Transaction costs. Structure of transaction costs

In the economic literature there are various classifications of transaction costs. It should be noted that there was no generally accepted classification of transaction costs; each of the researchers paid attention to the most interesting, from his point of view, elements. J. Stigler, Alchian identified among them “information costs”, Levy - the costs of operating the state system; O. Williamson? costs of opportunistic behavior; M. Milgrom and J. Roberts - costs of influence; and Jensen and Meckling are agency costs.

Here another problem of the theory of transaction costs emerged: in in some cases Some economists began to reduce the variety of transaction costs to some particular manifestation of them. Most often in theoretical works there is an identification of transaction and information costs. Of course, information costs are key to understanding the nature of transaction costs, since the acquisition and processing of information for subsequent transactions is very important, if not decisive. This allowed some economists (for example, Dalman) to argue that “we can only talk about one type of transaction costs - the loss of resources due to imperfect information.” Even such a prominent scientist as Alchian was inclined to identify transaction and information costs. However, information costs associated with searching, processing information, monitoring, etc. The whole set of transaction costs is not exhausted, since it is obvious that there are also costs for conducting transactions, such as the costs of protecting property rights, the costs of enforcing contracts, the costs of measurement, etc.

Within the framework of modern neo-institutional economic theory, a variety of approaches to the systematization of transactional

costs, including:

• - North-Eggertsson classification, in which transaction costs are actually divided according to the stages of their occurrence in contractual relations;
• - Milgrom-Roberts classification, which is based on the division of the transaction costs system into two main categories: transaction costs associated with coordination and costs associated with motivation;
• - Menard classification, based on four main factors that determine the costs of transactions.

This list can also be supplemented with Williamson’s typology, which, strictly speaking, is a systematization of the transactions themselves according to their frequency and specificity of assets. O. Williamson separates transaction costs ex ante and ex post - those arising before and after the conclusion of a transaction. General classification transaction costs are shown in Table 2.

Table 2 - Classification of transaction costs according to Williamson

Among domestic scientists, one can note the classification proposed by R. Kapelyushnikov, where the following division of transaction costs is made according to the external signs of the activity to which they relate:

• 1. Information search costs (costs of searching and acquiring information before concluding a transaction, this also includes losses caused by imperfect information);
• 2. Negotiation costs (costs of preparation and execution of the contract, negotiations);
• 3. Measurement costs (costs of assessing the characteristics of a product or service);
• 4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights (legal costs, costs necessary to restore violated rights, as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection);
• 5. Costs of opportunistic behavior (costs caused by the divergence of interests of economic agents).

This classification takes into account the costs of using the market mechanism for coordinating people's activities, or “market transaction costs.” However, transaction costs are present at other levels as well.

The classification of costs from the point of view of their clear division depending on the segment in which transactions occur is given, in particular, in the work of Furubotn and Richter (Table 3).

Table 3 - Classification of transaction costs

The class of “market transaction costs” here includes the typical costs of using the market mechanism; into the class of “managerial transaction costs”? costs associated with the exercise of rights to give orders within the firm (the costs of creating, maintaining or changing organizational design, including the costs of personnel management, protection from takeovers, investments in information technology, public relations and lobbying; and the costs of operating the organization, which include information costs for “decision making, monitoring the execution of orders, measuring employee performance,” etc.

Do Furubotn and Richter classify the costs associated “with the operation and adjustment of the institutional state” as the last class of transaction costs? "political transaction costs". Such costs, by their definition, “in a general sense, are the costs of creating public goods through collective action" and include such costs of carrying out government functions as costs of searching for information, making decisions, monitoring and enforcing laws; costs associated with the activities of political parties, establishing a legal framework, which can generally be described as costs creating, maintaining and changing the formal and informal political system.

Inclusion in the analysis of not only market, but also other aspects of transactions is necessary, since research and planning of activities is impossible without taking into account the entire set of operating factors.

Thus, there is no unity in the concept of transaction costs and in their classification representation in science today.

There are also more complex definitions of transaction costs and their classifications. But in most modern research in the field of institutional economic theory, the term “transaction costs” is used in the sense proposed by O. Williamson. These are all the costs in all transactions that arise both within the firm and on the market.

This is enough to prove the right to the existence of the basic provisions of neo-institutional economic theory, of which he is rightfully considered the founder.

