The losses of Hitler's aviation in the war against the USSR - Yaroslav Ognev. The last year of the war: a comparison of the losses of the Third Reich in the east and in the west

: 20.03.2019 11:30

I quote Sergey

: 05.05.2018 02:50

The Germans had 913 pilots who shot down from 30 to 352 aircraft. More than what Soviet industry produced during the war. What did the other pilots and anti-aircraft artillery shoot down? We had only 50 pilots who shot down from 30 to 62 aircraft. How did these 50 pilots kill 913 Germans and drive them to Berlin? All their victories are fake.

: 18.07.2017 12:39

: 25.04.2017 13:56

It was necessary to somehow stimulate the young Deutschbatyrs to fight... It’s just that it’s easy for the “Russians” to always go out to fight to the death! What's the first time - what's the 5th time!!

: 13.01.2017 21:36

It turns out that in the Luftwaffe there was a slang term - “neck scabies” or “neck disease” - when, on the eve of the next award or “round number” in the number of victories, a fighter’s personal count of “downed” began to grow incredibly quickly (even on a Luftwaffe scale). At such moments, Luftwaffe experts began to write down almost everything that they managed to see in flight, and accordingly, the command began to take almost their word for it. What scale did this lie reach, since popular rumor even coined a term for it...

: 24.12.2016 10:09

The author draws a conclusion about the monstrous overestimation of Soviet pilots (even in comparison with the famous “Munchausen”-Germans) by comparing the victories declared by us with the allegedly REALLY lost Germans, based on German documents. But there is one BUT - 97-98% of the reports of Luftwaffe squadrons about losses (that is, the most complete and accurate reports) were DESTROYED partly during the Allied bombing, partly by order of Goering in April-May 1945. That is, the columns in the tables “German aircraft actually shot down” should, at best, be renamed to “according to incomplete data, shot down AT LEAST”

: 18.11.2016 20:08

I quote Sergei Sivolobov

I’ll also add on this topic - I read Zefirov’s “Luftwaffe Aces” at one time, it’s clear that there is no analysis or critical approach - everything is based on, figuratively speaking, “award lists”, but some conclusions can be drawn. For example, a relatively large number of killed aces (both fighters and bombers) were struck in disasters in general and in collisions in particular. Moreover, both aces clashed with beginners (what else can be explained), and experienced pilots collided with each other (for example, 01/17/43 K. Nordman (Cavalier of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 78 victories, 800 sorties) crashed (for no apparent reason) into the commander’s plane 1/ 51JG R. Bush) and there are a lot of such cases. And after that they say that our pilots didn’t know how to fly?

: 18.11.2016 18:03

I hope I was understood correctly))). And now to our piggy bank. On May 22, 1941, two Ju-87s from I/StG 3 collided over the Argos airfield. Pilots Oberleutnant Ebner and Non-Commissioned Officer Marquardt escaped, both gunners were killed. The explosion of a 5oo-kg bomb shot down the third Junkers. It is clear that we have had our share of troubles, but the emphasis is on them. But it’s the same as always - only Russian tanks burn, only Russian planes are shot down...

: 18.11.2016 17:47

Khlobystov probably rammed his own. This is how advanced historians will answer you, especially since he died colliding in the air with his wingman. But the German aces are infallible, it’s indecent to discuss them, and you are so rude and undemocratic!

: 18.11.2016 14:07

I used to believe the German data, at least regarding my own losses, but after several cases I doubted this too. 1. In one of the battles when Khlobystov carried out a double ram, the Germans had no recorded losses at all (even damaged ones). Who did he destroy the plane about? 2. In one of the battles in the summer of 43, an Me 109 was shot down, everyone seemed to be a normal pilot, they took him prisoner, and took him to division headquarters, but... there are no losses in the Luftwaffe documents again. 3. In April 43, the Me 109 was forced to land again, the Germans, as you guessed, again did not lose anything, and according to their documentation, the captured plane is described as being burned by the Germans themselves during the retreat back in February 43... Miracles?

: 18.11.2016 13:49

I wonder why the author missed the brilliant battle carried out by the “ace of the Arctic” Muller on 1.09.42? In this battle, Muller shot down (and they were credited to him) 2 Soviet aircraft (type not specified), and the genius of the battle is that Soviet aviation did not take to the air AT ALL on that day, and the VNOS service did not record a single overflight.

05/23/2018 - last, unlike reposts, update of the topic
Every new message minimum 10 days is highlighted in red, But NOT NECESSARY is at the beginning of the topic. The "SITE NEWS" section is being updated REGULARLY, and all its links are ACTIVE
NB: active links to topics similar to this: “Little-known facts about aviation”, “Double standards of Allied bombing”

The theme consists of sections for each of the main participating countries. At the same time, I cleaned up duplicates, similar information and information that raised open doubts.

Tsarist Russian Air Force:
- during WW1, 120-150 captured German and Austrian aircraft were captured. Most - two-seat reconnaissance aircraft, fighters and twin-engine aircraft were rare (Note 28*)
- at the end of 1917, the Russian army had 91 air squadrons of 1,109 aircraft, of which: 579 were available at the fronts (428 serviceable, 137 faulty, 14 obsolete), 237 equipped for the front and 293 in schools. This number did not include up to 35 aircraft of the Airship Squadron, 150 aircraft of naval aviation, aircraft of logistics agencies, 400 aircraft of air fleets and in reserve. The total number of aircraft was estimated at 2200-2500 military aircraft (Note 28*)
- in the summer of 1917, the Baltic Fleet aviation included 71 aircraft (28 faulty) and 530 military personnel, of which 42 were officers (Note 90*)

