The issue of building a through shipping canal between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf is being considered by Russia and Iran. The Ambassador of Iran to the Russian Federation stated this on April 8 Mehdi Sanai at a meeting with students of St. Petersburg State University.
Let us recall that about the construction of a canal between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf in an interview with the Iranian news agency Fars stated back in 2012 by the Iranian Energy Minister Majida Namjoo. Then its cost was estimated at 7 billion dollars.
The Caspian Sea is the largest enclosed body of water on Earth. The coastline is 7000 km and passes through the territory of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan. It is possible to connect the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf only by laying a canal through the territory of Iran. The attractiveness of the project for the Russian Federation is mainly that the canal provides the shortest access to the Indian Ocean basin, bypassing the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.
Head of the Department of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Institute of CIS Countries Andrey Grozin notes: theoretically, it is possible to build a through shipping canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, just as it is possible to transfer part of the flow of Siberian rivers to Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
If you want and have a lot of money, you can dig anything. There is no evidence that the project is considered technically impossible. But in the current situation, its prospects are extremely doubtful, despite all the attractiveness of this kind of undertaking. Now, according to the most conservative estimates, the cost of the project will be at least 10 billion dollars. In addition, the levels of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf differ by almost 28 meters, therefore, it is necessary to build a huge amount of infrastructure similar to the Volga-Don shipping canal.
Currently, neither Russia, nor Iran, nor China have free resources of such a volume, which theoretically, within the framework of its transport strategy, the concept of the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” could be interested in the project under discussion. Bypassing the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits in the current geopolitical realities is an attractive idea, but still this is not the motive that would force the parties to take a risk and start digging a canal in the near future.
Another question is: what should we transport through this channel so that it reaches a decent level of profitability at least 5-10 years after the hypothetical construction is completed? And it will last no less than 10 years - based on the financial and technological potential, this is too global a project. As I already said, to some extent it could interest Beijing, but the Chinese are still more inclined to modernize existing transport arteries and connect them, rather than build new large-scale projects.
Maybe in a few years, if integration in the Eurasian space proceeds successfully, if real steps are actually taken to connect the Eurasian Economic Union project and the Chinese transport concept with the connection of Iran, if the prospects of the North-South corridor, which is neither shaky nor Valko has been developing for more than a decade, the need for the construction of a canal has become ripe. But now, in my opinion, the project from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf is rather a topic for conversation, and nothing more. By the way, the turn of Siberian rivers to regions in dire need of fresh water, in this regard, looks more promising.
Iranianist, consultant to the Foreign Policy and Security program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, Nikolai Kozhanov believes that the statement by diplomat Mehdi Sanai is another political and propaganda move by the Iranians.
Tehran is now actively trying to point out the importance of its country in order to quickly attract investors during the current period of “opening to the world.” Moreover, there are still problems with the lifting of sanctions - the Americans lifted only secondary sanctions against Iran related to the ban on business relations with Tehran for individuals and legal entities of third countries and foreign branches of US companies, while for US residents the restrictions remain in force. The bank holdings and property of the government of the Islamic Republic in the United States remain frozen.
Therefore, Western and Russian businessmen are circling around Iran, but have not yet decided to take practical steps directly. So the Iranians come up with all sorts of business proposals. But the project of laying a through shipping canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf is difficult to implement even from a technical point of view. Just look at geographical map Iran, in order to understand how much such construction would cost, since it would have to be laid through deserts, mountains and lowlands.
The second point is shipping occupancy. Let’s say, if you look at the project of the international transport corridor “North-South”, which is designed to provide transport links between the Baltic countries and India through Iran, then Russia does not have such large cargo flows in this direction... Yes, the seaport of Astrakhan is powerful, but the development of the Olya port at the confluence of the Volga into the Caspian Sea, on which hopes were initially pinned, is still a big question.
Iran is, of course, the most important regional transport hub. But for Tehran, from the point of view of transit as a source of income, it is enough to do what it is doing now - to continue to develop the road network, which is much better than the Russian one, small aviation and railways. The main directions of such transit are by no means “North-South”, but more “West-East”: Iran is actively making money by transporting goods from the Middle East in the direction of China-India-Central Asia or from Asia in the direction of the Middle East-Europe. Therefore, frankly speaking, there is neither political nor economic feasibility in implementing the canal construction project.