A significant number of types of classifications of transaction costs is a consequence of the multiplicity of approaches to the study of this problem. O.Williamson distinguishes two types of transaction costs: ex ante And ex post. To costs like ex ante include the costs of drawing up a draft agreement and negotiating it. Type costs ex post include organizational and operational costs associated with the use of the management structure; costs arising from poor adaptation; costs of litigation arising in the course of adapting contractual relations to unforeseen circumstances; costs associated with fulfilling contractual obligations.

The most famous domestic typology of transaction costs is the classification proposed by R. Kapelyushnikov :

1. Costs of searching for information. Before a transaction is made or a contract is concluded, you need to have information about where you can find potential buyers and sellers of the relevant goods and factors of production, what are the prevailing conditions this moment prices. Costs of this kind consist of the time and resources required to conduct the search, as well as losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the acquired information.

2. Negotiation costs. The market requires the diversion of significant funds for negotiations on the terms of exchange, for the conclusion and execution of contracts. The main tool for saving this kind of costs is standard (standard) contracts.

3. Measurement costs. Any product or service is a set of characteristics. In the act of exchange, only some of them are inevitably taken into account, and the accuracy of their assessment (measurement) can be extremely approximate. Sometimes the qualities of a product of interest are generally immeasurable, and to evaluate them one has to use surrogates (for example, judging the taste of apples by their color). This includes the costs of appropriate measuring equipment, the actual measurement, the implementation of measures aimed at protecting the parties from measurement errors and, finally, losses from these errors. Measurement costs increase with increasing accuracy requirements.

Enormous savings in measurement costs have been achieved by mankind as a result of the invention of standards for weights and measures. In addition, the purpose of saving these costs is due to such forms business practices, such as warranty repairs, branded labels, purchasing batches of goods based on samples, etc.

Measurement costs are influenced by which group of goods the product belongs to from a perceptual point of view:

Search Product- consumer characteristics (attributes) of such products can be quite simply compared with the corresponding attributes of other products and measured quantitatively. The demand for such goods depends on the external information available to the buyer. Consumer preference for a product can be formed before the purchase of the product. The demand for such goods becomes significantly elastic when substitute goods with better consumer characteristics appear on the market.

Experience Product- attributes of goods can only be assessed after their purchase and consumption. Example: food products, the quality of a musical concert.

Credence Products- the attributes of a product cannot be fully assessed even after purchase and consumption. Their assessment requires considerable time. The basis for consumer choice of such goods is trust in the seller of the goods, the Brand Name and the public image of the manufacturer. Example: paid educational or medical services.

4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights. This category includes the costs of maintaining courts, arbitration, government bodies, the time and resources required to restore violated rights, as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection. Some authors (D. North) add here the costs of maintaining a consensus ideology in society, since educating members of society in the spirit of observing generally accepted unwritten rules and ethical standards is a much more economical way to protect property rights than formalized legal control.

5. Costs of opportunistic behavior. This is the most hidden and, from the point of view of economic theory, the most interesting element of transaction costs.

There are two main forms of opportunistic behavior. The first one is called moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when one party in a contract relies on another party, and obtaining actual information about his behavior is costly or impossible. The most common type of opportunistic behavior of this kind is shirking when the agent works with less efficiency than is required of him under the contract.

Particularly favorable conditions for shirking are created in conditions of joint work by a whole group. For example, how to highlight the personal contribution of each employee to the overall result of the activities of the “team” of a factory or government agency? We have to use surrogate measurements and, say, judge the productivity of many workers not by results, but by costs (such as labor time), but these indicators often turn out to be inaccurate.

If the personal contribution of each agent to the overall result is measured with large errors, then his reward will be weakly related to the actual efficiency of his work. Hence the negative incentives that encourage shirking.

In private firms and government agencies, special complex and expensive structures are created whose tasks include monitoring the behavior of agents, detecting cases of opportunism, imposing penalties, etc. Reducing the costs of opportunistic behavior - main function a significant part of the management apparatus of various organizations.

