Moscow State University named after. M. V. Lomonosova
History department
The problem of the Caribbean crisis in historiography
Report on Russian history
3rd year students
Departments of IODiPP
Tsaryuk Lyudmila
Seminar leader:
Shchetinov Yu.A.
Introduction
Characteristics of sources
Historiography
1. Balance of power
2. Actions
3. Conflict resolution
Conclusion
List of references and sources
Caribbean crisis war nuclear missile
Introduction
“The Caribbean crisis” is what Russian historiography calls one of the most intense moments of the Cold War, which occurred in October 1962. "During the 13-day crisis in October 1962, events almost got out of the control of both the White House and the Kremlin. A nuclear war could have started without and contrary to the will of the leaders of the United States and the USSR." This was by far the most dangerous crisis in the last 40 years. Thus, it is important to trace and evaluate the events that led to such critical consequences and, moreover, the reasons why the world managed to miraculously avoid nuclear war and end the conflict peacefully. This is precisely the main goal of this work. To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set: to consider the relations between three countries - the USSR, Cuba and the USA - and determine the reasons for the rapprochement of the first two; understand the reasons that prompted N.S. Khrushchev to such drastic measures as the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba; restore the course of events from the beginning of the conflict until it was resolved peacefully.
Characteristics of sources
There are quite a lot of sources on the Cuban Missile Crisis, the problem is that not all of them are available. For this reason, one has to turn to published sources, and these are, for the most part, memoirs of direct participants in the events. The main feature of this kind of sources is that historical events are interpreted in them on the basis of the authors’ own experience, described as they were experienced and felt by them themselves as contemporaries and eyewitnesses.
First we need to look at the memories. Soviet leader, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - N.S. Khrushchev. Undoubtedly, his memoirs are the most valuable material for studying this topic, since this man was not only an outside observer of the crisis, but also a direct participant in it. However, it should be noted that Khrushchev wrote his memoirs while retired, that is, many years after the events described, therefore, one must approach his work with some caution. In his memoirs we can find many examples when the author himself admits to an incomplete presentation of events due to the passage of time: “I don’t have materials at hand now and am describing everything solely from memory, although the essence of the matter stands out in my memory,” “I dictate everything is from memory, even without notes, so if some photographic plate, which has not yet appeared in my memory, appears, I may have a desire to continue...”, “... I would have to return to the print of that time, but I’m like that I don’t have the opportunity."
In addition, it should be noted that the emphasis in his memoirs is placed somewhat differently than we would like. This means that Khrushchev attaches great importance to the transmission of his conversations with J. Kennedy and F. Castro, and important events are mentioned by him in passing, or not mentioned at all. To this we can add the fact that the author counted on wide circle readers, so in many ways I tried to justify some of my mistakes and miscalculations. “I lived through it and remember everything well, because from beginning to end I was primarily responsible for this action, was its initiator and formulated all the correspondence that we had with the president. It is a consolation for me now that we generally did the right thing and accomplished a great revolutionary deed, were not afraid, did not allow themselves to be intimidated by American imperialism,” “But I was, as it were, the driving force of this matter, I took on a large share of responsibility and, perhaps, to a greater extent than others, I experience joy from successful completion operations."
However, Khrushchev’s memoirs are of particular value precisely because he tried to give his own assessment to each person. For example, when deciding to send Mikoyan to Cuba to resolve the conflict, Khrushchev noted his outstanding diplomatic qualities: “He has good nerves, calm, can repeat the same argument many times without raising his tone. This is of greater importance, especially in negotiations with such an ardent person as Fidel." As for J. Kennedy, despite the fact that they were representatives of opposite and irreconcilable classes ("Kennedy and I - different people. I am a former miner, mechanic, worker, by the will of the party I became prime minister, and he is a millionaire and the son of a millionaire"), he believed that of all the US presidents, Kennedy is “the man with the highest intelligence, the smart one, who stands out sharply from his predecessors,” “ He showed sobriety of mind, did not allow himself to be intimidated, did not allow himself to be intoxicated by the power of the United States, did not go for broke... and showed wisdom, statesmanship, was not afraid of condemnation from the right and won the world.”
Khrushchev’s memoirs are characterized by a simple and unpretentious language of presentation; its text is full of various popular and popular expressions: “It doesn’t take any special intelligence to start a war. It takes more intelligence to end it. Fools easily start a war, and then the smart ones don’t know what do”, “in the world and death is red”, “American Vaska listens and eats”, “this is well said in an old story: the shepherds warned for prevention - there is a wolf, a wolf, a wolf, but there was no wolf, when The wolf really attacked, they shouted again - wolf, wolf! However, no one paid attention, and the wolf did its job.” And this is only a small part of them.
Thus, Khrushchev’s memoirs can be called an interesting, albeit controversial source on the history of the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Also, the memoirs of Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan were chosen as a source, based on numerous memoirs and archival documents, and which are unique evidence of more than sixty years of our history. They reflect such important milestones of Soviet history as the formation of Soviet power, the establishment of trade relations with the West in the 30s, the work of industry during the war, and the author also gives his assessment of the activities of Stalin, Beria, Khrushchev... Speaking of “Khrushchev’s” foreign policy, Mikoyan strongly criticizes Nikita Sergeevich for his actions, which, in his opinion, “pushed back détente by fifteen years, which cost enormous amounts of money for the sake of the arms race,” “in general, extremes interfered with many of Khrushchev’s good initiatives.” According to Mikoyan, the Caribbean Missile Crisis in 1962 was a pure gamble by Khrushchev, although, oddly enough, it ended successfully. However, Mikoyan does not dwell in detail on the events related to the Cuban missile crisis, although he is not only a participant in it, but also carried out a very important mission to coordinate the joint actions of the American-Soviet governments with the Cuban leadership.
Also important for writing this work were the documents and materials in the collection “History of International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR” for 1962. Naturally, from the variety of documents contained in the collection, we selected only those that have any relation to the chosen topic - these are various telegrams from heads of state, notes to governments, and speeches of country representatives at meetings of the XVII session of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, and public speeches of heads of state and much more, but the correspondence of N.S. is of particular interest. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy, by which we can judge the feelings experienced by the heads of state, in whose hands were the destinies of the whole world. It is interesting to note that Khrushchev’s letters are more personal in nature than Kennedy’s messages, this can be explained by the fact that Khrushchev himself dictated letters, which were then edited, but in such a way as to preserve not only the main thoughts, but also the mood, style, main figures of speech. After studying the correspondence, one can see how the tone of Khrushchev’s letters gradually changed: at first it was defiant, even aggressive, but towards the end, the feeling of gigantic responsibility for the fate of one’s people and all of humanity, the desire to prevent a nuclear catastrophe at any cost, increasingly prevailed.
Sources also include the work of S.N. Khrushchev "Cuban Missile Crisis. Events are almost out of control of the Kremlin and the White House." Sergei Nikitovich Khrushchev is the son of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and during the October days and nights of the Cuban Missile Crisis he was next to his father and other Kremlin leaders, taking advantage of the unique opportunity to observe the dramatic events from the inside. Although S.N. Khrushchev can also be classified as a researcher of this topic, which means he may well be included in the historiography section; anyway, his work serves rather as a source.
Historiography
In recent years, world historiography has sharply increased attention to the history of the Cold War, both in general and to its individual episodes, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. US historians and political scientists are particularly active. It was they who initiated the holding of three conferences in Moscow, Havana and Washington on the history of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. It is worth noting that there are significantly more foreign works devoted to this problem than domestic ones, this is primarily due to the greater availability of American and Western European archives.
Historian Klim Zhukov:
In the early 1960s, a story happened that almost led the world to World War III. It began in Washington, continued in Izmir, Turkey, reached the highest point of tension in Cuba, and then involved a good half of the planet, frozen in anxious anticipation. The Cubans call those events Crisis de Octubre, and we more commonly call them the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s was a period of significant increase in tension in the international situation. Only fifteen years have passed since the happy year of 1945, but history seemed to teach the main stakeholders nothing big politics. The generals “clanged their armor” with a deafening roar: the arms race was gaining momentum. The fact that these weapons were, among other things, nuclear, gave the situation a “special languor.”
It seemed that the adherents of realpolitik were so carried away, striking sparks all over the world, that any of these sparks could ignite a monstrous world fire.
Judge for yourself:
1950 The USA starts a war in Korea and only the help of the USSR and China saves the young republic in the north of the peninsula.
1953. The CIA and Mi-6 conduct Operation Ajax to overthrow the legitimate government Mohammed Masaddeq in Iran.
1954 President of Guatemala Jacobo Arbenz had the imprudence to carry out a number of important land reforms in his own country, infringing on the interests of the international giant United Fruit Company. The United States organized a coup, supported by direct military intervention. Operation PBSUCCESS brought to power the fascist regime of Castillo Armas, condemning the sovereign country to forty years of continuous civil war.
1956 President Dwight Eisenhower authorizes the US invasion of Lebanon and sends US warships to Taiwan, threatening the PRC with military force.
1961 The United States, with the help of mercenaries, is trying to strangle the revolution in Cuba. The Bay of Pigs operation ends in complete failure, and Cuba is literally pushed into the arms of the only country that at that moment was able to provide effective support - the USSR.
This is exactly how both previous World Wars began - with a series of local conflicts and “light, non-binding” interventions.
The main goal, of course, was not Cuba or Guatemala or even China, but the USSR. For maximum persuasiveness with a liberal Kennedy The United States has deployed Jupiter medium-range nuclear missiles on Turkish territory - in Izmir. The flight time to targets in the Union was about 10 minutes.