Iran would like to create a whole series of transport communications in case someone decides to block it in the future - Turkey or the West, says Director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Central Asia Semyon Bagdasarov. - Hence all these grandiose projects, but how feasible are they - big question
Let us also note that not all sanctions have been lifted from Iran yet; moreover, the question of new restrictions is being raised due to its missile program. Much will depend on the new US President. But! If anyone thinks that Russia will actively participate in Iranian projects related to energy resources, etc., they are greatly mistaken. The lion's share of them will go to Europe. We need to approach cooperation with Iran soberly and get rid of thoughts about some kind of mythical strategic partnership.
The issue of building a through shipping canal between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf is being considered by Russia and Iran. The Ambassador of Iran to the Russian Federation stated this on April 8 Mehdi Sanai at a meeting with students of St. Petersburg State University.
Let us remind you about the construction of a canal between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf in an interview with the Iranian news agency Fars stated back in 2012 by the Iranian Energy Minister Majida Namjoo. Then its cost was estimated at 7 billion dollars.
The Caspian Sea is the largest enclosed body of water on Earth. The coastline is 7000 km and passes through the territory of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan. It is possible to connect the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf only by laying a canal through the territory of Iran. The attractiveness of the project for the Russian Federation is mainly that the canal provides the shortest access to the Indian Ocean basin, bypassing the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.
Head of the Department of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Institute of CIS Countries Andrey Grozin notes: theoretically, it is possible to build a through shipping canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, just as it is possible to transfer part of the flow of Siberian rivers to Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
“If you want and have a lot of money, you can dig anything.” There is no evidence that the project is considered technically impossible. But in the current situation, its prospects are extremely doubtful, despite all the attractiveness of this kind of undertaking. Now, according to the most conservative estimates, the cost of the project will be at least 10 billion dollars. In addition, the levels of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf differ by almost 28 meters, therefore, it is necessary to build a huge amount of infrastructure similar to the Volga-Don shipping canal.
Currently, neither Russia, nor Iran, nor China have free resources of such a volume, which theoretically, within the framework of its transport strategy, the concept of the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” could be interested in the project under discussion. Bypassing the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits in the current geopolitical realities is an attractive idea, but still this is not the motive that would force the parties to take a risk and start digging a canal in the near future.
Another question is: what should we transport through this channel so that it reaches a decent level of profitability at least 5-10 years after the hypothetical construction is completed? And it will last no less than 10 years - based on the financial and technological potential, this is too global a project. As I already said, to some extent it could interest Beijing, but the Chinese are still more inclined to modernize existing transport arteries and connect them, rather than build new large-scale projects.
Maybe in a few years, if integration in the Eurasian space proceeds successfully, if real steps are actually taken to connect the Eurasian Economic Union project and the Chinese transport concept with the connection of Iran, if the prospects of the North-South corridor, which is neither shaky nor Valko has been developing for more than a decade, the need for the construction of a canal has become ripe. But now, in my opinion, the project from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf is rather a topic for conversation, and nothing more. By the way, the diversion of Siberian rivers to regions in dire need of fresh water looks more promising in this regard.
Iranianist, consultant to the Foreign Policy and Security program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, Nikolai Kozhanov believes that the statement by diplomat Mehdi Sanai is another political and propaganda move by the Iranians.
— Tehran is now actively trying to point out the importance of its country in order to quickly attract investors during the current period of “opening to the world.” Moreover, there are still problems with the lifting of sanctions - the Americans lifted only secondary sanctions against Iran related to the ban on conducting business relations with Tehran for individuals and legal entities third countries and foreign subsidiaries of US companies, while for US residents the restrictions remain in force. The bank holdings and property of the government of the Islamic Republic in the United States remain frozen.
Therefore, Western and Russian businessmen are circling around Iran, but have not yet decided to take practical steps directly. So the Iranians come up with all sorts of business proposals. But the project of laying a through shipping canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf is difficult to implement even from a technical point of view. It is enough to look at the geographical map of Iran to understand how much such construction will cost, because it will have to be laid through deserts, mountains and lowlands.
The second point is shipping occupancy. For example, if you look at the project of the international transport corridor “North-South”, which is designed to provide transport links between the Baltic countries and India through Iran, then Russia does not have such large cargo flows in this direction... Yes, the seaport of Astrakhan is powerful, but development the port of Olya at the confluence of the Volga into the Caspian Sea, on which hopes were initially pinned, is still a big question.