The second form of opportunistic behavior is extortion. Opportunities for it appear when several production factors work in close cooperation for a long time and become so accustomed to each other that each becomes indispensable and unique to the other members of the group. This means that if some factor decides to leave the group, then the remaining participants in the cooperation will not be able to find an equivalent replacement on the market and will suffer irreparable losses. Therefore, the owners of unique (in relation to a given group of participants) resources have the opportunity for blackmail in the form of a threat to leave the group. Even when “extortion” remains only a possibility, it always turns out to be associated with real losses. (The most radical form of protection against extortion is the transformation of interdependent (interspecific) resources into jointly owned property, the integration of property in the form of a single bundle of powers for all team members).

Paul R. Milgrom(Poul R. Milgrom) and John Roberts (John Roberts) proposed the following classification of transaction costs. They divide them into two categories: costs associated with coordination and costs associated with motivation.

Coordination costs:

1. Costs of determining contract details. Essentially, it is a market survey to determine what is generally available in the market before you narrow your approach to anything specific.

2. Costs of identifying partners. This is the study of partners who supply the desired services or goods (their locations, their ability to fulfill a given contract, their prices, etc.).

3. Direct coordination costs. What does this mean in terms of market exchange? At the collective farm market, these costs are approximately equal to the cost of driving to the market and walking around the rows, i.e. There is no significant induced cost in this case. As for a complex contract, there is a need to create a structure within which the parties are brought together. This structure represents, for example, the interests of the customer and ensures the negotiation process.

Motivational costs(i.e. the costs associated with the choice process: to enter or not to enter into a given transaction):

4. Costs associated with incomplete information. Limited information about the market can lead to a refusal to complete a transaction or purchase a good. A classic example of refusal to make a decision as a result of incomplete information is the current liquidation of the stock market in Russia. People don’t know whether it will exist, what the fate of the enterprises will be (maybe they will be nationalized again). Those. the level of uncertainty becomes so high that people prefer to abandon transactions rather than spend effort on obtaining additional information.

5. Costs associated with opportunism. They are especially common within the firm, but also appear in market contracts. The costs associated with overcoming possible opportunistic behavior, with overcoming the partner's dishonesty towards you, lead to the fact that you either hire a supervisor, or try to find and put into the contract some additional measures of your partner's effectiveness, etc.

Now let's turn to the classification of transaction costs by Douglas North and Trainn Eggertson. It was first proposed by North and clearly formulated by Eggertson in the book “Economic Behavior and Institutions”. According to North and Eggertson, transaction costs consist of the following:

Search costs;

Negotiation costs;

Costs of drawing up a contract;

Monitoring costs;

Coercion costs;

Costs of protecting property rights.

1) Search costs.

There are four types of costs that are associated with search:

Reasonable price;

High-quality information about available goods and services;

High-quality information about sellers;

High-quality information about buyers.

Quantitative information about sellers and buyers has already been given in the first two positions.

Qualitative information about sellers and buyers means information about their behavior - whether they are honest, how they fulfill their obligations, what their circumstances are (maybe one of them is on the verge of collapse or, conversely, thriving);

2) Negotiation costs.

In a market sense, you bargain to minimize costs. If you are an individual (and not a company) bargaining with someone in the market, you waste time saying that it is expensive for you, that you have little money, hinting that you are a wonderful target for a policy of price discrimination, turn around, walk away, demonstratively approach another stall.

Your costs as a firm in the negotiation process can be very significant if you organize a tender. For example, the European Commission takes 15% of the transaction amount as a fee to the tender agency. However, the costs will not necessarily be great if you manage to buy someone in the “enemy” camp in order to find out the partner’s backup position. To do this, in our conditions, with a low economic culture and low stamina, sometimes it is enough to take your partner’s representative to a good restaurant, and over dinner he will simply let it slip. This same way of obtaining information is very often used in the West.

3) Costs of drawing up a contract.

These are your costs for ensuring that the text of the contract records how in certain cases (foreseen by you) your partner will behave and how external circumstances will develop. And in relation to cases that you have not foreseen, a certain mechanism is usually formulated in the contract.

Let's say, it is established: if we do not agree, we will be judged by the International Arbitration Court of Stockholm (the usual authority for international contracts). Those. a certain position is specifically reserved for unforeseen circumstances.

4) Monitoring costs.

Points 1-3 related to activities before the appearance of a legally formalized contract). And from point 4, when such a contract has already appeared, activities begin after its appearance. And it begins with monitoring the execution of the contract by each of the counterparties.

