The battle for Pavlov's house is one of the brightest pages not only in the history of the defense of Stalingrad, but also of the entire Great Patriotic War. A handful of fighters repelled the fierce attacks of the German army, preventing the Nazis from reaching the Volga. There are still questions in this episode that researchers cannot yet give definitive answers to.
Who led the defense?
At the end of September 1942, a group of soldiers of the 13th Guards Division, led by Sergeant Yakov Pavlov, captured a four-story house on January 9th Square. A few days later, reinforcements arrived there - a machine-gun platoon under the command of Senior Lieutenant Ivan Afanasyev. The defenders of the house repelled the enemy's onslaught for 58 days and nights and left there only with the beginning of the counter-offensive of the Red Army.
There is an opinion that almost all these days the defense of the house was led not by Pavlov, but by Afanasyev. The first led the defense for the first few days until Afanasyev’s unit arrived at the house as reinforcements. After this, the officer, as the senior in rank, took command.
This is confirmed by military reports, letters and memoirs of participants in the events. For example, Kamalzhan Tursunov - until recently the last surviving defender of the house. In one of his interviews, he stated that it was not Pavlov who led the defense. Afanasyev, due to his modesty, after the war deliberately relegated himself to the background.
With a fight or not?
It is also not completely clear whether Pavlov’s group knocked the Germans out of the house in battle or whether the scouts entered an empty building. In his memoirs, Yakov Pavlov recalled that his soldiers were combing the entrances and noticed the enemy in one of the apartments. As a result of the fleeting battle, the enemy detachment was destroyed.
However, in his post-war memoirs, battalion commander Alexei Zhukov, who followed the operation to seize the house, refuted Pavlov’s words. According to him, the scouts entered an empty building. The head of the public organization “Children of Wartime Stalingrad” Zinaida Selezneva adheres to the same version.
There is an opinion that Ivan Afanasyev also mentioned the empty building in the original version of his memoirs. However, at the request of the censors, who forbade the destruction of an already established legend, the senior lieutenant was forced to confirm Pavlov’s words that there were Germans in the building.
How many defenders?
Also, there is still no exact answer to the question of how many people defended the fortress house. IN different sources the number mentioned is from 24 to 31. Volgograd journalist, poet and publicist Yuri Besedin in his book “A Shard in the Heart” said that the garrison totaled 29 people.
Other figures were given by Ivan Afanasyev. In his memoirs, he claimed that in just almost two months, 24 Red Army soldiers took part in the battle for the house.
However, the lieutenant himself in his memoirs mentions two cowards who wanted to desert, but were caught and shot by the defenders of the house. Afanasyev did not include the faint-hearted fighters among the defenders of the house on January 9 Square.
In addition, among the defenders, Afanasyev did not mention those who were not constantly in the house, but were periodically there during the battle. There were two of them: sniper Anatoly Chekhov and sanitary instructor Maria Ulyanova, who, if necessary, also took up arms.
"Lost" nationalities?
The defense of the house was held by people of many nationalities - Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Kazakhs and others. In Soviet historiography, the figure of nine nationalities was fixed. However, it is now being questioned.
Modern researchers claim that Pavlov's house was defended by representatives of 11 nations. Among others, Kalmyk Garya Khokholov and Abkhazian Alexey Sugba were in the house. It is believed that Soviet censorship removed the names of these fighters from the list of defenders of the house. Khokholov fell out of favor as a representative of the deported Kalmyk people. And Sukba, according to some information, was captured after Stalingrad and went over to the side of the Vlasovites.
Why did Pavlov become a hero?
Yakov Pavlov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for the defense of the house named after him. Why Pavlov, and not Yakov Afanasyev, who, as many claim, was the real leader of the defense?
In his book “A Shard of the Heart,” Volgograd journalist and publicist Yuri Besedin noted that Pavlov was chosen for the role of the hero because propaganda preferred the image of a soldier rather than an officer. The political situation allegedly also intervened: the sergeant was a party member, while the senior lieutenant was non-party.
The Battle of Moscow 1941 - battles with Nazi armies that took place from October 1941 to January 1942 around the Soviet capital, which was one of the main strategic goals of the forces Axles during their invasion of the USSR. The defense of the Red Army thwarted the attack of German troops.
The German offensive, called Operation Typhoon, was planned to be carried out in two pincer encirclements: one north of Moscow against the Kalinin Front, primarily by the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, with a simultaneous interception railway Moscow-Leningrad, and the other south of the Moscow region against the Western Front south of Tula with the help of the 2nd Tank Group. The 4th German field army was supposed to attack Moscow head-on from the west.
Initially, Soviet troops conducted the defense, creating three defensive belts, deploying newly created reserve armies and transferring troops from the Siberian and Far Eastern military districts to help. After the Germans were stopped, the Red Army carried out a large counteroffensive and a series of smaller offensive operations, as a result of which the German armies were pushed back to the cities of Orel, Vyazma and Vitebsk. During this process, part of Hitler’s forces almost fell into encirclement.
Battle for Moscow. Documentary from the series “The Unknown War”
Background to the Battle of Moscow
Initial German plan invasion (Plan Barbarossa) provided for the capture of Moscow four months after the start of the war. On June 22, 1941, Axis forces invaded the Soviet Union, destroyed most of the enemy air force on the ground, and advanced inland, destroying entire enemy armies through blitzkrieg tactics. The German Army Group North moved towards Leningrad. Army Group South occupied Ukraine, and Army Group Center moved towards Moscow and crossed the Dnieper by July 1941.
In August 1941, German troops captured Smolensk, an important fortress on the road to Moscow. Moscow was already in great danger, but a decisive attack on it would have weakened both German flanks. Partly out of awareness of this, partly in order to quickly seize the agricultural and mineral resources of Ukraine, Hitler first ordered the main forces to be concentrated in the northern and southern directions and to defeat the Soviet troops near Leningrad and Kiev. This delayed the German attack on Moscow. When it was resumed, the German troops were weakened, and the Soviet command was able to find new forces to defend the city.
Plan for the German attack on Moscow
Hitler believed that the capture of the Soviet capital was not a priority task. He believed that the easiest way to bring the USSR to its knees was to deprive it of its economic strength, primarily the developed regions of the Ukrainian SSR east of Kyiv. German Commander-in-Chief of the Army Walter von Brauchitsch advocated a speedy advance to Moscow, but Hitler responded by saying that “such an idea could only come to ossified brains.” Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Franz Halder He was also convinced that the German army had already inflicted sufficient damage on the Soviet troops, and now the capture of Moscow would mark the final victory in the war. This point of view was shared by the majority of German commanders. But Hitler ordered his generals to first surround enemy troops around Kyiv and complete the conquest of Ukraine. This operation was successful. By September 26, the Red Army had lost up to 660 thousand soldiers in the Kyiv area, and the Germans moved on.
Advancement of German troops in the USSR, 1941
Now, from the end of the summer, Hitler redirected his attention to Moscow and entrusted this task to Army Group Center. The force that would carry out the offensive Operation Typhoon consisted of three infantry armies (2nd, 4th and 9th), supported by three tank groups (2nd, 3rd and 4th) and 2 aviation -th Air Fleet (“Luftflot 2”) Luftwaffe. In total they amounted to two million soldiers, 1,700 tanks and 14,000 guns. German air force, however, suffered considerable damage in the summer campaign. The Luftwaffe lost 1,603 aircraft completely destroyed and 1,028 damaged. Luftfleet 2 could provide only 549 serviceable aircraft for Operation Typhoon, including 158 medium and dive bombers and 172 fighters. The attack was supposed to be carried out using standard blitzkrieg tactics: throwing tank wedges deep into the Soviet rear, surrounding the Red Army units with “pincers” and destroying them.
