Russian mentality. Characteristic features of the Russian mentality

mentality mentality Russian people

Characterizing Russian culture from the point of view of its place in the “East - West” dichotomy is a rather difficult task, since, firstly, it occupies a middle position in relation to the geopolitical factor (which is taken into account by representatives of the so-called “geographical” or “climatic” determinism) ; secondly, the study of Russian civilization is just beginning (it is generally possible in relation to the already established national-cultural integrity, and in Russia self-identity and national self-awareness are formed quite late in comparison with European cultures); thirdly, Russian culture is initially super-multi-ethnic in its composition (Slavic, Baltic, Finno-Ugric took part in its formation with a noticeable participation of Germanic, Turkic, North Caucasian ethnic substrates).

Russian culture began to stand out as a special type within the framework of Christian civilization in the 9th-11th centuries after the formation of the state among the Eastern Slavs and their introduction to Orthodoxy. From the very beginning, Russian culture has been formed on the basis of such cultural characteristics as:

• · Autocratic form of state power (“patrimonial state”);
• · Collective mentality;
• · Subordination of society to the state;
• · Little amount of economic freedom.

One of the most significant factors in the formation of Russian culture was Orthodoxy as a religious and moral guideline for spiritual culture. Old Russian state was a confederation of independent states. Orthodoxy set a common normative and value order for Rus', the only symbolic form of expression of which was the Old Russian language. It “captured” all layers of society, but not the whole person. The result of this is a very superficial (formal and ritual) level of Christianization of the “silent majority”, their ignorance in religious matters and a naive social-utilitarian interpretation of the fundamentals of the doctrine. Therefore, we can talk about a special type of Russian mass Orthodoxy - formal, closely “fused” with pagan mysticism and practice, which allowed N.A. Berdyaev to call it “Orthodoxy without Christianity.”

Middleness in relation to the Western and Eastern types of cultures is perhaps one of the leading characteristics of Russian culture, since the “Western” and “Eastern” features in the Russian mentality do not strictly contradict each other, but rather are combined and complementary. So, for example, Christian values ​​are borrowed by Russia as a value system of the culture of the West, but in the “eastern” version they are inherited from Byzantium, and the Russian church has been dependent on the Patriarch of Constantinople since the 15th century. Also in the types of socio-political structure: Rus' “tried on” both the Eastern and Western models, and the centers of the Ancient

If we try to formulate which features of the Russian mentality can be characterized as clearly Western, and which as Eastern, then we can present them as follows:

Western features:

• · Christian values;
• · the urban nature of culture, which determines the entire society;
• · military-democratic genesis of state power;
• · absence of the syndrome of total slavery in relations of the “individual-state” type.

Eastern features:

• · lack of private property in the European sense;
• · the dominance of the principle under which power gives rise to property;
• · autonomy of communities in relation to the state;
• · evolutionary nature of development.

As for the so-called “paths” of Russian culture, its cultural history has completely unique specifics. Our history is not so “eternally lasting”, aimed rather at stagnation, any maintenance of stability, balance and, if possible, immutability, as in the East, facing eternity, and, at the same time, not as gradually progressive as in the West, moving along the path of qualitative and extensive development. It’s as if we are playing, shuffling the eastern and western types structuring of historical time. Russian culture then falls into a kind of hibernation, in which it even “misses” the most important moments of the European history of the spirit (so we did not survive Antiquity, which gave European and eastern cultures such a powerful cultural innovation (which K. Jaspers called the “axis” of world history) as the transition from the mythological type of thinking to the rational exploration of the world, to the emergence of philosophy - we began to form our ethnocultural “self” immediately in the Middle Ages; The Renaissance personality type never took shape in Russian culture, since we also “stepped over” the Renaissance, stepping straight into a good and strong Enlightenment), then it concentrates and, from nowhere, drawing strength, is included in some kind of “explosion”, no matter external whether it is a war, an internal revolution, or something like “perestroika” or other reforms. This is another specific feature of the Russian mentality - polarity. Therefore, life in everyday language is a zebra, therefore “it’s either pan or gone”, “who is not with us is against us”, “from rags to riches”... That is, the Russian person does not tolerate intermediate states, he loves to “walk along the blade of a knife and cut your bare soul into blood.” Therefore, he feels great and adapts in crisis, milestone, turning point situations at the collective and even state level. This affects our way of fighting wars and our ability to resist external enemies. Likewise, at the individual level, no one, probably, like a Russian person knows how to come to terms with life’s circumstances, with fate (or even destiny), and if fate itself does not present any twists and tests, then the Russian person “helps” it, provokes it. It is no coincidence that all over the world the game with death, when a person himself “pulls its mustache,” is called “Russian roulette.” This is one of the heterostereotypes of the Russian person in many foreign cultures.

One can also note the accentuated binary as a characteristic feature of Russian culture, where such oppositions as “collectivism - personality” “coexist” in a completely unique and paradoxical way; “activity - passivity”; “borrowing is originality”; “development - stability”; “deconstruction - construction”; “Uniqueness - universalism.

The results of modern ethnopsychological research document the clash in the minds of Russian people of contradictory attitudes and behavioral stereotypes. Thus, there are five main behavioral orientations:

• · collectivism (hospitality, mutual assistance, generosity, gullibility, etc.);
• · on spiritual values ​​(justice, conscientiousness, wisdom, talent, etc.);
• · on power (honoring rank, creating idols, controllability, etc.);
• · for a better future (hope for “maybe”, irresponsibility, carelessness, impracticality, lack of self-confidence, etc.);
• · for a quick solution life problems(habit of rush jobs, daring; heroism, high ability to work, etc.).

One of the central features of the Russian mentality is the ideal of obedience and repentance in Christianity (and not physical labor as a mandatory prerequisite for “smart work”, similar to the Western Christian commandment “pray and work”, which, according to M. Weber, was one of the essential prerequisites the formation of capitalism in Western Europe after the Reformation). Hence, Russians have such a heightened sense of guilt and conscience as the individual’s ability to exercise moral self-control. It is savored with a special masochistic taste in Russian literature and is also one of the most common stereotypes.

Russian culture is characterized by a special ethnocentrism and messianism, which are an important part of the Russian way of thinking. This sensitively captures and expresses language, ironizing and hyperbolizing these properties of our mentality (“Russia is the homeland of elephants”; or in one of the modern commercials: “It was a long time ago, when everyone was still Jews, and only the Romans were Russian”). . We are also largely inclined towards traditionalism, which justifies attempts to attribute Russian culture to the East. This is an all-encompassing traditionalism of thinking - a force perceived by members of society, which consists not in the individual and his self-worth, as in Western culture, but in the crowd, the mass. Hence our desire for collective forms - conciliarity in Orthodoxy, “hey, come on, men”, “the whole world, all the people”, “Get up, huge country”, these are rush jobs, collective creativity in all spheres of cultural life. Traditionalism is expressed in “decency and orderliness”, in the everyday and personal life of the Russian person, in the presence of strict canons in literature and art, as well as in a special attitude towards time - in an appeal to the past or the very distant future (A.P. Chekhov: “ Russian people love to remember, but not to live"). One of the sides of our traditionalism is monumentalism - a penchant for grandiose forms of self-expression and self-affirmation. Despite its openness to any intercultural contacts and borrowings, Russian culture is largely introverted. Open to external influences, it is not susceptible to them due to cultural immunity developed over centuries and a “suspicious” attitude towards other, alien cultures. This is well illustrated by our particular way of carrying out reforms. For example, Peter’s “Westernization” in terms of goals and form became the deepest “anti-Westernization” in essence, and the “revolutionary” and Westernizer Peter I turned out to be a guardian and a traditionalist.

In general, mentality is the prevailing schemes, stereotypes and patterns of thinking. Russians are not necessarily Russians. An individual may be proud of being a “Cossack”, “Bashkir” or “Jew” within Russia, but outside its borders all Russians (past and present) are traditionally called (regardless of origin) Russians. There are reasons for this: as a rule, they all have similarities in their mentality and behavioral patterns.

Russians have something to be proud of, we have a huge and strong country, we have talented people and deep literature, while we ourselves know our own weaknesses. If we want to become better, we must know them.

So, let's look at ourselves from the outside, namely from the outside strictly scientific research. What do cultural researchers note as specific features of the Russian mentality?

1. Sobornost, the primacy of the general over the personal: “we are all our own,” we have everything in common and “what will people say.” Conciliarity results in the absence of the concept of privacy and the opportunity for any neighbor’s grandmother to intervene and tell you everything she thinks about your clothes, manners and the upbringing of your children.

From the same opera, the concepts of “public” and “collective”, which are absent in the West. “The opinion of the collective”, “don’t separate from the team”, “what will people say?” - conciliarity in its purest form. On the other hand, they will tell you if your tag is sticking out, your shoelace is untied, your pants are stained, or your grocery bag is torn. And also - they flash their headlights on the road to warn about the traffic police and save you from a fine.

2. The desire to live in truth. The term "pravda", often found in ancient Russian sources, means legal norms, on the basis of which the trial was carried out (hence the expressions “to judge the right” or “to judge in truth”, that is, objectively, fairly). Sources of codification are norms of customary law, princely judicial practice, as well as borrowed norms from authoritative sources - primarily the Holy Scriptures.

Outside of Russian culture, people often talk about law-abiding, decorum, or following religious commandments. In the Eastern mentality, Truth is not talked about; in China, it is important to live according to the precepts left by Confucius.

3. When choosing between reason and feeling, Russians choose feeling: sincerity and sincerity. In the Russian mentality, “expediency” is practically synonymous with selfish, selfish behavior and is not held in high esteem, like something “American.” It is difficult for the average Russian citizen to imagine that one can act intelligently and consciously not only for oneself, but also for the sake of someone, therefore selfless actions are identified with actions “from the heart,” based on feelings, without the head.

Russian - dislike of discipline and methodicality, life according to one's soul and mood, change of mood from peacefulness, forgiveness and humility to merciless rebellion to complete destruction - and vice versa. The Russian mentality lives rather according to the female model: feeling, gentleness, forgiveness, reacting with crying and rage to the consequences of such a life strategy.

4. A certain negativism: most Russians more often see flaws in themselves rather than virtues. Abroad, if a person accidentally touches another person on the street, the standard reaction of almost everyone is: “Sorry,” an apology and a smile. That's how they were raised. It’s sad that in Russia such patterns are more negative, here you can hear “Well, where are you looking?”, and something more harsh. Russians understand well what melancholy is, despite the fact that this word is untranslatable into other European languages. On the streets, it is not customary for us to smile, look into the faces of others, make indecent acquaintances, or simply start talking.

5. A smile in Russian communication is not a mandatory attribute of politeness. In the West, the more a person smiles, the more polite he is. In traditional Russian communication, priority is given to the requirement of sincerity. A smile among Russians demonstrates a personal affection for another person, which, naturally, does not apply to everyone. Therefore, if a person smiles not from the heart, it causes rejection.