For example, having bought a car, you within warranty period you can repair it at the seller’s expense at a service station - these will be the costs of monitoring when purchasing the car. And after the expiration of the warranty period, certain monitoring can also take place, but not within the framework of the first transaction (it is already completed), but in the case when you want to continue relations with this supplier, so that in a 5-year perspective you can buy another one from him again car.

Another example. A classic example of manufacturer-side monitoring is the automotive industry. You can regularly read that, say, Ford has recalled all its models of certain years of production. Those. the company, in an effort not to lose its name and position in the market, itself monitors cases of severe accidents, tracking how its products work, which entails considerable costs for it.

5) Coercion costs.

These are the costs of forcing the other party to fulfill the terms of the contract. Because people seek to act in their own best interests and information is (by definition) incomplete, situations often arise where a contract is not fulfilled in part or in full. It is assumed that there is a system that forces partners to comply with the terms of the contract. Such a system is primarily the state, and also to some extent professional associations and the private legal system. The latter interacts with the previous two, complementing them. But there is also an alternative system of coercion that arises in a weak state and competes with it.

This is a private enforcement system (not to be confused with the aforementioned private legal system). This includes the mafia, all kinds of “roofs”, etc.

Let us emphasize that the lion's share of the costs of enforcing contracts in normal civilized economies is free for economic agents. These are costs for the state, and it saves on scale. After all, it is expensive for each of us to a) search for, b) constantly maintain (whenever we need one!) a bailiff or a “man with a gun.” The state, taking into account that such cases regularly arise, maintains arbitration courts, ordinary criminal courts, and a system of threats of violence - a prison system, a system of judicial agents, etc. Naturally, the coercion system is financed to a huge extent at the expense of the state (at the expense of taxes, roughly speaking, since there is no free state). And a society that saves on taxes is forced to spend money on an alternative system of enforcement (the private justice system), which is extremely ineffective and very expensive. Therefore, if the contract is not protected (if you can be deceived), you will most likely prefer to simply not enter into it.

The ineffectiveness of the alternative enforcement system is due, in particular, to high competition between bandits. Let’s say you “stood under a certain roof,” and they took it and shot it. Those. you have no guarantee that the “roof” you choose will work reliably. Its effectiveness at the micro level is higher, but in the long term it is much lower than that of the police. In Russia, an alternative system of coercion can only exist in very highly profitable sectors - wholesale and retail trade, in the service sector of “new Russians”. But no one will even think of putting a “roof” over the system of selling pies at school, because this is not justified, from the point of view of the bandits.

6) Costs of protecting property rights.

This is the only static form of transaction cost, as opposed to the dynamic costs associated with securing contracts.

For example, you planted potatoes 100 km from Moscow for your own consumption, and not for sale, but homeless people dig them up. You either fold with your neighbors and hire a man with a gun loaded with salt for security, or refuse to plant potatoes at all, or lose up to 60% of the harvest. Both, and the other, and the third are specific either positive or negative transaction costs associated with the costs of protecting property rights. In certain cases, such costs are associated with protection from offenders, and then this is the function of the state. Approximately the same number of cases of this kind of costs are associated with precautions in relation to the state. In Russia, up to 50% of transactions are not entirely legal (the so-called “gray”). Classic examples of this type of transaction cost in our economy are bribes to the tax inspector, and if possible, also to the tax policeman, so that they turn a blind eye to certain aspects of your economic activity, as well as bribes to customs officers.

Coase theorem

The theorem addresses the problem external effects (externalities). This is the name for the by-products of any activity that concern not its direct participants, but third parties. Examples negative externalities: smoke from a factory chimney, which others are forced to breathe, river pollution wastewater etc.

Examples positive externalities: a private flower garden and lawn that passers-by can admire, street paving by private individuals at their own expense, etc. The existence of externalities leads to a discrepancy between private and social costs (according to the formula: social costs are equal to the sum of private and external, i.e., imposed on third parties persons). In the case of negative external effects, private costs are lower than social ones; in the case of positive external effects, on the contrary, social costs are lower than private ones.

The Coase theorem states: “If property rights are clearly defined and transaction costs are zero, then the allocation of resources (production structure) will remain constant and efficient regardless of changes in the distribution of property rights.”