Wehrmacht Three Soviet fronts confronted Moscow, forming a line of defense between the cities of Vyazma and Bryansk. The troops of these fronts also suffered greatly in previous battles. Nevertheless, it was a formidable concentration of forces of 1,250,000 soldiers, 1,000 tanks and 7,600 guns. The USSR Air Force suffered horrific losses in the first months of the war (according to some sources, 7,500, and according to others, even 21,200 aircraft). But in the Soviet rear, new aircraft were quickly manufactured. By the beginning of the Battle of Moscow, the Red Army Air Force had 936 aircraft (of which 578 were bombers).
According to the operation plan, German troops were supposed to break down Soviet resistance along the Vyazma-Bryansk front, rush east and encircle Moscow, bypassing it from the north and south. However, continuous fighting weakened the power of the German armies. Their logistical difficulties were also very acute. Guderian wrote that some of his destroyed tanks were not replaced with new ones, and there was not enough fuel from the very beginning of the operation. Since almost all Soviet men were at the front, women and schoolchildren went out to dig anti-tank ditches around Moscow in 1941.
Beginning of the German offensive (September 30 – October 10). Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk
The German offensive initially went according to plan. The 3rd Panzer Army penetrated the enemy's defenses in the center, encountering almost no resistance, and rushed further to encircle Vyazma together with the 4th Panzer Group. Other units were to be supported by the 2nd Panzer Group Guderian close the ring around Bryansk. The Soviet defense was not yet fully built, and the “pincers” of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups converged east of Vyazma on October 10, 1941. Four Soviet armies (19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd) found themselves in a huge ring here .
But the surrounded Soviet troops continued to fight, and the Wehrmacht had to use 28 divisions to destroy them. This constrained the forces that could have supported the attack on Moscow. The remnants of the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts retreated to new defensive lines around Mozhaisk. Although losses were high, some of the Soviet units were able to escape the encirclement in organized groups, ranging in size from platoons to rifle divisions. The resistance of those surrounded near Vyazma gave the Soviet command time to reinforce the four armies that continued to defend Moscow (5th, 16th, 43rd and 49th). WITH Far East Three rifle and two tank divisions were transferred to them, and others were on their way.
In the south, near Bryansk, the actions of the Soviet troops were just as unsuccessful as at Vyazma. The 2nd German tank group made a detour around the city and, together with the advancing 2nd Infantry Army, captured Orel by October 3, and Bryansk by October 6.
Operation Typhoon - German offensive on Moscow
But the weather began to change to the disadvantage of the Germans. On October 7, the first snow fell and quickly melted, turning roads and fields into swampy bogs. The “Russian thaw” has begun. The advance of the German tank groups slowed down noticeably, which gave the Soviet troops the opportunity to retreat and regroup.
The Red Army soldiers sometimes successfully counterattacked. For example, the 4th German Tank Division near Mtsensk was ambushed by Dmitry Lelyushenko's hastily formed 1st Guards Rifle Corps, which included Mikhail Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade. Newly created Russian tanks T-34 hid in the forest while the Germans rolled past them. Soviet infantry then held back the German advance while Soviet tanks attacked them victoriously from both flanks. For the Wehrmacht, this defeat was such a shock that a special investigation was ordered. Guderian discovered to his horror that the Soviet T-34s were almost invulnerable to the guns of German tanks. As he wrote, “our Panzer IV (PzKpfw IV) tanks with their short 75 mm cannons could only blow up a T-34 by hitting their engine from behind.” Guderian noted in his memoirs that "the Russians had already learned something."
The German advance was slowed by other counterattacks. The 2nd German Infantry Army, operating north of Guderian's forces against the Bryansk Front, came under heavy pressure from the Red Army, which had air support.
According to German data, during this first period of the battle for Moscow, 673 thousand Soviet soldiers fell into two bags - near Vyazma and Bryansk. Recent studies have given smaller, but still huge numbers - 514 thousand. The number of Soviet troops defending Moscow thereby decreased by 41%. On October 9, Otto Dietrich from the German Ministry of Propaganda, quoting Hitler himself, predicted at a press conference the imminent destruction of the Russian armies. Since Hitler had not yet lied about military events, Dietrich's words convinced foreign correspondents that the Soviet resistance near Moscow was about to collapse completely. The morale of German citizens, which had fallen greatly since the start of Operation Barbarossa, rose noticeably. There were rumors that by Christmas the soldiers would return home from the Russian front and that the “living space” captured in the east would enrich all of Germany.
But the resistance of the Red Army had already slowed down the Wehrmacht's advance. When the first German detachments approached Mozhaisk on October 10, they came across a new defensive barrier there, occupied by fresh Soviet troops. On the same day, Georgy Zhukov, recalled from the Leningrad Front on October 6, led the defense of Moscow and the united Western and Reserve Fronts. Colonel General became his deputy Konev. On October 12, Zhukov ordered to concentrate all available forces on strengthening the Mozhaisk line. This decision was supported by the actual head of the Soviet General Staff Alexander Vasilevsky. The Luftwaffe still controlled the skies wherever they went. Stuka (Junkers Ju 87) and bomber groups flew 537 sorties, destroying approximately 440 vehicles and 150 pieces of artillery.
On October 15, Stalin ordered the evacuation of the leadership of the Communist Party, the General Staff and administrative institutions from Moscow to Kuibyshev (Samara), leaving only a small number of officials in the capital. This evacuation caused panic among Muscovites. On October 16-17, most of the capital's population tried to flee, crowding trains and clogging roads out of the city. To ease the panic somewhat, it was announced that Stalin himself would remain in Moscow.
Fighting on the Mozhaisk defense line (October 13 – 30)
By October 13, 1941, the main forces of the Wehrmacht reached the Mozhaisk defense line - a hastily built double row fortifications on the western approaches to Moscow, which went from Kalinin (Tver) towards Volokolamsk and Kaluga. Despite recent reinforcements, only about 90,000 Soviet troops defended this line - too few to stop the German advance. Given this weakness, Zhukov decided to concentrate his forces in four critical points: 16th Army General Rokossovsky defended Volokolamsk. Mozhaisk was defended by the 5th Army of General Govorov. The 43rd army of General Golubev was stationed at Maloyaroslavets, and the 49th army of General Zakharkin was at Kaluga. The entire Soviet Western Front - almost destroyed after the encirclement at Vyazma - was recreated almost from scratch.
Moscow itself was hastily strengthened. According to Zhukov, 250 thousand women and teenagers built trenches and anti-tank ditches around the capital, shoveling three million cubic meters of earth without the help of machinery. The factories of Moscow were hastily transferred to a war footing: an automobile plant began making machine guns, a watch factory produced detonators for mines, a chocolate factory produced food for the front, automobile repair stations repaired damaged tanks and military equipment. Moscow had already been subjected to German air raids, but the damage from them was relatively small thanks to powerful air defense and the skillful actions of civilian fire brigades.