You can ask for help - most likely they will help. It's normal to beg for both a cigarette and money. A person in a constantly good mood raises suspicion - either sick or insincere. Anyone who usually smiles affably at others is, if not a foreigner, then, of course, a sycophant. Of course, insincere. He says “Yes”, agrees - a hypocrite. Because a sincere Russian person will definitely disagree and object. And in general, the truest sincerity is when you swear! Then you trust the person!

6. Love of controversy. Disputes traditionally occupy a large place in Russian communication. Russian people love to argue on a variety of issues, both private and general. Love for debates on global, philosophical issues - bright line Russian communicative behavior.

Russian people are often interested in argument not as a means of finding the truth, but as a mental exercise, as a form of emotional, sincere communication with each other. This is why in Russian communicative culture those arguing so often lose the thread of the argument and easily deviate from the original topic.

At the same time, it is completely uncharacteristic to strive for compromise or to let the interlocutor save face. Uncompromisingness and conflict are manifested very clearly: our person is uncomfortable if he did not argue, could not prove that he was right. “As an English teacher formulated this quality: “A Russian always bets to win.” And vice versa, the characteristic “conflict-free” rather has a disapproving connotation, like “spineless”, “unprincipled”.

7. Russian people live by faith in the good that will one day descend from heaven(or simply from above) to the long-suffering Russian land: “Good will definitely defeat evil, but then, someday.” At the same time, his personal position is irresponsible: “Someone will bring us the truth, but not me personally. I can’t do anything myself and I won’t do anything.” For several centuries now, the main enemy of the Russian people has been the state in the form of a serving-punitive class.

8. The “keep your head down” principle. The Russian mentality has a disdainful attitude towards politics and democracy as a form of political structure in which the people are the source and controller of the activities of power. Characteristic is the conviction that people don’t really decide anything anywhere and democracy is a lie and hypocrisy. At the same time, tolerance and habit of lies and hypocrisy of their authorities due to the conviction that it is impossible otherwise.

9. Habit of theft, bribery and deception. The conviction that everyone steals everywhere, and that it is impossible to earn big money honestly. The principle is “if you don’t steal, you don’t live.” Alexander I: “In Russia there is such theft that I’m afraid to go to the dentist - I’ll sit in a chair and they’ll steal my jaw...” Dahl: “Russian people are not afraid of the cross, but they’re afraid of the pestle.”

At the same time, Russians are characterized by a protest attitude towards punishment: punishing for minor violations is not good, somehow petty, it is necessary to “forgive!” will sigh for a long time until he gets angry and starts a pogrom.

10. A characteristic feature of the Russian mentality that follows from the previous paragraph is the love of freebies. Movies need to be downloaded via torrent, pay for licensed programs - it’s a waste, the dream is the joy of Leni Golubkov in the MMM pyramid. Our fairy tales depict heroes who lie on the stove and eventually receive a kingdom and a sexy queen. Ivan the Fool is strong not because of his hard work, but because of his intelligence, when Pike, Sivka-Burka, Little Humpbacked Horse and other wolves, fish and firebirds do everything for him.

11. Taking care of health is not a value, sports are strange, getting sick is normal, but it is categorically not allowed to abandon the poor, and it is also considered morally unacceptable to leave those who did not care about their health and, as a result, became essentially helpless and disabled. Women look for the rich and successful, but love the poor and sick. “How can he live without me?” - hence codependency as a norm of life.

12. In us, pity takes the place of humanism. If humanism welcomes care for people, placing them on the pedestal of the free, developed, strong man, then pity directs care to the unfortunate and sick. According to statistics from Mail.ru and VTsIOM, helping adults is in fifth place in popularity after helping children, the elderly, animals and helping environmental problems. People feel more sorry for dogs than for people, and among people, out of a sense of pity, it is more important to support non-viable children, rather than adults who could still live and work.

In the comments to the article, some agree with such a portrait, others accuse the author of Russophobia. No, the author loves Russia and believes in it, having been engaged in educational activities for his country for many decades now. There are no enemies here and there is no need to look for them here, our task is different: namely, to think about how we can raise our country and raise children - our new citizens.

GOU VPO

"Voronezh State Medical Academy named after. N.N. Burdenko"

Abstract on the topic:

“Characteristics of the peculiarities of the Russian mentality.”

Completed by: student P-509

Lyamina O. S.

Voronezh 2009

Mentality is one of the basic concepts of modern humanitarian knowledge. It includes the main characteristics of an ethnic group and is one of the leading criteria when comparing nations with each other.

Mentality is the subject of consideration in several humanities, each of which brings its own feature to the definition of this concept.

One-sided interpretation is not a feature of modern science alone. Mentality as an independent subject of research began to be considered in the 20-30s. XX century At the beginning of the 20th century, the term “mentality” appears to have been used in two ways. In ordinary speech, this somewhat fashionable term preferably denoted collective systems of attitude and behavior, “forms of the spirit.” At the same time, it also appears in the scientific lexicon, but again as a “way of thinking” or “peculiarities of attitude.”

There are many definitions of what mentality is, here are some of them:

Mentality is a special “psychological equipment” (M. Blok), “symbolic paradigms” (M. Eliade), “dominant metaphors” (P. Ricoeur), “archaic remains” (S. Freud) or “archetypes” (K. Jung), “... whose presence is not explained by the individual’s own life, but follows from the primeval innate and inherited sources of the human mind.”

The term mentality originated in France. It is found already in individual works of R. Emerson in 1856. In addition, W. Raulf, based on an analysis of French journalism at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. came to the conclusion that the semantic charge of the word mentality was formed before [Raulf W. History of mentalities. Toward the reconstruction of spiritual processes. Digest of articles. - M., 1995. P. 14], as the term appeared in everyday speech.

It is generally accepted that the category of mentality was one of the first to be introduced into the scientific terminology apparatus by the French psychologist and ethnographer L. Lévy-Bruhl after the publication of his works. In its essence, mentality is historically processed archetypal ideas, through the prism of which the main aspects of reality are perceived: space, time, art, politics, economics, culture, civilization, religion. Consideration of the mental characteristics of the consciousness of a particular social group allows us to penetrate into the “hidden” layer of social consciousness, which more objectively and deeply conveys and reproduces the mentality of the era, to reveal a deeply rooted and hidden slice of reality - images, ideas, perceptions, which in most cases remains unchanged even when one ideology changes to another. This is explained by the greater stability of mental structures compared to ideology.

Even J. Le Goff noted that “mentalities change more slowly than anything else, and their study teaches how slowly history moves”[ Disputes about the main thing: Discussions about the present and future of historical science around the French school of “Annals”. - M., 1993.- P.149]. If ideology, with certain deviations, generally develops progressively, so to speak linearly, then within the framework of mentality, ideas change in the form of oscillations of various amplitudes and rotations around a certain central axis. The basis of such a movement and development of mentality is a certain way of life.

So, mentality is a concept very rich in content, reflecting the general spiritual mood, way of thinking, worldview of an individual or social group, which is not sufficiently conscious, in which the unconscious occupies a large place.

The mental characteristics of Russian culture are characterized by a number of specific features, which are due to the fact that any attempt to present Russian culture as an integral, historically continuously developing phenomenon, with its own logic and expressed national identity, encounters great internal difficulties and contradictions. Each time it turns out that at any stage of its formation and historical development, Russian culture seems to double, revealing at the same time two faces that are different from each other. European and Asian, sedentary and nomadic, Christian and pagan, secular and spiritual, official and oppositional, collective and individual - these and similar pairs of opposites have been characteristic of Russian culture since ancient times and have actually persisted to the present day. Double faith, double thinking, dual power, schism are just a few of the concepts that are significant for the understanding of the historian of Russian culture, identified already at the stage of ancient Russian culture. Such stable inconsistency of Russian culture generates, on the one hand, increased dynamism of its self-development, and on the other, periodically escalating conflict. inherent in the culture itself; constitutes its organic originality, typological feature and is called by researchers binary (from Latin duality).

Binary nature in the structure of Russian culture is an undoubted result of the border geopolitical position of Rus'-Russia between East and West. Russia, throughout its history and geography, for centuries has been a Eurasian society, either striving to get closer to its European neighbors, or gravitating throughout its entire system of life towards the Asian world. [Semennikova L.I. Russia in the world community of civilizations. - M., 1994.]

It was (since the times of the Golden Horde) a country of border civilization. Western cultural figures perceived Russia as a country of a different, non-European order. Thus, G. Hegel did not even include Russians in his list of Christian peoples of Europe. Many observers have come to the conclusion that Russia is a kind of Eurasian hybrid, in which there are no clear signs of either part of the world. Oswald Spengler argued that Russia is a centaur with a European head and an Asian body. With the victory of Bolshevism, Asia reclaims Russia after Europe annexed it in the person of Peter the Great [Quote from the book Russia and the West: Dialogue of Cultures. M., 1994].

In addition, cultural and historical paradigms in Russian history were layered on top of each other: one stage has not yet ended, while the other has already begun. The future sought to come true when the conditions for this had not yet developed, and, on the contrary, the past was in no hurry to leave the historical stage, clinging to traditions, norms and values. A similar historical layering of stages, of course, is found in other world cultures - eastern and western, but in Russian culture it becomes a constant, typological feature: paganism coexists with Christianity, the traditions of Kievan Rus are intertwined with Mongol innovations in the Muscovite kingdom, in Peter's Russia there is sharp modernization combined with the deep traditionalism of pre-Petrine Rus', etc. Russian Culture for centuries was at the historical crossroads, on the one hand, of the modernization paths of civilizational development characteristic of Western European culture, on the other, of the paths of organic traditionalism characteristic of the countries of the East. Russian culture has always strived for modernization, but modernization in Russia was slow, difficult, constantly weighed down by the unambiguousness and setness of traditions, every now and then rebelling against them and breaking them. Hence the numerous heretical mass movements, and the daring thirst for will (robbers, Cossacks), and the search for alternative forms of power (imposture), etc.

The mental characteristics of Russian culture historically naturally developed as a complex, disharmonious, unstable balance of forces of integration and differentiation of contradictory tendencies of the national-historical existence of the Russian people, such as a sociocultural balance (often on the verge of a national catastrophe or in connection with its approaching danger), which declared itself in the most decisive, crisis moments of the history of Russia and contributed to the survival of Russian culture in extremely difficult for it, and sometimes seemingly simply impossible socio-historical conditions and everyday circumstances as the high adaptability of Russian culture to any, including directly anti-cultural factors of its more than thousand years of history.

The Russian mentality is characterized by absolutism - which is reflected even in the Russian language: the frequency of words such as “absolutely”, “perfectly” - as well as synonymous words “terribly”, “terribly” - is more than ten times higher in the Russian language, than, say, in English. And the very synonymy of these and other concepts paints an image of global, stunning and extreme changes. Sometimes they go beyond the rational and reasonable, since the collective mind, like ideology, is the preservation of the existing - and for the sake of radical change it is necessary to overturn it too.