Iran is, of course, the most important regional transport hub. But for Tehran, from the point of view of transit as a source of income, it is enough to do what it is doing now - continue to develop the road network, which is much better than the Russian one, small aviation and railways. The main directions of such transit are by no means “North-South”, but more “West-East”: Iran actively makes money by transporting goods from the Middle East in the direction of China-India-Central Asia or from Asia in the direction of the Middle East-Europe. Therefore, frankly speaking, there is neither political nor economic feasibility in implementing the canal construction project.
“Iran would like to create a whole series of transport communications in case someone decides to block it in the future - Turkey or the West,” says Director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Central Asia Semyon Bagdasarov. — Hence all these grandiose projects, but how feasible they are is a big question. For the first time, the project of a canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf was developed not in the early 60s of the last century, as some media write, but at the end of the 19th century by Russian engineers. Then the Iranian authorities planned to implement it with the help of the USSR. And I want to say that the implementation of the canal project was a problematic matter even for the USSR in terms of financial and technical resources, and what can we say about the modern Russian economy...
Let us also note that not all sanctions have been lifted from Iran yet; moreover, the question of new restrictions is being raised due to its missile program. Much will depend on the new US President. But! If anyone thinks that Russia will actively participate in Iranian projects related to energy resources, etc., then they are very mistaken. The lion's share of them will go to Europe. We need to approach cooperation with Iran soberly and get rid of thoughts about some kind of mythical strategic partnership.
In Iran, preparations continue for the construction of the Caspian-Persian Gulf shipping canal. The project, as in the past, is of strategic importance for our country. But the West, together with Turkey, directly or indirectly prevented the creation of this artery. By the way, the United States has included it in anti-Iranian sanctions.
Since the 1890s, our relationship with Iran has been largely determined by the Caspian-Persian Gulf shipping canal project. Developed by Russian engineers in 1889–1892, it provided Russia with the shortest access to the Indian Ocean basin; the Turkish Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits turned out to be unnecessary for this purpose.
The emergence of the project was facilitated by the collective refusal of England, France, Austria-Hungary and Germany to support the Russian proposals of 1878 regarding the Bosporus and Dardanelles for St. Petersburg’s control over these straits and the placement of military bases along their coasts.
The fact is that over half of Russia's foreign trade was carried out this way. And it was precisely along this route that interventionists, supported by Turkey, repeatedly penetrated into the Black Sea and, accordingly, to the shores of the empire.
But maintaining Russia’s dependence on this route has been and remains one of the strategic goals of the West in this region. It is not for nothing that in 1997, US anti-Iranian sanctions were extended to the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal project. More precisely, companies and countries that assisted Tehran in implementing this plan were subject to financial and other economic penalties. And although the US sanctions policy towards Iran is being reviewed, it is not yet clear whether the ban on participation in the said project will be lifted.
The joint Russian-Iranian commission for the construction of the canal, created in late XIX century, began work in 1904. But the parties could not agree on the status of the project and the artery itself. St. Petersburg insisted on the principle of extraterritoriality by analogy with the Suez and Panama Canals, which at that time belonged to Great Britain and the United States, respectively. Tehran's proposed condominium (parity) status for the canal joint management) did not suit St. Petersburg, since there was no confidence in the unequivocally pro-Russian orientation of Iran. And the extraterritoriality made it possible to ensure the military-political security of the route.
In 1908, negotiations were suspended, which was facilitated by growing pressure on Tehran from Istanbul and London regarding the status of the new canal and the timing of its construction.
First World War, naturally, did not allow the resumption of Russian-Iranian negotiations on the project, and the subsequent normalization of relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia reduced its relevance. The RSFSR and the USSR, as is known, provided military-technical and economic assistance to Turkey during the period of its confrontation with the Entente and Greece (1919–1923). In return, Ankara guaranteed in September 1924 that the Bosporus and Dardanelles would never be used to the detriment of the interests of the USSR.
With the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in November 1938, anti-Soviet, or rather, pan-Turkist tendencies in Ankara's politics intensified sharply. The best proof of this is her participation in the “Fuel” plan, a project of joint aggression against the USSR with England and France, scheduled for mid-March 1940. The plan provided, in particular, for the passage of British and French military ships into the Black Sea.
But from the late 30s, Soviet-Iranian relations began to deteriorate, which was caused by the active influence of England, Germany and Turkey on foreign policy Tehran. They were just preparing to terminate the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty “On Friendship and Borders,” according to which (Article 6) the USSR had the right to send troops into the country in the event of a threat to its security.
