training of Cuban emigrants appeared in the open press. On December 31, 1960, at a session of the UN General Assembly and on January 4, 1961, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Castro Roa made a statement about the preparation of an armed invasion of Cuba by American intelligence services.

After President J.F. Kennedy took office, on January 20, 1961, A. Dulles and R. Bissell briefed him on the landing operation plan (“ Operation Trinidad"), and the President expressed the wish that the plan be further studied by Pentagon experts. On January 26, a meeting was held, as a result of which a slightly modified version of the operation plan was approved, which included increasing the number of paratroopers from 800-1000 to 1443 people, providing them with bulldozers and tools for preparing a field airfield, as well as additional weapons.

On April 8, 1961, a radio appeal was broadcast to the Cuban people and the governments of Latin American countries with a call to begin an armed struggle against Castro.

Fighting [ | ]

Sabotage and sabotage[ | ]

Before the start of the operation in Cuba, the “fifth column” of opponents of the Cuban revolution (who received the contemptuous nickname “gusanos”, Spanish, among the revolutionaries) became more active. gusanos- lit. "worms")

Events April 14-16[ | ]

On April 14, 1961, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft took photographs of Cuban airfields, as a result of which the location of 15 of 24 Cuban aircraft was established.

As a result of anti-aircraft fire from the Cubans, two B-26s were damaged - one of them crashed into the sea 50 km north of Cuba (the crew of two people died), the second damaged aircraft landed at an air base in Key West, but later in did not take part in the operation.

The third B-26 landed at Miami International Airport. The pilot of this plane made a statement that he and his comrades were deserters from the Cuban Air Force, after which he turned to the US authorities with a request for political asylum. However, the disinformation mechanism did not work, as the invited journalists noticed the differences between the landed version of the B-26 and those in service with the Cuban Air Force, and drew attention to the fact that, contrary to the pilots’ story, the bomber’s machine guns were not used (the barrels were clean). The incident caused significant international resonance.

The repeated raid on Cuba was canceled by order of President J.F. Kennedy.

The fleet of the “Cuban Expeditionary Forces” consisted of two landing ships (LCI “ Blagar" and LCI " Barbara J") and five cargo ships - "Houston" (code designation " Aguja"), "Rio Escondido" (coded " Ballena"), "Karibe" (coded " Sardina"), "Atlantico" (coded " Tiburon") and "Lake Charles". Radars and anti-aircraft machine guns were installed on landing ships, and anti-aircraft guns on transport ships.

Landing operation and the Battle of Playa Giron[ | ]

A fragment of a US combat aircraft shot down by Cuban air defense during the fighting against the landing of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in the Bay of Cochinos. Cuba, April 1961. State Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia

At about 07:30, six military transport aircraft (five C-46s and one C-54), in accordance with the Falcon plan, dropped the 1st airborne battalion of Brigade 2506 (177 people) in the San Blas area .

By 11 o'clock, the two remaining transports of "brigade 2506" retreated to the open sea.

On the evening of April 17, more than 2 thousand 122-mm shells were fired at the landing force, but the artillery shelling of the long and narrow front turned out to be ineffective, since the paratroopers had already managed to dig in.

The bombers were supposed to escort US jet fighters from the USS Wessex, but the planes missed each other, and two B-26s with crews of US citizens (pilots of the Alabama National Guard) were shot down by the Cuban Air Force.

At the same time, the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza proposed using six P-51 Mustang fighters from the Nicaraguan Air Force (on which identification marks had begun to be painted over) for air support, but this decision was rejected.

On the same day, Cuban T-34-85 tanks destroyed two tanks of the “2506 brigade”.

In the afternoon, two American destroyers, USS Eaton (code Santiago) and USS Murray (code designation Tampico) approached the coast of the Bay of Pigs in order to evacuate the personnel of the invasion forces, but after several shots were fired at them from tank guns, the ships went into the open sea.