The constant need for something fundamentally new gives rise to the desire to actively adopt someone else’s (just as quickly consigning one’s own to oblivion: neglecting it as outdated). Russian thought has often been accused of turning to foreign heritage for the lack of its own. However, they did not indicate the other side of the coin: the ability to assimilate and implement other people's ideas as universal ones. It is the constant desire for something fundamentally different, new, as well as the perception of the universalism (objectivity) of ideas that makes it possible to cultivate them on our own soil.

The second Russian trait is going beyond one’s own boundaries: not only at the level of society, but above all at the level of the individual, which manifests itself in overcoming interpersonal barriers. This trait is clearly visible to everyone who has been abroad: Russians strive to unite their own and others, organizing collective interaction in any conditions. They easily manage to do this, unlike representatives of other nations, and this is due to the lack of fear and the presence of the habit of invading the very essence of someone else's life, crossing the personal barrier and overcoming the isolation of individuality. This quality is usually referred to as “Russian soulfulness.” Foreigners often perceive it as aggression: an attack on a person. For the vast majority of nations, the boundaries of the individual are sacred, and the psychological barrier between souls is insurmountable.

The concept of morality is inextricably linked with the very significant concept of truth for the Russian mentality - which is confirmed by the Russian language. The Russian word “pravda” not only has a high frequency in the Russian language compared to others, but also the epithet “mother” (truth-uterus, truth-mother), depicting the blood closeness of truth to a person, his original womb and refuge. And also the synonym “truth”, meaning the highest truth: truth in the spiritual sense, which connects it with the concept of the source of morality and ideal.

We can safely say that the desire to unite people/nations with an ideal or some universal idea is typical of our character. By playing such a role, Russia (Russian people) has a face in front of other nations (people).

Also important for the Russian mentality are the concepts of the soul: as a special inner, significant world - and fate, correlated with humility and the expression “nothing can be done.” Such concepts of soul and fate are unique: inherent only in the Russian language.

This character trait in physical terms is confirmed by more than six months of hibernation of nature and external passivity during this period - against the background of which there is an internal, unconscious fermentation of the psyche, predisposing to deep religious perception (in Lately Studies have emerged showing that short daylight hours promote meditation, but also depression). The consequence of this is the philosophical depth of mental life, manifested primarily not even in philosophers, but in writers whose works have gained worldwide fame (Tolstoy or Dostoevsky). When the clear mind is silent, images speak. The fact that Russian philosophy expresses itself in fiction more clearly than in rational-logical concepts has been repeatedly pointed out by historians of Russian philosophy, among them E.L. Radlov and A.F. Losev.

Nations deprived of such a long-term forced decline in physical activity (inevitable in our climate, no matter how it is influenced by the now intense, violent social rhythm of life) do not develop such emotional and spiritual philosophical depth.

Russian Orthodoxy also played a huge role in the formation of the mental characteristics of Russian culture. It has given internal certainty to the mentality of the Russian people and over the last millennium has determined the spiritual potential of the nation. The Orthodox faith plays the role of a spiritual core or spiritual substance for the Russian national mentality. Orthodoxy did not preach the idea of ​​predestination. And therefore, responsibility for sins committed of one’s own free will fell on the sinner. This was understandable and acceptable. Orthodoxy in this context is identical to the emotional and artistic structure of the Russian mentality: it reflects the Russian commitment to absolute spiritual values, maximalism, and the figurative and symbolic construction of the Russian national culture.

The historical conditions of existence, the spatial environment, the Orthodox religion and the Russian Orthodox Church as a sociocultural institution have left an indelible imprint on the Russian national mentality.

The Orthodox faith is a special, independent and great word in the history and system of Christianity. The Russian national spirit and national morality, respect and love for all tribes and peoples are based on Orthodoxy.

The moral and religious dominant gives rise to a number of features of the Russian cultural mentality. Firstly, not a single people had a Christian idea at the national-state level, only the Russians. Secondly, the Russian people are capable of religious and philosophical thinking. Thirdly, only Russians tend to understand the world through religious intuition, unlike the West. Fourthly, of all European peoples, the Slavs and especially the Russians are the most prone to religion, for in ancient times they believed in one God, and in our monotheistic paganism there was a premonition of Christ and the Mother of God, and Christian concepts such as God, heaven, hell, demons were originally Slavic.

The mental characteristics of Russian culture, which was determined by Orthodoxy, are the peculiarities of the attitude towards private property, wealth and justice in the Russian mentality. The economic experience of the Russians was dominated not by economic interest, but by the established moral economy, which has survival as its main goal. Therefore, people abandoned economic success and the risk associated with it, those values ​​that seem natural in modern liberal civilization. Property relations for the bulk of the population were labor character, and achieving material well-being was not an end in itself. Hence, in the character of Russians, there is a relative indifference to material wealth and individual property. There is a lack of traditions of private property in Russia Orthodox view for wealth, which is not the result of labor, it is sent by God and is given not for accumulation and storage, but for beneficial use to others. The focus is on the righteous use of wealth rather than the acquisition of it. Wealth should serve a person, and not vice versa. Income was not an end in itself.

In Russia, the Orthodox ethics of entrepreneurship and commodity-money relations was created, while Western Christianity cultivated pragmatism, hoarding, and a passion for money and wealth in people. In the Russian mentality, the category of wealth acquires the greatest value, as a measure of spirituality in connection with wealth. Entrepreneurs looked at their activities differently than in the West, not so much as a source of profit, but as the fulfillment of a task assigned to them by God or fate. Entrepreneurship was seen as a certain type of creativity and self-affirmation.

Wealth in Orthodox ethics was perceived as a violation of fair mechanisms. And if a market economy is based on the principles of rationality and expediency, then in Russia they give priority to the ideas of justice. In the historical mentality, Russians have developed an egalitarian understanding of justice, associated with the harsh climatic conditions of Russia and the need for the physical survival of people. Here there was no objective possibility of ensuring the distribution of produced material goods in proportion to the merits of each person to society. Ideas about equality in the Russian mentality are predominantly moral, not legal, in nature.

Under the influence of Orthodoxy, a moral tradition of world development and management was formed in the Russian mentality, which persists even where conscious religiosity was lost. The Russian world development is characterized by the principles of a religious and ethical approach to the development of life.

Many researchers note the indifference of Russians to the organization of their earthly life, some strange disregard for the material layer, comfort, and ease of existence. When a culture is oriented towards eternity, then human existence in it is perceived as especially brief and ephemeral. In the “Cherubim Song” there are the words: “Put aside every care of this life...”, which means pushing into the background all the troubles associated with ensuring material well-being and order in this world. At the same time, the world for such a person is only a temporary refuge, and the leading type of attitude is “the delicate patience of a guest.”

The focus of culture on eternity explains why it has a poorly developed time perspective and orientation towards the future. Therefore, it is incredibly difficult to reform anything in such cultures. They strongly resist any changes, and if they occur, they are revolutionary, or rather apocalyptic in nature.

Another mental characteristic of Russian culture is self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice is an absolute value in our culture. Quite strange things have happened several times in history - on the eve and during terrible disasters that threatened humanity with destruction, many European countries, their unique, original cultures and peoples were saved by the voluntary bloody sacrifice of Russia.

Of course, the original Russian culture and its spiritual center - Orthodoxy - are difficult for representatives of other national cultures to understand. Pushkin said this brilliantly: “the Greek religion, separate from all others, gives us a special national character.” It is not surprising that the West does not know or understand us; it is much more important that we ourselves know and understand our culture and mentality.

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4. Culturology: theory and history of culture. - M.: Knowledge, 1998.

5. Raulf W. History of mentalities. Toward the reconstruction of spiritual processes. Digest of articles. - M., 1995.

6. Russia and the West: Dialogue of Cultures. M., 1994.

7. Stelmashuk G.V. Culture and values ​​// Current problems of philosophy, sociology and cultural studies. - SPb.: Leningrad State University named after. A.S. Pushkin.- 2000.

The Russian mentality was formed under the influence of the richness of natural landscapes and sharply contrasting climate. Prolonged cold and frosts, lasting almost six months, are replaced by lush flowering of plants and sultry heat. Historian Valery Ilyin believes that in this powerful amplitude of fluctuations in weather conditions during one season - the secret of the Russian character pendulum: decline is replaced by an incredible rise, long depression - by a huge surge of optimism, apathy and lethargy - by a surge of strength and inspiration.

There is also an anatomical feature that affects the Russian mentality: the Slavs have a more developed right hemisphere of the brain, which is responsible for emotions rather than logic, therefore we are often not rational. This feature of the Russian mentality is clearly visible in planning, say, a family budget. If a German meticulously calculates all expenses, including the purchase of napkins, for a month, six months and even a year, then a measured way of life is alien to Russian people.

The Russian mentality is shaped by sharp fluctuations in weather conditions.

We are unable to foresee everything that may happen in the near future. We may get carried away by a project; we can, without preparing in advance, suddenly make a rather expensive purchase; after all, our relative, friend, or even an almost stranger may unexpectedly need help, and we will not hesitate to provide it. After all, when considering the Russian mentality, one cannot help but mention such a feature as sentimentality. Unlike people of other nationalities who know how to keep their distance, we are instantly imbued with the feelings of other people. It is not for nothing that only in the Russian language there are expressions “intimate conversation”, “heart-to-heart conversation”.

We are keenly aware of someone else’s misfortune and joy, and we ourselves are often ready to reveal our innermost feelings to someone almost on the first day of acquaintance. An Italian will never tell a stranger about his family problems, an American will tactfully avoid personal topics - it’s as if you came to visit, and they only let you into the corridor. Russians tend to open all doors wide.

Russians are characterized by sentimentality and compassion.

That is why almost any Russian emigrant who has left for Western Europe, the USA or Canada cannot get used to the fact that the people around him are cold, dry, and “buttoned up.” There, it takes years to establish close relationships, but here contacts between people develop much faster and warmer.
Moreover, we are very compassionate towards our smaller brothers. From time immemorial, Slavs have been willing to have pets and perceive them as full members of the family. And residents of Russian villages who keep cows cannot calmly lead them to the slaughterhouse and often continue to care for them until their death.

Our sensitivity has back side medals. We are quickly captivated by people, but soon we are often disappointed in them. These features of the Russian mentality manifest themselves in a sharp change in relationships– for example, fraternization after a fight and vice versa. And yet, if a quarrel occurs, a Russian person quickly forgets about it. We do not have traditions of “blood feud”, since easygoingness is one of the features of the Russian mentality. We are able not only to forget a momentary conflict, but also to endure serious grievances. Dostoevsky expressed it this way: “... and the entire Russian people are ready to forget whole torments for one kind word.”

Resourcefulness is one of the characteristic features of the Russian mentality

Another one peculiarity of the Russian mentality – social conformism. We like everything to be “like other people”; we care that they don’t think badly of us. Satirist Mikhail Zadornov notes: “Only a Russian woman, when leaving a hotel, cleans the room before the cleaning lady arrives. This would not occur to either a French woman or a German woman - after all, the cleaner is paid for this work!”