Tehran-43. Unknown plot
Since mid-April 1941, Turkey, under various pretexts, has been making it difficult for Soviet ships carrying military and other cargo to pass through the straits for Yugoslavia, which was subjected to fascist aggression. The pro-Nazi policy of Turkey during the Great Patriotic War is also known. Patriotic War(at least until 1944 inclusive). All these factors prompted the USSR to return to the idea of the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal. The project was finalized by the fall of 1942 - after the joint entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran in August-September 1941 and the coming to power in Tehran of anti-fascist forces led by Shahinshah Mohammad Reza-Pahlavi.
Alarming events on the Soviet-German front, the threat of a Turkish attack on the USSR and the approach of German-Italian troops to the Suez Canal in 1942 could not but contribute to the intensification of work on the creation of the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal. Both sides described the project as mutually beneficial and therefore promising. The issue was raised during negotiations with I.V. Stalin with M.R. Pahlavi, held on November 30, 1943 in Tehran.
The sharp deterioration of Soviet-Turkish relations in 1945–1953, on the one hand, contributed to the resuscitation of the Caspian-Persian Gulf project. But on the other hand, the USSR’s attempts in the same period to “annex” Iranian Azerbaijan to the Azerbaijani SSR led to increased influence of Washington and London on Tehran. That's why they forgot about the project long years. Moreover, in the spring of 1953 Soviet Union took a course towards normalizing relations with Turkey, as if as a counterbalance to the difficult relationship with Iran.
Soil preparation
Since the second half of the 50s, the Iranian leadership decided to restore the policy of what is called parity cooperation with the West and the USSR. In June-July 1956, an official visit of a government delegation led by Shahinshah to the USSR took place, unprecedented in the entire history of bilateral relations. A number of economic agreements were signed, which, however, did not concern the canal. However, during the negotiations, during one of the meetings of the then Pre-Council of the USSR N.A. Bulganin and Shahinshah noted (according to the protocol entry) that the parties attach important studying the project for the construction of the Caspian – Persian Gulf shipping canal. But this story was not included in the final communiqué. Most likely on the initiative of the Iranian delegation, so as not to irritate the Americans, who were dissuading Tehran from the project.
Nevertheless, in 1962, a Soviet-Iranian commission was created to study the issue, and the then head of the Supreme Council USSR L.I. Brezhnev during his visit to Tehran in November 1963. It was then that the parties created a legal basis for the implementation of the project by signing agreements “On the joint use water resources border rivers" and "On the development of transit of Iranian goods through the territory of the USSR, and Soviet goods through the territory of Iran."
And in June 1965, when Shahinshah’s visit to the USSR took place, as large-scale as in 1956, the parties agreed to speed up the resuscitation of the project, but again without appropriate mention in the final communiqué. A preliminary version of the channel was considered during the visit of the Soviet Prime Minister of the USSR A.N. Kosygin to Tehran in early April 1968. The project was largely approved by both parties. But according to tradition, no mention in the communiqué...
In those same years, American-Iranian meetings at top level, during which the United States directly or indirectly declared that the project did not correspond to the long-term interests of the United States and its NATO allies. This position was supported Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, on the contrary, they supported the project (providing the shortest route between this country and the USSR), which contributed to the normalization of relations between Baghdad and Moscow, which in 1974–1975 was crowned with a bilateral treaty “On Friendship and Good Neighborliness.”
It is noteworthy that since the fall of 1975, plans began to be developed in the United States to overthrow the Shah’s regime and provoke an Iranian-Soviet and Iranian-Iraqi confrontation. True, Washington observed “etiquette” on the issue of the canal: the American position on this project was also not included in the bilateral final communiqués...
Tehran did not dare to completely ignore the US position. After all, up to 70 percent of Iran's annual oil exports went overseas, and the United States' share of foreign investment in Iran exceeded 40 percent. In addition, supplies from the United States covered at least 60 percent of the needs of the Iranian armed forces for weapons and ammunition. Overall, the share of NATO countries in supplying the Iranian army reached 85 percent.
At the same time, since the second half of the 60s, Turkey began to periodically reduce tariffs for the transit of Soviet foreign trade cargo through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. This factor was important for the USSR, because, firstly, already in the 60s, at least 50 percent of the annual volume of exported Soviet oil was transported along this route. And secondly, the implementation of the canal project required colossal financial and technical resources, the allocation of which became problematic for the USSR for many internal and external economic reasons.