USSR Air Force:
- in 1937 there were 18 aviation schools in the Red Army, in 1939 - 32, as of 05/01/1941 - already 100 (Note 32 *). According to other data, if in 1938 (Note 64*) and 1940 there were 18 aviation schools and schools, then in May 1941 aviators were trained by 3 Air Force academies, 2 higher schools of navigators, 88 flight and 16 technical schools (Note 57*), and in 1945 - 130, which made it possible to train 60 thousand pilots during the Second World War (Note 64*)
- order No. 080 of 03.1941: training period for flight personnel - 9 months in peacetime and 6 months in wartime, flight hours for cadets on training and combat aircraft - 20 hours for fighters and 24 hours for bombers (a Japanese suicide bomber in 1944 had to have 30 hours of flight time) (Note 12*)
- in 1939, the Red Army had 8139 combat aircraft, of which 2225 were fighters (Note 41*)
- in 1939 the USSR produced 28 combat aircraft daily, in 1940 - 29 (Note 70*)
- by the beginning of WW2 - 09/01/1939 the USSR had 12677 combat aircraft (Note 31*)
- as of January 1, 1940, there were 12,540 combat aircraft in the western military districts, excluding long-range bomber aircraft. By the end of 1940, these numbers were almost doubled to 24 thousand combat aircraft. The number of training aircraft alone was increased to 6800 (Note 12*)
- in the summer of 1940 there were 38 air divisions in the Red Army, and by 01/01/1941 there should have been 50 of them (Note 9*)
- in the period from 01/01/1939 to 06/22/1941, the Red Army received 17,745 combat aircraft, of which 3,719 were new types, not inferior in basic parameters to the best Luftwaffe aircraft (Note 43*). According to other data, at the beginning of the Second World War there were 2,739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1 (412 produced as of 06/22/41 - Note 39*), Mig-3 (1094 produced as of 06/22/41 - Note 63*), LAGG-3, Pe-2, half of which (of which 913 Mig-1\3, which amounted to 1\4 of all fighters - Note 63 *) were in the western military districts (Note 11 *). On 06/22/41, 917 Mig-3 (486 pilots were retrained), 142 Yak-1 (156 pilots were retrained), 29 LAGG (90 pilots were retrained) entered the Air Force (Note 4*)
- as of January 1, 1941, the Red Army Air Force numbered 26,392 aircraft, of which 14,628 were combat aircraft and 11,438 were training aircraft. Moreover, 10565 (8392 combat) were built in 1940 (Note 32*)
- as of 06/22/41, the Red Army and Red Army Air Forces numbered 32 thousand aircraft, of which 20 thousand were combat aircraft: 8400 bombers, 11500 fighters and 100 attack aircraft (Note 60*)
- on the eve of the Second World War, there were 20 thousand aircraft in the European part of the USSR, of which 17 thousand were combat aircraft (Note 12*), at the same time, in the Red Army Air Force units of the border military districts there were 7,139 combat aircraft, separately 1,339 long-range bomber aircraft and 1,445 Navy aviation aircraft, which totaled 9917 aircraft
- 1,540 new Soviet fighters, not much inferior to the Messerschmitt Bf-109, were in the western border districts at the beginning of the war. In total, by June 22, 1941, the USSR had 3,719 aircraft of new designs (Note 81*)
- by 07/22/41, the Moscow air defense system had 29 fighter regiments, armed with 585 fighters - approximately the same as the Germans on the entire Eastern Front (Note 19*)
- in June 1941, in the Western Military District there were almost 1,500 I-156 aircraft (1,300 I-153 fighters + 6 regiments of I-153 attack aircraft), which out of 4,226 accounted for 1/3 of all combat aviation in the western districts (Note 68*)
- as of June 22, 1941, the RKKF Air Force had 859 seaplanes, of which 672 were MBR-2 (Note 66*)
- as of June 22, 1941, the RKKF Air Force consisted of 3838 aircraft, 2824 of which were combat aircraft (Note 70*). According to other sources, there were more than 2.5 thousand combat aircraft (Note 66*). According to other data, in total there were 6,700 aircraft in the aviation of the USSR Navy in three fleets (Base Fleet, Black Sea Fleet and Northern Fleet) (Note 77*): Baltic Fleet - 656 combat aircraft, of which 353 were fighters (Note 73*), Black Sea Fleet - 651 (Note 78*) or 632 combat aircraft: 346 fighter aircraft, 73 bomber aircraft; mine-torpedo - 61; reconnaissance - 150 (Note 80*)
- as of June 22, 1941, Soviet naval strike aviation: Baltic Fleet - 81 DB-3\3F, 66 SB and 12 AR-2; Northern Fleet - 11 SB; Black Sea Fleet - 61 DB-3 and 75 SB (Note 62*)
- in June 1941, there were 108 I-153 in the naval aviation of the Baltic Fleet, 73-76 in the Black Sea Fleet and 18 in the Northern Fleet (Note 68*)
- on the eve of the Second World War, 1/4 of the naval aviation of the RKKF consisted of seaplanes, so there were 54 aircraft in the Northern Fleet, 131 in the Baltic Fleet, 167 in the Black Sea Fleet, 216 in the Pacific Fleet (Note 89*)
- with the beginning of the Second World War, 587 aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet were at the front as special-purpose air groups, and then were consolidated into air regiments (Note 92*)
- at the beginning of the Second World War, 79 air divisions and 5 air brigades were formed, of which the Western Military District included 32 air divisions, 119 air regiments and 36 corps squadrons. Long-range bomber aviation in the western direction was represented by 4 air corps and 1 separate air division in the amount of 1,546 aircraft. The number of air regiments by June 1941 increased by 80% compared to the beginning of 1939 (Note 11*)
- The Second World War was met by 5 heavy bomber corps, 3 separate air divisions and one separate regiment of Soviet long-range bomber aviation - about 1000 aircraft, of which 2/3 were lost during the six months of the war. By the summer of 1943, long-range bomber aviation consisted of 8 air corps and numbered more than 1,000 aircraft and crews. (Note 2*)
- by the spring-early summer of 1944, the ADD of the Red Army Air Force consisted of 66 air regiments, united in 22 air divisions and 9 corps, which approximately amounted to 1000 long-range bombers (Note 58*)
- at the beginning of the Second World War, 1528 DB-3 long-range bombers (Note 44*) and 818 TB-3 heavy bombers (Note 41*) were produced
- by the spring of 1942, the USSR reached the pre-war level of aircraft production - at least 1000 combat aircraft per month, from the second half of 1942 it reached the production line of 2500 aircraft per month with a total monthly loss of 1000 aircraft. From June 1941 to December 1944, 97 thousand aircraft were produced (Note 9*)
- as of March 1942, the Red Army Air Force had 19,700 combat aircraft, of which 6,100 were on the fronts and in air defense, 3,400 in rear districts, reserve and marching regiments (without schools), in the Far East - 3,500, in flight and technical schools - 6,700 Of the new types: 2920 aircraft at the front, in reserve and marching regiments, 130 in the Far East, 230 in rear districts and 320 in flight schools. As of this date, there were 4610 faulty vehicles in the Air Force (Note 96*)
- 34 thousand aircraft were produced in the USSR in 1943, 40 thousand in 1944, and in total during the Second World War - 125 thousand aircraft (Note 26*). According to other data, during 1941-45, 115,600 combat aircraft were produced, of which about 20 thousand bombers, 33 thousand attack aircraft and almost 63 thousand fighters (Note 60*)
- from the second half of 1942, reserve aviation corps were created in the Red Army, so from September to the end of 1942, 9 such corps were created, and later - 23 more, each of which consisted of 2-3 divisions (Note 48 *)
- as of June 22, 1942, 85% of all Soviet long-range bomber aviation consisted of 1,789 DB-3 aircraft (from the DB-3f modification it was called IL-4), the remaining 15% were SB-3. These planes did not fall under the first attacks of German aircraft, since they were based relatively far from the border (Note 3*)
- during the years of production (1936-40), 6831 Soviet SB bombers were built (Note 41*)
- 79 (93 - Note 115*) four-engine Pe-8 bombers were produced during the Second World War (Note 104*) and 462 four-engine Er-2 (DB-240) bombers were produced during the Second World War (Note 115*). All of them were used exclusively in ADD (Note 115*)
- 10,292 I-16 biplanes and its modifications were produced from 1934 to 1942
- a total of 201 (600 - according to Yakovlev) Yak-2 and Yak-4 aircraft were produced (Note 82*)
- 16 thousand Yak-9s were produced during the war
- 6528 LAGG-3 fighters were produced during the Second World War (a controversial aircraft in many respects)
- 3172 MiG-1\3 were built in total (Note 63*)
- 36 thousand Il-2 attack aircraft were produced in 1941-45 (Note 41* and 37*) The losses of attack aircraft during the Second World War amounted to about 23 thousand.
- 4863 night bombers ADD Li-2 (Soviet military version of the licensed American Douglas DC-3-186 "Dacota") were produced from the beginning of 1942 until the end of the Second World War (Note 115*). According to other sources, 11 thousand aircraft of this type were produced during this period
- 11 thousand Soviet attack pilots died during the Second World War (Note 25*)
- in 1944, units had two aircraft for each Soviet attack pilot (Note 17*)
- the life of an attack aircraft lasted on average 10-15 sorties, and 25% of the pilots were shot down on the first sortie, while at least 10 sorties were required to destroy one German tank (Note 9*)
- the USSR received about 19,537 combat aircraft under Lend-Lease, of which 13,804 fighters, 4,735 bombers, 709 transport aircraft, 207 reconnaissance seaplanes and 82 training aircraft (Note 60*)
- by the beginning of 1944, the USSR had 11,000 combat aircraft, the Germans had no more than 2,000. During the 4 years of the war, the USSR built 137,271 aircraft (there is also data that from June 1941 to December 1944, 97 thousand combat aircraft were produced) and received 18,865 under Lend-Lease aircraft of all types, of which 638 aircraft were lost during transportation. According to other sources, at the beginning of 1944 there were 6 times more Soviet combat aircraft than all German aircraft (Note 8*)
- on the “heavenly slow-moving vehicle” - U-2vs about 50 air regiments fought during the Second World War (Note 33*)
- from the monograph “1941 - lessons and conclusions”: “... out of 250 thousand sorties carried out by Soviet aviation in the first three months of the war against enemy tank and motorized columns...” June 1942 was a record month for the Luftwaffe , when (according to Soviet VNOS posts) 83,949 sorties of combat aircraft of all types were carried out. In other words, “crushed and destroyed on the ground,” Soviet aviation flew in the summer of 1941 with an intensity that the Germans were able to achieve in only one month during the entire war (Note 13*). Thus, on 08/16/41 alone, the Red Army Air Force (464 combat aircraft, of which 100 were DA bombers) carried out 2,860 sorties (Note 115*)
- during 1942, 6178 (24%) Soviet military pilots died, which is more than 1700 more people than died in 1941 (Note 48*)
- Average survivability of Soviet pilots during the Patriotic War:
fighter pilot - 64 combat missions
attack aircraft pilot - 11 combat missions
Bomber pilot - 48 combat missions
torpedo bomber pilot - 3.8 combat missions (Note 45*)
- the number of combat sorties per combat loss of one aircraft increased for fighters from 28 in 1941-42 to 194 in 1945, for attack aircraft - from 13 to 90, and for bombers - from 14 to 133 (Note 112 *)
- the accident rate in the Red Army Air Force on the eve of the Second World War was enormous - on average, 2-3 planes crashed per day. This situation largely continued during the war. It is no coincidence that during the war, non-combat aircraft losses amounted to over 50% (Note 9*)
- on the first day of the Second World War, 1200 aircraft were lost (Note 78*), 800 of them at airfields (Note 78*,94*), and in two days - 2500 (Note 78*)
- during the first week of the Second World War, the Red Army Air Force lost 4,000 aircraft (Note 64*)
- in 6 months of the Second World War, the USSR lost 20,159 aircraft of all types, of which 16,620 were combat aircraft
- “unaccounted loss” - 5240 Soviet aircraft remaining at airfields after their capture by the Germans in 1941
- the average monthly losses of the Red Army Air Force from 1942 to May 1945 were 1000 aircraft, of which non-combat losses were over 50%, and in 1941 combat losses were 1700 aircraft, and total losses were 3500 per month (Note 9*)
- non-combat losses of Soviet military aviation in the Second World War amounted to 60,300 aircraft (56.7%) (Note 32*)
- in 1944, the losses of Soviet combat aviation amounted to 24,800 aircraft, of which 9,700 were combat losses, and 15,100 were non-combat losses (Note 18*)
- from 19 to 22 thousand Soviet fighters were lost in the Second World War (Note 23*)
- ADD losses during the Second World War amounted to 3570 aircraft: in 1941 - 1592, in 1942 - 748, in 1943 - 516, in 1944 - 554, in 1945 - 160. More than 2 thousand crew members died (Note 115*)
- in accordance with Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 632-230ss dated March 22, 1946 “On the rearmament of the Air Force, Air Defense Fighter Aviation and Naval Aviation with modern domestically produced aircraft”: “...to be removed from service in 1946 and written off: foreign fighter aircraft types, including "Aircobra" - 2216 aircraft, "Thunderbolt" - 186 aircraft, "Kingcobra" - 2344 aircraft, "Kittyhawk" - 1986 aircraft, "Spitfire" - 1139 aircraft, "Hurricane" - 421 aircraft Total: 7392. aircraft and 11,937 obsolete domestic aircraft (Note 1*)