And one last thing. Despite creative thinking, the way of acting we can be called conservatives. We perceive innovations with distrust and spend a long time approaching them this way and that before we accept them into our lives. Compare: in the UK, 55% of older people can use a computer, in the USA - 67%, and in Russia - only 24%. And the point here is not only the lack of financial opportunity to purchase equipment, but reluctance to change the usual way of life.

Introduction

An important factor influencing the culture of a particular country is the mentality of the carriers of this culture, formed over the centuries. Mentality from Latin mens(mentis) - mind, thinking, way of thinking, mental makeup, reason, mental development. This term denotes a set of habits and beliefs, a way of thinking characteristic of a particular community. Mentality is easier to describe using some key concepts than to give a clear definition.

It is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of “mentality” and “mentality”. Only partially these words are synonyms. The term “mentality” expresses a specific, historical quality, variability of mentality (a system of some relatively stable characteristics), the so-called. mental core, manifested in language, in national character, in folklore, in politics, in art.

In mentality, something is revealed that the historical era being studied does not directly communicate; the era, as if against its own will, “speaks out” about itself, about its secrets. At this level, it is possible to hear things that cannot be learned at the level of conscious statements.

We learn about the mentality of a particular culture, first of all, from the actions and writings of its representatives. The protection of national cultures becomes the most important task of society. Another, no less urgent task is not to impede cultural modernization, synthesis, and dialogue of cultures. Modern Russia and the emerging Russian mentality are rich and contradictory material for cultural research, which is very relevant right now.

70 years old Soviet power left a deep and controversial imprint on the culture of our country - one of the most profound after the adoption of Christianity, which formed the spiritual basis of Russian culture for centuries. The analysis of this complex, in many ways tragic period in the history of Russia is important precisely now, when the USSR as a state has already entered history, and remnants of the former Soviet mentality remain.

The main problem of the Soviet mentality is alienation from religious values. The ideology that dominated the country for seven decades was based on the materialist concept of Marxism-Leninism. Spiritual improvement has deeper roots.

The main problem of the Soviet mentality is that it is based on human teachings, not divine ones. By raising a person as a conductor of the pleasures of earthly life, we, without knowing it, are building the old, Soviet mentality. A Soviet person is a person far from freedom of thought and creative self-realization.

IN course work I am trying to show the characteristic features of the Russian mentality, as well as their transformation under the influence of Soviet ideology. The culture of modern Russia is a synthetic culture (synthesis of both pre-revolutionary and Soviet experience with the liberal-rationalistic values ​​of the West); it has tendencies for further creative development, for overcoming those remnants of the Soviet mentality that prevent the Russian people in general and millions of individuals in particular from realizing their intellectual, creative and economic potential, from building a viable economic and political system based on democratic principles, incorporating ourselves both traditional and latest phenomena domestic and world culture.

Chapter 1. Origins of the Soviet mentality

1.1 Character traits Russian mentality

Also V.O. Klyuchevsky revealed the connection between natural and climatic conditions with the traits national character of this or that people. Russian thought is initially associated with the desire to understand nature. The formation of Rus' began in an area covered with forests and steppes. The forest served as a reliable refuge from enemies, but was dangerous for people, the steppe formed the motif of space, but also carried the threat of wars and raids. Hence the “unrootedness” of the Russian person.

The culture of Russia was formed under the influence of both the West (the adoption of Christianity) and the East (in the XIII-XV centuries - Tatar-Mongol yoke, then - the capture and development of the eastern territories). A.O. Boronoev and P.I. Smirnov believe that the basis of the national Russian character is service, altruistic activity (alternative activity, For-Another-activity), and the role of “Other” can be played by man, God, nature, and the country (service to “Holy Rus'” as God's plan). This was facilitated by a number of reasons - Russia’s border position, the need to defend itself from both the West and the East, and the need for mutual assistance. This slowed down the development of market relations, but developed religiosity and asceticism in the minds of the Russian people. This is where a demarcation occurred (precisely a demarcation, and not a complete break) with the rationalistic, more egocentric worldview of the West.

1.1.1 Religiosity as a fundamental feature of the Russian mentality

The most striking feature of the Russian mentality, noted by philosophers, is religiosity. The religion and philosophy of all peoples, long before Christianity, established that humanity as a whole and each person individually strives for God. Christianity of the Byzantine model, if not immediately, but firmly lay on the pagan basis of Slavic religiosity.

Christian religiosity is manifested in the search for absolute, perfect good, feasible only in the Kingdom of God. At the heart of this spiritual search are two biblical commandments: love God more than yourself and your neighbor as yourself. According to Christian teaching, relative goods, not based on a clear division of good and evil, do not lead to the Kingdom of God.

In the famous work of S. M. Solovyov “History of Russia from Ancient Times” one can find the texts of chronicles, official documents, reports of diplomats and generals. All these documents are full of references to God, God's will. Before their death, princes usually took monastic vows. In the 18th century, when the ideas of the Enlightenment began to penetrate into Russia, the activities of Freemasons, who sought to deepen the understanding of the truths of Christianity through cultural and religious synthesis (Christianity, Judaism, medieval alchemy, the heritage of antiquity), developed widely. In the 19th – early 20th centuries, religiosity was expressed in works of poetry, prose, drama, and religious philosophy.

A religious person seeks absolute goodness in freedom. Both Western (Byzantine) and Eastern (Arab) sources testified to the love of freedom of the Slavs. This was also reflected in Russian folklore (the melodiousness and melody of Russian fairy tales, songs, and dances).

1.1.2 The desire for service and self-sacrifice as a national Russian trait

A tendency towards isolation, the development of complex plans, the ability to collectivism, self-sacrifice - these are the features of Russian psychology. The affairs of the social whole are placed above one's own business. Service turned out to be the most appropriate form of activity for the Russian mentality, and indeed life in general. For a Russian person, the value of individual life is insignificant compared to the general value (family, community, Fatherland). Hence the spirit of Russian sovereignty, the merging of state and society. Orthodox humility gave rise to sacrifice, asceticism, and disregard for the values ​​of everyday comfort and well-being in the Russian people. However, humility does not mean inactivity; it presupposes a volitional act (feat, virtue).

The consequence of Christian humility is the spiritual warmth of Russians, a hospitable attitude towards foreigners, a sense of community, and the need for selfless communication. The Russian mentality is characterized not by egocentric incentives for self-affirmation, but by the desire for spiritual freedom. This desire in relation to management is also manifested in relation to material wealth.

1.1.3 Attitude to money and wealth

Perhaps no other people has a negative attitude towards material well-being as deeply rooted as the Russians. In Rus', in Russia, a wealthy person had to look for “excusing reasons” for his wealth. Hence the craving for charity, for philanthropic activities (remember the Morozovs, Mamontovs and other famous merchant dynasties of Russia)

The focus on economic well-being turned out to be more characteristic of the Western mentality. It turned out to be both more stable and more competitive. With the beginning of the New Age in Europe, and then in America, the so-called. “middle class” is a social layer of people with a stable financial situation, which, nevertheless, does not allow them to live without working (they started talking about the “middle class” in Russia seriously only at the end of the last century). In the Russian character, the desire to value material wealth, a careful attitude towards material values, respect for work, and responsibility towards one’s own destiny are not sufficiently developed.

1.1.4 Attitude to work

There are two directly opposite opinions about the attitude of Russians to work. Some observers consider Russians lazy due to centuries of everyday disorder, others insist on hard work. Oddly enough, there is no contradiction here. The Russian mentality is not characterized by love for work as such. For Russians, the goal of labor is important - not for oneself, but for a high goal (for the sake of saving the soul, for obedience, for the Motherland). At the same time, Russians tend to strive for self-expression in creativity. A difficult task, interesting work or problem is a good incentive for a Russian to work intensively, often financially unprofitable.

A component of the Russian mentality is a penchant for collective, artel work. Earnings are usually divided not according to contribution to the result, but “fairly”.

Russian entrepreneurship is also largely based on the Orthodox tradition. Neither the peasant nor the merchant aspired to wealth as main goal existence. The Orthodox tradition prohibits the collection of interest (surplus) from one's neighbor and asserts that only labor can be a source of wealth. The basis of pre-revolutionary Russian entrepreneurship was the motive of service: to the Tsar, to the Fatherland (the early Stroganovs, Demidovs), to God (builders of monasteries and churches), to the people (patrons of the arts and benefactors - see 1.1.3).

Among Russian entrepreneurs, paternalistic, “family” relationships with hired personnel have traditionally dominated, at least with the permanent part of it close to the owner (the same was true in the relationships between landowners and serfs). Dating back to Domostroy (XVI century), they were widespread even in late XIX century.

Traditionally, Russian family farming was subsistence; they bought only what could not be produced independently. Residents of cities - townspeople, workers, merchants, whose main activity was not related to agriculture, still wanted to have their own farm. Only in Russia did a special type of settlement appear - the city estate.

1.1.5 Relationship to the state

IN public life Russians' love of freedom is expressed in a tendency towards anarchy and a certain contempt for the state. This mentality trait influenced such thinkers as Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Leo Tolstoy, Old Believer talk and some modern religious associations.

Russians’ contempt for the state is contempt for the bourgeois focus on property, on earthly goods, the so-called. "philistinism". This was alien to the European mentality even in the crisis era between the two world wars (let us recall, for example, Hesse’s novel “Steppenwolf”, imbued with the spirit of escapism, where, nevertheless, the “philistine” spirit is described with sympathy).

Unlike Western Europe, where states arose through conquest, statehood in Rus', according to historical sources, was established through the voluntary calling of the Varangian rulers by the people. The ruling strata lived by “external” truth, creating external rules of life and resorting to coercive force in case of their violation. The “earth”, the people, lived with the “inner”, Christian truth. Even the conquest of new territories was largely not at the expense of the authorities, but at the expense of the population, who often fled from state persecution (Cossacks); The state caught up with the pioneers only during the development of new lands. The formation of an absolute monarchy in Russia occurred not only thanks to the efforts of the rulers, but also thanks to the support of the people. The war years were more a common occurrence than peaceful years. Characteristic of the Russian mentality, service to a higher principle prompted huge sections of the population (clergy, merchants, military) to subordinate their freedom to the state, as a necessary condition for curbing evil. The clergy were called to the same goal. The church became a weapon in the fight against evil through moral means, and the state became a means of coercion.

Patriotism, natural love for the motherland, and national feeling, that is, love for the Russian people, were combined in the church into one inseparable whole. The Orthodox clergy became the stronghold of the Russian autocracy.

Politically, Russia remained an absolute monarchy, while bourgeois revolutions were in full swing in Europe and constitutional orders were being established. At the same time, in public life, everyday democracy was expressed more clearly than in the West (dislike for the conventions of the nihilists of the sixties, greater freedom from church regulations than among Catholics and Protestants).