On October 13, 1941, the Wehrmacht resumed its offensive. Initially, German troops attempted to bypass the Soviet defenses by moving northeast toward weakly defended Kalinin and south toward Kaluga. By October 14, Kalinin and Kaluga were captured. Inspired by these first successes, the Germans launched a frontal attack against the enemy fortified line, taking Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets on October 18, Naro-Fominsk on October 21, and Volokolamsk on October 27, after stubborn fighting. Due to the growing danger of flank attacks, Zhukov was forced to retreat east of the Nara River.
In the south, Guderian's Second Panzer Group initially advanced to Tula easily, because the Mozhaisk defense line did not extend that far to the south and there were few Soviet troops in the area. However, bad weather, fuel problems, destroyed roads and bridges delayed the German movement, and Guderian reached the outskirts of Tula only on October 26. The German plan envisaged a quick capture of Tula in order to extend its claw east of Moscow. However, the first attack on Tula was repulsed on October 29 by the 50th Army and civilian volunteers after a desperate battle near the city itself. On October 31, the German High Command ordered a halt to all offensive operations Until the painful logistics problems are resolved, the mudslide will not stop.
Break in fighting (November 1-15)
By the end of October 1941, German troops were severely exhausted. They only had a third of their means of transportation, and their infantry divisions were reduced to half, or even a third, of their strength. Extended supply lines prevented the delivery of warm clothing and other winter equipment to the front. Even Hitler seemed to have come to terms with the inevitability of a long struggle for Moscow, since the prospect of sending tanks into such a large city without the support of heavily armed infantry looked risky after the costly capture of Warsaw in 1939.
To boost the spirit of the Red Army and the civilian population, Stalin ordered the traditional military parade on the Red Square. Soviet troops marched past the Kremlin, heading from there straight to the front. The parade was great symbolic meaning, demonstrating unwavering determination to fight the enemy. But despite this bright “show,” the position of the Red Army remained unstable. Although 100,000 new soldiers strengthened the defenses of Klin and Tula, where renewed German attacks were about to be expected, the Soviet line of defense remained comparatively weak. However, Stalin ordered several counter-offensives against German forces. They were started despite the protests of Zhukov, who pointed out the complete lack of reserves. The Wehrmacht repelled most of these counter-offensives, and they only weakened the Soviet forces. The Red Army's only notable success was southwest of Moscow, at Aleksin, where Soviet tanks inflicted serious damage on the 4th Army because the Germans still lacked anti-tank guns capable of fighting the new, heavily armored T-34 tanks. .
From October 31 to November 15, the Wehrmacht High Command prepared the second stage of the attack on Moscow. The combat capabilities of Army Group Center fell greatly due to battle fatigue. The Germans were aware of the continuous influx of Soviet reinforcements from the east and the presence of considerable reserves among the enemy. But given the enormity of the victims suffered by the Red Army, they did not expect that the USSR would be able to organize a strong defense. Compared to October, Soviet rifle divisions took up a much stronger defensive position: a triple defensive ring around Moscow and the remnants of the Mozhaisk line near Klin. Most Soviet troops now had multi-layered defense, with a second echelon behind them. Artillery and sapper teams were concentrated along the main roads. Finally, the Soviet troops - especially the officers - were now much more experienced.
By November 15, 1941, the ground was completely frozen and there was no more mud. The armored wedges of the Wehrmacht, numbering 51 divisions, were now going to move forward to encircle Moscow and connect to the east of it, in the Noginsk region. The German 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups had to concentrate between the Volga Reservoir and Mozhaisk, and then move past the Soviet 30th Army to Klin and Solnechnogorsk, encircling the capital from the north. In the south, the 2nd Tank Group intended to bypass Tula, still held by the Red Army, to move to Kashira and Kolomna, and from them - towards the northern claw, to Noginsk. The German 4th Infantry Army in the center was supposed to pin down the troops of the Western Front.
Resumption of the German offensive (November 15–December 4)
On November 15, 1941, the German tank armies began an offensive towards Klin, where there were no Soviet reserves due to Stalin's order to attempt a counteroffensive at Volokolamsk. This order forced the withdrawal of all forces from Klin to the south. The first German attacks split the Soviet front in two, separating the 16th Army from the 30th Army. Several days of fierce fighting followed. Zhukov recalled in his memoirs that the enemy, despite the losses, attacked head-on, wanting to break through to Moscow at any cost. But the “multi-layered” defense reduced the number of Soviet casualties. The 16th Russian Army slowly retreated, constantly snapping at the German divisions that were pressing it.
The 3rd German Panzer Group captured Klin on November 24, after heavy fighting, and Solnechnogorsk on November 25. Stalin asked Zhukov whether it would be possible to defend Moscow, ordering him to “answer honestly, like a communist.” Zhukov replied that it was possible to defend, but reserves were urgently needed. By November 28, the German 7th Panzer Division had secured a bridgehead across the Moscow-Volga Canal—the last major obstacle before Moscow—and had taken up a position less than 35 km away. from the Kremlin, but a powerful counterattack by the 1st Soviet Shock Army forced the Nazis to retreat. To the northwest of Moscow, Wehrmacht forces reached Krasnaya Polyana, a little over 20 km. from the city. German officers could see some of the large buildings of the Russian capital through field binoculars. The troops of both sides were severely depleted, some regiments were left with 150-200 fighters.
On November 18, 1941, fighting resumed in the south, near Tula. The 2nd German Panzer Group tried to surround this city. And here the German troops were badly battered in previous battles - and still did not have winter clothing. As a result, their advance was only 5-10 km. in a day. German tank crews were subjected to flank attacks by the Soviet 49th and 50th armies located near Tula. Guderian, however, continued the offensive, taking Stalinogorsk (now Novomoskovsk) on November 22, 1941 and encircling the Soviet rifle division stationed there. On November 26, German tanks approached Kashira, a city that controls the main highway to Moscow. The next day, a persistent Soviet counterattack began. General Belov's 2nd Cavalry Corps, supported by hastily put together formations (173rd Rifle Division, 9th Tank Brigade, two separate tank battalions, militia detachments), stopped the German offensive near Kashira. In early December the Germans were driven back and the southern approaches to Moscow were secured. Tula did not give up either. In the south, Wehrmacht forces did not approach Moscow as closely as in the north.
Having encountered strong resistance in the north and south, the Wehrmacht attempted on December 1 to mount a direct attack on the Russian capital from the west along the Minsk-Moscow highway, near Naro-Fominsk. But this attack had only weak tank support against powerful Soviet defenses. Faced with staunch resistance from the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and flank counterattacks from the Russian 33rd Army, the German offensive stalled and was repulsed four days later by a launched Soviet counteroffensive. On December 2, one German reconnaissance battalion managed to reach the city of Khimki - about 8 km from Moscow - and capture the bridge over the Moscow-Volga canal, as well as the railway station. This episode marked the furthest breakthrough of German troops to Moscow.
Meanwhile they began very coldy. November 30th Fedor von Bock reported to Berlin that the temperature was -45 ° C. Although, according to the Soviet weather service, the lowest temperature in December reached only -28.8 ° C, German troops without winter clothing froze even with it. Their technical equipment was not suitable for such harsh weather conditions. More than 130 thousand cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers. The oil in the engines froze; the engines had to be warmed up for several hours before use. The cold weather also harmed the Soviet troops, but they were better prepared for it.