The Soviet government could not help but react. After all, it was ridiculous to even compare the nuclear potentials of both countries. The United States had 6,000 warheads, and the USSR only 300. The United States could launch an armada of 1,300 strategic bombers into the sky, and nine nuclear-powered cruisers with Polaris missiles on board at sea. The USSR needed an urgent asymmetric response, when the United States literally gave it, forcing Fidel Castro to move closer to Moscow.
On June 20, 1962, Operation Anadyr began to relocate a group of missile forces with technical support and cover units to Cuba. Directly led the operation General Issa Aleksandrovich Pliev. By the way, he belonged to the cohort that various half-educated people used to call “stupid Budenov cavalrymen.” The stupid cavalryman carried out the most complex set of events brilliantly.
24 R-14 missiles and 36 R-12 missiles with launchers and personnel, two cruise missile regiments with Luna tactical missiles, four motorized rifle regiments, two air defense divisions, a fighter air regiment and a separate fighter squadron (more than 50 aircraft in total), a helicopter regiment, a coastal defense regiment with 8 Sopka missile launchers, 11 submarines, 2 cruisers, destroyers and mine-torpedo ships - all this was delivered to Cuba quickly, accurately and on time. And most importantly - secretly. Until mid-October, Washington had no idea that 70 Soviet megatons of TNT were located within a quarter of an hour of flight. This is the “stupid cavalryman” Issa Pliev was.
However, it was impossible to hide the sharp increase in Soviet cargo transportation. Regular overflights of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which were considered invulnerable to air defense systems, were able to reveal the deployment of strategic missiles. On October 15, the next batch of photographic films was deciphered and Kennedy, who had already stated in Congress on September 4 that there were no Soviet missiles in Cuba, was forced to admit that he was somewhat hasty with such conclusions. The US Army and Navy were placed on DEFCON-3 alert. On October 20, the naval blockade of Cuba began.
A blockade, as we know, is an act of war. Thus, the United States unilaterally launched aggression against a sovereign state. After all, the deployment of missiles could not violate any international rules and agreements, but the blockade could and did. In fact, from the moment the Cuban “quarantine” opened, the world was on the brink of a nuclear disaster. From now on, any accident could trigger an uncontrollable chain reaction - as soon as someone lost their nerve.
Thus, the submarine B-59 of the USSR Navy, breaking through to the shores of Cuba, was blocked by US destroyers and fired upon from an aircraft. Since the destroyers were jamming communications, the ship's commander decided that war had begun and was ready to fire a salvo with nuclear weapons. And only the composure of the first mate, captain 2nd rank Vasily Arkhipov, saved the situation. The code phrase “Stop provocations” became a response to the shelling. But everything could easily have turned out differently, the situation was so tense when everything depended on the performers on the ground. The respectable gentlemen in Washington sowed such wind that the world almost reaped the storm. In the corridors of high-level diplomacy, cries of “what are we for?!” were naturally and expectedly heard.
On October 23, Kennedy demanded USSR Ambassador Dobrynin to ensure that soviet ships will comply with the conditions of maritime quarantine. To which Dobrynin pointed out the illegality of the blockade and the obvious absurdity of the demands of the American side.
The US Armed Forces have achieved DEFCON-2 combat readiness level. To understand: DEFCON-1 is actually the beginning of full-scale military operations.
At this time, the UN Security Council fought like a lion Soviet representative Valerian Aleksandrovich Zorin, A US Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay demanded to open hostilities, up to and including a nuclear strike on the USSR. The “Tokyo Inquisitor,” who burned more than 80,000 people alive in the capital of Japan on March 10, 1945, was generally a prominent specialist in “ramming into the Stone Age.”
On October 27, a missile from the S-75 Dvina air defense system shot down an “invulnerable” U-2 over Cuba. The pilot died. Kennedy's military advisers demanded an order for an immediate military response, but the president, fortunately for everyone, turned out to be either weak or quite prudent, completely blocking such initiatives. "Black Saturday" was the day when the world balanced on a razor's edge.
He summoned USSR Ambassador Dobrynin, saying that the United States was ready for a diplomatic settlement. A telegram went to Moscow:
“1) You (USSR) agree to withdraw your weapons systems from Cuba under the appropriate supervision of UN representatives, and also take steps, in compliance with appropriate security measures, to stop the supply of the same weapons systems to Cuba.
2) We, for our part, will agree - subject to the creation, with the help of the UN, of a system of adequate measures to ensure the fulfillment of these obligations - a) quickly cancel the introduced currently blockade measures and b) provide guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba.”
Negotiations began. The result was detente. America withdrew Jupiter and Thor missiles from Turkey and Europe and guaranteed Cuba against military aggression. In response, the USSR had to withdraw strategic forces from Liberty Island.
Thus, historical practice has once again confirmed the old truth: si vis pacem - para bellum, if you want peace, prepare for war. This is a serious lesson for our contemporaries. Imperialist circles understand only one language—and that is the language of force. Fortunately, there are still missiles on duty, originally from the USSR, equipped with thermonuclear filling, originally from the same place. As long as this is the case, and as long as there is a strong will to use them in the event of aggression, another world massacre is unlikely. And not the least role was played in this by the heroes of Operation Anadyr, who proved that there is no action that does not give rise to opposition.
The dangerous confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, began 55 years ago. At that time, the American and Soviet armed forces were in a state of full combat readiness. One erroneous decision made by the US administration or the political leadership of the USSR could set in motion a gigantic mechanism of military blocs of two opposing socio-political systems using nuclear missiles. The world was one step away from nuclear collapse.
It seemed that the Cuban missile crisis, after its successful resolution, left a serious mark on the historical memory of mankind, and the political leaders of the USA and the USSR realized that their armies were capable of destroying human civilization. However, the events that followed the collapse of the USSR clearly show that the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis were not learned by the US leadership.
WHO PROVOKED THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS
The vast majority of foreign researchers identified the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 as the main reason, which threatened to escalate into a third world war with the use of missiles. nuclear weapons, called the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles on Cuban territory. However, if we objectively assess the international situation that had developed by the early 60s of the twentieth century, and the nature of the military-strategic situation in the American-Soviet direction, then the conclusions from the analysis of that situation will be diametrically opposed to those that Western and some Russians have argued and continue to assert. "political scientists" and "historians".
In 1961, after the failure of a Washington-inspired attempt by Cuban counter-revolutionaries to overthrow the legitimate Cuban government The White house decided to begin preparing a new operation, codenamed “Mongoose” (in Russian transcription “Mongoose”). To guarantee the success of the action to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro and restore the pro-American puppet regime in Cuba, in addition to organizing (with the help of the CIA) the rebel movement in Cuba, it was planned to involve the US armed forces. The Pentagon planned to launch air strikes with Air Force and Navy aircraft (several hundred bombers), a long-term fire attack on the territory and subsequent landings by two airborne, one armored, two infantry divisions and one marine division. The duration of the operation was October-November 1962.
Under the current conditions, in response to Havana’s request for military assistance in order to protect Cuba from aggression and in agreement with the Cuban leadership, on May 18, 1962, the Soviet government decided to deploy a Group of Soviet Forces on Liberty Island. The Group included: a missile division (40 launchers of medium- and intermediate-range missiles), military units and units of other types of nuclear weapons, which ensured the real ability of our military group to deter the enemy from invasion. When determining the combat strength of the Group, the complexity of the military-strategic situation around the USSR was taken into account. The Soviet Union was actually surrounded by groups of US troops and their allies in the west, south and east. They were armed with a large number of nuclear weapons. In terms of the number of nuclear weapons, the USSR was 11–12 times inferior to the United States. The US was capable of inflicting nuclear strikes on bodies of higher state and military administration, industrial centers, groupings of strategic nuclear forces, and other vitally important facilities of our country. The United States itself, in the event of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the USSR, remained practically invulnerable to a retaliatory strike due to the lack at that time of the Soviet Union of means of delivering intercontinental-range nuclear weapons. The state sovereignty of our country was not guaranteed to be protected.
By the decision of the Soviet government, the main task of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba was “to ensure the joint defense of the Republic of Cuba and the USSR.” In other words, the very fact of placing Soviet nuclear weapons 90 miles off the American coast was dictated not by preparation for aggression against the United States, but, to use modern terminology, solely for the purpose of encouraging Washington to contain. The operation to transfer the Group to Cuba received the code name “Anadyr”. The Soviet command managed to ensure the secrecy of the preparation and conduct of the operation.
In September 1962, CIA Director John McCone reported to US President John F. Kennedy: “...After extensive discussion and research, American intelligence has concluded that the Soviet Union does not intend to turn Cuba into a strategic base...” It was concluded that the Cuban government did not have the strength to counteract the implementation of the Operation Mongoose plan and it will be implemented successfully. Preparations for the operation have entered the final stage.
Thus, the impending American military invasion of Cuba and the extremely unfavorable military-strategic situation created by the US ruling circles ultimately provoked the Cuban Missile Crisis. Soviet military intelligence played an important role in resolving the crisis.
UNPRECEDENTED SOVIET INTELLIGENCE MISSION
In 1961–1962, an unprecedented incident occurred in the activities of domestic military intelligence. An officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Colonel Georgy Bolshakov, on the eve and at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, had the opportunity to directly ensure the exchange of personal confidential messages between Soviet and American leaders. The messages were presented orally, communication between the Soviet military intelligence officer and the confidant of the US President was carried out on English language, and Bolshakov was personally responsible for the accurate transmission of positions, proposals and decisions of the leaders of both states to each other.