Thus, the Russian mentality combines diverse and even contradictory properties and modes of behavior. N. Berdyaev expressively emphasized this feature of the Russian people: “Two opposite principles formed the basis for the formation of the Russian soul: the natural, pagan Dionysian element and ascetic monastic Orthodoxy. It is possible to discover opposite properties in the Russian people: despotism, hypertrophy of the state and anarchism, freedom; cruelty, a tendency to violence and kindness, humanity, gentleness; ritual belief and the search for truth; individualism, heightened consciousness of personality and impersonal collectivism; nationalism, self-praise and universalism, pan-humanity; eschatologically messianic religiosity and external piety; the search for God and militant atheism; humility and arrogance; slavery and rebellion."

Obtaining higher education at universities and technological institutes was not a privilege for rich people in Russia. Russian everyday democracy contributed to an abundance of scholarships and assistance to students from societies at universities. Therefore, the Russian intelligentsia was non-class and non-class, heterogeneous. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia had a chance to develop its own constitutional order, the foundations of a rule of law state (possibly with a monarchical form of government, perhaps with a republican one) and civil society, had it not been for the First World War and the Bolshevik coup. However, after October 1917, and especially after Stalin came to power, the development of the country, and with it the development of mentality, took a different path.

1.2 From Russian to Soviet mentality

In the first years of Soviet power, education younger generation was focused on the development of personality, the education of a “new man”. Subsequently, the Bolshevik government took the opposite path, believing that in a totalitarian state it was more important to subordinate the individual to the collective.

The Soviet mentality was formed not only on Marxist-Leninist foundations, but in many ways on the basis of the Christian mentality of the Russian people. The attitude towards work, material wealth, and statehood remained the same over the years.

Just as the Russian peasant owner worked hard from dawn to dusk, so the Soviet worker and collective farmer quickly carried out plans and orders on time. The tradition of the Russian city estate (see 1.1.4) resulted in a special, nowhere else found movement of gardeners, which originated in Soviet times and had no economic roots. Patriarchal relations in production (albeit in a somewhat distorted form) were still encountered in Soviet times at enterprises headed by talented Russian directors.

The Soviet slogan “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” which stems from the principle of dividing material wealth “fairly,” also has Christian roots. The primordially Russian property of not striving for wealth, for profit by any means, migrated into the Soviet consciousness.

The attitude towards the state continued to be ambivalent. The Soviet era was characterized by such phenomena as the cult of personality of the leader (Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev - this was less evident under Khrushchev), and an exaggeration of the role of the party in public life. At the same time, the “unofficial”, everyday attitude towards state power was less serious, more ironic, and often quite condescending (“political” jokes, caricatures of the Brezhnev era).

The fundamental link in the transition from Russian to Soviet mentality was a change in attitude towards religion. It was believed that the establishment of communist ideology leads to the overcoming of religious consciousness and the establishment of atheism. State policy towards the church changed at different stages Soviet history from attempts to cooperation in the first months after October revolution, before the displacement and restriction of church activities, the destruction of churches in the 30s. The Bolsheviks initially did not seek conflict with the church, but the decrees of the Soviet government on the separation of church from state and school from church and the transition to the Gregorian calendar caused the condemnation of Patriarch Tikhon. This leads to conflict; The church is declared a stronghold of counter-revolution. The Soviet government is trying to attract part of the clergy to its side and at the same time strives to eliminate the Moscow Patriarchate. By the end of the 1920s, the Bolsheviks managed to ensure a split in the church and intensify the persecution of those who were not ready to cooperate.

During the Great Patriotic War, Stalin not only lifted restrictions on the activities of the Orthodox clergy, but also returned some churches and monasteries and helped restore the Moscow Patriarchate. Under Khrushchev, on the contrary, the authority of science is strengthened and atheism is declared again. During the years of Brezhnev's rule, the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, although under strict control of the party and the KGB, were nevertheless encouraged and supported, and anti-religious campaigns were directed, first of all, against sectarians, which received the approval of the highest church officials. However, the country's religious traditions were lost; a significant part of the clergy was either repressed or emigrated. This happened not only with Orthodoxy. In the 30s and 40s, entire nations were destroyed along with their beliefs, their temples, rituals, and customs.

Despite the fact that in the USSR it became outdated and sometimes shameful to be a believer, remnants of religion were preserved in the form of numerous signs and superstitions, which became another integral feature of the Soviet mentality. The Soviet era did not eliminate all forms of mass religious consciousness, but it pushed them beyond traditional norms into the realm of everyday mysticism. Level religious culture the population has decreased significantly; state ideology took the place of religion.

The predominance of the value of an idea over the value of human life, the tendency to asceticism was also characteristic of the pre-revolutionary mentality. Soviet propaganda transformed this idea, removing Christian overtones from it. It became righteous to sacrifice oneself not in the name of God, but for the sake of the triumph of the ideology of communism, for the sake of future generations. This attitude remained in the mentality of several formations of Soviet people. The loss of religious heritage changed the attitude towards morality and morality, and led to the decline of legal culture. It has become natural for Soviet people to strive for their goals, not disdaining any means.

Cultural potential pre-revolutionary Russia was lost not only because of the persecution of the clergy and the systematic destruction of “reactionary” remnants of Christianity in the mentality of the people. The secular culture of Russian society was also lost: the flower of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, the traditions of merchants, entrepreneurship, peasant farming (the tragic consequence of collectivization and “dekulakization”), jurisprudence, and public administration. The formation of the Soviet mentality took place in conditions of a cultural crisis, which was hushed up by the official ideology. The continuity of generations and traditions was disrupted, which affected over seven decades of building socialism and continues to affect modern, capitalist Russia.

Chapter 2. Characteristic features of the Soviet mentality

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the Soviet mentality, although it contained many all-Russian features, nevertheless differed very significantly from the pre-revolutionary one. The period of socialism led to the formation of the contradictory mentality of the “Soviet man.” This chapter will discuss its characteristic features that developed during the years of the Soviet regime in our country.

2.1 Feeling like a citizen of a superpower

After the start " cold war“The world has become bipolar. The main world confrontation was the confrontation between two systems - socialism and capitalism, two world powers - the USA and the USSR. New role countries in the world community has also affected the consciousness of people.

The main thrust of Soviet propaganda was the belief about the decline of capitalism, the “decay” of Western society and the advanced position of the Soviet Union. This concerned not only politics, economics, the military industry, influence in the world, the development of new territories and space, but also moral values, artistic culture, sports achievements. The roots of anti-American sentiment, still widespread in Russian society, date back to the times of the Cold War.

Having opposed itself to the “capitalist” world of the West, the USSR found itself in cultural isolation. Sometimes contradictory processes taking place in Western culture (exacerbation political struggle, youth movements, the growth of protest sentiments) did not receive sufficient response in the culture of our country. Interest in Western culture, literature, far from the principles of socialist realism, philosophy not of the Marxist-Leninist sense, Western music of the twentieth century (“Today he plays jazz, and tomorrow he will sell his homeland; today he plays rock, and tomorrow he will get a prison sentence”) if not suppressed, it was not encouraged by society. Even in the “fraternal” socialist countries of Eastern Europe, this phenomenon was not as widespread as in the Soviet Union. Censorship in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland was not prohibitive, but permissive. Synthetic phenomena in culture went underground; Many of them were talked about only when they themselves became part of Soviet history.

It was officially believed that all the processes taking place in America and Europe (economic crises, unemployment, rising crime, moral decay of society) lead only to the collapse of the capitalist value system, but this does not exist under socialism. In practice, it turned out that similar phenomena in Soviet society were simply hushed up, and people were not ready for the crisis of socialism during the years of Brezhnev’s “stagnation”, for the realization of the utopianism of the communist goal, the discrepancy between propaganda and the real situation in the country and the world.

An important attitude in the mentality of Soviet people was confidence in the future, in the future of both their family, future generations, and the entire country. Modern supporters of communist ideology note this quality, lost in the modern Russian mentality, as unambiguously positive. At the same time, it was precisely this false confidence that prevented millions of Soviet citizens from adapting to the social changes of recent decades.

2.2 Constructing an image of the enemy

The Soviet mentality became characterized by an unambiguous division of those around them into “us” and “strangers”. Anyone who did not fit into the value system imposed from above could become a “stranger.” The image of the enemy (the enemy of the country, society, and with him the ordinary Soviet citizen) was constructed by official propaganda.

As the years passed, the circle of forces “hostile” to Soviet society only expanded. At the dawn of the revolution, opponents were everyone who did not accept the new order, the new way of life. With the beginning of Stalin's rule, with the intensification of repression, the struggle for power, and internal party contradictions, this circle was replenished by representatives of the ruling circles, the official ideology, who tried to resist the dictatorship. During the years of Khrushchev’s “thaw,” when the party set a course to expose Stalin’s personality cult, public opinion condemned adherents of old ideological clichés. During the Brezhnev era, the totalitarian regime began to take on authoritarian features, and those who did not submit to authority, did not adapt to the majority, openly expressed their own opinions, expressed sympathy both for the West and for the remnants of the pre-revolutionary mentality became “enemies.” The attitude remained wary towards supporters of changes in art, science, social thought, towards adherents of one religion or another, towards people involved in artistic creativity(both professionals and amateurs). Even though the methods of combating dissent were not as openly cruel as under Stalin, the destinies of many people were broken in prisons and psychiatric hospitals.

Even among the creative intelligentsia, who always tried to resist stereotypes, hostile images were constructed. There was a division into “us” and “strangers”, people of the “party” and “everyday people”. Contempt for the “philistines”, for the “scoops” as the antipodes of representatives of “their own circle” did not reach the complete denial of the values ​​of Soviet society, as happened from time to time in the West; in practice, intellectual “free-thinking” was primarily of a declarative nature. The “protest” attitudes of the Soviet era were thoroughly imbued with the spirit of conformism, easily explained by the desire of people to survive in the depths of the system and build their own system on its basis. The same desire was observed in the youth movements of the perestroika years; it is still observed today. This is partly why the contradictory but undoubtedly rich counter cultural heritage The 50-70s in Europe and America received a powerful echo in the USSR only in the late 70s - early 80s, and many phenomena became known in Russia only in the 90s.

Throughout the entire period of socialism's influence in the world, the establishment of communist ideology occurred very unevenly. A large number of “doubters”, ready to weaken the influence of the USSR on the politics, culture, mentality of their country, remained in the Baltic republics, annexed to the Soviet Union only during the Second World War, in the countries of Eastern Europe, where the formation of socialism took place under the sign of the USSR’s victory over fascism . This doubt had to be paid with considerable blood, which explains the dislike of Russians by the residents of the current independent states - Russia's western neighbors. No matter how much the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Latvians, Estonians try to disown the socialist past, the new image of the enemy in the face of modern Russia, the desire to shift responsibility for their past to the whole Russian people can also be regarded as a relic of the Soviet mentality.