All this contributed to the fact that both sides not only put the brakes on the strategic project, but chose not to speed up its implementation. During negotiations between Shahinshah in Moscow in October 1972 and A.N. Kosygin in Tehran in March 1973, the parties again, outside the communique, recorded the mutual benefit of the channel, recommending that a number of technical parameters be clarified. But the legal and technological basis for future construction was still expanded: during these visits, in addition to the aforementioned agreements of 1963, the “Program of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation” for 15 years and the memorandum “On mutual encouragement of capital investments” were signed.
In total, in the 60–70s, over 60 industrial, energy and transport facilities were built in Iran with the help of the USSR, including one of the largest in the region, the Isfahan Metallurgical Plant and the almost 500-kilometer Trans-Iranian Gas Pipeline adjacent to the Azerbaijan SSR.
Washington, London and Ankara insisted that the main export flow of Iranian blue fuel be pumped through Turkey, but Moscow and Tehran agreed in 1972-1973 on the transit of Iranian gas to European countries over a 20-year period through the USSR. These deliveries were supposed to begin in 1976, but the deterioration inside political situation and subsequent well-known events in Iran led to the “mothballing” of the project.
In short, the Caspian-Persian Gulf highway, extremely beneficial to the USSR and Iran, encountered increasingly active opposition from the United States and NATO. Although, judging by the mentioned agreements and trends in bilateral relations, the legal, economic and technological ground was being gradually prepared.
Time to build
Today the project is on the list of priorities for Tehran and, unlike the Shah period, the country does not hide either the parameters of the canal or negotiations with other countries on its construction. As Iranian experts and media note, the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal directly leads not only Russia, but also most other countries of the former USSR, as well as Europe, to the Indian Ocean. For potential users, this route is more than half the length of the traditional water route through Turkey. Therefore, not only Iranian, but also foreign specialists are involved in finalizing the project. The channel is planned to be put into operation in the 2020s.
Similar assessments are expressed by the Russian expert community. In short, the Caspian-Persian Gulf shipping canal, which passes entirely through the territory of Iran, is capable of providing the shortest access to the Indian Ocean basin from the North Atlantic, Baltic, Black Sea-Azov, Danube and Volga-Caspian basins. The country needs this route not only as a transport corridor, but also to provide desalinated water to the central arid regions. True, although all this is promising, it is still only a prospect.
Back in 1996–1997, the leadership of the Iranian Ministry of Roads and Transport, sending delegations to Russia, announced their desire to attract its investments or technologies to the construction of the trans-Iranian waterway. Our side approved these proposals in principle, advocating their comprehensive study, especially in the environmental sphere, given the uniqueness of the Caspian biological environment. At the same time, an agreement was reached on Iranian specialists studying Russian experience in hydraulic engineering construction. Delegations from Iran sent by Tehran began to regularly visit the White Sea-Baltic, Volga-Baltic, and Volga-Don canals. In 1998, a joint expert group was created to study the Trans-Iranian water project, and in next year The government of the Islamic Republic officially approved the revised feasibility study.
The total length of the shipping route will be about 700 kilometers, including along the fairways of the rivers of northwestern (Caspian) and southwestern Iran, including the Shatt al-Arab international channel bordering Iraq, about 450 kilometers. The required investments for the construction of the entire artery were estimated by the Iranian side at least 10 billion in 2012-2013, including for the connecting trans-Iranian section (northwest - southwest) - at 5.5-6 billion dollars. Full payback for the project will occur, according to local estimates, in the fifth year from the date of commissioning. According to the same calculations, the canal will provide Russia and Iran with transit revenues of 1.2–1.4 and 1.4–1.7 billion dollars, respectively, starting from the third or fourth year of operation.
During meetings in the early 2000s of the Russian-Iranian commission on trade and scientific and technical cooperation, representatives of Tehran offered our country a number of options for paying for its technological assistance in the construction of the canal, as well as the construction in the Russian Federation of cargo (“river-sea”) and auxiliary vessels, in demand on the waterway.
Noteworthy in this regard is the recent publication of a group of experts in Dagestanskaya Pravda (Makhachkala):
The presence of factories specialized in shipbuilding in the republic is a strong argument in favor of creating a large industrial cluster in Dagestan for the production of ships, including for the trans-Iranian route
But the project to form such a cluster on the basis of the Makhachkala shipyard-repair plant remained on paper. According to the chief engineer of this enterprise, Mikhail Khalimbekov, drawings, technologies, and calculations for the construction of a modern high-tech production facility were prepared by a well-known German shipbuilding company, but the matter never moved forward.