German Air Force:
- during the German offensive of 1917, up to 500 Russian aircraft became German trophies (Note 28*)
- according to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to scrap 14 thousand of its aircraft after the end of WW1 (Note 32*)
- serial production of the first combat aircraft in Nazi Germany began only in 1935-1936 (Note 13*). So in 1934, the German government adopted a plan to build 4,000 aircraft by September 30, 1935. Among them there was nothing but junk (Note 52*): Do-11, Do-13 and Ju-52 bombers had very low flight characteristics (Note 52*)
- 03/01/1935 - official recognition of the Luftwaffe. There were 2 regiments of Ju-52 and Do-23 (Note 52*)
- 771 German fighters were produced in 1939 (Note 50*)
- in 1939, Germany produced 23 combat aircraft daily, in 1940 - 27, and in 1941 - 30 aircraft (Note 32*)
- 09/01/1939 Germany began WW2, having 4093 aircraft (of which 1502 bombers (Note 31*), 400 Ju-52 (Note 75*). According to other sources, the Luftwaffe at the time of the attack on Poland consisted of 4000 combat aircraft: 1,200 Bf-109 fighters, 1,200 medium-range bombers He-111 (789 - Note 94*) and Do-17, about 400 Ju-87 attack aircraft and about 1,200 military transport aircraft, communications aircraft and decommissioned, obsolete aircraft , which could be useful in battles with Polish aircraft (Note 26*)
- in 1940, Germany produced 150 aircraft per month (Note 26*). By the spring of 1942, production reached 160 aircraft per month
- by May 1940, the Luftwaffe had recovered from Polish losses and consisted of 1100 He-111 and Do-17, 400 Ju-87, 850 Bf-109 and Bf-110 (Note 26*)
- in 1940, the Luftwaffe lost 4,000 aircraft and received 10,800 new ones (Note 26*)
- in the summer of 1941, the German aircraft industry monthly produced over 230 single-engine fighters and 350 twin-engine combat aircraft (bombers and fighters) (Note 57*)
- at the end of June 1941, the Luftwaffe in the West had only 140 serviceable Bf-109E-F fighters (Note 35*)
- a little more than 500 Bf-109 had the Luftwaffe in the East to attack the USSR, since the remaining about 1300 aircraft were bombers or attack aircraft (Note 81 *), according to the then Soviet classification, out of 1223 bombers there were 917 horizontal bombers and 306 dive bombers (Note .86*)
- 273 (326 - Note 83*) Ju-87 acted against the USSR, while Poland was attacked by 348 Ju-87 (Note 38*)
- on the eve of the Second World War, Germany had 6,852 aircraft, of which 3,909 aircraft of all types were allocated to attack the USSR. This number included 313 transport aircraft (of which 238 Ju-52 (Note 37*) or 210 Ju-52 (Note 74*) and 326 communications aircraft. Of the remaining 3270 combat aircraft: 965 fighters (almost equally - Bf-109e and BF-109f), 102 fighter-bombers (Bf-110), 952 bombers, 456 attack aircraft and 786 reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32*), which coincides with the data that on 06/22/41 the Luftwaffe included 3904 aircraft for the attack on the USSR of all types (3032 combat): 952 bombers, 965 single-engine fighters, 102 twin-engine fighters and 156 “stukas” (Note 26*) Bf-109; 179 Bf-110 as reconnaissance aircraft and light bombers, 893 bombers (281 He-111, 510 Ju-88, 102 Do-17), attack aircraft - 340 Ju-87 (according to other sources, 273 Ju-87 - Note 38*), reconnaissance aircraft - 120. Total - 2534 (of which about 2000 are combat-ready). According to other data, 06/22/41 Luftwaffe against the USSR: 3904, of which 3032 were combat aircraft: 932 bombers, 965 single-engine fighters, 102 twin-engine fighters. and 156 Ju-87 attack aircraft (Note 26*). And more data on the same topic: 2549 serviceable Luftwaffe aircraft were concentrated against the USSR on June 22, 1941: 757 bombers, 360 dive bombers, 735 fighters and attack aircraft, 64 twin-engine fighters, 633 reconnaissance aircraft, including naval ones (Note 70*). And again about the same thing - according to the Barbarossa plan, 2000 combat aircraft were allocated, of which 1160 bombers, 720 fighters and 140 reconnaissance aircraft (Note 84 *). And also no more than 600 aircraft of the German allies (Note 70*)
- during the first week of the war with the USSR, Luftwaffe losses amounted to 445 aircraft of all types; as of 07/05/1941 - more than 800 combat aircraft (Note 85*); for 4 weeks of battles - 1171 aircraft of all types, for 10 weeks of battles - 2789 aircraft of all types, for 6 months of battles - 3827 combat aircraft only
- in 1941, the Luftwaffe lost 3,000 aircraft in battle (another 2,000 were non-combat losses) and received 12,000 new ones (Note 26*)
- if at the beginning of 1941 the number of Luftwaffe aircraft was 4500, then at the end of the year, as a result of losses and their subsequent replacement, their number did not exceed 5100 (Note 26*)
- from 435 single-engine fighters in the first half of 1942, production increased to more than 750 in the first half of 1943 and to 850 in the second half of 1943 (Note 26*)
- in 1943, the Luftwaffe lost 7,400 aircraft in battle (another 6,000 were non-combat losses) and received 25,000 new ones (Note 26*)
- if at the beginning of 1943 the number of Luftwaffe aircraft was 5,400, then at the end of the year, as a result of losses and their subsequent replacement, their number did not exceed 6,500 (Note 26*)
- as of 05/31/44, the number of single-engine Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front: 444 aircraft of the Reich Air Force, 138 in the 4th Air Force in Ukraine, 66 in the 6th Air Force in Belarus (Note 58 *)
- from 22.06. by 09/27/41, 2631 German aircraft on the Eastern Front were damaged or lost (Note 74*)
- in the summer of 1941, the Germans produced over 230 single-engine fighters per month (Note 26*)
- by 08/16/41, only 135 serviceable Non-111s remained on the Eastern Front (Note 83*)
- in November 1941, due to losses, the number of Bf-109s on the Eastern Front was reduced by 3 times compared to their number in July 1941, which led to the loss of air superiority, first in Moscow, and then in other directions (Note 83 * ), and on 12/01/41 the number of Bf-109Bf-110s became deplorable due to huge losses (Note 55*)
- after the transfer in December 1941 of 250-300 aircraft of the 2nd Air Corps from the Eastern Front for operations in the area of ​​Malta and North Africa, the total number of Luftwaffe on the Soviet front decreased from 2465 aircraft on 12/01/1941 to 1700 aircraft on 12/31/1941. In December of the same 1941, the 10th Air Corps arrived in Sicily from the Eastern Front to carry out attacks on Malta instead of the Italians who did not live up to their hopes (Note 88*). In January 1942, the number of German aircraft decreased further after the transfer of aircraft of the 5th Air Corps to Belgium (Note 29*) Also: starting in the second half of 1941, several elite Lufftwaffe units were transferred from the Eastern Front to the Mediterranean theater of operations (Note 54*)
- at the end of October 1942, the Luftwaffe had 508 fighters on the Eastern Front (389 combat-ready) (Note 35*)
- in 1942, Germany produced 8.4 thousand (of which 800 single-engine fighters - Note 26 *) combat aircraft. According to other sources, the Germans produced only up to 160 aircraft monthly
- in total, as of 06/01/1943, the Germans on the Eastern Front had 2365 bombers (of which 1224 Ju-88 and 760 Non-111) and over 500 Ju-87D attack aircraft (Note 53*)
- at the beginning of November 1943, after the Allied landings in North Africa, the Luftwaffe group in Norway, which acted against the Red Army in the north of the USSR, decreased many times (Note 99*)
- in February 1943, the Germans were for the first time able to produce 2000 combat aircraft per month, and in March - even 2166 (Note 35*)
- in 1943, 24 thousand aircraft were produced (Note 26*), of which 849 fighters were produced on average per month (Note 49*)
- in June 1944 the Luftwaffe lost 10 thousand aircraft in Operation Overlord and another 14 thousand in the next six months - at the end of 1944 the Luftwaffe had no more than 6000 aircraft of all types, and only 1400 of which were fighters (Note 26*)
- from January to June 1944, the Germans produced 18 thousand aircraft, 13 thousand of which were fighters (Note 71*). During 1944, about 40 thousand aircraft were produced, but many of them never took to the skies due to the lack of pilots (Note 26*)
- 5 months before the end of the war, the German aircraft industry was able to produce only 7,500 aircraft (Note 26*)
- in 1945, the share of fighters out of all military aircraft produced in Germany was 65.5%, in 1944 - 62.3% (Note 41*)
- 84,320 aircraft of all types were produced by the Germans in 1941-45 (Note 24*): 35 thousand Bf-109 fighters (Note 14* and 37*), 15,100 (14676 - Note 40* and 37*), Ju bombers -88 (Note 38*), 7300 He-111 bombers (Note 114*), 1433 Me-262 jets (Note 21*),
- in total, 57 thousand German aircraft of all types were destroyed during WW2
- 1190 seaplanes were produced by the German aircraft industry during WW2 (Note 38*): of which 541 Arado 196a
- 2500 communication aircraft "Storch" ("Stork") were built in total. According to other sources, 2871 Fi-156 “Storch” were produced, and in the summer of 1941 the Germans captured the plant producing its Soviet counterfeit copy of the OKA-38 “Storch” (Note 37*)
- a total of 5709 Ju-87 "Stuka" were produced (Note 40*)
- in 1939-45, 20,087 (or almost 20 thousand - Note 69 *) FW-190 fighters were produced, while production reached its peak at the beginning of 1944, when 22 aircraft of this type were produced daily (Note 37 * and 38 * )
- 230 (Note 104*) or 262 (Note 107*) four-engine FW-200C "Condor" were produced before the end of WW2
in 1941, the losses of transport Ju-52s (“Auntie Yu”) for the first time exceeded their production - more than 500 aircraft were lost, and only 471 were produced (Note 40*)
- having produced 3225 transport Ju-52 since 1939 (1939 - 145, 1940 - 388, 1941 - 502, 1942 - 503, 1943 - 887, 1944 - 379 - Note 76 *), the German aircraft industry was forced to stop its production in 1944 (Note .40*)
- if in 1943 1028 transport aircraft were produced, including 887 Ju52/3m, then in 1944 this figure dropped to 443, of which 379 were Ju-52 (Note 75*)
- during the years of WWII, factories in Germany, France and the Czech Republic produced 846 (Note 55*) or 828 (Note 106*) FW-189 ("Rama" - "Owl") for the Luftwaffe
- a total of 780 reconnaissance spotters Hs-126 (“crutch”) were produced (Note 32*). On June 22, 1941, these single-engine parasol biplanes made up the vast majority of the 417 German short-range reconnaissance aircraft assigned to the army and tank corps (Note 34*)
- 1433 Me-262 and 400 Me-163 - the total number of Luftwaffe jet combat aircraft produced by Germany during WW2
- German failed aircraft adopted by the Wehrmacht: 871 (or 860 - Note 108*) Hs-129 attack aircraft (1940), 6500 Bf-110 (6170 - Note 37*), 1500 Me-210 and Me- 410 (Note 15*). The Germans retrained the failed Ju-86 fighter as a strategic reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32*). The Do-217 never became a successful night fighter (364 were produced, of which 200 were produced in 1943) (Note 46*). Produced in quantities of more than 1000 units (according to other sources, only 200 aircraft were produced, another 370 were in various stages of readiness, and parts and components were produced for another 800 aircraft - Note 38*) the German heavy bomber He-177 due to numerous accidents, often simply burned up in the air (Note 41*). The He-129 attack aircraft turned out to be extremely unsuccessful due to difficult controls, weak engine armor, and weak stern weapons (Note 47*)
- during WW2, the Germans produced 198 not entirely successful, heavy six-engine military transport aircraft Me-323 from converted Gigant gliders, at one time intended for landing (could transport 200 paratroopers or a certain number of tanks and 88mm anti-aircraft guns) to the territory England (Note 41* and 38*)
According to other sources, 198 Me-323 "Gigant" of all modifications were produced, another 15 were converted from gliders. Thus, the total number of aircraft built was 213 (Note 74*)
- in 8 months (01.08.40 - 31.03.41) due to accidents and disasters, the Luftwaffe lost 575 aircraft and killed 1368 people (Note 32*)
- the most active Allied pilots flew 250-400 sorties in WW2, while similar figures for German pilots fluctuated between 1000 - 2000 sorties
- by the beginning of WW2, 25% of German pilots had mastered the skill of blind piloting (Note 32*)
- in 1941, a German fighter pilot, leaving flight school, had more than 400 hours of total flight time, of which at least 80 hours were in a combat vehicle. Afterwards, in the reserve air group, the graduate added another 200 hours (Note 36*). According to other sources, each Luftwaffe graduate pilot had to fly 450 hours on his own, at the end of the war only 150. Usually, during the first 100 (!) combat missions, the newcomer was only supposed to observe the battle from the side, study the tactics, habits of the enemy and, if possible, evade from the battle (Note 72*). In 1943, the training time for a German pilot dropped from 250 to 200 hours, which was half that of the British and Americans. In 1944, the training time for a German pilot was reduced to 20 hours of piloting training (Note 26*)
- during the Second World War there were 36 German pilots, each of whom shot down more than 150 Soviet aircraft and about 10 Soviet pilots, each of whom shot down 50 or more German aircraft (Note 9* and 56*). Another 104 German pilots shot down 100 or more enemy aircraft (Note 56*)
- the ammunition of the Bf-109F fighter is enough for 50 seconds of continuous firing from machine guns and 11 seconds from the MG-151 cannon (Note 13*)