In the everyday life of Soviet people, representatives of any minorities could fall under the image of the “enemy”: national (I’ll say more about “everyday” xenophobia), religious, sexual (the criminal prosecution of homosexuals that began in the Stalin years caused a wave of homophobia that does not fade in modern Russia), and simply those who stood out too much from the crowd, the “black sheep.” The feeling of enmity was instilled from childhood (remember the film “Scarecrow”) - to people gifted with this or that skill, talent, to those who studied, worked better or worse than the majority, were poorer or richer, differed in the way they dressed, behaved, think.

The Cold War and anti-American propaganda constructed a hostile image of America. Young people's interest in Western culture began during Khrushchev's “thaw” - just when Europe and the United States were gripped by protest sentiments. The Soviet intelligentsia discovered the works of writers of the “lost generation” - Ernest Hemingway, Richard Aldington, Francis Scott Fitzgerald, and periodicals published novels and stories by contemporary authors - Jerome David Salinger, John Updike, Jack Kerouac. However, all this was presented from a certain ideological angle; a point of view was imposed on the reader, often of an anti-American nature, which did not correspond to the worldview of the writers themselves. At the end of the 60s and throughout the 70s, interest in the West did not fall, but, on the contrary, increased. The images drawn from books, from Eastern European periodicals (censorship in the “countries of victorious socialism” was not as strict as in the Soviet Union), from the impressions of military personnel, sailors, and diplomats who had been abroad, differed significantly from those promoted. Passion for the culture of Europe and America was, first of all, characteristic of young intellectuals who less firmly absorbed ideological principles and were critical of them. There was a gap between the generation of “fathers,” for whom the dominant ideology was undeniable, and the generation of “children,” who tried, if not to completely deny generally accepted ideals, then at least to critically and creatively rethink them. And among the youth, “hipsters”, “informals”, subject to the “pernicious influence of the West”, found their opponents among party and Komsomol activists. Such cliches in the minds of people (including the very bearers of “protest” attitudes) did not disappear even at the turn of the millennium.

Scientific and technological progress, the development of the natural sciences, and the military-industrial complex led to another division of society - into “physicists” and “lyricists”. The Soviet consciousness adopted the priority of technical knowledge over the humanities. Representatives of creative professions and the humanities fell under the image of the “enemy” and “stranger”; an attitude was formed towards them as “idlers”, “people without education”. Even in the 90s, when with the development of information technology and connections between countries, humanitarian knowledge was increasingly in demand, many professionals were unable to overcome the stereotype left over from Soviet times.

The spirit of hostility permeated the entire Soviet society. An atmosphere of fear and suspicion lay at the heart of the socialist system; it was also the reason for his downfall. This relic of the Soviet mentality is dangerous in modern Russian society, which is even more heterogeneous than Soviet society. It is dangerous because anyone can fall under the image of the enemy - by skin color or political beliefs, by demeanor, by religious or aesthetic preferences. An external attitude toward tolerance does not always result in tolerance in everyday life; more often, it’s the other way around. It will take a lot of time to overcome hostility and hostile attitudes in the mind.

After the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union positioned itself as main winner fascism. Hence the declaration of friendship of peoples, internationalism as a counterbalance to “bourgeois” nationalism and neo-fascism.

The USSR was a multinational state. The vast territory of the former Russian Empire was not fully developed; the peoples who inhabited it were at different levels of development. Starting from Stalin's times, official propaganda testified to the increase in the cultural level of the peoples of the Far North, Far East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, and the development of education, writing, and literature in the union republics. This phenomenon had great consequences, and not only positive ones. The national-cultural autonomies that existed in Tsarist Russia were destroyed; During the Stalin years, entire peoples were deported (Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans). The traditional way of life of the peoples of the North and Siberia was destroyed by outside interference, which led to the death of a huge number of people, an increase in drunkenness, which was not typical of these peoples before, and the loss of traditional culture, beliefs, folklore, and crafts. Just as Nazism used neo-paganism, based on ancient German and Scandinavian religion and magic, as one of its foundations, so Stalinism in the Far North, Siberia, and the Far East was largely established through paganism and shamanism.

The high-profile trials of the Stalin years (first, internal party repressions, and then the notorious “Doctors’ Plot”), and the dissatisfaction of the Soviet leadership with the policies of the young state of Israel during the reign of Brezhnev led to the spread of anti-Semitism in society. Despite the fact that among the first revolutionaries, among the members of the Bolshevik Party there were many representatives of the Jewish people (which is easily explained by the Jewish pogroms and the growth of Black Hundred sentiments at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries), for the “ordinary Soviet person” the word “Jew” became a dirty word. Belonging to a specific nationality was associated in the mentality with certain qualities, character traits, often negative, “hostile” to Soviet society (stinginess, penchant for profit, selfishness). This is despite the fact that it was the Jewish people who presented Russian and Soviet society with a whole galaxy of scientists and artists. Many people hid their origins, changing their surnames to Russian ones, hushing up their ancestry.

“Everyday” xenophobia, rooted in the Soviet mentality, also affected people from the Caucasus and Central Asia. We can safely say that the growth of such sentiments in modern Russia, constant armed conflicts in the southern territories of the former USSR are a consequence of remnants of Soviet consciousness. Immigrants from the south increasingly found themselves in territories with a predominant Russian population: some ended up in the RSFSR after the war and Stalin’s deportations, others came to study at universities or work as assigned workers. Insufficient knowledge of the Russian language, a different attitude towards the family, towards women, and towards elders, different from the Central Russian one, set the indigenous population against the southerners. Hence the numerous jokes and jokes “About the Georgian”, “About Uzbeks”, the contemptuous names “Khachik”, “Churka”, “Chuchmek”, “Black Sea” unrevigentlyed by nationality.

Under the motto of internationalism, the Soviet Union welcomed national liberation movements in former European possessions in Asia and Africa, Latin America, and established diplomatic relations with new states in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. At the same time, the Soviet government supported dictatorial regimes, often established after the victory of liberation movements in these states, which cost the lives of thousands of people.

People from third world countries came to study at Soviet universities. Along with their receipt of higher education, there was also an “export of revolution”, the imposition of Soviet values ​​on young national formations with a not yet established mentality. “Export of revolution” became the cause (though not the only one, but an important one) of the civilizational conflict at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries. The attitude towards foreigners within the Soviet Union continued to be wary, even hostile.

The declared internationalism, the notorious “friendship of peoples” led, on the one hand, to the establishment of ties between the population of the entire country, and the whole world, on the other hand, they left an indelible mark on the mentality and culture of the peoples of the USSR. And this trace did not always benefit the cultural level of the population. People broke away from their roots, forgot the traditions of their people - and at the same time remained “strangers” to those around them. National contradictions both in the post-Soviet space and throughout the world have become one of the main problems of the new millennium.

2.4 Collectivism

Communist ideology placed the interests of the collective above the interests of the individual. The status of a Soviet citizen throughout his life largely depended on his membership in certain groups and social formations - either compulsory (Octobers, pioneers) or desirable (Komsomol, party, trade unions).

Soviet schoolchildren - Octoberists, pioneers, Komsomol members - were taught that relationships within the team should be placed above family and friendships, that you can dislike a comrade because of some personal qualities, but you cannot refuse to help him. With the same attitude, a person went into adulthood. The legacy of the traditional Russian communal order is noticeable here, echoes of the Christian mentality (“love your neighbor”), although devoid of a religious component.

Despite the fact that the team really strengthened the sense of comradely responsibility, it also deprived the individual of the opportunity to develop within an individual framework. Membership in the Communist Party, public work in the Komsomol and trade union organizations, and service in the armed forces were encouraged both morally and financially, and increased the social status of the Soviet citizen. If a person isolated himself from the group or denied its interests, he inevitably became an outcast. Individualism, the desire for personal improvement, refusal to follow generally accepted patterns, escapism and egocentrism were condemned by society. The team did not accept those who were noticeably different from the majority - in their way of thinking, in their intellectual level, in their range of interests and communication. Bright individualities sometimes could not fully realize themselves or reveal themselves in the depths of one or another cell of society.

When, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the usual social patterns began to break down, people sometimes did not have enough strength or experience to adapt to new conditions. The development of the Russian market, and with it the market system of values, contradicted the beliefs enshrined in the minds of several generations, which led to a value crisis in modern Russia.

2.5 Anti-intellectualism

Contempt for intelligence has always played an important role in the Soviet mentality. The word "intellectual" was offensive throughout Stalin's reign. Soviet leaders considered themselves entitled to impose their opinions on scientists, artists, and writers under pain of reprisals. During the years of Soviet power, many representatives of the intellectual stratum had to emigrate; many of those who remained in the USSR became victims of the totalitarian regime or “internal emigrants.” Until now, key positions in Russian science and art are occupied by those who made their careers through political means.

Anti-intellectualism was a consequence of the imprint of official ideology in the mentality of people. In the minds of the Soviet average person, intellectually developed person was "ideologically unreliable." The Soviet “intellectual” gravitated towards values ​​that were alien to society, contrary to generally accepted ideas, was critical of the phenomena taking place in the country and the world, did not bow to government officials, was interested in the culture of the capitalist West, and, therefore, could be dangerous.

The lack of complete freedom of speech in the country, censorship of the media led to the fact that the heritage of pre-revolutionary Russian culture, the culture of the Silver Age and the first years of Soviet power, the creativity of the victims of Stalinism, as well as a huge layer of Western art and philosophy (even of the Marxist persuasion) turned out to be unknown to the Soviet Union. reader, listener, viewer. Many phenomena were talked about during the years of perestroika, but a significant part passed unnoticed by Russian culture.

The glorification of criminality, immorality, the attribution of drunkenness, hooliganism, and thoughtlessly used physical force to a person’s personal achievements, although not officially declared, became distinctive feature Soviet mentality. Even for the artistic intelligentsia, it became common to mock both their own value priorities and “philistine” stereotypes, and often this went beyond harmless joke. It became a shame to be smarter and more educated than those around you. The attraction to “thieves” romance, “everyday” alcoholism, disrespect for both morality and law and order have become habits of the entire society, regardless of cultural and educational level. The decline in the cultural level of the Soviet people, which had been hushed up for decades, made itself felt at the turn of the 80s and 90s, when they started talking about everything openly.

2.6 The desire to shift responsibility for one’s destiny to the authorities

The totalitarian regime that emerged in the Soviet Union reached its apogee in the 30-50s, subsequently taking on authoritarian features. The political struggle within the one-party system was weakened, and citizens were given the illusion of “stability” and unshakable power.

The low level of political culture and unfamiliarity with the mechanism of democratic elections led to the fact that an individual, an individual, could rarely make informed political decisions. Just as during the autocracy the people had hope for a “good tsar,” so in Soviet times people relied, first of all, on the authorities, and not on themselves. The main difference was that in pre-revolutionary Russia there was a tradition of tsarist, then imperial power; the Soviet regime did not develop such a tradition.