At the beginning of September 1962, the topic of transferring Soviet military cargo to Cuba and the possible deployment of Soviet missiles there began to be discussed in American political circles and in the press. Operation Anadyr has not yet ended. Measures had to be taken to ensure the completion of the operation and the completion of the construction of missile launch sites.
To this end, the Soviet government decided to inform the American president that the USSR had no plans to attack the United States. For this purpose, Bolshakov, who was on vacation, was summoned to Khrushchev. He was tasked with ensuring that this information was conveyed to Kennedy.
Moscow closely monitored the development of the situation in the pool Caribbean Sea. The activation of the landing forces of the US Atlantic Fleet and the flights of American reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba indicated that preparations for the invasion had entered the final phase. The tension was growing.
On October 13, 1962, based on the results of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flight over Cuba, the US Department of Defense concluded that Soviet medium-range missiles were stationed on the island. The news of this caused panic in the White House. In Washington, apparently, they began to realize that with Soviet troops in Cuba, it had become extremely dangerous to carry out the final stage of Operation Mongoose.
The deployment of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba changed the balance of power both in the Caribbean and beyond. The White House needed to make a decision about canceling or postponing the invasion of Cuba. But this significantly weakened President Kennedy’s position in the American establishment, since he was already subject to obstruction from the “hawks” who advocated extreme measures against the Soviet Union.
PLAYING WITH FIRE
On October 20, Washington decided to declare a naval blockade on Cuba, preventing the transfer of Soviet weapons to the island. This measure flagrantly violated basic international norms, but, according to Washington, it was supposed to demonstrate the determination of the US government.
In Moscow, the US establishment of a blockade of Cuba was regarded as “unprecedented aggressive actions.” The statement of the Soviet government indicated: “The people of all countries must clearly understand that by taking such an adventure, the United States of America is taking a step towards unleashing a world thermonuclear war.”
On October 22, Kennedy addressed the American people with a message. But in its content it was addressed primarily to Khrushchev. Kennedy said: “We do not intend to take the unnecessary risk of plunging the world into a nuclear war in which the fruits of victory will be ashes, but we have the courage to take such a risk any time it becomes necessary.” And further: “I have ordered the US armed forces to be prepared for any eventuality.”
In the USSR, in the Strategic Missile Forces, the Air Defense Forces and the submarine fleet, the dismissal of older people was delayed, and vacations were canceled for all personnel. The troops were put on high alert.
On October 23, the US President approves a decree, according to which the US armed forces were ordered to intercept any ships and aircraft allegedly heading to Cuba. The decree stated: “All ships or aircraft taken under arrest will be sent to the proper US port or destroyed.”
SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO RESOLUTE THE CRISIS
On October 24, Bolshakov, through a proxy of the American president, receives information that Kennedy is concerned about the developments in Cuba and does not want to launch an invasion. Washington's goal is to eliminate bases for Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Bolshakov sent an urgent report to the Center, in which special attention was paid to three important circumstances:
– the United States is confident that there are Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba;
– the Kennedy administration is ready to reach a compromise settlement of the contradictions;
- The US President proposes to involve UN observers in resolving the crisis and asks for this time to suspend the advance of new Soviet ships with weapons to the shores of Cuba.
On the same day, Bolshakov was additionally informed of the American president’s proposal for a possible deal: the elimination of Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for the closure of the American missile base in Turkey.
On October 25, Bolshakov again receives information from the American side that the USSR’s actions in Cuba are regarded by the US President, among other motives, as a response to the deployment of American missile bases in Turkey and Italy, and about Kennedy’s readiness to discuss a previously proposed deal: the US will liquidate missile bases in Turkey, and the USSR in Cuba.
Moscow carefully analyzed the proposals received to resolve the Cuban missile crisis and developed its own.
CONFRONTATION IS GROWING
Meanwhile, the flywheel of confrontation, which could develop into a major war, was gaining momentum. The troops of two huge armies were brought to increased levels of combat readiness. Commanders and commanders were waiting for orders.
On October 24, at 10 a.m. Washington time, GRU technical means intercepted an order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) of the US Air Force: to prepare for a nuclear attack. A GRU resident reported to the Center: “During the day on October 23, 85 aircraft were flying over the United States strategic aviation. Of these, 22 were B-52 bombers. At the same time, 57 B-47 bombers headed from the United States to Europe.” The resident also reported that “30 refueling aircraft are constantly in the air.” GRU radio intelligence recorded the transfer of SAC command to strategic bomber commanders next order: “Stay on course even if one engine fails...”
The report of the GRU resident to the Center reported that the command of the US armed forces is actively deploying hospitals and staffing them with medical personnel according to wartime staff, the population is buying up food and strengthening bomb shelters.
On October 27, the Center received a message about a statement from the American government that if the construction of missile bases in Cuba was not stopped, the United States would invade the island.
The military intelligence resident reported to the head of the GRU:
1. The situation at 24:00 on October 27 remains tense. I consider the next 24 hours to be decisive.
2. US Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the Secretary of the Air Force to transfer 24 airborne transport squadrons with support units from the reserve. The squadrons are intended to transport the first assault echelon during the landing.
3. Enhanced troop movements on Florida roads are completed.
4. On Saturday, up to 50% of the personnel continued to work at the Pentagon.
On the same day, the GRU resident reported from Washington to the Center: “Based on an analysis of conversations with Americans, military diplomats, local press and radio reports on October 26, I report that in the near future we can expect American invasion to Cuba under the pretext of eliminating the supposed missile bases there. An American officer at a reception on October 25 declared their government’s unshakable determination to bring the matter with Cuba to an end, regardless of world public opinion. A British embassy official who spends several hours every day at the Pentagon said that, according to his information, the invasion will take place within the next five to seven days.”
“- the press, radio and television are intensively preparing public opinion to justify decisive US steps against Cuba;
– the concentration of troops continues in Florida, where new military units and equipment are constantly arriving;
– among Cuban emigrants there is confidence in landing in Cuba in the coming days;
“Intensive night work continues at the Pentagon and other senior military institutions.”
On October 27, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, under the cover of a fighter, invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union. Soviet fighters scrambled to intercept the intruders and forced the American pilots to leave Soviet airspace.
On the same day, an American plane was shot down while on a reconnaissance flight over Cuba. The pilot died. Perhaps this moment became the critical point of the Caribbean confrontation. The US President made a difficult decision - not to take retaliatory measures.
INTERCLOSURE
The most intense days of the crisis were October 27 and 28. It was during these days that the main question was decided in Washington and Moscow - to be or not to be a war.
The White House realized that the implementation of the plan to overthrow the Castro government had unexpectedly turned against them. President Kennedy made a decision - he is ready to declare that the United States will not conduct an operation against Cuba and will lift the blockade.
On October 27, the White House reached a final decision: to abandon the attack on Cuba, in addition to the conditions previously approved by the parties - Washington’s willingness to liquidate its missile base in Turkey in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. On the same day, a message from the US President was sent to the Kremlin.
On October 28, in a response message, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev said that today the answer to the American president would be broadcast by radio, and it would be positive.
The orders that would have signed the death warrant for humanity did not take place on October 28 either in Washington or Moscow. At the same time, the White House ordered the suspension and later cancellation of Operation Mongoose. The United States has ceased active actions against the Cuban government both on the territory of Liberty Island and beyond its borders.
LESSONS ARE DANGEROUS OF FORGETING
The US administration and the Soviet government went through a very difficult test 55 years ago. John Kennedy and Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev realized the disastrous consequences for earthly civilization that blackmail and the threat of military force could lead to in the context of actual possession of nuclear weapons.
Until Washington realized that the reckless policies of the United States could lead to catastrophic consequences for the United States itself, the American administration was planning an invasion of Cuba to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. And only the USSR’s determination to protect its friendly independent state with all available means restrained the American “hawks” from aggression against both Cuba and the USSR.
The United States and the Soviet Union decided to limit themselves to nuclear confrontation in the context of the strategic parity of the two superpowers that was soon achieved. Moreover, despite the Cold War, they agreed to mutually balanced reductions in nuclear and other military capabilities while maintaining equal security for the parties. Strategic parity with the USSR, especially against the backdrop of the substantive lesson Washington received during the Vietnam War of 1964–1972, to some extent restrained the United States from a provocative aggressive policy of hegemony.
The United States perceived the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the collapse of the Soviet Union as its victory in the Cold War and immediately began moving NATO eastward. They bombed and dismembered Yugoslavia. Afghanistan was occupied. They unleashed aggression against Iraq and executed its president. They destroyed the state of Libya and its leader. In order to eliminate the current leader of a sovereign country, they initiated a terrorist massacre in Syria.
The United States is creating a strategic missile defense system aimed at our country. We have begun deploying missile defense systems in Poland and Romania. Deployed close Russian borders groupings of their troops. They are cultivated in states neighboring Russia and encouraged by Russophobic nationalist and Nazi forces. They are waging a sanctions war against our country and whipping up propaganda hysteria. They are seizing Russian property. US-Russian relations have been reduced to the lowest level.
The US President from the UN rostrum officially threatens to “wipe off the face of the earth” the sovereign state of the DPRK, believing that these senseless threats and blackmail can replace a political solution to the problem of nuclear non-proliferation, which Washington is calling for by Russia and China, which condemn Pyongyang for nuclear tests.