Royal Air Force:
- 759 (of which 93 monoplanes) aircraft numbered the British fighter aviation in 1938 (Note 70*)
- if in October 1937 England produced 24 "Spitfire" and 13 "Hurrycane" monthly, then in September 1939 there were already 32 "Spitfire" and 44 "Hurrycane" (Note 79*)
- at the beginning of WW2, the British Air Force had 1000 fighters, just over half of which were modern “Hurrycane” and “Spitfire” (Note 79*)
- 09/01/1939 England began WW2, having 1992 combat aircraft (Note 31*)
- the most popular English bomber 2 MB "Wellington" was produced in the amount of 11,461 aircraft (Note 51*), and "Halifax" - 6,000 aircraft (Note 104*)
- already in August 1940, England was producing twice as many fighters every day as Germany. Their total number subsequently so exceeded the number of pilots that it soon made it possible to transfer some of the aircraft to conservation or transfer them to other countries under Lend-Lease (Note 31*)
- from 1937 to the end of WW2, more than 20 thousand British Spitfire fighters were produced (Note 41*)
- in total, in 1942-44, losses during combat missions over Romania amounted to 44 bombers, while 38 of them were shot down during raids on Ploiesti (Note 27 *)

Air forces of other countries:
- The Hungarian Air Force as of June 26, 1941 had 363 combat aircraft, including 99 Falko CR-42 biplanes purchased from Italy (Note 88*)
- The Italian Air Force at the beginning of WW2 Italy had 664 bombers, of which 48 were Cant Z.506 seaplanes (Note 97*), 612 SM-79 bombers, which accounted for 2/3 of all multi-engine aircraft of the Italian Air Force (Note 93*)
- from 07/10/1940 to 09/08/1943, the Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) lost 6483 aircraft, incl. 3,483 fighters, 2,273 bombers, torpedo bombers and transport aircraft, as well as 277 reconnaissance aircraft. 12,748 people were killed, missing or died from wounds, including 1,806 officers. During the same period, according to official Italian data (more than dubious - editor's note), 4293 enemy aircraft were destroyed during hostilities, of which 2522 were shot down in air battles, and 1771 were destroyed on the ground (Note 65* )
- The French Air Force as of 09/01/1939 had 3335 aircraft (Note 31*): 1200 fighters (of which 557 MS-406 - Note 91*), 1300 bombers (of which 222 modern LeO-451 - Note 98*) , 800 scouts, 110,000 personnel; According to other sources, by September 3, 1939, France had 3,600 aircraft, of which 1,364 were fighters. These included 535 MS.405 and MS.406, 120 MB.151 and MB.152, 169 N.75, two FK.58 and 288 twin-engine R.630 and R.631. To this we can add 410 obsolete fighters D.500, D.501, D.510, Loire-46, Blériot-Spade 510, NiD.622, NiD.629, MS.225. And already on 05/01/1940 its fighter units consisted of 1076 MS.406, 491 MB.151 and MB.152, 206 (about 300 - Note 103*) N.75, 44 S.714 and 65 D.520. 420 of these aircraft could fight on equal terms with the German Bf-109E (Note 95*). 40 V-156F bombers for French naval aviation arrived from the USA (Note 111*)
- The Japanese Air Force in 1942 had 3.2 thousand combat aircraft; During the war years, 2426 twin-engine G4M Mitsubishi bombers were produced (Note 105*)
- The Polish Air Force at the beginning of WW2 consisted of 400 first-line combat aircraft (in combat units), of which 130 R-11 monoplane fighters and 30 R-7 biplane fighters. In total, with reserve and training units, there were 279 fighters (173 P-11 and 106 P-7). (Note 100*) or, according to other sources, had 1900 aircraft (Note 8*). According to German data, the Poles had 1000 combat aircraft (Note 101*)
- The Bulgarian Air Force in 1940 consisted of 580 aircraft (Note 27*)
- Romanian Air Force as of June 22, 1941: 276 combat aircraft, of which 121 fighters, 34 medium and 21 light bombers, 18 seaplanes and 82 reconnaissance aircraft. Another 400 aircraft were in flight schools. It makes no sense to specify types of aircraft due to moral and physical obsolescence. On the eve of the war, the Germans retrained 1,500 Romanian aviation specialists and agreed to supply modern Bf-109U and He-111E to Romania. On the eve of the war, 3 (2 - consisting of 24 aircraft - Note 87 *) squadrons (Note 7 *) were re-equipped with the new Romanian fighter IAR-80. According to other sources, the Romanian Air Force consisted of 672 aircraft on the eve of the attack on the USSR, of which 253 aircraft were allocated to participate in combat operations on the Eastern Front (Note 27*). The Romanian 250 (205 combat-ready) aircraft (among them 35 He-111 bombers - Note 94*) allocated against the USSR were opposed by about 1900 Soviet aircraft (Note 27*). On the eve of WW2, 48 SM-79 bombers were purchased from Italy (Note 93*)
- The Yugoslav Air Force on the eve of WW2 had 45 SM-79 bombers purchased before the war in Italy (Note 93*)
- Belgian Air Force at the beginning of WW2: 30 "Hurrycane" monoplane fighters (half purchased in England), 97 "Fox" Vi two-seat biplane fighters and 22 "Gladiator"-2 biplane fighters built in England, 27 CR-42 biplane fighters Italian-built, 50 Firefly biplane fighters - an English project built in Belgium (Note 102*), as well as 16 Battle bombers built in England (Note 110*)
- The Finnish Air Force at the beginning of WW2 had 50 Fiat G-50 fighters purchased from Italy
- The Dutch Air Force at the beginning of WW2 had 16 Fokker T.V medium bombers, which were completely destroyed during the fighting

OTHER:
- from WW2 four-engine bomber production statistics: if the British were able to produce 6,000 Halifaxes, the Germans - 230 Condors, the USSR - only 79 Pe-8s, then the USA - 12,726 B-17s (Note 104*)
- the weight of a minute salvo (continuous fire for a minute from all types of weapons) of the Yak-1 was 105 kg, La-5 - 136 kg, "Aircobra" - 204 kg (Note 22 *)
- Messerschmitt spent 4,500 man-hours on the production of one Bf-109, while the assembly of one Italian S.200 already took 21 thousand man-hours, or 4.6 times more (Note 65*)
- in the “Battle of England” the Germans lost 1,733 aircraft (Note 30*). According to other sources, losses amounted to 1,792 aircraft, of which 610 Bf-109 (Note 37*) and 395 Non-111 (Note 94*). British losses amounted to 1,172 aircraft: 403 Spitfires, 631 Hurricanes, 115 Blenheims and 23 Defiants (Note 37*). 10% (61 aircraft) of German Bf-109E losses fell into the English Channel due to lack of fuel (Note 79*)
- by the end of September 1940, 448 Hurricanes were shot down, and in October 1940, another 240; during the same two months, 238 Spitfires were shot down and another 135 were damaged (Note 79*)
- more than 200 P-36 fighters (Note 41*) and 40 V-156F bombers (Note 111*) were manufactured by the USA for France before WW2
- September 1944 marks the peak of the number of allied bombers in Europe - more than 6 thousand (Note 36*)
- 250 million aircraft cartridges received under Lend-Lease were melted down (Note 9*)

During the Second World War, the Finns (Air Force-PVO) claim 2,787 (according to other sources, Finnish pilots won 1,809 victories during 1939-44, losing 215 of their aircraft - Note 61*), the Romanians - about 1,500 (about 1,500, having lost 972 people killed, 838 missing and 1167 injured - Note 27 *), the Hungarians - about 1000, the Italians - 150-200 (88 Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air during 18 months of fighting in the USSR according to official statements by the Italian pilots themselves, 15 of their own were lost. In total, 2557 combat missions were carried out, or 72 sorties for each of the destroyed Soviet aircraft (Note 113 *), the Slovaks - for 10 downed Soviet aircraft, another 638 downed Soviet aircraft are listed as combat aircraft. accounts of the Slovak, Croatian and Spanish (164 victories and about 3 thousand sorties - Note 27 *) fighter squadrons. According to other sources, the German allies together shot down no more than 2,400 Soviet aircraft (Note 23 *)
- about 3240 German fighters were destroyed on the Soviet-German front, of which 40 were accounted for by the allies of the USSR (VVS-Air Defense of the Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians since 1944, the French from Normandy-Niemen) (Note 23*)
- on 01/01/1943, 395 German daytime fighters operated against 12,300 Soviet aircraft, on 01/01/1944 - 13,400 and 473, respectively (Note 23*)
- after 1943, from 2/3 to 3/4 of all German aviation countered the aviation of the anti-Hitler coalition in Western Europe (Note 23*) The 14 Soviet air armies formed at the end of 1943 put an end to the dominance of German aviation in the skies of the USSR (Note 9*) . According to other sources, Soviet aviation achieved air superiority in the summer of 1944, while the Allies achieved local air superiority in Normandy in June 1944 (Note 26*)
- losses of Soviet aviation in the first days of the war: 1142 (800 were destroyed on the ground), of which: Western District - 738, Kiev - 301, Baltic - 56, Odessa - 47. Luftwaffe losses in 3 days - 244 (of which 51 in the first day of the war) (Note 20*). According to other sources, as a result of German attacks on 66 front-line airfields and brutal air battles, the Red Army Air Force lost 1,200 aircraft by noon on June 22, 1941 (Note 67*)
- in 1940, 21,447 aircraft engines were produced in the USSR, of which less than 20% were domestic developments. In 1940, the standard repair life of Soviet aircraft engines was 100-150 hours, in reality - 50-70 hours, while this figure in France and Germany was 200-400 hours, in the USA - up to 600 hours (Note 16*)
- at the beginning of the war in the European part of the USSR, the Soviet Air Force had 269 reconnaissance aircraft out of a total number of 8000 aircraft against German 219 long-range and 562 short-range reconnaissance aircraft out of a total number of 3000 aircraft (Note 10*)
- the Allied Air Force in the Mediterranean theater after the fall of Tunisia, estimated at 5,000 aircraft, was opposed by no more than 1,250 Axis aircraft, of which roughly half were German and half were Italian. Of the German aircraft, only 320 were suitable for action, and among them were 130 Messerschmitt fighters of all modifications (Note 8*)
- aviation of the Northern Fleet of the USSR in 1944: 456 combat-ready aircraft, of which 80 were flying boats. German aviation in Norway consisted of 205 aircraft in 1944 (Note 6*)
- the German Air Force in France lost 1401 aircraft, the French only lost fighters - 508 (257 fighter pilots died) (Note 5*)
- 10.20.42 for the first time BW-190 began to operate on the Eastern Front (Note 35*)
- if in September 1939 the French aviation industry produced about 300 combat aircraft monthly, then by May 1940 it reached the milestone of 500 aircraft per month (Note 95*)