The Soviet mentality did not contain the desire to argue with the authorities, to rebel. In the 80s, this led to the fact that all reforms, as in the 19th-20th centuries, took place “from above.” The country turned out to be unprepared for either the mechanism of free democratic elections or market changes in the economy. The masses were easily led by the slogans of populist politicians who promised to solve all their problems and fulfill all their aspirations. When promises were not fulfilled in practice, new demagogues came with new programs, most often incompatible with the real situation in the country.

Here is a short list of the features of the mentality that developed during the Soviet period and became an obstacle on the inconsistent path from socialism to capitalism, from dictatorship to democracy. The confusion of the 1990s led to apparent stability at the beginning of the new century. The authority of “firm” state power and a clearly developed ideology emerged again, and a new turn towards authoritarianism, and, possibly, a new totalitarian regime, was outlined. To avoid this, it is important to understand what features of modern Russian mentality can contribute and which can hinder this process.

Chapter 3. Peculiarities of Russian and Russian mentality in overcoming Soviet stereotypes

3.1 At the turn of the century: from Soviet mentality to Russian

The main mistake of perestroika was the attempt to mechanically instill elements of Western culture onto Russian soil. The older generation of Soviet citizens lost the confidence (even if often illusory) in the future that the system of “developed socialism” offered, the younger generation sometimes thoughtlessly adopted new values, paying attention, first of all, to their external, image aspects, rather than to their internal content . However, at the end of the last century there was a transition from the Soviet mentality to the modern Russian one.

The life of people in post-communist Russia is individualized and less regulated “from above” than before (before the start of perestroika and market reforms). Freedom of choice is assumed, and, consequently, risk and responsibility. The right of every person to build his life independently is not only a right, but in many ways also an obligation. Without a conscious choice of the present, subsequent success becomes impossible (which is fundamentally the opposite of the Soviet illusion of “faith in a bright future”).

From such an attitude it follows that modern Russians are developing a different attitude towards money and wealth than the Soviet one. Working and earning money has become not shameful, but, on the contrary, prestigious. Material values ​​began to be perceived as a sign of strength (both physical and intellectual), success, and luck. At the same time, discussing income and salaries is increasingly becoming bad manners – as in America and Europe.

The influence of Western, rationalistic mentality is great here, but the precursor of this phenomenon can also be found in the pre-revolutionary culture of Russia. Both the Russian peasant and the Russian merchant were, first of all, owners, for whom material wealth meant fame, power and confidence (let us remember how painfully, at the cost of enormous human sacrifices, collectivization and “dekulakization” took place during the Stalin years).

It would be wrong to unequivocally state that the only sign of a change in the post-Soviet mentality is a rethinking of the attitude towards the material side of life to the detriment of the spiritual. As attitudes towards income change, so does the attitude towards education. Without special knowledge and skills, it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve financial well-being, and Russian citizens of all ages and social strata are increasingly drawn to new knowledge. Graduates of higher and secondary specialized educational institutions of the Soviet era are re-educated both in Russia and abroad, mastering professions that are in demand in market economy.

The opinion that exists in the minds of many citizens of our country about the “lack of spirituality” of young people is not always justified. Stereotypes imposed by the media only partially reflect processes occurring in real life. Among young Russians there are much more thinking people than is commonly believed. What is characteristic of people born in the 70s–80s and even the early 90s is that no ideology has become obligatory for them. Thousands of young Russians today are in a political, religious, ethical and aesthetic search. And the preferences of peers, representatives of the same generation and even the same social stratum often differ to the extreme. Some, in search of a moral guideline, turn to the Soviet past, feeling unrooted in modern society, others - to the origins of Russian pre-revolutionary culture, to Orthodoxy, some - to Russian nationalism and monarchism, others - to the values ​​of the West, others - to the religion and philosophy of the East. Freedom of choice is freedom of religion, political preferences, and everyday values ​​of a person and society.

Another important change in the mentality of Russians, which primarily affected young people (to a lesser extent - older generations) - in relation to intimate sphere, to nudity, to discussion of details related to sexuality. This corresponds to the modern Western European standard of decency.

On the one hand, sexual relations in the minds of Russians have received the right to exist outside of family and generally outside of any spiritual sensations. On the other hand, among the educated part of the population the attitude towards this area of ​​life has become more rational.

E. Bashkirova, in her article “Transformation of the values ​​of a democratic state,” tries to identify the structure and dynamics of value preferences in Russian society, based on empirical research data (data from two sociological surveys are presented - 1995 and 1999). An analysis of Russians’ answers to questions about traditional, “universal” values ​​allows us to identify the following hierarchy of priorities (as their importance decreases):

family - 97% and 95% of all respondents in 1995 and 1999, respectively;

work - 84% (1995) and 83% (1999);

friends, acquaintances - 79% (1995) and 81% (1999);

free time- 71% (1995) and 68% (1999);

religion - 41% (1995) and 43% (1999);

politics - 28% (1995) and 38% (1999).

What is immediately striking is the population’s commitment to traditional values ​​for any society (family, communication), attitudes towards which change very little over the years. The priority of work as a source of income in an unstable market economy subject to frequent crises is also easy to explain. At the same time, work is often also a way of realizing intellectual and creative potential person.

Somewhat unexpectedly, religion and politics are located in the hierarchy of values: after all, during Soviet history, atheism and “political literacy” were actively cultivated in the country. The Constitution of the Russian Federation guaranteed every citizen the freedom to profess any faith independently or in community with others. The liberalization of legislation in this area led to the fact that in the late 80s and early 90s the number of religious associations in the country increased noticeably. The separation of church and state was also legally enshrined, and, therefore, the right to be outside religion.

Since for many centuries the fate of the Russian people was closely connected with Orthodoxy, other religions (even other models of Christianity) do not easily take root in society. There are many people who consider the Orthodox Church to be the only custodian of national spiritual treasures. According to the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research, 45 percent of Russians are Orthodox believers.

The Russian Orthodox Church plays a significant role in the life of the country (suffice it to recall the widely discussed project with attempts to introduce lessons in Orthodox culture in schools), which sometimes negatively affects the relationship between representatives of different faiths. The current state of the church resembles the situation at the beginning of the twentieth century: on the one hand, social self-isolation, on the other, close contact with the state apparatus.

To a large extent, the process of religious identification and religious education of ordinary Russians is complicated by the widespread spread of pseudo-mystical religions and cults. New doctrines, sometimes openly totalitarian in meaning and orientation, nevertheless receive their social order.

The Orthodox clergy usually sets up parishioners against various kinds of “sectarian heretics” and almost traitors to Russian traditions, which quite unfairly include Muslims, Buddhists, Jews, and even Christians of other branches.

On the other hand, religious minorities are also trying to maintain their faith. The 90s were a time of restoration not only of those closed and destroyed during the Stalin years Orthodox churches, but also churches, mosques, synagogues. Religious communities are created, religious schools and higher education institutions are opened educational establishments.

Another phenomenon that began back in the 70-80s and continues to this day is the growth of interest in the religion and philosophy of the East. This interest does not always take the form of a cheap passion for mysticism. There are also those who, having been brought up from childhood in the Christian tradition or in the spirit of Soviet-style atheism, consciously accept Buddhism or Hinduism, Judaism or Islam. This phenomenon has not become widespread; it is mainly common among young intellectuals. However, an increase in the level of tolerance towards adherents of non-dominant faiths and a tendency towards independent choice of religious affiliation is undoubtedly a progressive shift in the development of mentality.

The danger of increased attention to religion in general lies in the fact that certain political forces can play on this (there are plenty of examples: the so-called “Islamic extremism”; “Orthodox nationalism”; neo-paganism and occultism as means of promoting right-wing radical ideas). Religious associations must, not in words, but in deeds, be equal before the law and minimally involved in the struggle of parties and movements.

The role of politics in the lives of citizens of our country is steadily increasing. With the collapse of the USSR, countless parties and movements entered the political arena, only a small part of which had a well-structured program of action and gained sufficient support in society. Over the years, their number began to decline; more significant forces formed the system of state power, smaller parties and movements either united or remained on the periphery of the political struggle.

Let politic system in Russia has so far become only a semblance of democratic models, the level of political consciousness of citizens has nevertheless increased somewhat in connection with the right to elect and be elected. In the last few years, there has even been a certain “fashion” for politics, especially for youth politics (the influence of the “orange” revolutions in the union republics, dissatisfaction with the political course of representatives of different, sometimes opposing, beliefs). Ratings of young politicians – from 18 to 30 years old – are increasingly found in the media. Perhaps these are the forces that will influence the political development of Russia in the 21st century.

However, as follows from the survey results, personal interests still prevail over public ones. There are obvious consequences of the synthesis of Western, native Russian and Soviet systems of values, which nevertheless led to some democratization of the Russian mentality. Unfortunately, this does not happen everywhere. In the next section, I want to talk about the remnants of the Soviet mentality in the self-awareness of the citizens of our country.

3.2 Remnants of the Soviet mentality in post-communist Russia

In the 20th century Western world has gone far ahead in its development. Modern Russia has to assimilate foreign culture, foreign values, sometimes regardless of centuries-old traditions. The weakness of Russian liberalism is the belief in the universality, absoluteness, and objectivity of the laws of social development. In fact, this attitude is a Marxist position. Social laws are not absolute, but depend on people, their national character, traditions, and culture.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of citizens quickly changed their behavioral attitudes, the same could not so easily happen to values. Values ​​in Russia often contradict each other. In this regard, in modern literature They often talk about their crisis in Russian society. The wave of pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia, which became decisive in the formation of the mentality of Russian people at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, either emigrated to the West or was destroyed by the Stalinist system. Freedom of creative realization 50 years later collided with the value disorientation of society. Promoted ideals were often either untrustworthy or seemed unattainable.

Over the past 20 years, Russians have enjoyed much greater freedom of choice than during seven decades of socialism. Unfortunately, recognition of this fact often leads to the denial of the entire experience of the previous generation. During the years of perestroika, the image of an “ordinary Soviet citizen” turned into one of the variants of the image of the enemy. This was especially pronounced in the second half of the 80s. On the one hand, it was during this period that people began to talk widely about the rich heritage of the country, the history and fate of which had been hushed up for half a century. On the other hand, the phenomena of Soviet culture often began to be thoughtlessly “thrown off the ship of history,” instead of being subjected to rethinking and constructive criticism. This has created a generation gap. Young people in the Soviet and post-Soviet space were not instilled from birth with a respectful attitude towards family and elders. With the change in the values ​​of society, the older generation in the eyes of young people began to be perceived as the bearer of old, “Soviet”, unmodern views.

The self-critical, sometimes bordering on self-deprecation, tone in which they spoke about the Soviet and Russian mentality persisted in Yeltsin’s Russia. The first Chechen campaign caused a wave of anti-patriotism and defeatism.