The Axis advance on Moscow stopped. Heinz Guderian wrote in his diary: “the attack on Moscow failed... We underestimated the enemy’s strength, distances and climate. Fortunately, I stopped my troops on December 5, otherwise disaster would have been inevitable."
Some historians believe that artificial floods played an important role in the defense of Moscow. They were organized mainly to break the ice and prevent German troops from crossing the Volga and the Moscow Sea. The first such act was the explosion of the Istra reservoir dam on November 24, 1941. The second was the draining of water from 6 reservoirs (Khimki, Iksha, Pyalovsk, Pestov, Pirogov, Klyazma) and the Moscow Sea in the Dubna area on November 28, 1941. Both were carried out by order Soviet General Staff 0428 dated November 17, 1941. These floods, in the midst of severe winter time, partially flooded about 30-40 villages.
Although the Wehrmacht advance was stopped, German intelligence believed that the Russians no longer had reserves left and would not be able to organize a counteroffensive. This assessment turned out to be wrong. The Soviet command transferred over 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks and more than 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East to Moscow. By early December, when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin, the Red Army had created a reserve of 58 divisions. Even with these new reserves, the Soviet troops involved in the Moscow operation numbered only 1.1 million people, only slightly larger than the Wehrmacht. However, through skillful deployment of troops, a ratio of two to one was achieved at some critical points.
On December 5, 1941, a counteroffensive with the goal of “removing the immediate threat to Moscow” began on the Kalinin Front. The Southwestern and Western Fronts began their offensive operations a day later. After several days of little progress, Soviet troops in the north recaptured Solnechnogorsk on December 12, and Klin on December 15. In the south, Guderian's army hastily retreated to Venev and then to Sukhinichi. The threat to Thule was lifted.
Counter-offensive of the Russian army near Moscow in the winter of 1941
On December 8, Hitler signed Directive No. 9, ordering the Wehrmacht to go on the defensive along the entire front. The Germans were unable to organize strong defensive lines in the places where they were by that time, and were forced to retreat in order to consolidate their lines. Guderian wrote that on the same day a discussion took place with Hans Schmidt and Wolfram von Richthofen, and both of these commanders agreed that the Germans could not hold the current front line. On December 14, Halder and Kluge, without Hitler's approval, gave permission for a limited withdrawal west of the Oka River. On December 20, during a meeting with German commanders, Hitler prohibited this withdrawal and ordered his soldiers to defend every piece of land. Guderian protested, pointing out that losses from the cold exceeded combat losses and that the supply of winter equipment was hampered by the difficulties of the route through Poland. Nevertheless, Hitler insisted on defending the existing front line. Guderian was dismissed on December 25, along with Generals Hoepner and Strauss, commanders of the 4th Panzer and 9th Field Army. Feodor von Bock was also dismissed, formally for medical reasons. The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walter von Brauchitsch, was removed from his post even earlier, on December 19.
Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued in the north. The Red Army liberated Kalinin. Retreating from the Kalinin Front, the Germans found themselves in a “bulge” around Klin. The front commander, General Konev, tried to envelop the enemy troops in it. Zhukov transferred additional forces to the southern end of the “bulge” so that Konev could trap the German 3rd Tank Army, but the Germans managed to withdraw in time. Although it was not possible to create an encirclement, the Nazi defenses here were destroyed. A second encirclement attempt was made against the 2nd Tank Army near Tula, but met strong resistance at Rzhev and was abandoned. The prominence of the front line at Rzhev lasted until 1943. In the south, an important success was the encirclement and destruction of the 39th German Corps, which defended the southern flank of the 2nd Tank Army.
The Luftwaffe found itself paralyzed in the second half of December. Until January 1942, the weather remained very cold, making it difficult to start car engines. The Germans did not have enough ammunition. The Luftwaffe practically disappeared from the skies over Moscow, and the Soviet Air Force, operating from better prepared bases and supplied from close behind, strengthened. On January 4 the sky cleared. The Luftwaffe was quickly receiving reinforcements, and Hitler hoped that they would “save” the situation. Two groups of bombers arrived from Germany re-equipped (II./KG 4 and II./KG 30). Four groups of transport aircraft (102 Junkers Ju 52) were transferred to Moscow from the 4th German Air Fleet to evacuate encircled units and improve supplies for the German front. This last desperate effort by the Germans did not remain in vain. Air support helped prevent the complete defeat of Army Group Center, which the Russians were already aiming for. From December 17 to 22, Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed 299 vehicles and 23 tanks near Tula, making it difficult to pursue the retreating German army.
In the central part of the front, the Soviet advance was much slower. Only on December 26, Soviet troops liberated Naro-Fominsk, on December 28 - Kaluga, and on January 2 - Maloyaroslavets, after 10 days of fighting. Soviet reserves were running low, and on January 7, 1942, Zhukov's counteroffensive was stopped. It threw the exhausted and freezing Nazis back 100-250 km. from Moscow. Stalin demanded new offensives to trap and destroy Army Group Center, but the Red Army was overworked and these attempts failed.
Govorov led the heroic defense of Leningrad for 670 of the 872 days of the siege.
After the Battle of Moscow, on the recommendation of G.K. Zhukova L.A. Govorov in April 1942 was sent to Leningrad as the commander of a group of troops of the Leningrad Front, which directly defended the city. In June of the same year, the Headquarters appointed him commander of the troops of the entire Leningrad Front.
In Leningrad, city leaders accepted this appointment without enthusiasm. They were confused by many things: he served with the whites, he was non-partisan. Moreover, he is not talkative and reserved.
But within a few months, the 1st Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) A.A. Zhdanov will say among his comrades: “Perhaps, a better commander than Govorov cannot be found for the Leningrad Front.”
Just like in 1941, when L.A. Govorov took command of a combined arms army, for the first time in the Soviet military history The artillery general became the front commander. And again, as near Moscow, the situation demanded it.
And the situation in Leningrad was extremely difficult. The dilapidated city was surrounded by a blockade, in dire need of food, and at the same time suffering daily from systematic artillery shelling and air raids. “I am responsible for Leningrad, and I will not give it to the enemy,” Govorov wrote to his wife in Moscow in July 1942.
Commander of the Leningrad Front
Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov, 1942
He constantly remembered the two main tasks assigned to him by Headquarters and personally by I.V. Stalin: the first was to protect the city from destruction by enemy artillery, the second was to accumulate forces for the upcoming attack on the enemy.
In a short time, Govorov built a long-term and stable defense system, insurmountable to the enemy. 110 large defense centers were created, many thousands of kilometers of trenches, communication passages and other engineering structures were equipped. This created the opportunity to secretly regroup troops, withdraw soldiers from the front line, and bring up reserves. Govorov checked the quality of defensive work personally and it was very “unfortunate” for those division commanders in whose sector it was impossible to walk full-length through the trenches from the command post to the front line. As a result of these measures, the number of losses of our troops from shell fragments and enemy snipers has sharply decreased.
Govorov sought not only to hold Leningrad, but to conduct an active defense, undertaking reconnaissance, private offensive actions, and delivering powerful fire strikes against enemy groups. As Govorov later recalled, the idea of attacking from a besieged city gave birth to a powerful offensive impulse and gave the Soviet troops a powerful factor - operational surprise.
Those who served and worked with L.A. at this time. Govorov, noted that his distinguishing features as a commander were enormous self-control, calmness and composure in the most difficult and tense situations. He introduced planning, systematicity and high organization into the management of front troops.