Last edition 12/12/2011 17:06

The material was read by 25,155 people

Since the summer of 1944, the Third Reich and its allies went into “blind defense.” The catastrophe in Belarus, the transfer of hostilities on the eastern front beyond the borders of the USSR, the opening of a second front, massive bombing of German territory: everything suggested the inevitable and imminent collapse of the “eternal” Reich. Some local successes of the German armed forces simply prolonged the agony. Germany and its allies were forced to wage a war on two fronts: from the east, the Red Army, whose military power was growing every day, was approaching the original German territories; from the west, Anglo-American troops were advancing, which had a “big grudge” against the Nazis and a huge technical advantage.

In the context of the conduct of hostilities between June 1944 and May 1945, several rather interesting questions arise. How great were the Reich's losses in the personnel of the armed forces and in the main types of military equipment during this period? How were they distributed across theaters of war? Which direction (Western or Eastern) was a priority for the Reich leadership? For those who live in the territory of the former USSR, it would seem that the answer is obvious. But is he true? After all, for those who live in the West and the USA today, the correct answer seems completely different.

On the one hand, there is a “canonized” opinion, the source of which lies in the Soviet interpretation of the events of the Second World War: the main efforts of the Reich Armed Forces and the German allies were concentrated against the Red Army, and they considered the Western Front as secondary. On the other hand, there is an opposite opinion, especially in English-language “pop” historiography, which regards the eastern front as “secondary”.
Let's try to abstract from personal biases, preferences and patriotism, and analyze the distribution of resources in the Reich across theaters of war and their losses during the last year of World War II in Europe. Based on these statistics, we will see which front was considered a higher priority by the German leadership. Simply put, who was Hitler “more afraid of?” Let's start with military equipment.

AVIATION

Combat aviation played a huge role in World War II. Air superiority allowed the opposing sides to inflict significant losses on the enemy, in turn greatly reducing their own. Moreover, the aircraft industry was a kind of “litmus test” for each of the warring countries, showing both the industrial and intellectual potential of the country and the ability to implement it in practice.
We need to start with statistics on the production of aircraft during the Second World War:

According to German data, the German aircraft industry and the industry of the countries occupied by Germany from September 1, 1939 until the end of the war produced 113,515 aircraft of all types, of which 18,235 bombers, 53,729 fighters, 12,359 attack aircraft, 11,546 training aircraft, 1,190 naval aircraft , 3145 transport-landing gliders.

During Soviet times, it was claimed that the Germans lost 77,000 aircraft on the eastern front. The classic work “Soviet Aviation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in Figures” gives more modest figures for the losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front: 1941 - 4200 aircraft, 1942 - 11,550, 1943 - 15,200, 1944 - 17,500 , 1945 - 4,400. Total: 52,850 aircraft.

In the monograph “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed,” a team of authors led by G.F. Krivosheeva contains other data on German Air Force losses on the Eastern Front: 1941 - 4,000 aircraft, 1942 - 11,500 aircraft, 1943 - 19,000, 1944 - 17,500, 1945 - 7,500. Total: 59,500 aircraft of all types. This, so to speak, is the official Russian point of view at this moment.

There is a point of view that differs from our official one. For the first time, the figures for irretrievable/total losses of the German Luftwaffe were made public by a famous aviation historian O. Groiler(Gröller) in the 3rd issue of the magazine “Militaergechichte” back in 1972, based on daily reports of the 6th Department of the Quartermaster General of the Reich Air Force. To say that these data differ from those circulating in Soviet historiography means to say nothing. So, according to these data, aircraft losses for 1941 on the eastern front amount to 2213 irretrievably damaged aircraft and 1435 severely damaged ones. During the period from January to August 1942, 4,561 were destroyed and 3,740 were damaged.

But the fact is that the documents of the 6th department were not completely preserved, since the Luftwaffe archive was mostly destroyed by the Germans themselves. More or less complete data was preserved until December 1943, partially until December 1944, and fragmentarily for 1945. The remainder of the documents were mostly exported to the United States, and only in the 1970s were they returned to the military archives of Germany.

Thus, there is no reliable data on the losses of the German Air Force during the last year of fighting in Europe. However, irretrievable losses on the eastern front suffered precisely during combat missions were known quite accurately. According to Groiler, in 1944 they amounted to: 839 fighters, 1342 bombers and attack aircraft, 376 reconnaissance aircraft. Some domestic “historians” happily clung to these figures and, based on the known losses of the Soviet Air Force, derived a loss ratio of 6:1 in favor of the Germans, and some even managed to get 8:1. However, these “historians” forgot to take into account that all belligerents suffered significant non-combat aviation losses throughout the Second World War. The figure for non-combat losses ranges from 40% in the German Air Force to 50-55% in the Soviet Air Force. In addition, Groyler wrote his work back in 1972, since then several more very detailed studies have been published on the issue of losses of the German Air Force in the period from 1940 to 1945.

At the moment, the most complete and reliable information on Luftwaffe losses and the breakdown of these losses in the theater of operations is contained in the works of Professor Murray and aviation historian Michael Holm.

According to these data, Luftwaffe losses are: on the Eastern Front for the period February - December 1942, 2,955 aircraft destroyed directly in battle, 2,308 aircraft lost “outside enemy influence” and 1,806 aircraft damaged. The total losses of the Luftwaffe on the Soviet-German front amounted to 5,263 aircraft destroyed plus 1,806 damaged, for a total of 7,069 combat vehicles, which is 58% of all Luftwaffe losses in 1942 in relation to all theaters of operations. On all other fronts, 3,806 aircraft were lost permanently and 1,102 damaged, or 4,908 combat vehicles. There are no data on training units for 1942.

Reformatted the topic into a group of sections for each of the main participating countries and cleaned up duplicates, similar information and information that raised open doubts.

Tsarist Russian Air Force:
- during WW1, 120-150 captured German and Austrian aircraft were captured. Most - two-seat reconnaissance aircraft, fighters and twin-engine aircraft were rare (Note 28*)
- at the end of 1917, the Russian army had 91 air squadrons consisting of 1,109 aircraft, of which:
available at the front - 579 (428 serviceable, 137 faulty, 14 obsolete), 237 equipped for the front and 293 in schools. This number did not include up to 35 aircraft of the Airship Squadron, 150 aircraft of naval aviation, aircraft of logistics agencies, 400 aircraft of air fleets and in reserve. The total number of aircraft was estimated at 2200-2500 military aircraft (Note 28*)