It was also noted that in the opinion of “many scientists, including Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Shikhsaid Abdullaev, on the basis of cooperation of republican industrial enterprises, it is realistic to organize competitive production of river-sea vessels.” Moreover, the use of the developments of the famous Russian designer Hamid Khalidov to create a new generation of mixed navigation ships - “trimarans” - exactly meets the requirements and conditions of transit cargo transportation through channels such as the trans-Iranian one.” Moreover, there has been an increase in demand for such vessels in the world.
It is reasonable to assume that modern geopolitical factors, including the serious aggravation of relations with Russia provoked by Turkey, contribute to a more thorough study of options for our assistance in the creation of such an important waterway.
This project was conceived a long time ago, then it was forgotten for a while, and then remembered again. Today it has every chance of being implemented, although there are many difficulties. There are doubts that the Trans-Iranian Canal will still be built, but they are becoming fewer and fewer.
Projects under the Tsar
Still the first Russian Emperor Peter the Great, who thought in strategic terms, formulated the idea of a shipping route from the Caspian Sea to the Indian Ocean, but at that time no country could carry out such large-scale construction. The channel began to be designed much later, in the 90s XIX century, and this work was generally completed, but the question came down to who would own the hydraulic structure. Russian authorities insisted on its extraterritoriality, while the Shah of Iran wanted joint ownership, which, in fairness, it should be noted, was a completely legal requirement. In addition, there were intrigues from Western capitals. England, Austria-Hungary, France and Germany did not want to give up an important instrument of pressure on St. Petersburg, and they considered the Bosphorus Strait to be such. Something similar should be expected now, in the third millennium. Much time has passed, but the principles of the relationship remain the same.
The secret dream of Stalin and Brezhnev
Relationships young Soviet country relations with Turkey at first were very warm, which was facilitated by the assistance provided to Ataturk by the Bolsheviks during the conflict with Greece and the Entente. In the year of Lenin's death, Moscow and Istanbul signed an agreement guaranteeing the USSR preferential terms use of the Bosphorus. However, the “Father of All Turks” died in 1938, and the cloudless friendship became darkened. Meanwhile, relations with Iran also fluctuated, although they remained generally good. Not everyone knows that at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, in August 1941, the Red Army actually occupied the northern part of this country (the south was occupied by the British) on the basis of Article Six of the Treaty on Friendship and Borders. Türkiye, meanwhile, prevented the passage of Soviet ships through the Bosphorus, thereby aiding Nazi Germany. During the Tehran Conference of 1943, the issue of the canal was raised again, but objective reasons did not contribute to the implementation of the bold project. Later they returned to it under Brezhnev, but with the same result.
Great benefit
The history of this as yet failed canal indicates that its construction was hampered mainly by changes in the political situation, but also economic reasons. In addition, the scale of the upcoming construction had a hypnotic effect on both the Soviet and Iranian sides. Even the digging of relatively short isthmuses in Suez and Panama was each time declared to be the construction project of the century, but here we were talking about creating hundreds of kilometers of waterway with many locks in difficult terrain and geodetic conditions. However, the effect of the predicted result is so attractive that it was decided to give the project the green light. And the point is not only in the complicated relations with Turkey, they will most likely normalize in the near future, but also in the enormous savings and colossal profits promised by the operation of this facility.
Approximate calculations
The lifting of international sanctions on Iran will improve the economic situation in the country and free up the funds necessary for construction, estimated at approximately ten billion dollars in the first two years, and it will take four years to complete the project. Actually, there is an alternative route, which goes further east, takes longer, but has its advantages. The project's self-sufficiency period is approximately five years, and it is justified by the fact that it will be profitable for all countries to transport cargo through the Trans-Iranian Canal former USSR And of Eastern Europe, and for passage along the waterway, a tariff will, of course, be charged. Transit revenues are projected to be between $1.2 billion and $1.7 billion per year. To each. Options for paying for equal shares of construction are currently being discussed, but there is no doubt that an agreement will be reached due to the obvious profitability of this enterprise. Adds optimism and presence production capacity(Makhachkala shipyard-shipyard), capable of providing the route with vehicles - trimarans.
Possible resistance
There is no doubt that Turkey will actively object to the implementation of the project, seeking to maintain a natural monopoly on transport transit through the Bosphorus. But it’s not so much about Istanbul; any increase in influence in the region of Russia, and Iran too, will face attempts to suppress it from the West, and especially from the United States, which considers the entire planet a zone of its vital interests. Sanctions on Tehran have just been lifted, and Russia is still under pressure from them. However, it is unlikely that it will be possible to make them more stringent, and this may be the factor that completely frees us from the need to look back at possible pressure when implementing this large-scale project.