On October 13, 2017, the US President announced Washington’s plans to torpedo the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear issue, agreed upon in 2015, ignoring the opinions of its other participants and UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
Turning to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, one involuntarily comes to the conclusion: those not so distant lessons for Washington and the American establishment, apparently, were of no use. Once again, but with even greater persistence, they are trying to dictate their narrowly selfish terms to the whole world, directly threatening some with military force, and creating a dangerous military-strategic situation for others, believing that someone has been given the right to do so. An extremely dangerous misconception. When putting our finger on the trigger, we should not forget the lessons of the past: in modern conditions, the consequences of such actions can be even more tragic than it could have been 55 years ago, which, fortunately, did not happen then.
“The skillful actions of US President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which broke out exactly 50 years ago, have been elevated to the rank of the central myth of the Cold War. It is based on the thesis that Kennedy, thanks to the military superiority of the United States and his steely will, forced Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev to capitulate and remove missiles secretly stationed there from Cuba... According to the myth, Khrushchev lost everything, but Kennedy gave up nothing. Thus, the end of the crisis was the undivided triumph of America and the unconditional defeat of the USSR,” writes the author of the article.
And these theses seem to him “incorrect.” What does he think is “true”?
"Kennedy's victory in a Cold War battle that was controversial both in its course and in its results became a benchmark for American foreign policy." And this is a historical fact!
“She deified military strength and willpower, and did not value give-and-take diplomacy.
She set a standard of toughness and risky confrontation with the villains, which was simply impossible to meet - if only because this victory did not happen.”
Well, what's wrong with that from the point of view of America itself?
“The view of the Cuban Missile Crisis—that Kennedy succeeded without retreating an inch—has become entrenched in political thinking... It (sic!) still manifests itself today, half a century later, in worries about concessions to Iran over its nuclear weapons or the Taliban in the context of their role in Afghanistan.
American leaders don't like to compromise. And this has a lot to do with the entrenched misunderstanding of those 13 days in October 1962.”
Wow! It turns out that Kennedy, or rather, the algorithm he proposed for resolving the Caribbean, the most deadly crisis, is to blame for how the Yankees are leaving Afghanistan and how they behave with Iran?! We found the last...
“In fact, the crisis did not end in a fiasco of Soviet diplomacy, but in mutual concessions,” notes the author of Foreign Policy. – The Soviets withdrew their missiles from Cuba in exchange for a US promise not to invade Fidel Castro Island and to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
The fact is that the American authorities for a long time kept secret the agreements with Khrushchev on the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey. American government could not admit to its citizens that in October 1962 it “showed weakness” before the Soviets!
“From the very beginning, Kennedy's people did everything they could to hide the Jupiter concession. On October 27, Robert Kennedy told USSR Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin the following: “We will remove the Jupiters, but this part of the deal is not subject to disclosure.” The secret was kept for 16 years (!) until a paragraph about this fact appeared in the book of Arthur Schlesinger, who worked on John Kennedy’s team.
Kennedy's advisers then published an article on the 20th anniversary of the crisis, in which they acknowledged the Jupiter clause of the agreement. However, they did this in a way to downplay its significance, saying that Kennedy had already decided to remove the Jupiters from Turkey by that time.
They acknowledged that the secrecy surrounding the Jupiter portion of the deal was so important that any leak "would have a devastating impact on the security of the United States and its allies."
These Kennedy advisers, by keeping the Jupiter guarantees secret, misled their colleagues, compatriots, successors and other allies into the erroneous conclusion that “standing firm on that Black Saturday was enough,” the author writes. "Foreign Policy".
Let us note in passing that many claims can be made against the Americans, but what they cannot be denied is the creation and maintenance of political myths that work for the image of an indestructible America!
The very fact of exposing this part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev deal “would have caused considerable confusion in NATO, where it would have been perceived as a betrayal of Turkey,” writes Foreign Policy.
Robert Kennedy even told Anatoly Dobrynin that these concerns were his main reason why the deal should remain secret. A. Dobrynin telegraphed Bobby’s words to Moscow: “If such a decision were announced now, it would seriously split NATO.”
These are the stakes around simply announcing the fact of a compromise on the part of the United States!
“Why didn’t the USSR organize a leak?” - asks the American author.
So the USSR did not make a secret of this. It’s just that the “iron curtain,” as the information blockade was called then, closed not only the Soviet Union from the West - the West had its own “iron curtain”, which closed it from the influence of the USSR. And that is why they did not allow Moscow to leak information that the United States, as part of the agreements, had removed its missiles from Turkey.
Even the students of MGIMO, where I studied in those years, knew about this. And Moscow made no secret of this “exchange.” Therefore, I am quite surprised by such assessments heard today in the Foreign Policy article. By the way, it’s time to name its author - this, by the way, is a famous American figure, honorary president of the Council on Foreign Relations Leslie H. Gelb.
As Leslie Gelb himself suggested, "Khrushchev never considered the possibility of a leak because he could not know how the crisis would be presented later - how weak it would appear."
Let's leave such an assessment to Mr. Gelb's conscience. But I never heard that the USSR looked like someone’s foreign eyes, as "weakling". But I remember how the Americans and NATO members jumped up when Khrushchev told them: “We will bury you” and threatened them with “Kuzka’s mother,” and even hit him with his boot at the UN. And where is the “weakling” here?
This is how Americans lull themselves to sleep: “We, they say, are stronger than everyone else.” They forget that this has already happened in history: “Deutschland Uber Alles”...
“Politicians, as a rule, are not delighted by the idea of compromise, especially when it comes to US foreign policy. The myth of the Cuban Missile Crisis increased arrogance. Myth, not reality, has become the yardstick for negotiating with adversaries.”
A stunning confession on the pages of America's leading foreign policy magazine from the mouth of the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, a former Pentagon employee!
Since the early 1960s, “few people have been willing to expose themselves by offering even mild compromises with their opponents.”
“To openly admit today that Iran can, under strict control, enrich uranium to militarily insignificant percentages is political suicide, although such enrichment is permitted by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” writes L. Gelb frankly.
“Barack Obama's team is negotiating with the Taliban, and its demands are absolute - the Taliban must lay down their arms and accept the Kabul constitution. No serious exchange of concessions seems possible.”
This is how the attitudes of 50 years ago are “played out” in modern politics.
And at the end of the article, Leslie Gelb simply delivers a “verdict”:
"Too long foreign policy The US emphasized threats and confrontation and minimized the role of compromise.
Yes, compromise is not always a solution, and sometimes it is a completely wrong decision. But politicians of all stripes must be able to openly and fearlessly explore the possibility of compromise, weighing it against alternatives.”
This is the lesson Americans learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In any case, in the editorial office of Foreign Policy magazine...
Chapter seven. Cuban Missile Crisis: Private Opinions
The past years have alienated the participants in the Cuban missile crisis - citizens of the USSR, USA and Cuba - at a considerable distance from the events in which they took part. At the end of the 20th century, the vast majority of them completed public service and acquired new status: They became “private individuals.” How did these private individuals evaluate what they were directly or indirectly involved in?
The reflection of the opinions of the participants in the Cuban Missile Crisis has been preserved in numerous, but scattered, published and unpublished memoirs, in newspaper and magazine articles, in books that some of them once managed to publish. The author was able to find some statements and assessments of the main characters those past events, but, unfortunately, not all yet. Nevertheless, what we managed to collect and present in a logical sequence is undoubtedly of significant interest and allows us not only to understand their attitude to the crisis itself, but also reveals some mechanisms for making responsible decisions, explains previously incomprehensible but important episodes of relations between former comrades who influenced the development of the crisis, and therefore the course and development of history.
The Prime Minister of the USSR Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, having retired, “dictated” his memoirs, which he called “Time. People. Power" 256.
He devoted one of the chapters to the Cuban missile crisis. Also of interest are Khrushchev’s statements made publicly in different years and dedicated to the Cuban missile crisis. Here are some of them:
“America surrounded the Soviet Union with its bases, it placed missiles around us. We knew that US missile forces were stationed in Turkey and Italy.”
“The purpose of installing (in Cuba - V.A.) missiles with nuclear weapons, as I stated, was not to attack the United States, but solely for the defense of Cuba.”
“We, in fact, wanted America to shake itself up, and its leadership to feel what war is, that it is on their doorstep, that therefore there is no need to cross the line, a military clash should be avoided.”
The above statements by Khrushchev speak volumes.
First, it follows that the Soviet prime minister understood that the US missile bases deployed in Turkey and Italy increased the threat to the security of the USSR. The flight time of American missiles to targets on Soviet territory was reduced to 10-15 minutes. Taking adequate response measures within such a time limit would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The US government's act of placing its missiles in Turkey was unfriendly and provocative.
Secondly, as Khrushchev argued, the purpose of placing Soviet missiles in Cuba “was not to attack the United States, but solely for the defense of Cuba.” It follows that the Soviet government was informed that the United States was preparing to invade Cuba and intend to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro. This statement by Khrushchev directly relates to the topic of our research. Previously, one could treat him differently, given that Nikita Sergeevich loved and knew how to embellish his successes in all fields. But after reading this book, the reader can be convinced that Khrushchev was indeed aware of the US government's secret plans regarding Cuba and acted quite reasonably.
And thirdly, as follows from what Khrushchev said, he wanted America to “shake itself up,” that is, for its leadership to remember that they are not alone in this world and that if they stepped on their toes, they should at least apologize.
From the above it follows that Nikita Sergeevich did not change his attitude towards the crisis and the reasons that gave rise to it until the end of his life.