USSR Air Force:
- in 1937 there were 18 aviation schools in the Red Army, in 1939 - 32, as of 05/01/1941 - already 100
(Note 32*)
- order No. 080 of 03.1941: training period for flight personnel - 9 months in peacetime and 6 months in wartime, flight hours for cadets on training and combat aircraft - 20 hours for fighters and 24 hours for bombers (a Japanese suicide bomber in 1944 had to have 30 hours of flight time) (Note 12*)
- in 1939, the Red Army had 8139 combat aircraft, of which 2225 were fighters (Note 41*)
- 09/01/1939 the USSR had 12,677 combat aircraft at the beginning of WW2 (Note 31*)
- in the summer of 1940 there were 38 air divisions in the Red Army, and by 01/01/1941 there should have been and there were 50
(Note 9*)
- only in the period from 01/01/1939 to 06/22/1941, the Red Army received 17,745 combat aircraft, of which 3,719 were new types, not inferior in basic parameters to the best Luftwaffe aircraft (Note 43 *). According to other sources, at the beginning of the war there were 2,739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1, MIG-3, LAGG-3, PE-2, half of which were in the western military districts (Note 11*)
- as of January 1, 1940, there were 12,540 combat aircraft in the western military districts, excluding long-range bomber aircraft. By the end of 1940, these numbers were almost doubled to 24 thousand combat aircraft. The number of training aircraft alone was increased to 6800 (Note 12*)
- as of January 1, 1941, the Red Army Air Force numbered 26,392 aircraft, of which 14,628 were combat aircraft and 11,438 were training aircraft. Moreover, 10565 (8392 combat) were built in 1940 (Note 32*)
- at the beginning of the Second World War, 79 air divisions and 5 air brigades were formed, of which the Western Military District included 32 air divisions, 119 air regiments and 36 corps squadrons. Long-range bomber aviation in the western direction was represented by 4 air corps and 1 separate air division in the amount of 1,546 aircraft. The number of air regiments by June 1941 increased by 80% compared to the beginning of 1939 (Note 11*)
- The Second World War was met by 5 heavy bomber corps, 3 separate air divisions and one separate regiment of Soviet long-range bomber aviation - about 1000 aircraft, of which 2\\3 were lost during the six months of the war. By the summer of 1943, long-range bomber aviation consisted of 8 air corps and numbered more than 1,000 aircraft and crews. (Note 2*)
- 1528 DB-3 long-range bombers were built in 1941 (Note 44*)
- 818 TB-3 heavy bombers were launched at the beginning of the Second World War (Note 41*)
- by the beginning of the war there were 2,739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1, MIG-3, LAGG-3, PE-2, half of which were in the western military districts (Note 11*). On 06/22/41, 917 Mig-3 (486 pilots retrained), 142 Yak-1 (156 pilots retrained), 29 Lagg (90 pilots retrained) (Note 4*) entered the Air Force
- in the Red Army Air Force units of the border military districts at the beginning of the war there were 7139 combat aircraft, 1339 long-range bomber aircraft, 1445 in naval aviation, which totaled 9917 aircraft
- on the eve of the war, in the European part of the USSR alone there were 20 thousand aircraft, of which 17 thousand were combat aircraft (Note 12*)
- by the spring of 1942, the USSR reached the pre-war level of aircraft production - at least 1000 combat aircraft per month. From June 1941 to December 1944, the USSR produced 97 thousand aircraft
- from the second half of 1942, Soviet industry reached the production line of 2500 aircraft per month with a total monthly loss of 1000 aircraft (Note 9*)
- as of June 22, 1942, 85% of all Soviet long-range bomber aviation consisted of 1,789 DB-3 aircraft (from the DB-3f modification it was called IL-4), the remaining 15% were SB-3. These planes did not fall under the first attacks of German aircraft, since they were based relatively far from the border (Note 3*)
- during the years of production (1936-40), 6831 Soviet SB bombers were built (Note 41*)
- 10,292 I-16 biplanes and its modifications were produced from 1934 to 1942
- as of June 22, 1941, 412 Yak-1s were produced (Note 39)
- 16 thousand Yak-9s were produced during the war
- IL-2 was the most popular attack aircraft of the Second World War. From 1941 to 1945, 36 thousand of them were produced (Note 41 * and 37 *) The losses of attack aircraft during the war years amounted to about 23 thousand.
- 11 thousand Soviet attack pilots died during the Second World War (Note 25*)
- in 1944, units had two aircraft for each Soviet attack pilot (Note 17*)
- the life of an attack aircraft lasted on average 10-15 sorties, and 25% of the pilots were shot down on the first sortie, while at least 10 sorties were required to destroy one German tank (Note 9*)
- the USSR received 18.7 thousand aircraft from the USA under Lend-Lease (Note 34*), of which: 2243 P-40 "Curtiss", 2771 A-20 "Douglas Boston", 842 B-25 "Mitchell" bombers " from the USA, and 1338 "Supermarine Spitfire" and 2932 "Hurricane" - (Note 26 *) from England.
- by the beginning of 1944, the USSR had 11,000 combat aircraft, the Germans - no more than 2,000. During the 4 years of the war, the USSR built 137,271 aircraft and received 18,865 aircraft of all types, of which 638 aircraft were lost during transportation. According to other sources, at the beginning of 1944 there were 6 times more Soviet combat aircraft than all German aircraft (Note 8*)
- on the “heavenly slow-moving vehicle” - U-2vs about 50 air regiments fought during the Second World War (Note 33*)
- from the monograph “1941 - lessons and conclusions”: “... out of 250 thousand sorties carried out
Soviet aviation in the first three months of the war, against tank and motorized columns of the enemy..." The record month for the Luftwaffe was June 1942, when (according to Soviet VNOS posts) 83,949 sorties of combat aircraft of all types were carried out. In other words, "the defeated and "destroyed on the ground" Soviet aviation flew in the summer of 1941 with an intensity that the Germans were able to achieve in only one month during the entire war (Note 13*)
- Average survivability of Soviet pilots during the Patriotic War:
fighter pilot - 64 combat missions
attack aircraft pilot - 11 combat missions
Bomber pilot - 48 combat missions
torpedo bomber pilot - 3.8 combat missions (Note 45*)
- the accident rate in the Red Army Air Force on the eve of the Second World War was enormous - on average, 2-3 planes crashed per day. This situation largely continued during the war. It is no coincidence that during the war, non-combat aircraft losses were over 50% (Note 9*)
- “unaccounted loss” - 5240 Soviet aircraft remaining at airfields after their capture by the Germans in 1941
- the average monthly losses of the Red Army Air Force from 1942 to May 1945 were 1000 aircraft, of which non-combat losses were over 50%, and in 1941 combat losses were 1700 aircraft, and total losses were 3500 per month (Note 9*)
- non-combat losses of Soviet military aviation in the Second World War amounted to 60,300 aircraft (56.7%) (Note 32*)
- in 1944, the losses of Soviet combat aviation amounted to 24,800 aircraft, of which 9,700 were combat losses, and 15,100 were non-combat losses (Note 18*)
- from 19 to 22 thousand Soviet fighters were lost in the Second World War (Note 23*)
- in accordance with Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 632-230ss dated March 22, 1946 “On the rearmament of the Air Force, Air Defense Fighter Aviation and Naval Aviation with modern domestically produced aircraft”: “...to be removed from service in 1946 and written off: foreign fighter aircraft types, including Airacobra - 2216 aircraft, Thunderbolt - 186 aircraft, Kingcobra - 2344 aircraft, Kittyhawk - 1986 aircraft, Spitfire - 1139 aircraft, Hurricane - 421 aircraft Total: 7392 aircraft. and 11937 obsolete domestic aircraft (Note 1*)

German Air Force:
- during the German offensive of 1917, up to 500 Russian aircraft became German trophies (Note 28*)
- according to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to scrap 14 thousand of its aircraft after the end of WW1 (Note 32*)
- serial production of the first combat aircraft in Nazi Germany began only in 1935-1936 (Note 13*). So in 1934, the German government adopted a plan to build 4,000 aircraft by September 30, 1935. Among them there was nothing but old stuff (Note 52*)
- 03/01/1935 - official recognition of the Luftwaffe. There were 2 regiments of Ju-52 and Do-23 (Note 52*)
- 771 German fighters were produced in 1939 (Note 50*)
- in 1939, Germany produced 23 combat aircraft daily, in 1940 - 27, and in 1941 - 30 aircraft (Note 32*) By the spring of 1942, Germany was producing up to 160 aircraft per month
- 09/01/1939 Germany began WW2 with 4093 aircraft (of which 1502 were bombers) (Note 31*)
- on the eve of the Second World War, Germany had 6,852 aircraft, of which 3,909 aircraft of all types were allocated to attack the USSR. This number included 313 transport personnel and 326 communications aircraft. Of the remaining 3,270 combat aircraft: 965 fighters (almost equally - Bf-109e and BF-109f), 102 fighter-bombers (Bf-110), 952 bombers, 456 attack aircraft and 786 reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32 *). According to other sources, on June 22, 1941 the Germans concentrated against the USSR; 1037 (of which 400 are combat-ready) Bf-109 fighters; 179 Bf-110 as reconnaissance aircraft and light bombers, 893 bombers (281 He-111, 510 Ju-88, 102 Do-17), attack aircraft - 340 Ju-87, reconnaissance aircraft - 120. Total - 2534 (of which about 2000 combat-ready ). As well as 1000 aircraft of the German allies
- after the transfer in December 1941 of 250-300 aircraft of the 2nd Air Corps from the USSR for operations in the area of ​​Malta and North Africa, the total number of Luftwaffe on the Soviet front decreased from 2465 aircraft on 12/01/1941 to 1700 aircraft on 12/31/1941. In January 1942, the number of German aircraft decreased further after the transfer of aircraft of the 5th Air Corps to Belgium (Note 29*)
- in 1942, Germany produced 8.4 thousand combat aircraft. According to other sources, the Germans produced only up to 160 aircraft monthly
- in 1943, Germany produced 849 fighters on average per month (Note 49*)
- 84,320 aircraft of all types were produced in Germany in 1941-45. (Note 24*) - in total, 57 thousand German aircraft of all types were destroyed during WW2
- 1190 seaplanes were produced by the German aircraft industry during WW2 (Note 38): of which 541 Arado 196a
- 2,500 Storch communications aircraft were built in total. According to other sources, 2871 Fi-156 "Storch" ("Stork") were produced, and in the summer of 1941 the Germans captured the plant producing its Soviet counterfeit copy of the OKA-38 "Stork" (Note 37*)
- the German Ju-88 bomber was produced with a total of 15,100 aircraft (Note 38*)
- 1433 Me-262 jets were produced in Germany during WW2 (Note 21*)
- a total of 5709 Ju-87 Stuka (Note 40*) and 14676 Ju-88 (Note 40* and 37*) were produced
- in 1939-45, 20,087 FW-190 fighters were produced, while production reached its peak at the beginning of 1944, when 22 aircraft of this type were produced daily (Note 37 * and 38 *)
- during WW2, 35 thousand German Bf-109 fighters were produced (Note 14* and 37*)
- having produced 3225 transport Ju-52 ("Auntie Yu") since 1939, the German aircraft industry was forced to stop its production in 1944 (Note 40*)
- during the war years, Czech airlines produced 846 “frames” - FB-189 fire spotters - for the Luftwaffe. In the USSR this type of aircraft was not produced at all.
- a total of 780 reconnaissance spotters Hs-126 (“Crutch”) were produced (Note 32*)
- German failed aircraft adopted by the Wehrmacht: 871 Hs-129 attack aircraft (1940), 6500 Bf-110 (6170 - Note 37*), 1500 Me-210 and Me-410 (Note 15*). The Germans retrained the failed Ju-86 fighter as a strategic reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32*). The Do-217 never became a successful night fighter (364 were produced, including 200 in 1943) (Note 46*). Produced in quantities of more than 1000 units (according to other sources, only 200 aircraft were produced, another 370 were in various stages of readiness, and parts and components were produced for another 800 aircraft - Note 38*) the German heavy bomber He-177 due to numerous accidents, often simply burned up in the air (Note 41*). The He-129 attack aircraft turned out to be extremely unsuccessful due to difficult controls, weak engine armor, and weak stern weapons (Note 47*)
- in 1945, the share of fighters out of all military aircraft produced in Germany was 65.5%, in 1944 - 62.3% (Note 41*)
- during WW2, the Germans produced 198 not entirely successful, heavy six-engine military transport aircraft Me-323 from converted "Giant" gliders, which at one time were intended for landing (they could transport 200 paratroopers or a certain number of tanks and 88mm anti-aircraft guns) to the territory England (Note 41* and 38*)
- in 1941, the losses of Ju-52 transports for the first time exceeded their production - more than 500 aircraft were lost, and only 471 were produced (Note 40 *)
- 273 Ju-87s operated against the USSR, while Poland was attacked by 348 Ju-87s (Note 38*)
- in 8 months (01.08.40 - 31.03.41) due to accidents and disasters, the Luftwaffe lost 575
aircraft and killed 1368 people (Note 32*)
- the most active Allied pilots flew 250-400 sorties in WW2, while similar figures for German pilots fluctuated between 1000 - 2000 sorties
- by the beginning of WW2, 25% of German pilots had mastered the skill of blind piloting (Note 32*)
- in 1941, a German fighter pilot, leaving flight school, had more than 400 hours of total experience
flight time, of which at least 80 hours - on a combat vehicle. After graduating from the reserve air group
added another 200 hours (Note 32*)
- during the Second World War there were 36 German pilots, each of whom shot down more than 150 Soviet aircraft and about 10 Soviet pilots, each of whom shot down 50 or more German aircraft (Note 9*)
- the ammunition of the Bf-109F fighter is enough for 50 seconds of continuous firing from machine guns and 11 seconds from the MG-151 cannon (Note 13*)
- the V-2 rocket consisted of 45 thousand parts; Germany was able to produce up to 400 rockets of this type maximum monthly
- out of 4,300 V-2 missiles, more than 2,000 exploded on the ground or in the air during launch or came out of
building during the flight. Only 50% of the missiles hit a circle with a diameter of 10 km (Note 27*). In total, 2,419 V-missile attacks were recorded on London, and 2,448 on Antwerp. Of those fired at targets, 25% of the missiles reached their target. A total of 30 thousand V-1 missiles were produced. In 1945, the speed of V-1 missiles reached about 800 km/h. (Note 9*)
- 06/14/1944 the first V-2 fell on London. Of the 10,492 V-2s fired at London, 2,419 reached the target. Another 1,115 rockets exploded in Southern England (Note 35*)
- by the end of 1944, 8696, 4141 and 151 V-2s were produced from the He-111 (N-22) carrier aircraft in Antwerp, London and Brussels, respectively (Note 35*)