The changes at the turn of the 80s and 90s did not entail revolutionary changes in the mentality of the majority of Russians. The very imprint of the Soviet mentality in the consciousness of Russian people turned out to be one of the most profound after the adoption of Christianity in Rus'. The years of perestroika can rather be perceived as another period of “thaw” in the minds of the people. The desire to defend the newfound freedom of private life from uninvited intrusions, including from the state, continues to be combined with a craving for authoritarianism, characteristic of the Russian mentality.

The mosaic nature of ideas and their fragmentation are clearly manifested in the political sphere. The general trend for all CIS countries is the strengthening of the influence of the executive branch. Here such a feature of the Soviet mentality manifested itself as the desire to shift responsibility for one’s fate to the authorities. Russian citizens in a referendum in the spring of 1993, unable to make a choice between a strong presidential and legislative power, on the one hand, sanctioned the coexistence of a leader and an independent parliament as elements of different cultures, on the other, showed the inability to choose, characteristic of Soviet people. There is a synthesis of Western and Soviet cultures. Another illustrative example is the results of a sociological survey conducted in Crimea. It turned out that various groups The population, while supporting democratic values ​​(freedom of speech, press, equality of forms of property), at the same time believe that to get the country out of the crisis, a leader like Lenin, Stalin, Andropov is needed, that is, they combine political ideals characteristic of the West with ideas about a “strong hand.” The current cultural situation consists of disparate elements: Soviet culture as a system of ideas has collapsed, but continues to exist in the form of separate fragments; ideas characteristic of modern Western culture are actively spreading; the influence of the Russian-Orthodox or other national-religious mentality is increasing.

Since the mid-90s. the terms “Soviet mentality” and “Russian mentality” began to be identified less and less often. Although they still had some negative connotations, in the contexts in which they were used, there was visible a desire, on the one hand, to build bridges between Russia before 1917 and Russia after 1993, and on the other, to rehabilitate the “common Soviet man.” The search for cultural identity, which took place in this vein, also led to a more balanced assessment of the Soviet period of national history. Voices began to be heard more and more often, claiming that “not everything was bad” with us. This, of course, has its own very sober grain. However, faith in authority (which in Soviet times lost its original, religious content) is still combined with distrust of liberal values, supposedly introduced from the outside, to democratic institutions.

In the minds of many, nostalgia for the “superpower” coexists with the “image of the enemy” left over from Soviet times. The collapse of the Soviet empire, along with the exacerbation of interethnic conflicts, led to the growth of nationalist sentiments in society - from moderate to openly fascist. Unfortunately, in recent years this has been happening rapidly and is felt especially acutely - only the objects of hatred are changing. The anti-Semitism of the era of stagnation gave way to anti-Islamic sentiments of the times of “wild capitalism.” A huge percentage of people retain the negative attitude towards the United States and Americans that was established during the Cold War. The image of the enemy, supported by Soviet propaganda, only became more variegated in the 90s: these include representatives of other nationalities (Azerbaijanis, Chechens, Jews), and homosexuals, and the government, and the church. The series can be continued endlessly.

Despite the appearance of ideological pluralism, over 20 years the state has not developed a political scale. The level of political and legal culture, which has remained low since Soviet times, is compensated by trust in power based on force. There has not yet emerged a force ready to counter extremism, especially right-wing extremism. Xenophobia, homophobia, and religious fanaticism under the guise of “spiritual revival” resonate in the post-Soviet consciousness. “Anti-fascist” human rights movements are too heterogeneous in their social, ideological, component; their slogans are often declarative in nature (a relic of the Soviet mentality), and their methods of struggle, unfortunately, often differ little from the actions of their opponents.

A negative consequence of Gorbachev’s reforms, when everything that was economically efficient was considered moral, was the criminalization of society and the state. Getting used to freedom and private initiative is accompanied by a reluctance to take responsibility for the consequences of one’s own decisions.

A. Ovsyannikov, in the article “Sociology of disaster: what kind of Russia we carry within us,” provides data indicating the criminalization of people’s consciousness and behavior (as a percentage of respondents).

Now, at the beginning of the new millennium, disrespect for the law left over from Soviet times leads to a high level of crime and the inability of citizens to defend their rights. This comes both from ignorance of official legislation, the legal framework, and from the instability of moral standards in the mentality of Russians.

Perestroika and the subsequent years of “wild” capitalism exposed all the problems that existed during the Soviet period and about which it was customary to remain silent. The mental, value gap between different formations, between different social strata led to a cultural crisis in the country. The intelligentsia rediscovered the pre-revolutionary and early Soviet, pre-Stalinist cultural heritage of Russia, the culture of the Russian diaspora; The media started talking about the unofficial culture of the USSR, about the Soviet “underground”. Works of classics of Western literature, both from past centuries and from the 20th century, were being printed in full swing. At the same time, that part of world literature that was covered in books and periodicals in the USSR (literature of socialist countries, third world countries, former Soviet republics) often ceased to be republished and remained forgotten.

The abolition of censorship led to the fact that it became possible to cover almost everything in the media, and not always this “everything” turned out to be High Quality. The decline in the level of literacy of journalists, columnists, publishers, the blind copying of American models by Soviet mass culture (already often quite wretched) ( we're talking about not about American pop culture as a whole, which is a heterogeneous, synthetic and, of course, interesting phenomenon, but about its most “commercial”, meaningless sides), the growing popularity of “tabloid” reports - all this was revealed to Russians in last decades.

This is only a cursory list of those real contradictions that do not allow us to unambiguously assess Russia’s place in the modern world. Overcoming the entire set of problems associated with culture and mentality will require a lot of time and effort. However, modern Russian culture has not lost all those forces that will help the formation of a new mentality, which does not contradict either the original Russian or Soviet, but is still different from them.

3.3 Overcoming the Soviet mentality as an individual and social task

To form qualitatively new values, it is necessary to rethink the centuries-old cultural experience of Russia. Understanding the values ​​of your country means understanding not only its present, but also its past. To raise the cultural level of Russians, interest in the history of their country and their people is important.

The study of history should be as free as possible from any ideology. Not a single historical event, not a single era should be assessed unambiguously; Everywhere you need to look for both positive and negative sides. Any point of view must be supported by historical facts and expert opinions. Without this, an objective assessment of historical events is impossible.

An important, key period in the history of the country was the period between two revolutions (1905-1917). With the restriction and the subsequent fall of the absolute monarchy, a semblance of political pluralism emerged in the country. The parties of the Socialist Revolutionaries, Cadets, Octobrists, and the Menshevik faction for some time represented real political forces capable of resisting both the ruling Black Hundred circles and the Bolsheviks. The beginning of the twentieth century saw not only the flourishing of social thought and artistic culture, but also the rise of legal culture and the development of jurisprudence, which is what modern Russian society lacks.

To rehabilitate this heritage in the culture and mentality of Russians, it is important to renew interest in the culture of Russians abroad. Despite the fact that a significant part public figures non-Bolshevik orientation emigrated, not wanting to cooperate with the new regime; the majority supported the Soviet Union and the anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War. The rehabilitation of pre-revolutionary values, which began during the years of perestroika, should not be interrupted, but it should not be of an unambiguously anti-Soviet nature. Frankly criminal acts must be condemned, regardless of what religious or ideological banner they were committed under. Condemnation of the system as a whole (and even more so, “fighting” against it) is not only biased, but also meaningless.

The borderline geopolitical position forces Russia to take into account the values ​​of both the West and the East. It is necessary to both establish diplomatic relations with our closest neighbors and develop the culture of small nations within the country. A Russian should not be ashamed of his nationality or religion. The predominance among believers of supporters of a certain religion (Orthodoxy), the centuries-old priority of Christian values ​​in the Russian mentality should not turn this religion into an official, state religion. Secondary and higher education, legislation, and business should be based on universal human values ​​and not be clearly identified with any religion. Religious extremism is also unacceptable - regardless of what religion one identifies with.

One cannot but take into account Western values, the influence of which on the Russian mentality has become noticeably more noticeable over the past 20 years. Western culture also needs to be talked about, and controversial phenomena must be studied objectively. An individual should be judged as a representative of his time and his culture; unequivocal rejection of, say, the American, Jewish or Islamic value system is criminal. The media have provided the opportunity for dialogue with people around the world, and whenever possible this dialogue should be conducted peacefully, be it personal correspondence, business cooperation or diplomatic negotiations.

Just as the elevation of the Russian national idea above all others is unacceptable, openly Russophobic sentiments should also be avoided. It is important to cultivate, if not love, then at least respect for certain representatives of your country, your culture - contemporaries or prominent personalities from the past.

Unfortunately, in recent years there has again been a tendency to suppress ideological pluralism. The current regime in Russia, proclaimed democratic according to the Constitution, is actually authoritarian in nature. There are fewer and fewer real political forces ready to participate in the struggle for power. Under the banner of fighting extremism, political opposition is increasingly being suppressed, while the criminal acts of extremists remain unpunished. This is fraught with either the establishment of a new dictatorship, or another sharp change in political course. This is worth remembering for everyone who is in one way or another connected with politics. We can only hope that the current government officials and “Soviet”-style politicians will be replaced by those for whom this will not be the fulfillment of some false obligations, but a full-fledged profession.

However, the spiritual factors underlying the synthetic Russian mentality should be placed higher than political and economic ones. The introduction of elements of the Western worldview, which turned out to be more viable in a democracy and market economy, is inevitable. Russia is connected to the West through a system of Christian values. The roots of the Russian mentality are in Byzantine-style Orthodoxy, and the Western one is in Protestant ethics. The formation of two value systems took place in parallel; The Soviet period suspended this process. Now that the “Iron Curtain” has collapsed, Russia needs a harmonious interaction between the original foundations of its own culture and the best practices of other countries.

Conclusion

At the turn of the century, Russia is again at a crossroads, trying to distinguish itself from the countries of Europe and the United States, whose experience had to be adopted since the mid-80s. Despite the contradictory consequences of such borrowing, this experience should not be unequivocally denied; rather, it is helpful to rethink all the gains and losses.

In the Marxist value system, culture was only a superstructure; the basis of any socio-economic formation was considered to be the type of management. Tragic events throughout the twentieth century - wars, revolutions, the death of a huge number of people - proved that it was cultural characteristics The activities of the country and people are determined.

The study of cultures, the synthesis of cultures, attempts to understand someone else's value system - these are steps towards a multipolar world in which Russia can and should take its place. Raising the cultural level of society is unthinkable without raising the cultural level of individuals. Values ​​focused on personal development should become dominant in society. No idea should cost more than human life; this is overcoming one of the negative, most destructive sides of the Soviet mentality.

I would like to hope that the development of Russia in the new century will still follow the path of democracy. The “steady hand” of government will undoubtedly play its role. It is important that the head of the state is a competent politician, and in his circle there are those who could challenge his point of view and offer their own alternatives to the political, economic, and cultural development of the country. It is important that government officials can be supported by the population through the mechanism of free elections. But establishing a new order will still require a considerable period of time, during which Russia must try to understand its place in the past, present and near future.

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