In the memoirs “Time. People. Power”, the former Prime Minister of the USSR made one extremely valuable and, it seems, philosophical conclusion, which should also be mentioned. It is as follows: “If you are guided by reasonable goals and the desire to prevent war, and resolve controversial issues through compromise, then such a compromise can be found.”
In this conclusion, which Khrushchev left for future generations, there are three parts that are inextricably linked and complement each other. Khrushchev invites all statesmen in their actions to be “guided by reasonable goals” and “the desire to prevent war,” since war in the age of nuclear missile weapons will inevitably lead to Armageddon, after which it is unlikely that anything living and intelligent will remain on planet Earth. Further, an active fighter for the Cuban missile crisis, on whose decisions if not everything, then a lot depended, confidently argued that all “controversial issues” should be resolved only “through compromise.” And third, with mutual desire, the parties to disputes can always reach the “desired compromise.”
Khrushchev considered it possible to assess the personality of his main rival, American President John Kennedy, whom he initially underestimated. “My memory,” he wrote, “retains the best memories of the President of the United States. He showed sobriety of mind, did not allow himself to be intimidated, did not allow himself to become intoxicated by the power of the United States, and did not go for broke. It didn't take much intelligence to start a war. But he showed wisdom, statesmanship, was not afraid of condemnation from the right and won the world” 257.
The world was won not only by John Kennedy, but also by Khrushchev, and all of us, and, most importantly, our children and grandchildren. The world, which in October 1962 really hung by a thread over the nuclear abyss, was saved from destruction. Life goes on, and that's the main thing.
Recalling the tense Soviet-American relations, US President John Kennedy was less talkative. Nevertheless, he managed to utter a phrase that became his testament to all the inhabitants of planet Earth: “Either humanity will end the war, or the war will end humanity.”
This is how the leaders of the USSR and the USA, the leaders of the great powers, on whose actions the peaceful future of our planet largely depended, assessed the Cuban missile crisis.
And what did Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba Fidel Castro say about the events of October 1962 in the post-crisis years?
The leader of the Cuban state devoted many statements made over the years to this topic. Fidel did not change his assessments. Some of them sound like political declarations, others contain sincere gratitude to the Soviet Union for the military assistance and support provided in difficult times, others show pride in the people of a small country who were not afraid of an eminent and powerful neighbor who wanted to forcefully impose its rules of the game on Cuba . The most vivid of Castro's assessments are reproduced on these pages.
“We did not hesitate to repulse the mercenary invasion of Playa Giron and proclaim the socialist character of our Revolution.”
“Our Revolution was not afraid of the threat of invasion and nuclear war in October 1962, which arose as a result of the crisis caused by the criminal actions and threats of the United States against our Motherland.”
“If there had been no Soviet Union, the imperialists would not have hesitated to launch a direct military attack on our country. It was the power of the Soviet Union that restrained imperialist aggression against our Fatherland” 258.
How did other participants in those events feel about the events of October 1962 in the post-crisis years? Let us turn to the memoirs of Marshal D.F. Yazov. In 1962, as part of the GSVK, he commanded a motorized rifle regiment.
In 2006, Yazov, as a military leader, former minister Defense of the USSR, recalling the Caribbean events, reflected on what could happen in the event of a further escalation of Soviet-American events.
In his opinion, “the US military operation against Cuba would take place in two stages and would include an air stage and an invasion operation on the island. It is noteworthy that even then the Americans “gravitated” towards such a structure of military operations. It was this model that they repeated 30 years later in the first war against Iraq (1990-1991), and then in Yugoslavia (1999) and again against Iraq (2003).”
Marshal Yazov had no doubt that the targets of destruction during the first air strike would be, first of all, the positions of the Soviet missile regiments R-12 and R-14, anti-aircraft missile air defense divisions, airfields and MiG-21 and Il-aircraft deployed on them. 28. American air raids would have provoked fierce opposition from Soviet and Cuban air defense systems.
Discussing how events would have developed further, Yazov wrote: “Given the American “moral vulnerability” from heavy losses, the results of the first hours and days of the operation could have a negative impact on the morale of the American troops. By the way, on October 26, 1962, Secretary of Defense R. McNamara reported to John Kennedy that in the first ten days of hostilities, American troops landed on the island would lose 18,484 people. It is difficult to say how the Pentagon made such calculations, predicting its possible losses to the accuracy of one person. However, this figure is clearly underestimated, if only because American intelligence estimated the GSVK at 5-10 thousand people. In fact, in October we already had more than 40 thousand people, and the Americans had no idea about the presence of tactical nuclear weapons at that time.”
Assessing the state of morale of his former subordinates - Soviet soldiers and officers, Marshal Yazov wrote:
“As for the composition of the Soviet group of troops in Cuba, given the hopelessness of the situation (there is nowhere to retreat!) they would be ready to fulfill their duty to the end, in any conditions, with any losses. They were ready to fight the Russian way. I saw it myself, felt it and knew it. We simply would have had no other choice: the Group of Forces had no reserves. It is impossible to transport reinforcements 11 thousand kilometers by sea under conditions of a naval blockade. Then we could only rely on ourselves, on our weapons, on the strength of our spirit.”
“Morally,” Marshal Yazov emphasized, “we were much stronger than the Americans, and they probably knew about it. This also served as a deterrent for American “hawks” 259.
Discussing the course of military operations, he said that “a protracted war on Cuban territory would require the mobilization of significant US reserves - human, economic, and military. Inevitably, this armed conflict would eventually go beyond the local and limited. And again - the temptation to use nuclear weapons. Most likely, the losing side or both sides in the event of a deadlock, prolongation of the war” 260.
Thus, Yazov concluded that any conflict involving states that have nuclear weapons in their armies, in the event of a “deadlock situation” or “prolongation of the war,” can escalate into a war with the use of nuclear weapons. This conclusion fully applies to our time. In the years since the Cuban Missile Crisis, the club of nuclear powers has expanded. In addition to Russia, the USA, China, Great Britain and France, Israel broke into or crawled into it, South Africa, India, Pakistan, North Korea and possibly some other states. That's why modern world less stable than in 1962. Taking into account the peculiarities of modern times, we can say that the Cuban missile crisis is a textbook that should not be forgotten.
Of significant interest in this regard is the opinion of the President of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation, General of the Army M.A. Gareev, about the Cuban missile crisis. Discussing the causes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, he said: “Was there an alternative to placing Soviet missiles in Cuba? Put yourself in the shoes of the political and military leadership of the USSR. Back then, not everything was known about the US plans.”
From these words it is difficult to understand what the Soviet leadership proceeded from when deciding to deploy a Group of Soviet Forces and a missile division in Cuba. M. A. Gareev believes that “the political leadership of the USSR did not know everything about the US plans.” Judging by the declassified documents presented in this book, it can now be argued that the Soviet leadership decided to create the GSVK because it had at its disposal reliable intelligence data that the United States was preparing in October 1962 to carry out an operation to overthrow the regime of F. Castro . It was this information, obtained by KGB and GRU intelligence officers, that was taken into account by Khrushchev and his associates in the process of developing military-political measures, which were ahead of the actions of the American side. It can be said with good reason that the military phase of Operation Anadyr was carried out brilliantly. The group of Soviet troops created in Cuba in a short time became the shield that prevented US aggression against Cuba. The invasion of CIA mercenaries, the bombing of important objects on the island by aviation, followed by a landing of marines on the territory of an independent state did not take place.
It should be emphasized that while the military part of providing assistance to Cuba was thoroughly thought out by the Soviet leadership and the command of the USSR Armed Forces and carried out clearly, the information and diplomatic support completely failed. Soviet diplomacy and means mass media did not complete their tasks. However, this is a topic for another independent study.
In assessing the situation that was developing around Cuba in October 1962, Gareev made the correct forecast: “If the Americans had landed on the island, then we would have to either start a war with the United States or accept defeat. Indeed, what would be the reaction of the entire socialist camp in response to the seizure by the Americans of a state that declared its commitment to socialism? And could the socialist countries understand the inaction of the USSR in this case?
Based on this, it was decided to act firmly, decisively, forestall the Americans and deliver missiles. And why, in the end, could the Americans have their own bases and put missiles on them in Turkey and Italy, but the Soviet Union could not?” 261
By asking his rhetorical question, Gareev touched on the most important reason for the Cuban missile crisis. It consisted in the fact that the United States of America was the first to place its missiles near the borders of the opposing side. The US government did this in 1957. By deploying Jupiter missiles in Turkey, American leaders could not help but understand that sooner or later an adequate military response, implemented in 1962, would follow from the Soviet Union. The appearance of the GSVK, which included a division of medium-range missiles, created for the Americans the same alarming situation that already existed in the Soviet Union.
Information about the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, which became known to the US leadership in mid-October 1962, initially caused a nervous shock in the highest spheres of power. President Kennedy developed a high fever and led his country by telephone for a couple of days. A week later, the US President announced a quarantine (blockade) of Cuba and an ultimatum, the essence of which was a demand calling on the Soviet government to immediately dismantle the missiles and remove Soviet aircraft carrying atomic weapons from Cuba. Otherwise, the US President was ready to take other measures, and this meant a further aggravation of the crisis and the likelihood of air and other strikes on military targets in Cuba.
The Kremlin coolly observed what was happening in Washington. Khrushchev and his associates even considered it possible to attend the performance at the Bolshoi Theater. This, of course, was a demonstrative act, but it undoubtedly had a positive effect both on the Soviet average person and on foreign guests, of whom there were many in Moscow. American intelligence officers also could not help but inform Washington about Khrushchev’s trip to the theater. But at this tense time, Moscow was awaiting proposals from America to resolve the crisis. Showing composure, restraint and readiness for any development of events, Khrushchev and his assistants survived the difficult time with dignity.