Military strategic significance
If the canal is built, it will provide the opportunity for ships of the Black Sea Fleet to enter the operational ocean space, bypassing the Bosphorus Strait. This is very important in conditions where the passage of each vessel must be agreed with Ankara, and there is no guarantee that permission will be obtained. In the event of a military conflict, the strait will undoubtedly be blocked. The purpose of the project is primarily economic in nature, but the defense component should not be completely excluded. The situation in the world is extremely transient. It was difficult to imagine just recently that Türkiye would show hostility.
Role of the Bosphorus
The strait between Europe and Asia will not lose its relevance in any case. Transporting cargo from the Black Sea basin to Greece, Italy or Spain via the Persian Gulf is time-consuming and expensive, so cargo flow to the Bosporus is ensured, and we're talking about O the shortest route from Russia, Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan to the Indian Ocean. However, some diversification of transport routes will benefit all countries concerned, which are given a choice in this case. The mutual interest of Russia and Iran (namely, they will own the channel) will serve as the key to the fulfillment of Peter’s long-standing dream.
Russia and Iran are again discussing the construction of a water canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. This will give Russia the shortest access to the Indian Ocean basin, bypassing the Turkish straits. The idea of creating a competitor to the Bosporus and Dardanelles originated more than a century ago, but the project was hampered not only by its technical complexity, but also by geopolitics. Turkey and the United States clearly will not like the revival of the project.
Russia and Iran are discussing the issue of building a through shipping canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanai said this at a meeting with students of St. Petersburg State University. “Yes, this issue is being discussed,” the ambassador answered the student’s question about laying a canal, without specifying details.
“Thanks to the canal from the Caspian Sea to the Indian Sea, the delivery of goods through Russia becomes half as long as the traditional route through Turkey”
The day before, Mehdi Sanai gave lectures to students about domestic policy And international relations Iran in Russian.
The Caspian Sea is the largest enclosed body of water on Earth. The coastline is 7000 km and passes through the territory of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan. It is possible to connect the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf only by laying a canal through the territory of Iran.
We are talking about a shipping route with a length of about 700 km. According to Iranian estimates made in 2012-2013, the construction of the artery will require at least $10 billion, and investments in the section connecting the northwest and southwest of Iran will be about $6 billion. However, the payback of the project may occur already in the fifth year of operation. Russia's transit revenues could amount to about $1.4 billion, Iran's - about $1.7 billion in the third or fourth year from the moment the canal is put into operation. They want to open the channel in the 2020s.
This canal is of strategic importance for Russia because it creates the shortest access to the Indian Ocean basin. Actually, all those countries that have access to the closed Caspian Sea also receive direct access to the ocean. Moreover, it is interesting to the Northern and Western Europe, Finland and the Baltic. In fact, this vertical route could go from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean.
The main opponent of such a project, of course, was and remains Turkey, since the emergence of a canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf creates direct competition with the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Thanks to the canal from the Caspian Sea to the Indian Sea, the delivery of goods through Russia becomes half as long as the traditional route through Turkey.
The Suez Canal will also suffer from the Russian-Iranian project. The canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, of course, will not replace it completely, since it is still convenient for Europe, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, notes First Vice-President of the Russian Union of Engineers Ivan Andrievsky.
“From a technical point of view, the existing Suez and New Suez Canals are more convenient for ships, if only for the reason that they are lockless, and both seas - the Mediterranean and the Red - are at the same level. The Caspian-Persian Canal, in turn, must connect the Caspian Sea, which is approximately 27-29 meters below sea level, which will require the installation of a whole system of hydraulic structures that will control the water level and prevent flooding,” he says.
“Russia still needs the strait between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf in to a greater extent than anyone else,” adds Andrievsky.
However, the Suez Canal risks reduced utilization due to the new one. However, this could also happen in the event of implementation by Russia, Iran and India, which includes a land railway line along the western coast of the Caspian Sea, that is, it allows cargo to be transported in transit through Azerbaijan and then by car or by railway to Iran up to the port city of Bandar Abbas in the south of Iran, on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and further by sea to Mumbai. This project is now in full swing, new way They promise to open in 2016–2017.Geopolitical factor
The idea of laying such a canal is already much more than a hundred years old; the first developments by Russian engineers began not even in the 20th, but at the end of the 19th century. Why hasn't it been implemented yet? First of all, for geopolitical reasons. And this was largely due to the relations of the USSR and Russia with Turkey and Iran on the one hand and the US relations with Turkey and Iran on the other. IN different periods they either improved or worsened, and this directly influenced the development of the Russian-Iranian channel project.