Transaction costs are zero, which means:

1. Everyone knows and they learn new things instantly and unambiguously. Everyone understands each other perfectly, that is, words are not needed.

2. Everyone’s expectations and interests are always consistent with everyone else. When conditions change, approval occurs instantly. Any opportunistic behavior is excluded.

3. Each product or resource has many substitutes.

Under these conditions, “the initial distribution of property rights does not at all affect the structure of production, since ultimately each of the rights will end up in the hands of the owner who is able to offer for it highest price based on the most effective use of this right.”

The theorem was proved by Coase using a number of examples, partly conventional, partly taken from real life.

Let's imagine that there is an agricultural farm and a cattle ranch in the neighborhood, and the rancher's cows can enter the farmer's fields, causing damage to the crops. If the rancher is not responsible for this, his private costs will be less than his social costs. It would seem that there is every reason for government intervention. However, Coase argues otherwise: if the law allows farmer and rancher to enter into voluntary agreements regarding weeding, then government intervention will not be required; everything will resolve itself.

Let us assume that the optimal production conditions, under which both participants achieve maximum welfare, are as follows: the farmer harvests 10 centners of grain from his plot, and the rancher fattens 10 cows. But then the rancher decides to get another, eleventh cow. The net income from it will be $50. At the same time, this will lead to exceeding the optimal load on the pasture and will inevitably pose a threat to the farmer. This extra cow would result in a crop loss of one hundredweight of grain, which would give the farmer $60 in net income.

Let's consider the first case: the farmer has the right to prevent grass. Then he will demand compensation from the cattle breeder, no less than 60 dollars. And the profit from the eleventh cow is only $50. Conclusion: the rancher will refuse to increase the herd and the production structure will remain the same (and therefore effective) - 10 centners of grain and 10 heads of livestock.

In the second case, the rights are distributed so that the rancher is not responsible for the grass. However, the farmer still has the right to offer compensation to the rancher for not raising an additional cow. The size of the “ransom,” according to Coase, will range from $50 (the rancher’s profit from the eleventh cow) to $60 (the farmer’s profit from the tenth hundredweight of grain). With such compensation, both participants will benefit, and the rancher will again refuse to raise a “suboptimal” unit of cattle. The structure of production will not change.

Coase's final conclusion is this: both in the case where the farmer has the right to demand compensation from the rancher, and in the case where the right to weed remains with the rancher (i.e., with any distribution of property rights), the outcome is the same: the rights still transfer to the party that values ​​them more (in this case, the farmer), and the production structure remains unchanged and efficient. Coase himself writes the following on this subject: “If all rights were clearly defined and prescribed, if transaction costs were equal to zero, if people agreed to adhere firmly to the results of voluntary exchange, then there would be no externalities.” “Market failures” would not occur under these conditions, and the state would have no reason to intervene to correct the market mechanism.

Several important theoretical and practical conclusions follow from the “Coase theorem”.

First, it reveals the economic meaning of property rights. According to Coase, externalities (i.e., discrepancies between private and social costs and benefits) appear only when property rights are not clearly defined and blurred. When rights are clearly defined, then all externalities are “internalized” (external costs become internal). It is no coincidence that the main field of conflict in connection with external effects turns out to be resources that are moving from the category of unlimited to the category of rare (water, air) and for which property rights in principle did not exist before.

Secondly, the Coase theorem deflects accusations of market failure. The path to overcoming externalities lies through the creation of new property rights in those areas where they were not clearly defined. Therefore, externalities and their negative consequences are generated by defective legislation; If anyone is “failing” here, it’s the state. The Coase theorem essentially eliminates the standard charges of destruction environment, put forward against the market and private property. The opposite conclusion follows from it: it is not excessive, but insufficient development of private property that leads to degradation of the external environment.

Third, the Coase theorem reveals key value transaction costs. When they are positive, the distribution of property rights ceases to be a neutral factor and begins to influence the efficiency and structure of production.

Fourth, the Coase theorem shows that references to externalities are not a sufficient basis for government intervention. In the case of low transaction costs, it is unnecessary; in the case of high ones, it is not always economically justified. After all, government actions themselves involve positive transaction costs, so the treatment may well be worse than the disease itself.