Despite Kennedy's formidable public statements, his demonstrative addresses to the nation and orders to bring the US Armed Forces to full combat readiness, as well as the increasing frequency of flights of American strategic bombers in the direction of the USSR, Moscow stubbornly waited for constructive proposals.
Personal messages were exchanged between Khrushchev and Kennedy. Soon proposals were made to resolve the crisis, but they did not come directly from the US President or his official representatives, but were transmitted through unofficial channels - to the advisers of the USSR Embassy G.N. Bolshakov and A.S. Feklisov. Since the contacts of these embassy employees with US representatives close to the “highest authorities” were unofficial, they were not recorded in official protocol documents. Within a few years, the memory of these important crisis management mechanisms was erased or deliberately distorted. Therefore, in the post-crisis years, disputes arose between the main participants in resolving the crisis, which remained unresolved. The main one is who was the first to propose the conditions for resolving the crisis - the USSR or the USA. And the second is who came up with the idea of the deal, the essence of which was the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for the dismantling of American missiles in Turkey.
A dispute over key issues in resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis arose not only between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kennedy administration, but also among the Soviet embassy staff who were directly involved in discussions on these issues. Among them: USSR Ambassador to the USA A.F. Dobrynin, Embassy Counselor A.S. Feklisov (KGB resident) and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the magazine “Soviet Life” G.N. Bolshakov (GRU employee).
Let us first consider the assessments of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Fedorovich Dobrynin. To do this, let us turn to the book of his memoirs, which contains the chapter “Cuban Crisis (October 1962).” It contains only 30 pages. Here Dobrynin sets out his assessment of the causes, development and resolution of the crisis. It is noteworthy that the Soviet ambassador calls the events that took place in October 1962, as is customary in the United States, the Cuban Crisis. Perhaps he initially prepared the manuscript for publication in America and was afraid that the publisher would still call the October events of 1962 not the Caribbean, as was customary in the USSR and as is customary in Russia, but the Cuban crisis.
What episodes of the crisis left the greatest mark on the memory of the Soviet ambassador?
Naturally attracts attention detailed description Robert Kennedy's meeting with Dobrynin, which took place on October 27 in the office of the Minister of Justice. This meeting, as we now know, was not the climax of the crisis, but its final stage. Even before her, representatives of the administration, through dummies (journalists F. Holman, C. Bartlett and D. Scali), proposed conditions for resolving the crisis, which came from the “highest power” of the United States. Moscow appreciated these conditions. Dobrynin, as a representative of the USSR, had to make sure that the American side would not officially abandon its unofficially made proposals. For this purpose, a meeting between Robert Kennedy (Secretary of State D. Rusk was excluded from measures to resolve the crisis) and the Soviet ambassador was needed.
The meeting between Kennedy and Dobrynin is a delicate moment in the history of the Cuban missile crisis and has special significance. He confirms that the reason that forced the Soviet government to decide to create a Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba was the planned secret CIA operation Mongoose, about which the Soviet leadership was promptly warned by the GRU and KGB residents.
During the meeting, Kennedy was alarmed; Dobrynin noted that he even slept in his office at night. What was the reason for this? First of all, apparently, the adventure against Cuba, which he led on behalf of the US President, failed. Under the current conditions, it was pointless to launch an invasion by CIA mercenaries. Moreover, Soviet missiles were discovered in Cuba, which unexpectedly radically changed the situation.
It was necessary to find a way out of the crisis that would allow the US administration, and not Khrushchev, to “save face.” The international community still knew nothing about Operation Mongoose, so at that moment Kennedy was most afraid of revealing the fact that the American president and government were involved in the conspiracy against F. Castro.
The memory of the Soviet ambassador remained “the fever of the October missile crisis, when world peace literally hung by a thread.” This is a general but nevertheless memorable assessment.
Further, Dobrynin writes: “To understand the full danger of a military conflict around Cuba, it is enough to recall that Soviet short- and medium-range missiles had dozens of nuclear charges, the targets of which could be Largest cities America, including New York, Washington, Chicago."
It is unlikely that Soviet missiles could have reached Chicago, about whose fate the Soviet ambassador was worried, but American missiles, which were based in Turkey and Italy, did threaten the security of the largest cities of the Soviet Union, located in the European part of the country, but this is an alarming fact for his fellow citizens For some reason, Dobrynin didn’t mention it.
Assessing the post-crisis development of Soviet-American relations, Dobrynin wrote that the Soviet “military establishment took advantage of this (the crisis - V.L.) in order to achieve a new program for building up nuclear missile weapons, which gave new impetus to the arms race, which ... continued for almost thirty more years, although attempts were made to limit this race to some extent” 262.
Anatoly Fedorovich did not say a word in his memoirs that starting in 1945, when American bombers dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was the United States that started the arms race, which ultimately led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nevertheless, he considered it necessary to emphasize that in subsequent years, when he was the USSR Ambassador to the USA, attempts were made to limit this race.
And the last thing the ambassador writes about is the participation of embassy adviser A.S. Feklisov (Fomina) in resolving the crisis. We already know that he operated in Washington as a resident of the KGB foreign intelligence service.
Dobrynin assessed Feklisov’s work during the Cuban Missile Crisis this way: “Our intelligence did not have reliable sources of information in Washington at that moment. It is no coincidence that Resident Fomin himself went to the bar-restaurant to obtain information from the correspondent” 263.
Hero of Russia KGB Colonel A.S. Feklisov also wrote his memoirs. Based on them, we will try to tell you what the KGB resident in Washington thought about the crisis.
Feklisov owns the book “Confession of an Intelligence Officer. Atomic bomb. The Cuban missile crisis - truth and lies." Summarizing the assessments of the crisis that appeared in subsequent years, he wrote: “Sometimes in Washington and Moscow voices are heard that during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union retreated under pressure from Washington, afraid of American military power. In my opinion, they say that in vain. The crisis was resolved as a result of mutual reasonable compromise: one side agreed to remove missiles from Cuba, the other agreed to remove them from Turkey. This is how the threat of a nuclear collision with unpredictable consequences was eliminated. In addition, the USSR managed to obtain a commitment from the United States that they would not invade Cuba in the future. This agreement is still in effect." 264
Recalling the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Feklisov repeatedly asked himself three questions related not to its causes, but to the tactics of negotiating on the most pressing issues used by the John F. Kennedy administration. They are of interest and make one think about some of the moral issues of both the crisis itself and the behavior of government officials who were involved in it.
The first question: “What was the real reason that Ambassador Dobrynin did not sign the telegram on October 26, 1962, containing the conditions for resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis transmitted by the President of the United States through John Scali?” 265
Answering this question, Feklisov wrote that the ambassador’s motivation was based on the fact that he “could not do this because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not give the embassy authority to conduct such negotiations.”
Feklisov believed that the ambassador’s refusal to sign his report to Moscow was “just a frivolous excuse. Really, the embassy staff should have only formally followed the instructions of their department and refrained from taking initiative in their activities, especially in crisis situations, when the technical means that ensure communication between the embassy and Moscow do not keep up with rapidly changing events?
Feklisov came to the conclusion that “if Scali had conveyed the terms of the conflict settlement to any of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees, Dobrynin would have immediately handed over the dispatch to its destination with his signature. He did not sign my telegram, since this would mean that the embassy stood aside from resolving the Cuban missile crisis. In addition, it is possible that the ambassador believed: I will not dare to send such an important telegram to the Center, then the White House will be forced to turn to him with its proposals.”
“In this case,” Feklisov concluded his reasoning, “Dobrynin was let down by an overly narrow departmental approach to a living, creative matter.” Apparently, the retired KGB resident was right.
Second question: “Why didn’t the White House convey, as is usually customary, the conditions for eliminating the Cuban missile crisis through the ambassador?”
Trying to find an answer to this question, Feklisov made a cautious assumption, which boils down to the following: “I believe that President Kennedy did not want to do this, since at that time he was hostile to Dobrynin and Gromyko. The fact is that on the eve of the crisis, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs assured the owner of the White House that the USSR was supplying Cuba with only peaceful equipment that did not pose any threat to the security of the United States. And in general, the Soviet Union will not take any foreign policy steps that would complicate Soviet-American relations on the eve of the midterm elections in the United States. The Soviet ambassador, naturally, echoed his minister. After receiving documentary data about Soviet missiles in Cuba, the White House regarded the statement of Gromyko and Dobrynin as a deliberate lie. There was a lot of talk about this in the American press. During the discussion for " round table“In January 1989 in Moscow, M. Bundy and T. Sorenson openly confirmed in the presence of Gromyko and Dobrynin that the latter lied to President Kennedy.”
Mention of the meeting in Washington between Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and John Kennedy - exclusively important point. On October 18, the CIA was already completing the training of mercenaries for the invasion of Cuba and, carried away by it, the CIA leadership and agents were unable to obtain information that the Soviet Union was completing the deployment of a Group of Forces in Cuba, which included a division of medium-range missiles. Kennedy did not tell Gromyko anything about the impending attack; it would have blown up the world. The Soviet Foreign Minister knew about this provocation prepared by the United States, and perhaps expected the President to inform him about it, but Gromyko's expectations were not realized. Under these conditions, he also chose not to tell the president anything about the presence of missiles in Cuba, which Kennedy already knew about from the reports of CIA Director D. McCone. Ambassador Dobrynin, who was present at this meeting, knew neither one nor the other.