The project was first discussed in the late 1890s. “The First World War did not allow the resumption of Russian-Iranian negotiations on the project, and the subsequent normalization of relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia reduced the demand for the project. The RSFSR and the USSR provided military-technical and economic assistance to Turkey during its confrontation with the Entente and Greece (1919–1923). In return, Ankara guaranteed in September 1924 that the Bosporus and Dardanelles would never be used to the detriment of the interests of the USSR,” says candidate of economic sciences Alexey Chichkin in his article in the Military-Industrial Courier.
In the 1930s, relations Soviet Russia relations with Iran began to deteriorate, and after the death of Turkish President Kemal Ataturk, with Ankara as well. Iran and Türkiye then became closer to England, France and Germany. Therefore, the canal project was postponed. “Since April 1941, Turkey, under various pretexts, has been making it difficult for Soviet ships carrying military and other cargo for Yugoslavia, which was subjected to fascist aggression, to pass through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Turkey's pro-Nazi policy during the Great Patriotic War (until 1944 inclusive) is also known. All this prompted the USSR to return to the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal project. The project was finalized by the autumn of 1942, after the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran in August - September 1941 and the coming to power in Tehran of anti-fascist forces led by Mahinshah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,” says Chichkin.
“The Caspian-Persian Gulf highway, extremely beneficial to the USSR and Iran, encountered increasingly active opposition from the United States and NATO”
After the war, relations between the USSR and Turkey were bad, and things did not work out with Iran. Not only London, but also Washington began to influence Tehran. Since then, the United States has actively opposed the implementation of the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal construction project.
But since the mid-50s, Iran decided to pursue a policy of parity cooperation with both the USA and the USSR. Therefore, in the 60s, a Soviet-Iranian commission was created to study the canal issue. In 1963, during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Tehran, an agreement was signed that created the legal basis for the implementation of the project. In 1968, USSR Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin visited Tehran and was shown a preliminary version of the channel.
“In those same years, American-Iranian summit meetings became more frequent, during which the United States directly or indirectly stated that the project did not correspond to the long-term interests of the United States and its NATO allies. This position was supported by Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, on the contrary, they supported the project (providing the shortest route between this country and the USSR), which contributed to the normalization of relations between Baghdad and Moscow, which in 1974–1975 was crowned with a bilateral agreement “On Friendship and Good Neighborliness,” says Chichkin.
By this time, the United States had become an important buyer and supplier of Iran's oil. military equipment, and Türkiye in the 60s began to reduce tariffs for the transit of Soviet goods through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Therefore, although the canal project moved forward, it was very slow. And in the late 70s, an internal political conflict began in Iran. “The Caspian-Persian Gulf highway, extremely beneficial to the USSR and Iran, encountered increasingly active opposition from the United States and NATO,” says Chichkin.
A new stage for the project began in the mid-90s, meetings between Russia and Iran on this issue resumed. In 1998, a joint expert group was created, and the following year the government of the Islamic Republic officially approved the revised feasibility study. However, sanctions against Iran again buried the project. As Chichkin notes, it was not without reason that in 1997 the United States extended anti-Iranian sanctions to the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal project. Punishment threatened all companies and countries that assisted Tehran in the implementation of this project.
It is not surprising that right now the water canal has become relevant again. Iran is getting rid of Western sanctions, and Russia has maintained friendly relations with Tehran. Relations with Turkey are experiencing a serious crisis. It's time to implement an ambitious infrastructure project.
Technical and environmental risks
However, this is clearly not a quick matter. Head of the Caspian Research and Information Center, Dr. geographical sciences Chingiz Ismailov pointed out technical and ecological problems water artery "Caspian - Persian Gulf". In particular, the channel must be filled big amount water in a volume of 10% of the Volga River water. The obstacle is also worth mountain range Alborz in northern Iran.
Moreover, during construction work it will be necessary to evacuate a large number of the population and pay them significant compensation. Finally, a long canal through Iranian territory could cause floods, which in turn would lead to an increase in earthquakes in Iran, where they are already not uncommon.
“The main obstacle is distance. Even taking into account the minimum route, construction will drag on for decades, because a canal hundreds and thousands of kilometers long cannot be reinforced with concrete walls; new materials and technologies will be required, as well as time for their development and implementation. The channel will have to remain in working order for many years,” says Ivan Andrievsky.