1. Define transaction costs.

2. What is J. Commons’ classification of transactions? Williamson's transaction concept?

3. Name and describe the main types of asset specificity and transaction parameters.

4. What is fundamental transformation?

5. What is the meaning of approaches to determining transaction costs. Describe the costs of functioning of the market mechanism and the costs of intra-company transactions.

6. Name the main factors in the occurrence of transaction costs.

7. What is the North-Eggertsson classification of transaction costs? Milgrom-Roberts classification.

(Amazon UK)

P. Milgrom, J. Roberts Economics, organization and management: In 2 volumes / Transl. from English I.V. Rozmainsky, D.E. Teterin, K.A. Kholodilin, edited by I.I. Eliseeva and V.L. Tambovtseva - St. Petersburg. : Economic School, 1999. - vol. 1 – 472 p., vol. 2 – 424 p.

TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS

As an example of such coordination costs, consider the problem of exchanging financial assets such as stocks and bonds. Such transactions are mostly carried out through organized financial markets, such as the New York, London and Tokyo stock exchanges. Very few markets operate more efficiently than these organized financial markets, and yet their operation undoubtedly requires the expenditure of significant amounts of resources in determining prices and executing transactions. Large buildings, powerful communications and computing technology, and the abilities of thousands of gifted people are used. If the often staggering returns of investment bankers and securities traders provide any indication of the costs to society of employing these people in a given sector of the economy, the transaction costs associated with the operation of such markets are must be very large.

In other markets, transaction costs associated with coordination include the resources sellers expend on conducting market research to determine buyer tastes, advertising and marketing costs to inform buyers about a given product or service, and to develop administrative decisions that determine the prices at which goods and services will be sold. On the part of buyers, these costs include time to search for suppliers and optimal prices. Another, less obvious type of transaction costs is lost profits that are not realized due to the imperfection of contracts between sellers and buyers and the failure of profitable transactions as a result.

Transaction costs of coordination with the help of hierarchical structures, whether private or public structures, are primarily the costs associated with the transfer to the upper levels of the hierarchy of initially scattered information necessary for the development of an effective plan, with the preparation of this plan based on the transmitted information and with the subsequent communication of this plan to those persons who will be responsible for its implementation. These costs include not only the direct costs of collecting and transmitting information, but also the loss of time spent on transmitting information and developing a plan by the center. Since information can never be transmitted with absolute accuracy, there are also transaction costs associated with inaccuracy or insufficient information held by the decision center.

Costs of motivation.

Transaction costs associated with the problem of motivation primarily include two groups of costs. One group consists of costs associated with incompleteness and asymmetry of information- situations in which the participants in a potential or actual transaction do not have all the information necessary to determine mutually acceptable terms of the agreement and to verify their implementation. For example, a potential buyer of a new car may have difficulty verifying the seller's claims regarding the car's economy and reliability and may question why the seller wants to get rid of it. It may be difficult for a firm's sales manager to determine whether a particular firm's local agent is truly devoting all of his time and effort to the firm's affairs, or whether he is minding his own business during business hours. Under such circumstances, mutually beneficial transactions may fall apart because one party or the other fears harm, or because costly precautions are taken to protect against opportunistic behavior.

Another group of transaction costs associated with the problem of motivation arises in cases where there isunreliability of obligations - the inability of the parties to guarantee the fulfillment of their threats and promises, the fulfillment of which they may subsequently refuse. Example. The industrialist seeks to obtain from his supplier the large investments necessary to meet the specific requirements of the industrialist. The supplier in this case cannot but fear, despite all the promises of the industrialist in this regard, that after making the investment the industrialist will try to extract from him a price reduction and other concessions that will be difficult to avoid. Recognizing the possibility of non-fulfillment of threats and promises deprives them of their persuasiveness. Because of this, prudent people will not take them into account, and again a situation arises where either profitable opportunities are missed, or resources must be spent on providing guarantees or protection against opportunism. The ability to guarantee non-opportunistic behavior would be beneficial to the industrialist, since in this case the supplier would be more willing to invest. Ensuring such reliability may be difficult, and the supplier may therefore refuse to invest, or costly measures may be necessary to protect its interests.

These problems affect both market and non-market organizations, although they may be different in nature and have different impacts for different organizational forms. Thus, one organizational form may be more suitable for a particular transaction than another.

Transaction Characteristics