For over two years, in the conditions of a besieged city, the front artillerymen waged a counter-battery fight against the enemy’s siege artillery. To increase the firing range of the guns, Govorov took unconventional measures: he moved forward the positions of heavy artillery, secretly transferred some of it across the Gulf of Finland to the Oranienbaum bridgehead, which made it possible to increase the firing range, both to the flank and rear of enemy artillery groups. For these purposes, the naval artillery of the Baltic Fleet was also used.
The damage caused to Leningrad decreased, not only due to a decrease in the intensity of shelling due to the destroyed guns, but also because the enemy was forced to spend most of the shells on fighting Soviet artillery. By 1943, the number of enemy shells falling on the city had decreased 7 times! As a result, many thousands of human lives were saved, huge material and cultural values, including outstanding historical and architectural monuments.
With the direct participation of L.A. Govorov, the number of people transported from besieged Leningrad along the Road of Life and the amount of products imported into the city doubled, both due to the strengthening of artillery and air cover of the ice road, and thanks to his order to allocate all free military vehicles for these goals.
Battle for Moscow(September 30, 1941 - April 20, 1942) - military operations of Soviet and German troops in the Moscow direction. It is divided into 2 periods: defensive (September 30 - December 4, 1941) and offensive, which consists of two stages: counteroffensive (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942) and the general offensive of Soviet troops (January 7–10 - April 20, 1942).
Adolf Hitler considered the capture of Moscow, the capital of the USSR and the largest Soviet city, as one of the main military and political goals of Operation Barbarossa. In German and Western military history, the battle is known as Operation Typhoon.
Previous events.
The original plan for the Blitzkrieg (Operation Barbarossa) called for the capture of Moscow within the first three or four months of the war. However, despite the successes of the Wehrmacht in the first months of the war, increased resistance from Soviet troops prevented its implementation. In particular, the Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941) delayed the German advance on Moscow for 2 months.
The battles for Leningrad and Kyiv also delayed part of the Wehrmacht forces intended for the attack on Moscow.
Thus, the German offensive on Moscow began only on September 30. The goal of the offensive was to capture Moscow before the onset of cold weather.
Brief description of the theater of military operations.
The Moscow operation unfolded over a vast area, the borders of which in the north ran along the Volga River, from Kalyazin to Rzhev, in the west along the Rzhev-Vyazma-Bryansk railway line (to Dyatkovo), in the south along the conventional line Ryazhsk-Gorbachevo-Dyatkovo.
Plan of attack.
On September 6, 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler, in his Directive No. 35, ordered the defeat of the Soviet troops.
On September 16, as the battle for Kyiv was nearing its end, the command of Army Group Center issued a directive to prepare an operation to capture Moscow, codenamed “Typhoon.”
The idea of the operation was to use powerful strikes from large groups concentrated in the areas of Dukhovshchina (3rd Tank Group), Roslavl (4th Tank Group) and Shostka (2nd Tank Group) to encircle the main forces of the Red Army troops covering the capital and destroy them in the areas of Bryansk and Vyazma, and then quickly bypass Moscow from the north and south with the aim of capturing it.
The attack on Moscow was preceded by detailed aerial reconnaissance of both the city itself and the surrounding area. Reconnaissance flights were carried out by a separate Luftwaffe squadron - Aufkl. St. (F)/Ob.d.L, so-called "Rovel Group".
Defense of Moscow (Operation Typhoon).
On September 30, with the 2nd Panzer Group going on the offensive, the German command began Operation Typhoon. On October 2, the main forces of Army Group Center went on the offensive in the Moscow direction.
During the Moscow defensive operation, the following were carried out: Orel-Bryansk, Vyazemsk, Mozhaisko-Maloyaroslavets, Kalinin, Tula, Klin-Solnechnogorsk and Naro-Fominsk frontal defensive operations.
The defeat of the Bryansk Front. Bryansk "cauldron" in October 1941.
On October 1, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decides to form the 1st Guards Rifle Corps from the reserve for the defense of Orel, however, due to the rapid advance of G. Guderian’s troops, at the suggestion of Major General D. D. Lelyushenko, who was appointed commander of the corps, they decided to organize the defense to the north. On October 2, the 1st Guards Rifle Corps, supported by the 6th Reserve Air Group of the Headquarters and front-line aviation, advanced to the Mtsensk area.
Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, which launched its offensive on September 30, immediately achieved serious success. Already on October 3, units of the 24th Motorized Corps broke into Oryol, covering about 200 km. When the German 4th Panzer Division burst into the city, trams were still running through the streets and boxes of unevacuated factory equipment were lying around.
Meanwhile, on the evening of October 3, the 4th Tank Brigade of Colonel M.E. Katukov arrived in Mtsensk, which the very next day, with the support of Captain Chumak’s Guards Mortar Division, attacked the marching columns of the German 4th Tank Division and actually put it out of action. The battles for Mtsensk pinned down German troops for a week. On October 6, a battle took place at height 217.8 (near the village of Pervy Voin, Mtsensk region): the German 4th Tank Division, having suffered significant losses, was again stopped by the 4th Tank Brigade. The planned German offensive on Tula had to be postponed.
Taking into account the deep breakthrough of German troops on the evening of October 5, the Bryansk Front was allowed to withdraw troops to the second line of defense in the Bryansk region and to the line of the Desna River.
However, already on October 6, the German 17th Panzer Division captured Bryansk, and the 18th Panzer Division captured Karachev, thus encircling the forces of the Bryansk Front. Front commander A. I. Eremenko is forced to give an order to the front armies to fight “with an inverted front.”
The forces of the 3rd, 13th and 50th were surrounded near Bryansk Soviet armies: 27 divisions, 2 tank brigades, 19 artillery regiments of the RGK and commands of the 50th, 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front. During the escape from the encirclement, the commander of the 50th Army, Major General M.P. Petrov, died. While trying to escape the encirclement on October 13, Eremenko himself was seriously wounded and evacuated to Moscow by a plane specially sent for him.
Vyazemsky "cauldron".
On October 2, the offensive of the remaining forces of Army Group Center began. Having created an overwhelming advantage in narrow areas, German troops broke through the front of the Soviet defense. On October 4, Spas-Demensk and Kirov were captured, and on October 5, Yukhnov. On the same day, the enemy entered the Vyazma area.
For a flank counterattack against the advancing group, the front group of I.V. Boldin was created. However, as a result of a tank battle in the area south of Kholm-Zhirkovsky, Soviet troops were defeated. On October 7, the German 7th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Group and the 10th Panzer Division of the 4th Panzer Group closed the encirclement of the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts in the Vyazma region. 37 divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the RGK and the commands of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies were surrounded (the command of the 16th Army, having transferred the troops to the 19th Army, managed to get out of the encirclement ).
Until October 11, the encircled troops attempted to break through; only on October 12 did they manage to a short time make a hole, which was soon closed again. In total, more than 688 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured near Vyazma and Bryansk, only about 85 thousand managed to escape from encirclement. In the Vyazma “cauldron” the commander of the 19th Army, Lieutenant General M.F. the former commander of the 32nd Army, Major General S.V. Vishnevsky, came to his aid; the commander of the 24th Army, Major General K.I. Rakutin, died.
Mozhaisk line of defense.