Feklisov’s third question is: “Why do President Kennedy’s aides - P. Salinger and A. Schlesinger and others - in their books hide the truth that President Kennedy made a proposal for a peaceful settlement of the nuclear missile conflict, and write that for the first time they, these proposals were allegedly received from the adviser of the Soviet embassy Fomin?”
Anticipating the answer to this question, Feklisov recalled that even in the text of the memorial plaque installed in the Occidental restaurant in Washington, it was written: “During the tense period of the Cuban crisis (October 1962), the mysterious Russian Mr. “X” conveyed a proposal to remove missiles from Cuba to ABC correspondent John Scoli. This meeting served to eliminate the threat of nuclear war."
Interesting inscription. Rather, the history of its appearance and the reason why it was made are interesting. The sign claims that at this restaurant, “the mysterious Russian Mr. “X”” conveyed a proposal to remove missiles from Cuba to John Scali. But everything was different. And for the Soviet leadership it did not matter who was the first to make this proposal. Declassified GRU materials related to the activities of Colonel Bolshakov in Washington also indicate that F. Holman and C. Bartlett informed him of similar conditions of the “highest power” of the United States, which confirms the statement of A. S. Feklisov that it was D. Scali invited him to a meeting and proposed a deal to resolve the crisis.
We have already said earlier that the question of who was the first to formulate the conditions for resolving the crisis is one of the key ones. It should be added that the one who first proposed these conditions is the main culprit in causing the crisis. Such a conclusion involuntarily follows from cause-and-effect relationships and secrets, long time enveloping the decision-making mechanisms in both Moscow and Washington.
The problems of Feklisov’s personal and official relations with the Soviet ambassador, which arose during the Cuban missile crisis, worried the KGB resident until the last days of his life. Recalling his days of work in Washington, Feklisov wrote: “In books published in the USA, they write that on Saturday, October 27, R. Kennedy met with Dobrynin. Some indicate that their meeting took place at the Soviet embassy, while others indicate that they met in the office of the Minister of Justice. In fact, they met twice that day. I witnessed their first meeting at the embassy. At Dobrynin’s call, at about 2 p.m., I came to the hall on the second floor, where he was sitting with R. Kennedy on the sofa and talking about something. It seemed to me that the dialogue was difficult. I approached them. The ambassador, nervous, turned to me for some information. His speech, unlike usual, was confused. I immediately realized that my arrival was needed not by the ambassador, but by his interlocutor. R. Kennedy sat leaning over and looked intently at me from under his brows with a studying, and perhaps even condemning, gaze. He came to the embassy, apparently, in order to personally look at Advisor Fomin and make sure whether he conveyed the president’s well-known proposal to the ambassador.
The second meeting between them took place on the same day in the evening. There was no response from Khrushchev until a quarter past seven. The President instructed his brother to talk to Dobrynin again. The meeting took place in R. Kennedy's office. The Minister of Justice told the ambassador:
We must receive assurance that the missiles will be dismantled no later than tomorrow. Moscow must understand that if it does not demolish these bases, then we will demolish them.
For his part, Dobrynin, acting in accordance with last letter Khrushchev, directed by Kennedy, insisted that the United States agree, in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, to remove American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The ambassador's arguments, based on the principle of equal security, were very convincing. Robert Kennedy, after consultations by telephone with the White House, said that President Kennedy agreed with this on the condition: firstly, that the Jupiters would be removed three to five months after the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and, secondly, this agreement will be kept strictly confidential and will not be included in the official text of the agreement to end the Cuban missile crisis.
Robert Kennedy explained this by the difficult situation in the United States and the need to hold appropriate negotiations with Turkey and other NATO member states.”
Feklisov further writes that “late in the evening, the Minister of Justice also met with the counselor of our embassy, G. Bolshakov, through whom the heads of the USSR and the USA sometimes exchanged confidential letters. In the conversation, R. Kennedy repeated to Bolshakov what he had already said to Dobrynin. At the same time, he emphasized that if a positive response is not received from Moscow in the next 24 hours, it will be impossible for the president to restrain the military from invading Cuba.” Bolshakov did not write anything about this meeting; documents confirming its holding could not be identified.
Concluding the description of the alarming events, Feklisov wrote: “the fact that the White House emissaries on October 27 as many as four (two. - V.L.) times sought from the Soviet embassy a quick response from the Kremlin to the proposal made by the president testifies to John Kennedy’s desire to avoid a military conflict , resolve the crisis peacefully and thereby avoid the death of thousands and thousands of people - American, Soviet and Cuban citizens."
Feklisov in his memoirs tried to describe what he knew and remembered, and Alexander Semenovich’s memory was excellent, he remembered many details. They left a deep imprint on his soul, and the KGB resident reliably reproduced them in his memories.
Three questions that troubled him until the last days of his life touched upon and continue to touch upon complex problems. The author of the book believes that these questions should be asked to politicians, diplomats and other citizens of the United States and Russia who are interested in international relations, are responsible for their level of development and are ready to learn useful lessons from historical events for your practical activities conducted in modern conditions.
If readers have carefully read the contents of the book “Armageddon is Cancelled,” they can also give their answers to the questions of KGB resident Colonel A. S. Feklisov.
One of the main characters of the book and a real participant in the Cuban missile crisis, as has now been reliably established, was GRU Colonel Georgy Nikitovich Bolshakov. What memories of the Cuban missile crisis did he retain in his soul? How did he evaluate those events, the participation of GRU leaders and his colleagues in intelligence activities in them?
It should be noted right away that the name of Georgy Nikitovich Bolshakov has already been forgotten. If anyone remembers him, it is only due to the fact that he was an officer on special assignments for the USSR Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov and met with the brother of US President Robert Kennedy.
What did Bolshakov write in his memoirs about the Cuban Missile Crisis? It was possible to find these memories only in the Russian State Library. Getting acquainted with them, every reader can be convinced that their author was a modest and decent person who knew how to appreciate real male friendship, was faithful to the cause he served, and tried with all his might to contribute to the positive development of Soviet-American relations.
“When we remember the events of those years,” Bolshakov wrote, “we should not forget that even today... the agreement, achieved over the 13 tragic days of October 1962, is being respected. The Cuban Republic is alive, which means our actions were justified, although some still believe that the signed agreement was a concession to American imperialism. In fact, by the end of these thirteen days, the world looked into the abyss of a nuclear catastrophe. And we must give tribute to both Prime Minister Khrushchev and President Kennedy for the fact that they both had the political courage to come to the understanding that in the Cuban crisis there would be neither winners nor losers.”266
In an effort to give an objective assessment of the events that preceded the crisis, Bolshakov wrote: “Of course, it was no secret that in the summer of 1962 the Soviet Union and Cuba signed a military supply agreement Soviet weapons to Cuba to strengthen its defense capabilities. The issue was discussed during Raul Castro's stay in Moscow in July 1962.
The Soviet Union sent the necessary military equipment and weapons, including a number of medium-range missiles and a corresponding contingent of Soviet military specialists to provide assistance and training to Cuban military personnel. Maintenance of the missiles was carried out only by Soviet military specialists. This agreement was kept secret, although it was not difficult to assume that the very transportation of bulky missile launchers to Cuba by sea could not but go unnoticed. After all, all approaches were controlled.”
Further, Bolshakov named the root cause of the crisis. Here is his point of view: “As a matter of fact, passions raged not so much around the missiles themselves, but around our position of stubborn denial of the fact of their installation near American shores. The Americans have long since placed their missiles under our noses - in Turkey. But no one made a secret of this fact. The whole world knew about him, including the Soviet Union. But our deliberate secrecy constrained the actions of Soviet diplomacy, because whenever and wherever the question of Cuba was raised, another one immediately arose: are there Soviet missiles in Cuba? The fact of direct denial was used unambiguously: a lie. And it very easily crept into the minds of ordinary Americans. That is why, probably, President Kennedy, before the planned invasion of Cuba, managed to enlist the support of not only the Organization of American States, but also a number of European governments - Great Britain, Germany, France."
American journalists, including his friend Frank Holeman, wrote about Bolshakov’s actions in Washington. Bolshakov was painfully worried about the unfair reproaches that were addressed to him. These experiences were also reflected in the memories. Here is what he wrote about this: “Soviet diplomats, employees of the USSR Embassy in Washington, also found themselves in a very unpleasant situation. The truth was hidden not only from “strangers”, but also from “our own”. We did not know how things really stood, and the “no” with which we answered all the “missile” questions was regarded accordingly. What was it like for the USSR representative to the UN, in front of the whole world, surrounded by photographs of our launch sites, to fuss and twist, avoiding a direct answer to the question about the presence of our missiles in Cuba. It saddens me to think that in this matter I was considered a liar by both Robert Kennedy and other people who sincerely wanted rapprochement with our country and who, like me, made a lot of effort to achieve this rapprochement.”267
Realizing that, by the will of fate, he turned out to be one of the main characters in the Cuban missile crisis, Georgy Nikitovich wrote: “In fact, in the name of this idea (improving Soviet-American relations - V.A.) a hotline was created and operated. The channel of personal communication between N. S. Khrushchev and John Kennedy appeared new form relations between the leaders of our two powerful states, in which the personal “I” predominated, which excluded, to a certain extent, the influence on them of the forces opposing them (the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and others). It allowed the two leaders to openly express their views on individual issues and thus better understand each other.”