US Air Force:
- after WW1, in November 1918, the United States had 1,172 “flying boats” in service (Note 41*)
- 09/01/1939 the United States had 1576 combat aircraft at the beginning of WW2 (Note 31*)
- during WW2, the US aviation industry produced over 13 thousand Warhawks, 20 thousand Wildcats and Hellcats, 15 thousand Thunderbolts and 12 thousand Mustangs (Note 42*)
- 13 thousand American B-17 bombers were produced in WW2 (Note 41*)

Royal Air Force:
- the most popular English bomber, MV 2 Wellington, was produced in the amount of 11,461 aircraft (Note 51*)
- 09/01/1939 England began WW2, having 1992 combat aircraft (Note 31*)
- already in August 1940 England was producing twice as many fighters every day as
Germany. Their total number subsequently exceeded the number of pilots so much that
soon made it possible to transfer some of the aircraft to conservation or transfer them to other countries under Lend-Lease (Note 31*)
- from 1937 to the end of WW2, more than 20 thousand British Spitfire fighters were produced (Note 41*)

Air forces of other countries:
- 09/01/1939 France began WW2 with 3335 aircraft (Note 31*): 1200 fighters, 1300 bombers, 800 reconnaissance aircraft, 110,000 personnel
- in 1942 Japan 3.2 thousand combat aircraft
- in total, the Polish Air Force had 1900 aircraft at the beginning of the war (Note 8*)
- Romanian Air Force as of June 22, 1941: 276 combat aircraft, of which 121 fighters, 34 medium and 21 light bombers, 18 seaplanes and 82 reconnaissance aircraft. Another 400 aircraft were in flight schools. It makes no sense to specify types of aircraft due to moral and physical obsolescence. Romanian 250 (205 combat-ready) aircraft allocated against the USSR were opposed by about 1,900 Soviet aircraft. On the eve of the war, the Germans retrained 1,500 Romanian aviation specialists and agreed to supply modern Bf-109u and He-110e to Romania. On the eve of the war, 3 squadrons were re-equipped with the new Romanian fighter IAR-80 (Note 7*)

OTHER:
- in the “Battle of England” the Germans lost 1,733 aircraft (Note 30*). According to other sources, losses amounted to 1,792 aircraft, of which 610 were Bf-109s. British losses amounted to 1,172 aircraft: 403 Spitfires, 631 Hurricanes, 115 Blenheims and 23 Defiants (Note 37*)
- more than 200 US P-36 fighters were manufactured for France before WW2 (Note 41*)
- September 1944 marks the peak of the number of allied bombers in Europe - more than 6 thousand (Note 36*)
- 250 million aircraft cartridges received under Lend-Lease were melted down (Note 9*)
- during the Second World War, the Finns (Air Force-PVO) claim 2,787, the Romanians - about 1,500, the Hungarians - about 1,000, the Italians - 150-200, the Slovaks - 10 downed Soviet aircraft. Another 638 shot down Soviet aircraft are listed in the combat accounts of the Slovak, Croatian and Spanish fighter squadrons. According to other sources, the German allies together shot down no more than 2,400 Soviet aircraft (Note 23*)
- about 3240 German fighters were destroyed on the Soviet-German front, of which 40 were accounted for by the allies of the USSR (VVS-Air Defense of the Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians since 1944, the French from Normandy-Niemen) (Note 23*)
- on 01/01/1943, 395 German daytime fighters operated against 12,300 Soviet aircraft, on 01/01/1944 - 13,400 and 473, respectively (Note 23*)
- after 1943, from 2\\3 to 3\\4 of all German aviation countered the aviation of the anti-Hitler coalition in Western Europe (Note 23*) The 14 Soviet air armies formed at the end of 1943 put an end to the dominance of German aviation in the skies of the USSR (Note 9* )
- losses of Soviet aviation in the first days of the war: 1142 (800 were destroyed on the ground), of which: Western District - 738, Kiev - 301, Baltic - 56, Odessa - 47. Luftwaffe losses in 3 days - 244 (of which 51 in first day of the war) (Note 20*)
- on June 22, 1941, the Germans allocated 3 bombers to attack each Soviet military airfield. The strike was carried out with 2-kilogram SD-2 fragmentation bombs. The radius of destruction of the bomb is 12 meters with 50-200 fragments. A direct hit from such a bomb was equivalent to a medium-power anti-aircraft shell (Note 22*) The Stuka attack aircraft carried 360 SD-2 bombs (Note 19*)
- in 1940, 21,447 aircraft engines were produced in the USSR, of which less than 20% were domestic developments. In 1940, the standard repair life of Soviet aircraft engines was 100-150 hours, in reality - 50-70 hours, while this figure in France and Germany was 200-400 hours, in the USA - up to 600 hours (Note 16*)
- at the beginning of the war in the European part of the USSR, the Soviet Air Force had 269 reconnaissance aircraft out of a total number of 8000 aircraft against German 219 long-range and 562 short-range reconnaissance aircraft out of a total number of 3000 aircraft (Note 10*)
- the Allied Air Force in the Mediterranean theater after the fall of Tunisia, estimated at 5,000 aircraft, was opposed by no more than 1,250 Axis aircraft, of which roughly half were German and half were Italian. Of the German aircraft, only 320 were suitable for action, and among them were 130 Messerschmitt fighters of all modifications (Note 8*)
- aviation of the Northern Fleet of the USSR in 1944: 456 combat-ready aircraft, of which 80 were flying boats. German aviation in Norway consisted of 205 aircraft in 1944 (Note 6*)
- the German Air Force in France lost 1401 aircraft, the French only lost fighters - 508 (257 fighter pilots died) (Note 5*)

This article examines Israeli and Syrian air force losses during the 1982 Lebanon War. Chronologically, the review is limited to the period from June 11, 1982, which accounted for the bulk of the fighting between the armed forces of the two countries. All statistics relate to losses of combat aircraft (that is, helicopter losses are not specifically considered).

War Review

Operation Peace of Galilee (also known as the First Lebanon War or the Israeli invasion of Lebanon), which took place from June to August 1982, was not a “classic” Arab-Israeli military conflict. Unlike all previous Middle Eastern wars, the main enemy of the Israeli army in 1982 was not the regular Arab armed forces, but paramilitary militias, primarily the armed wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Although the Palestinian forces were organized into three "divisions" equipped with heavy weapons (including tanks), they were inferior in combat capabilities to regular units.

The initially declared goal of the Israeli operation in Lebanon was to create a 40-kilometer security zone in the south of the country in order to stop rocket attacks on the northern regions of Israel (Galilee). The invasion began on June 6 and took place in three directions. The Israeli leadership intended to avoid armed clashes with the Syrian peacekeeping forces stationed in Lebanon since 1976; The Syrians also initially took measures to prevent possible military contacts with the Israelis. However, very soon Israeli units encountered resistance from the Syrians in the Central and then in the Western directions. In view of this, it was decided to strike a large Syrian group in the Bekaa Valley, which posed a threat to the right flank of Israeli forces. On June 9, the Israeli army attacked the Syrian positions and achieved significant (though not complete) success within two days. These battles took place with the active use of armored vehicles and combat aircraft by both sides.

At noon on June 11, a truce came into force in the Eastern and Central directions, but fighting continued in the Western direction (without the use of large ground forces and aviation by Syria). A few days later, Israeli troops reached the southern approaches to Beirut. In fact, now the talk was about eliminating the presence of the PLO in Lebanon, which contradicted the initial statements of the Israeli leadership and was perceived very ambiguously in Israel itself. The siege of Beirut lasted two months (until the end of August). Under military pressure from Israel, the PLO was forced to agree to the evacuation of its forces from Lebanon, which marked the end of Operation Peace to Galilee. Subsequent events (the murder of Bashir Gemayel, the tragedy of Sabra and Shatila, the entry of international forces into Lebanon, the signing of the Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty) significantly complicated the situation; The Israeli army was drawn into the fight against the guerrilla movement in the occupied areas of Lebanon. Politically, the Lebanon campaign was the most unpopular war in Israeli history up to that time and significantly damaged the country's international prestige. In -1985, the bulk of the Israeli forces were withdrawn from the country; later (from June 1985 to May 2000), a “security strip” remained under the control of the IDF - 850 km² in the south of the country (8% of the territory of Lebanon).

Brief historiography

Israeli air losses

Israeli aviation losses according to Israeli data

With reference to official Israeli data, Oleg Granovsky writes that during the period under review, the country’s air force lost 1 aircraft. It was an A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft, shot down on the morning of June 6 by Palestinian militants using MANPADS. Its pilot ejected and was captured, where he spent two and a half months. In addition, during the battles with Syrian aviation, two F-15 fighters were damaged (one was shot down by an R-60 missile that hit the nozzle of one of the engines, the second was damaged by a close explosion of the MiG-21 it shot down), but both of them returned safely to base. Granovsky notes that information about damaged aircraft may be incomplete.

After June 11, two more aircraft were lost. The Kfir fighter-bomber was damaged by a Syrian anti-aircraft missile on June 13 and crashed during landing (the pilot successfully ejected). An F-4 Phantom II reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by two anti-aircraft missiles on July 24, killing one crew member and capturing another.