The unfavorable development of military operations in the area of Vyazma and Bryansk created a great danger for Moscow in the Mozhaisk direction. On October 4, the Chief of Artillery of the Reserve Front, Major General L. A. Govorov, was sent to Mozhaisk by the Supreme Command Headquarters to organize anti-tank defense. On October 9, by order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the Mozhaisk line of defense was created (commander of the troops, Lieutenant General P. A. Artemyev, deputy commander, Major General L. A. Govorov).
At the beginning of October 1941, the 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht began an offensive in the direction of Maloyaroslavets. On October 5, Yukhnov was captured. The blow was unexpected for the Soviet troops. But the head of the parachute service of the Western Front, Captain I. G. Starchak, who commanded a detachment of paratroopers of several hundred people, on his own initiative took up defense on the Ugra River behind Yukhnov and was able to hold back the leading columns of the 10th Panzer Division of the 57th Motorized Corps of the Wehrmacht, advancing along the Warsaw highway. Also on October 5, about 2,000 artillery cadets and 1,500 infantry cadets from the Podolsk schools were removed from classes, alerted and sent to defense in the Ilyinsky combat area. The Germans were detained for 2 weeks, which was enough to form solid line defense in sections of the second line of the Mozhaisk line - along the Nara River.
In order to unite the leadership of the troops in the western direction, the remaining troops of the Reserve Front were transferred on October 10 to the Western Front, whose commander on that day was Army General G. K. Zhukov (I. S. Konev was left as his deputy).
On October 12, the troops of the Mozhaisk defense line were subordinated to the Western Front. On this day, Major General L.A. Govorov was appointed commander of the front artillery. However, the position of the troops of the Western Front, who took up defensive positions on the Mozhaisk Line, remained extremely difficult. On the front from the Moscow Sea to Kaluga, the Western Front consisted of only about 90 thousand people. Under these conditions, the front command sought to firmly cover only the most important directions leading to Moscow: Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga. The troops were subordinated to army departments, whose loud name should not deceive:
16th Army (Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky)
5th Army (created on the basis of the troops of the Mozhaisk combat sector, Major General D. D. Lelyushenko was appointed commander, from October 18, Major General L. A. Govorov)
49th Army (Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkin).
On October 19, part of the troops of the 43rd Army in the Verei direction were subordinated to the headquarters of the 33rd Army (brigade commander D.N. Onuprienko, since October 25, Lieutenant General M.G. Efremov).
Already on October 13, Kaluga fell, on October 16 - Borovsk, on October 18 - Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets. The enemy was stopped only at the border of the Protva and Nara rivers.
Despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, by the end of October 1941, German troops of the 4th Army and 4th Tank Group managed to knock down the Western Front formations from the Mozhaisk defense line along almost its entire length and gradually push them towards Moscow. The fighting on the Mozhaisk defense line lasted an average of 7-9 days, and in the Volokolamsk direction 10-12 days. Although the Soviet troops lost their support in the form of engineering structures, time was spent breaking the defense line, which the Red Army command used to consolidate the battle formations of the troops defending the capital.
Thus, it was not possible to stabilize the defenses on the distant approaches to Moscow, and fighting at the end of October was already taking place 80-100 km from Moscow.
Moscow is under siege.
On October 15, the USSR State Defense Committee decided to evacuate Moscow. The next day, the evacuation from Moscow (to Kuibyshev, Saratov and other cities) of the General Staff directorates, military academies, people's commissariats and other institutions, as well as foreign embassies began. Mining was carried out at factories, power plants, and bridges.
On October 16, the city was gripped by panic. Tens of thousands of people tried in vain to escape the city. On October 20, the State Defense Committee introduced a state of siege in Moscow and surrounding areas.
General Vladislav Sikorsky, who had a conversation with Stalin in early December, in a conversation with British Ambassador in the USSR, Stafford Cripps stated: “There is no doubt that the Russians will continue to fight regardless of the fate of Moscow.”
Kalinin defensive operation.
Meanwhile, the German 3rd Panzer Group turned towards Kalinin and took the city on October 14. The main objective of this turn was to create a new “cauldron” with the forces of the 9th Army and the 3rd Tank Group on the northern flank of Army Group Center.
To cover the capital from the north-west, on October 17, on the basis of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front (22nd, 29th, 31st and 30th armies), the Kalinin Front (Colonel General I.S. Konev) was created.
Front troops, supported by aviation, attacked the Germans daily in the Kalinin area. As a result of these actions, on October 23, von Bock issued a directive to suspend the offensive through Kalinin. Thus, energetic attacks in the Kalinin area, although they did not lead to the capture of the city, did disrupt the completion of the main task, for which the 3rd Panzer Group was deployed from Moscow to the north.
Early winter.
Mud on the roads, autumn 1941.
October 18-19 went heavy rains. In the combat log of the headquarters of Army Group Center on October 19 it was written: “On the night of October 18-19, it rained along the entire front of Army Group. The condition of the roads deteriorated so much that a severe crisis arose in the supply of troops with food, ammunition and especially fuel. The condition of the roads, weather and terrain conditions significantly delayed the progress of military operations. The main concern of all formations is the supply of logistics and food.”
Soviet commanders made similar complaints about the mud.
Only on November 4 did frost strike, the period of thaw ended, and transport stuck in the mud ceased to be a deterrent for the troops of both sides. The German command pulled up reserves and regrouped.
The defense of the approaches to Tula was entrusted to the 50th Army (Major General A. N. Ermakov, from November 22 - Lieutenant General I. V. Boldin). Under pressure from superior enemy forces, its small troops were forced to retreat in a northeast direction, to Tula. The formations of the 3rd Army retreated to the east, to Efremov.
Tula defensive operation
After heavy fighting in the Mtsensk area, German troops continued their attack on Tula on October 23-24. However, the release of the remnants of many formations of the Bryansk Front from encirclement allowed Headquarters to restore the front with the expenditure of fewer forces from the reserve and other sectors of the front.
On October 29, German troops reached Tula. During three days German troops launched fierce attacks in order to capture the city. Despite the fact that only part of the troops of the 50th Army managed to retreat to Tula, they, together with the local garrison (156th NKVD Regiment, 732nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Air Defense Regiment) and militias (Tula Workers' Regiment) defended the city. With the help of the population, three defensive lines were created around the city. As a result, the attacks of the German 24th motorized corps on Tula on November 1 and 2 were successfully repulsed. New attempts by the enemy in the first half of November to capture Tula with a frontal attack from the south, as well as to bypass it from the north, were repelled by Soviet troops with the active participation of the entire population of the city.
The last push to Moscow.
“To now stop the enemy on the approaches to our capital, not to let him in, to crush Hitler’s divisions and corps in battles... The Moscow node is now decisive... A little more time will pass, and the enemy’s offensive on Moscow will have to choke. It is necessary to withstand the tension of these days at all costs” (G.K. Zhukov, November 26, 1941).
To resume the offensive on Moscow, the Wehrmacht deployed fifty-one divisions, including thirteen tank and seven motorized divisions. According to the plan of the German command, Army Group Center was supposed to defeat the flank defense units of the Soviet troops and encircle Moscow.
The Soviet command reinforced dangerous sectors of the front with reserves and reinforcements. The parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941 was of great political significance. Thus, the government of the USSR and J.V. Stalin personally demonstrated their determination to fight to the end.