The Cuban air force and air defense shot down 12 B-26 Invader, C-46 and other types of aircraft covering the landing force, including several with crews of US citizens. Of these, 7 B-26s and 1 C-46 were shot down by Cuban fighters, who suffered no losses.

The Cuban government estimated the damage caused to the country by the invasion at $53 million. In April 1962, the Gusano prisoners from Brigade 2506 were tried, and in December 1962 they were handed over to the United States in exchange for a shipment of medicines and food worth $53 million, which were provided by the US government, but contributed on behalf of charitable foundation Tractors for Freedom Committee .

Subsequent events[ | ]

The failure of the operation caused significant resonance in the United States and internationally. In Cairo, Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro and Lima, demonstrators attempted to storm US diplomatic missions.

At a UN meeting, representatives of 40 countries condemned the US aggression against Cuba.

The USSR government condemned the armed invasion and sent a note of protest to the United States calling on it to take measures to stop the aggression against Cuba.

In 1986, representatives of the US scientific community (American historians Howard Zinn, William Appleman Williams (English), Gabriel Kolko (English), Lloyd Gardner (English), David Horowitz, etc.) admitted that the US operation in 1961 was US interference in the internal affairs of Cuba, an act of US aggression against Cuba and a direct violation of Article 18 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, to which the US signed in 1948, prohibiting anyone to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. The text of the expert report was published in full in The Nation magazine.

Review by General Maxwell Taylor[ | ]

On April 22, 1961, President Kennedy requested that General Maxwell Taylor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and CIA Director Allen Dulles form a Cuba Study Group to study the reasons for the failure of the operation. On July 13, General Taylor sent the report of the commission of inquiry to President Kennedy. The reasons for the defeat, according to the authors of the report, were related to the lack of speedy deployment, the inability to achieve success by secret means, insufficient air support (insufficient number of pilots involved and air strikes carried out), insufficient amount of weapons and ammunition provided to the “2506 brigade”, sinking of the brigade’s ships .

Declassified US government documents indicate that after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, the US continued to consider and prepare a direct military invasion of Cuba.

According to the report of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (Operation Northwoods) on March 13, 1962, a number of provocations were supposed to be used as a reason for direct military intervention in Cuba, in particular:

• 1. Sabotage in and around the American military base at Guantanamo Bay (the following examples were considered: the arson of an airplane and the sinking of a ship; at the same time, it was necessary to publish a list of non-existent “dead” in the media).
• 2. The sinking of a ship with Cuban refugees.
• 3. Organize terrorist attacks in Miami, other cities in Florida and in Washington, aimed at Cuban refugees. Arrest “Cuban agents” and publish fake “documents.”
• 4. Conduct an air raid on the territory of states adjacent to Cuba.
• 5. Simulate attacks on passenger planes and shoot down an unmanned American plane or blow up a radio-controlled ship. To simulate attacks, use an F-86 Saber fighter repainted to look like a Cuban MIG. It was also planned to publish in newspapers a list of those killed in a downed plane or blown up ship.
• 6. Simulate the shooting down of a US military aircraft by a Cuban MiG.

Each of the incidents was supposed to be blamed on the Cuban government.

"Gusanos" [ | ]

Declassification of documents[ | ]

Memory [ | ]

Entrance to the Operation Museum

Later, a museum of the operation was opened in Playa Giron, at the entrance to which one of the Cuban Air Force aircraft (“Sea Fury”) that participated in the operation was installed. Along the entire road along which Cuban troops marched to Playa Giron, memorial obelisks were erected at the places where soldiers died during bombing. The victory is celebrated annually on April 19; to commemorate it, Air Force and Air Defense Day is established on April 17, and Tankman Day is established on April 18. In July 1961, the Council of Ministers of the country established the Order of Playa Giron, one of the highest state awards in Cuba.

Reflection in literature, art and journalism[ | ]

A number of literary and artistic works, films, and paintings are devoted to the operation in the Bay of Pigs.