The victories of Syrian aviation over Israeli aircraft are listed in sufficient detail in the works of V. Ilyin (“MiG-23 in the Middle East” and “Multipurpose fighters of foreign countries”):

• June 7- two planes were shot down (both F-16s)
• June 8- three aircraft were shot down (one F-16, two A-4)
• the 9th of June- six aircraft were shot down (two F-15s, two F-16s, one F-4, one Kfir)
• June 10th- ten aircraft were shot down (including at least three F-15s and one F-16; the types of other aircraft were not disclosed)
• June 11- three planes were shot down (all three were F-4s)

According to Ilyin, the Syrian Air Force shot down 24 Israeli aircraft in five days, including five F-15s, six F-16s, four F-4s, two A-4s, one Kfir and six aircraft whose types are not established (at least case, they were not named by V. Ilyin). At the same time, according to G. Yashkin, at a meeting between Hafez Assad and the leadership of the General Staff, it was reported that in four days of fighting, Syrian aviation shot down 23 enemy aircraft. The reason for the discrepancies remains unclear, but in any case, we can say that according to Soviet (and possibly Syrian) data, the Syrian Air Force shot down 23 or 24 Israeli aircraft in air battles.

However, V. Ilyin, summing up the work of Syrian fighter aircraft, reports that it shot down 42 Israeli aircraft during the period under review. Thus, he contradicts both his own list of Syrian victories, given in two sources, and the data of the main military adviser in Syria. Moreover, this figure is given in most of his publications (see, for example, the sections on the F-15 and F-16 aircraft in the illustrated reference book “Combat Aviation of Foreign Countries”). Only in his early work “Fighters” (1996), written together with M. Levin, he twice (in articles about the MiG-23 and F-16) talks about 23 Israeli losses in air battles. This figure is also present in the article “MiG-23 in the Middle East,” but here, three paragraphs later, it talks about 42 shot down. One way or another, the figure of 42 planes shot down by Syrian aircraft is not confirmed by anything, contradicts known factual information and can hardly be considered plausible and reflective of the data of Soviet military advisers in Syria.

Syrian air losses

The most complete data on the losses of Syrian aviation during this period are given in Ilyin’s book “Fighters of Foreign Countries” and are confirmed by a number of other publications:

• MiG-21 - 37 aircraft lost (including 26 MiG-21bis and 11 MiG-21MF)
• MiG-23 - 24 aircraft lost (including 6 MiG-23MS, 4 MiG-23MF and 14 MiG-23BN)
• Su-22M - 7 aircraft lost

It should be noted that according to the chief military adviser in Syria, G. Yashkin, in just one day, June 10, the Syrian Air Force lost 4 MiG-23MF and 8 MiG-23MS (that is, more than according to Ilyin for the entire period of fighting).

Thus, the Syrian Air Force lost 68 aircraft in total. V. Ilyin claims that all these losses were suffered in air battles, and even attributes all the downed MiG-23BN and Su-22 to the account of Israeli F-16s, but this statement is erroneous. As O. Granovsky points out, in his other book (“MiG-29, Mirage-2000, F-16. Stars of the fourth generation”), Ilyin speaks only about nine MiG-23BNs shot down by F-16s. The article by V. Markovsky “Hot June 1982” provides information about the circumstances of the loss of all fourteen MiG-23BN. For most aircraft, the reason for the loss is indicated rather unclearly (probably in some cases it was not established by the Syrians themselves), the loss of several aircraft is attributed to the actions of Israeli air defense systems, and only for one MiG-23BN the cause of loss is clearly indicated as a defeat by a missile fired by an F- fighter 16. The article by O. Granovsky describes the case of the Israeli air defense shooting down one MiG-21. Of the seven Su-22s lost by the Syrians, three aircraft, according to A. Yavorsky’s article “Sukhoi are on fire,” were damaged by fragments of bombs dropped from the leading aircraft, after which the pilots of all three aircraft ejected; It is interesting that all three aircraft are officially listed as lost from enemy anti-aircraft fire. Another Su-22 crashed due to lack of fuel while returning to the airfield. In addition, Yavorsky reports that 12 Syrian aircraft out of the total losses were shot down by their own air defense (V. Markovsky, citing Soviet military advisers, gives a less categorical estimate - 10-12 aircraft).

Due to these ambiguities, it is impossible to determine how many Syrian aircraft were shot down by enemy fighters and how many were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, although such an attempt was made. The book by Ilyin and Levin “Fighters” (1996) states that Syria lost 67 aircraft (this should include helicopters in the figure), including 47 in air battles and 20 from Israeli air defense systems. Most likely, this assessment is based on an early article by G. Yashkin. The following remarks can be made here. Firstly, there is a discrepancy with modern sources in the total number of losses (67 aircraft compared to 68 aircraft, and it is known that Syria actually lost several helicopters - according to Yavorsky, 18 Gazelles). Secondly, the number of losses from enemy air defense systems is clearly overestimated (see Israeli statistics below) - losses from their own air defense could have been included in it. Thirdly, it is indicated above that, for example, for the MiG-23BN attack aircraft, the reasons for the loss may not be named in all cases. Due to these circumstances, G. Yashkin’s data on losses of Syrian aviation in air battles and from fire from the ground may be questionable.

Syrian aviation losses according to Israeli estimates

The number of air victories of the Israeli Air Force in battles with Syrian aircraft in June 1982 is usually stated as "more than 80". Those sources that try to provide an exact number often contradict each other. According to the most plausible data given by Granovsky, in total, in the period 6-11.6.1982, Israeli aircraft shot down 82 aircraft, including 80 enemy aircraft and 2 helicopters:

• F-15s shot down 36 planes and 1 helicopter
• F-16s shot down 43 planes and 1 helicopter
• F-4s shot down 1 plane

By day it looks like this:

• June 7- 1 plane shot down
• June 8- 3 planes shot down
• the 9th of June- 29 aircraft shot down
• June 10th- 29 planes and 1 helicopter shot down
• June 11- 18 planes and 1 helicopter shot down

By the end of June, Israeli aircraft shot down two more Syrian aircraft (a total of 84 aircraft in June), and over the entire summer - 87 aircraft. Some publications talk about 102 air victories of the Israeli Air Force during the Lebanon War. In fact, it is known that in the period from June 27, 1979 (the first air battle over Lebanon) to June 11, 1982 (the cessation of active air war), Israeli pilots were officially credited with 103 victories over enemy aircraft.

It is not possible to determine how many aircraft of which types were shot down by the F-15 and F-16. Some English-language sources allow you to collect such statistics, but their reliability and accuracy will be unsatisfactory.

Regarding other losses of Syrian aviation, Granovsky, with reference to the book “Fighters over Israel,” reports that for the entire June 1982, the Israeli ground forces and air defense counted 7 downed enemy aircraft, including helicopters, and 3 more enemy aircraft were lost for unknown reasons ( double counting is possible here). In total, Israeli statistics report the loss of approximately 90 aircraft by the Syrians in June.

Overall loss estimate

As can be seen from the above statistics, in the period from June 6 to June 11, 1982, the Israeli Air Force admitted the loss of 1 combat aircraft in Lebanon, while the Syrian side announced the destruction of 50-51 aircraft (23-24 in air battles and 27 by air defense fire) . During the same period, the Syrian Air Force admitted the loss of 68 combat aircraft, but the Israeli side reported the destruction of 80 aircraft in air battles and up to 7 aircraft by air defense fire (there is no data confirming that all 7 aircraft, including helicopters, were shot down in period under review).

Information about one's own losses, as a rule, is quite accurate, unless we are talking about cases of military propaganda. Information about air victories won is much less accurate; this is often associated not only with propaganda, but also with completely objective circumstances that make it difficult to determine the fate of an attacked or damaged enemy aircraft. For example, in Igor Seydov’s study “Red Devils in the Skies of Korea” (M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007), dedicated to the Korean War, there are many cases when both American and Soviet pilots confidently chalked up an enemy aircraft, actually returned safely to his airfield. There were also opposite cases when the pilot did not even suspect that the plane he had shot down crashed as a result of the damage received or was written off.

V. Ilyin describes the balance of capabilities of the parties during air battles over Lebanon as follows:

Some advantage in air battles in favor of Israel can be explained, in addition to the difference in the combat capabilities of aircraft, by the wider use of AWACS and electronic warfare aircraft, better developed tactics for the combat use of fighter aircraft, as well as higher flight and tactical training of Israeli fighter pilots.

Therefore:

To this we can add that Israeli aviation had a significant numerical superiority. The most modern Syrian fighters were 24 MiG-23MF, which the Israeli Air Force countered with about 40 F-15s and about 70 F-16s. All these factors explain why, even according to Soviet data, the results of the air war were in favor of the Israelis. As stated above, the Syrian pilots were credited with destroying five F-15s, six F-16s, and six more unspecified aircraft. It is unlikely that all six unidentified aircraft were F-15 and F-16 fighters, but even if this possibility is accepted, it turns out that Israel lost from 11 to 17 fighter-class aircraft (Kfirs and Skyhawks were used exclusively in the role attack aircraft, and “Phantoms” were involved in air battles only sporadically). If we take into account that the losses of Syrian fighter aviation amounted to 47 aircraft (six MiG-23MF, four MiG-23MS, thirty-seven MiG-21, of which one was shot down by Israeli anti-aircraft units and, possibly, several more by their own air defense), it turns out that that the ratio of fighter losses ranged from 1:2.5 to 1:4 in favor of the Israeli Air Force. Of course, even such statistics contradict official Israeli figures.

The official assessment of the air victories of the Israeli Air Force is generally confirmed by modern data from Russian military experts (Colonel Pyotr Moiseenko, Candidate of Military Sciences; Major General Valentin Tarasov, Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor), who report that in the first week of fighting, 86 Syrian aircraft were shot down. However, establishing performance for the F-15 and F-16 fighters is difficult. Israeli data suggests approximately equal numbers of victories for both types (36 and 43, respectively, excluding helicopters), despite the fact that the F-16 was twice as large as the F-15. This cannot be traced from Soviet data due to their incompleteness (in particular, it is impossible to establish what type of aircraft were used to shoot down the MiG-23MF pilots Nazakh, Said and Zofie on June 9, and it is also doubtful who shot down the pilot Dib). There are also obvious errors in Soviet statistics: for example, the MiG-23MF, lost on June 8, is considered to be shot down by an F-16, but O. Granovsky reports that all three victories that day were won by F-15s.

According to independent researcher Tom Cooper, Syrian MiG-21 fighters claim 2 confirmed air victories (1 Kfir and 1 Phantom). According to researcher Efim Gordon, the Syrians also claim 2 air victories. .

David Nicol's book "Arab MiG-19s and MiG-21s in Combat" contains a photograph of the wreckage of a Phantom shot down by a MiG-21 on June 10.

According to researchers Steve Davis and Doug Dildy, Syria lost 88 aircraft. Israeli losses are estimated at 1 F-16, 1 F-4, 1 Kfir, 2 A-4 and several helicopters.