The German offensive against Moscow resumed from the northwest on November 15-16, and from the southwest on November 18. The enemy delivered the main attacks in the Klin-Rogachevo and Tula-Kashira directions. At the end of November, the enemy managed to capture the Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Istra areas, reach the Moscow-Volga canal in the Yakhroma area and occupy Krasnaya Polyana (32 km from the Moscow Kremlin). Further advance of the Germans in the northern direction was prevented by the release of water from the Istrinsky, Ivankovsky reservoirs and reservoirs of the Moscow Canal. According to the memoirs of Marshal Shaposhnikov, “as the Germans approached this line, the spillways of the reservoir were blown up (at the end of the crossing of our troops), as a result of which a water flow up to 2.5 m high was formed over a distance of up to 50 km south of the reservoir. The Germans’ attempts to close the spillways were unsuccessful.”
The 1st Shock Army (commander - Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov) and the 20th Army (commander - Major General Vlasov A.A.) were transferred to the Western Front, which covered the gap between the 30th (17 November transferred to the Western Front, commanded by Major General D. D. Lelyushenko) and the 16th Armies (commander - Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky). As a result of the involvement of Soviet reserves, the enemy was stopped and forced to go on the defensive.
At the end of November there were fierce battles in the area of Kashira and Tula. On November 27, Soviet troops launched a counterattack on the 2nd Tank Army and drove it back from Kashira. The 2nd Tank Army tried to bypass Tula from the northeast and cut the Serpukhov-Tula railways and highways, but a counterattack by the Soviet troops drove the enemy back to their original positions.
On December 1, the command of Army Group Center made a new attempt to break through to Moscow in the Aprelevka area. On December 2, the Germans occupied Burtsevo - the closest locality to Moscow on the southwestern sector of the front. Thanks to the clearly organized interaction of the 33rd Army of General M. G. Efremov and the 5th Army of General L. A. Govorov, this attempt was eliminated. The Supreme High Command Headquarters ordered, in addition to the new 10th and 20th armies transferred to the Western Front from the reserve of the 1st Shock Headquarters, to include the 24th and 60th armies in the Moscow defense zone.
On December 2, the advanced units of the 1st Shock and 20th armies repelled all enemy attacks north of Moscow in the Dmitrov area and to the south and forced him to stop the offensive. On December 3-5, the 1st Shock and 20th Armies launched several strong counterattacks in the area of Yakhroma and Krasnaya Polyana and began to push back the enemy. The left-flank divisions of the 16th Army, in cooperation with the 5th Army, drove the enemy back from the large bend of the river. Moscow northeast of Zvenigorod. The strike group of the 33rd Army, having defeated enemy units on December 4-5, restored the situation on the Nara River.
Sensing a turning point in the battle, the Soviet command gave the order for a counteroffensive.
Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow.
At the end of November - beginning of December, Soviet troops received significant reinforcements. When it became clear from Soviet intelligence reports that Japan would attack the USSR only after the fall of Moscow, then in October-November ten divisions, along with a thousand tanks and aircraft, were transferred from the Far East to Moscow. Three combined arms armies (1st shock, 20th and 10th), nine rifle and two cavalry divisions, eight rifle, six tank brigades and a large number of special units were transferred to the Western Front. The Kalinin Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front were also significantly strengthened. The air forces of these fronts were replenished with aviation units and formations of the Moscow Military District, the 6th Air Defense Fighter Corps and long-range bomber aviation of the High Command. As a result, by the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Soviet troops numbered 1,100 thousand people, 7,652 guns and mortars, 415 rocket artillery installations, 774 tanks (including 222 heavy and medium) and 1,000 aircraft. However, the German Army Group Center had 1,708 thousand people, about 13,500 guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft.
On December 5, the troops of the Kalinin Front (Colonel General I.S. Konev), and on December 6 - the Western (Army General G.K. Zhukov) and the right wing of the Southwestern Front (Marshal S.K. Timoshenko) launched a counteroffensive. By the start of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops numbered more than 1 million soldiers and officers.
On December 8, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht A. Hitler signed Directive No. 39 on the transition to defense on the entire Soviet-German front.
During the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow, the Kalinin, Klin-Solnechnogorsk, Narofominsk-Borovsk, Eletsk, Tula, Kaluga and Belevsko-Kozel offensive operations were carried out.
December 5th is the Day military glory Russia - The day of the start of the counteroffensive of Soviet troops against Nazi troops in the Battle of Moscow in 1941.
Kalinin offensive operation.
At the beginning of December 1941, a strike force consisting of five rifle divisions of the 31st Army and three rifle divisions of the 29th Army was concentrated in the Kalinin area. These armies did not receive newly formed divisions and fought with formations that had been thinned out in the battles for Moscow.
The formations of the left flank of the 29th Army under Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov (from December 12 - Major General V. I. Shvetsov) went on the offensive on December 5, but were unable to break through the defenses of the infantry divisions of the 9 Army.
The troops of the 31st Army of Major General V.A. Yushkevich, after stubborn three-day battles, broke through the enemy defenses, by the end of December 9 they advanced 15 km and created a threat to the rear of the enemy group in the Kalinin area.
At the same time, the offensive launched by the 30th Army of the Western Front threatened to reach the rear of the German 9th Army in the Kalinin direction. On the night of December 16, the command of the 9th Army ordered a retreat from the Kalinin area. On the morning of December 16, the troops of the 31st and 29th armies resumed their offensive. The city was taken on December 16.
In the twentieth of December, a fresh 39th Army (Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikova) was introduced into the junction of the 22nd and 29th armies. By the end of December, the troops of the Kalinin Front in the 39th Army zone had broken through the enemy’s defenses to the entire tactical depth. During the battles of January 2-7, 1942, front troops on the right wing reached the river line. Volga, in the center they broke through a new line of defense organized by the enemy along the right bank of the Volga, and captured Rzhev from the west and southwest.
Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation.
The idea of the operation was to use strikes from the 30th Army from the north and the 1st Shock, 20th and 16th Armies from the east to cut through the main forces of the German 3rd and 4th Tank Groups in the area of Klin, Istra, Solnechnogorsk and create favorable conditions for further development attack to the west.
The troops of the 30th Army (Major General D. D. Lelyushenko), which began the offensive on December 6, broke through the front of two enemy motorized divisions defending against them. By the end of the day on December 7, they had advanced 25 km. The 1st Shock Army (Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov) concentrated its main efforts on the right flank and in the center, in the Yakhroma area.
The most difficult was the transition to the counteroffensive of the 20th (Major General A. A. Vlasov) and 16th armies (Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky). Only on December 9 did the German troops opposing the 16th Army begin to withdraw in the northwestern and western directions.
The main battles on the right wing of the Western Front took place around Klin. By the evening of December 13, the Klin enemy group found itself semi-surrounded. On the night of December 15, units of the 30th Army entered Klin. After the end of the fighting on December 16, 1941, the 30th Army was transferred to the Kalinin Front.
At this time, the 16th and 20th armies were moving west. At the turn of the Istrinsky reservoir, German troops tried to provide serious and long-term resistance to our troops. The water from the reservoir was drained, the ice dropped several meters and was covered with a layer of water of 35-40 cm near the western shore. However, on December 15, the exit of two Soviet flank groups north and south of the reservoir forced the German command to quickly retreat westward. Thus, the enemy’s defenses at the line of the Istra Reservoir were broken through.