Assessing the actions and capabilities of the leaders of the USSR and the USA on the eve of and during the Cuban missile crisis, Bolshakov wrote: “Kennedy and Khrushchev were kind of “prisoners” of the forceful course of their predecessors. If the lesson of the failure of the adventure against Cuba in the Bay of Cochins led President Kennedy to a painful reassessment of his foreign policy course, then for the other side it became a reason to increase its forceful “confrontational pressure” (Vienna, Berlin, Cuba...).
And only 13 tragic days of October 1962 had a sobering effect on the two leaders, who saw with their own eyes the abyss of a nuclear disaster, and they had the courage to begin searching for mutual peaceful solutions to world problems. However, one of them was prevented from continuing this path by bullets in Dallas, and the other by a “well-deserved rest” that began in October 1964. Thus, the opening opportunities for Soviet-American rapprochement were missed, precious time was lost” 268.
Bolshakov made several erroneous assessments in his memoirs. One is that the failure at the Bay of Cochins led Kennedy to “an agonizing reassessment of his foreign policy.”
As evidenced by the facts (investigation of the CIA by the commission of Senator Church, declassified reports of foreign intelligence of the KGB and GRU), after the events in the Bay of Cochinos, Kennedy not only did not make a “painful reassessment” of the foreign policy course, but also authorized Operation Mongoose, the implementation of which was thwarted by joint actions of the leaders of the USSR and Cuba.
Bolshakov undoubtedly trusted Robert Kennedy, who skillfully kept state secrets and did not say a word to the editor of Soviet Life magazine about the preparation of the CIA operation against Cuba. R. Kennedy sought to find ways to solve acute problems that were holding back the development of Soviet-American relations. But at the same time, he also created new, even more difficult difficulties on the path of rapprochement. The adventure against Cuba, if it had succeeded, would hardly have improved relations between the USA and the USSR.
Readers will remember that on the pages of our book it was already reported that Bolshakov was friends with military intelligence officer Viktor Lyubimov, who operated in Washington, Paris and other cities. Viktor Andreevich assessed Bolshakov’s role in resolving the Caribbean crisis as follows: “Georgy Bolshakov played an important positive role in stabilizing Soviet-American interstate relations. With all his appearance, behavior, goodwill, frankness and awareness, he said that the country and people who sent him to the USA cannot be an insidious aggressor” 269.
Lyubimov further wrote: “I am convinced that partly and under the influence of Georgy Bolshakov, Robert Kennedy and his close friends, who communicated with Bolshakov in their usual environment, took a restrained, realistic position in the process of resolving the Cuban missile crisis. All of them stood for a blockade and negotiations, and not for an attack and invasion of Cuba” 270.
Once upon a time, Viktor Andreevich Lyubimov gave the author of this book his unpublished memories of the Cuban missile crisis. They are also the “private opinion” of a person who lived and worked during that difficult time, as a military intelligence officer operating in Paris and supervising the work of an agent who had the secret pseudonym Murat in the GRU. What did Captain 1st Rank V. A. Lyubimov write about the Caribbean crisis? Let's turn to his memories.
“I don’t undertake to evaluate the events on a large scale, however, in my opinion,” he wrote, “the assessments of political and military leaders, which were made immediately in the wake of the events, more clearly and truthfully reflected the reality of the situation at that time. I wanted to use some words to reflect the participation of intelligence in general, and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, in particular, in the Berlin and Caribbean crises, in their emergence and resolution. To understand the development of events, one must first turn to the events of May 1960, when U-2 reconnaissance flights organized by the CIA over Soviet Union ended with the destruction of a US reconnaissance aircraft over Sverdlovsk.
But that was only the beginning. In May - June of the same year, the most valuable source of the GRU “Murat” gave us a “Nuclear Strike Plan” against the USSR and people’s democracies, which is called “SAKERS Atomic Strike Plan No. 110/59 of November 16, 1959.” In this plan, everything was described in exceptional detail: the scope and tasks, principles of implementation, control and implementation, goals and action programs of the NATO Supreme Command and regional commands, ground and naval operations. At the same time, a new top secret NATO Instruction on waging a nuclear war against the USSR, on the limits of action...
The head of the GRU reported these documents of particular importance to the Minister of Defense of the USSR R. Ya. Malinovsky and the Chief of the General Staff M. V. Zakharov, who could not help but report these NATO documents to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief N. S. Khrushchev.
What moral and purely physical shock the leader of the USSR experienced should be described by eyewitnesses. But there was this shock. N. S. Khrushchev’s friend D. Eisenhower, a comrade-in-arms in the war against Nazi Germany, brazenly and secretly, directly and quite seriously threatens our state and tells lies. Khrushchev’s son, Sergei, writes about it this way: “The notches remained in his father’s heart forever. The deception on the part of the “friend” struck the father to the heart. He has not forgiven President Eisenhower or the man Eisenhower.” Negotiate about peaceful life and at the same time plan nuclear strikes. This, in my opinion, makes it clear where the roots of the Cuban missile crisis lie. I believe that it was the United States and NATO that literally led the USSR to take a retaliatory step - placing missiles in Cuba" 271 .
The opinion of retired KGB lieutenant general Nikolai Leonov, who was a resident in Mexico during the Cuban missile crisis, is also interesting. According to his assessment, expressed in 2012 to the correspondent of the Spanish newspaper El Soggeo, Ignacio Ortega, the main result of the Cuban missile crisis is “a small victory in political and moral terms. From that moment on, the United States recognized that the USSR was a powerful nuclear power.” According to Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Leonov, “Operation Mongoose” - a secret program of propaganda, psychological warfare and sabotage against Cuba developed in the Kennedy administration, undertaken to remove the communists from power - became the prerequisite for the Cuban missile crisis.
And further: “The US-initiated attempt by Cuban counter-revolutionary forces to land on Playa Giron (Bay of Cochinos) in April 1961 demonstrated that the USSR could not defend Cuba without the deployment of Soviet military bases on the island.” Leonov claims that the Soviet government received information from the KGB about the impending new US provocation against Cuba in April 1962. This information supplemented the data that had already been obtained by military intelligence officers. The reports of the Soviet intelligence services were correctly assessed by Khrushchev and his associates, who made the responsible decision to get ahead of events. And they did it.
Russian historian Alexander Fursenko, who in 1999, together with American researcher Timothy Naftali, published the book “Infernal Game” 272, assessed the actions of the Soviet prime minister this way: “Khrushchev took a risk by deciding to place missiles in Cuba. But, as follows from official documents, he did not intend to use them, but simply wanted to force the American authorities to enter into a dialogue with Moscow on equal terms.”
The dialogue worked out. Dialogue of equals. But it was a dangerous dialogue, which, nevertheless, had a significant impact on the development of relations between the USSR and the USA.
Recalling his activities as a KGB resident, Leonov wrote: “In the reports that I sent to the Soviet leadership from Mexico, I warned that the United States was ready to attack Cuba. The risk was enormous, and conflict was quite possible. Still I hoped that common sense will win, and Cuba will be able to prevent a worldwide nuclear holocaust.”
In general, in most of the above private opinions, their authors are unanimous that the Cuban Missile Crisis was provoked by the actions of the Kennedy administration. Describing the impending invasion of Cuba by American troops, US Secretary of Defense R. McNamara stated in 2002: “It was supposed to be a massive attack. On the first day, air strikes were envisaged, for which it was planned to carry out 1080 sorties. Then an invasion operation was to follow, in which the participation of 80 thousand people was planned.”273
During the Cuban missile crisis, R. McNamara took a cautious position. He listened to what the president said and, understanding him, did not propose solutions that could lead to an operation by the American armed forces against the Soviet contingent stationed in Cuba.
Events happen faster than people change. The intense and dangerous Cuban Missile Crisis raged for thirteen days. It arose unexpectedly, swept over the United States, Cuba and the Soviet Union, could have captured Europe and other regions, but died down in November 1962. So Armageddon, that is, a general military clash between two superpowers, which could really develop into a global nuclear war, managed to cancel.
After the successful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis, a mutual understanding was established between Khrushchev and Kennedy, which could contribute to the positive development of Soviet-American relations. But in 1963, John Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, and in 1964, Khrushchev was deprived of the post of prime minister as a result of another Kremlin coup.
256 Khrushchev N. S. Time. People. Power: in 4 vols. M., 1999.
257 Khrushchev N. S. Time. People. Power: in 4 vols. M., 1999 // Esin V.I. Strategic operation “Anadyr” How it happened. M., 2000. P. 22.
258 Esin V.I. Strategic operation “Anadyr”. How it was. M., 2000. P. 5
259 Yazov D. F. Caribbean crisis. Forty years later. M., 2006. pp. 371-372
260 Ibid.
261 Gareev M. A. The Caribbean crisis and the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring Russia’s security in modern conditions // Esin V. I. Strategic operation “Anadyr”. How it was. M., 2000. pp. 252-254.
262 Dobrynin A.F. Purely confidential. M., 1996. P. 78.
263 Ibid.
264 Feklisov A. S. Caribbean nuclear missile crisis. Looking from Washington // Esin V.I. Strategic operation “Adadyr”. How it was. M., 2000. P. 248.
265 Ibid.
266 Bolshakov G. Hotline // New Time, 1989, No. 6. P. 39.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid. P. 40.
269 Lyubimov V. A. About the Caribbean crisis. Manuscript. P. 10. From the author’s personal archive.
270 Ibid. P. 11.
271 Ibid.
272 Fursenko A., Naftali T. Hell of a game. M., 1999.
273 Yazov D. F. Caribbean crisis. Forty years later. M., 2006. P. 279.