On December 11, the 5th Army (Lieutenant General L.A. Govorov) went on the offensive. She ensured the entry into battle of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Major General L. M. Dovator. On the very first day of the offensive, the enemy was driven back from their positions on the northern bank of the Moscow River. The Kulebyakino-Lokotnya areas have been occupied, and a number of settlements have been liberated.
On December 20, German troops were driven out of Volokolamsk. On the same day, the right-flank units of the 1st Shock Army, pursuing the enemy, reached the river. Lame. The attempt of the 1st Shock, 16th and 20th armies to immediately break through the enemy’s defenses did not produce significant results. Fighting at this point they became protracted.
Narofominsk-Borovsk operation.
On December 16, the command of the Western Front assigned the task of pursuing the enemy to all armies included in its composition. However, the enemy offered stubborn resistance, and Soviet troops had to literally “bite into” the German defense. However, the 33rd Army (Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov) liberated Naro-Fominsk on December 26, and Borovsk on January 4.
The 43rd Army (Major General K.D. Golubev) occupied the Balabanovo station on December 28 and drove the enemy out of Maloyaroslavets on January 2.
To the south, the 49th Army (Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkin) took Tarusa on December 19 and by the end of December reached the Maloyaroslavets-Kaluga line.
Changes in the German command.
Hitler's order to suspend the retreat, transmitted to the army group command on December 16, prohibited the withdrawal of large formations of the ground army over large areas. The army group was tasked with pulling together all reserves, eliminating breakthroughs and holding the line of defense.
...hold the front until the last soldier... Commanders, commanders and officers, personally influencing the troops, do everything possible to force them to hold their positions and provide fanatically stubborn resistance to the enemy who has broken through on the flanks and in the rear. Only this kind of tactic can gain time, which is necessary for the transfer of reinforcements from Germany and from the Western Front, which I have already given orders for. Only when the reserves arrive at cut-off positions will it be possible to think about withdrawing to these lines...
K. Reinhard. Turning near Moscow. The collapse of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42, 1980
Hitler's "stop order" received mixed reviews. Chief of Staff of the 4th German Army G. Blumentritt wrote:
Hitler believed that he alone could save his army from the disaster that was inevitably approaching near Moscow. And to be honest, he really achieved this. His fanatical order, obliging the troops to stand firm in every position and under the most unfavorable conditions, was certainly correct. Hitler instinctively realized that any retreat through snow and ice in a few days would lead to the collapse of the entire front, and then German army would have suffered the same fate as Napoleon's Grand Army...
As a result of the retreat from Moscow on December 19, the commander-in-chief was removed from office ground forces Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, Hitler personally took command of the army. On the same day, Field Marshal General F. von Bock was removed from his post as commander of Army Group Center, and Field Marshal G. von Kluge, who had previously commanded the 4th Army, was appointed in his place. General of the Mountain Troops L. Kübler was appointed commander of the German 4th Army.
Yelets offensive operation.
The offensive of the right flank of the Southwestern Front began on December 6 with a strike by the group of Major General K. S. Moskalenko (from the 13th Army) bypassing Yelets from the north. On December 7, the front-line cavalry-mechanized group of Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko went on the offensive south of the city.
After stubborn fighting, the meeting of two mobile groups and the completion of the encirclement of units of the German 45th and 134th infantry divisions west of Yelets took place on December 14. On the night of December 15, the commander of the 134th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General von Kochenhausen, shot himself. During December 15, the encircled units of the two German divisions were split into several parts, and on December 16 they were destroyed.
As a result of the operation, Soviet troops defeated the German 2nd Army and liberated the cities of Yelets and Efremov, and on December 25 - Livny. [source not specified 201 days]
On December 24, the Bryansk Front was recreated (commander - Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko). The 3rd and 13th armies were subordinate to him, the front was reinforced by the fresh 61st army. In the second half of December, the troops of the Bryansk Front advanced 30-110 km. However, by the end of December they were stopped by organized resistance and enemy counterattacks and went on the defensive.
Tula offensive operation.
The Soviet command planned with the forces of the fresh 10th Army (Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov) to deliver a powerful blow to the extended flank of the enemy’s 2nd Tank Army, where the German 10th Motorized Division was defending on a wide front.
The offensive of the 10th Army began on December 6, and by the morning of December 7, Mikhailov was liberated. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, Major General P. A. Belov, liberated Venev on December 9, and by December 10 was on the outskirts of Stalinogorsk.
On December 14, the 49th Army began the offensive. In three days of fighting, her troops advanced 10-20 km, liberated the city of Aleksin and captured bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. Oka.
The 50th Army of I.V. Boldin, which did not receive reinforcements, advanced more slowly. Only on December 17, her troops managed to capture Shchekino, but by this time the enemy had already managed to withdraw his troops in a southwestern direction.
As a result of the operation, enemy troops were thrown back 130 km to the west. At the same time, the prerequisites were created for the further development of operations in the direction of Kaluga and Sukhinichi.
Kaluga operation.
As a result of the counteroffensive near Tula, the integrity of the formation of G. Guderian's 2nd Tank Army was lost: the main forces of the army retreated in a southwestern direction to Orel, while the left flank 53rd Army Corps retreated in a western direction. By the evening of December 17, the gap between them reached 30 km.
By order of the commander Western Front G.K. Zhukov, a mobile group was created as part of the 50th Army under the command of Deputy Army Commander, Major General V.S. Popov. Without getting involved in battles with the enemy, Popov’s group secretly reached Kaluga from the south by the end of December 20. On the morning of December 21, she captured the bridge over the river. Oka, broke into Kaluga and started street battles with the city garrison.
Meanwhile, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps reached Odoev south of Kaluga. The German units fighting on the Kaluga-Tula highway were deeply enveloped from the south.
Taking advantage of this, the divisions of the 50th Army began to carry out a flanking maneuver. At the same time, the left flank divisions of the 49th Army hung over the Kaluga enemy group from the north.
The enemy held Kaluga until the end. Only on the night of December 30, the Germans were driven out of the city and retreated to Yukhnov, and on December 31, a train arrived at the Kaluga 2 station with New Year's gifts for German soldiers.
Belevsko-Kozelsky operation.
A few days earlier, on December 25, the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, G. Guderian, was removed from his post and transferred to the reserve. The troops of the 2nd Tank Army and the 2nd Field Army were united into the army group of General of the Tank Forces R. Schmidt.
On December 27, the Soviet 10th Army launched an attack on Belyov. On December 31, Belev was captured. The rifle divisions of the 10th Army headed towards Sukhinichi. Here they encountered a fresh German division. It was not possible to dislodge it from Sukhinichi, and it was blocked in the city by January 5th.
Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation.
The Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation was carried out from January 8, 1942 to March 3, 1942, being an integral part of the strategic offensive of Soviet troops in the winter of 1941/1942. The goal was to complete the defeat German group armies "Center" (commander - Field Marshal G. von Kluge). Despite the incompleteness, the operation had important during the general offensive of the Red Army. Soviet troops pushed back the enemy in the western direction by 80-250 km, completed the liberation of Moscow and Tula regions, liberated many areas of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions.
The losses of Soviet troops in the operation, according to official data, amounted to 776,889 people, of which 272,320 were irrecoverable, or 25.7% of the number of troops participating in the operation (1,059,200).
