Why is the Kursk Bulge called? They commanded fronts and armies in the Battle of Kursk

At the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Land Forces, when the true face of Hitler the strategist emerged When Klaus arrived at the OKH Organization Department, he was still under the impression of the victorious campaign in France. It was an incredible success, the euphoria of victory was equal

Appendix 1. HEADS OF INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENTS OF THE FRONT HEADQUARTERS THAT TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE OF KURK PETER NIKIFOROVICH CHEKMAZOVMajor General?. N. Chekmazov during the Battle of Kursk was the head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Central Front (August - October

The Battle of Kursk was the fighting during the Great Patriotic War in the area of ​​the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was a key element of the summer 1943 campaign of the Red Army, during which a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War, which began with the victory at Stalingrad, ended.

Chronological framework

In domestic historiography, there is an established point of view that the Battle of Kursk took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. It distinguishes two periods: the defensive stage and the counter-offensive of the Red Army.

At the first stage, the Kursk strategic defensive operation was carried out by the forces of two fronts, Central (July 5-12, 1943) and Voronezh (July 5-23, 1943), with the involvement of strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters (Steppe Front), the purpose of which was to disrupt the Citadel plan "

Background and plans of the parties

After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German leadership faced two key problems: how to hold the eastern front under the increasing blows of the growing power of the Red Army, and how to keep the allies in their orbit, who had already begun to look for ways out of the war. Hitler believed that an offensive without such a deep breakthrough as was the case in 1942 should have helped not only to solve these problems, but also to raise the morale of the troops.

In April, the Operation Citadel plan was developed, according to which two groups strike in converging directions and encircle the Central and Voronezh fronts in the Kursk ledge. According to Berlin's calculations, their defeat made it possible to inflict huge losses on the Soviet side, reduce the front line to 245 km, and form reserves from the released forces. Two armies and one army group were allocated for the operation. South of Orel, Army Group (GA) “Center” deployed the 9th Army (A) of Colonel General V. Model. After several modifications to the plan, she received the task: breaking through the defenses of the Central Front and, having traveled about 75 km, connecting in the Kursk area with the troops of the GA "Yu" - the 4th Tank Army (TA) of Colonel General G. Hoth. The latter was concentrated north of Belgorod and was considered the main force of the offensive. After breaking through the Voronezh Front line, she had to travel more than 140 km to the meeting place. The external front of the encirclement was to be created by 23 AK 9A and the army group (AG) "Kempf" from the GA "South". Active combat operations were planned to take place over an area of ​​about 150 km.

For the "Citadel" GA "Center" allocated to V. Model, whom Berlin appointed responsible for the operation, 3 tank (41,46 and 47) and one army (23) corps, a total of 14 divisions, of which 6 were tank, and GA "South" - 4 TA and AG "Kempf" 5 corps - three tank (3, 48 and 2 SS Tank Corps) and two army (52 AK and AK "Raus"), consisting of 17 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) received the first information about Berlin's planning of a major offensive operation near Kursk in mid-March 1943. And on April 12, 1943, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, a preliminary decision was already made on the transition to strategic defense. Central Front of Army General K.K. Rokossovsky was given the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk Bulge, repelling a possible attack, and then, together with the Western and Bryansk fronts, launching a counteroffensive and defeating the German group in the Orel area.

The Voronezh Front of Army General N.F. Vatutin was supposed to defend the southern part of the Kursk ledge, bleed the enemy in the upcoming defensive battles, and then launch a counteroffensive and, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front and the Steppe Fronts, complete its defeat in the Bel region -city and Kharkov.

The Kursk defensive operation was considered as the most important element of the entire summer campaign of 1943. It was planned that after the expected enemy offensive in the Central and Voronezh fronts was stopped, conditions would arise to complete its defeat and launch a general offensive from Smolensk to Taganrog. The Bryansk and Western Fronts will immediately begin the Oryol offensive operation, which will help the Central Front to completely thwart the enemy’s plans. In parallel with it, the Steppe Front should approach the south of the Kursk ledge, and after its concentration it was planned to launch the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, which was to be carried out in parallel with the Donbass offensive operation of the Southern Fronts and the Southwestern Front.

On July 1, 1943, the Central Front had 711,575 people, including 467,179 combat personnel, 10,725 guns and mortars, 1,607 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the Voronezh Front had 625,590 military personnel, of which 417,451 combat personnel, 8,583 guns and mortars, 1,700 units armored vehicles.

Kursk defensive operation. Fighting in the north of the Kursk Bulge July 5-12, 1943

During April - June, the start of the Citadel was postponed several times. The last date was determined to be dawn on July 5, 1943. On the Central Front, fierce battles took place over an area of ​​40 km. 9 A attacked in three directions at short intervals. The main blow was delivered to the 13A of Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov by the forces of 47 Tank Tank - on Olkhovatka, the second, auxiliary, 41 Tank Tank and 23 AK - to Malo-Arkhangelsk, on the right wing of 13 A and the left 48A of Lieutenant General P.L. .Romanenko and the third - 46 tk - on Gnilets on the right flank of 70A Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. Heavy and bloody battles ensued.

In the Olkhovat-Ponyrovsk direction, Model launched more than 500 armored units into the attack at once, and groups of bombers were flying in waves in the air, but the powerful defense system did not allow the enemy to immediately break the lines of the Soviet troops.

In the second half of July 5, N.P. Pukhov moved part of the mobile reserves to the main zone, and K.K. Rokossovsky sent howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Counterattacks by tanks and infantry, supported by artillery, stopped the enemy's offensive. By the end of the day, a small “dent” had formed in the center of 13A, but the defense had not been broken anywhere. Troops 48A and the left flank 13A completely held their positions. At the cost of heavy losses, the 47th and 46th Tank Corps managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction, and the 70A troops retreated only 5 km.

To restore the lost position at the junction of 13 and 70A, K.K. Rokossovsky, in the second half of July 5, decided to carry out a counterattack on the morning of July 6 by the 2nd TA of Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin and 19th Tank Tank in cooperation with the second echelon of 13A - 17th Guards . Rifle Corps (RK). He was unable to fully solve the problems. After two days of fruitless attempts to implement the Citadel plan, 9A was stuck in the defense of the Central Front. From July 7 to July 11, the epicenter of the fighting in zones 13 and 70A was the Ponyri station and the area of ​​​​the villages of Olkhovatka - Samodurovka - Gnilets, where two powerful resistance centers were created that blocked the path to Kursk. By the end of July 9, the offensive of the main forces of 9A was stopped, and on July 11, it made the last unsuccessful attempt to break through the defenses of the Central Front.

On July 12, 1943, a turning point occurred in the fighting in this area. The Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. V. Model, appointed responsible for the defense of the entire Oryol arc, began hastily transferring troops near Oryol aimed at Kursk. And on July 13, Hitler officially stopped the Citadel. The depth of advance of 9A was 12-15 km at a front of up to 40 km. No operational, let alone strategic, results were achieved. Moreover, she did not retain the positions already taken. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive and two days later it basically restored its position until July 5, 1943.

At dawn on July 5, 1943, the troops of the GA "South" went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered in the 6th Guards zone. And Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov in the direction of Oboyan by forces of 4TA. More than 1,168 armored units were deployed here by the German side. In the auxiliary, Korochan direction (east and northeast of Belgorod) positions of the 7th Guards. And Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov was attacked by 3 tanks and "Raus" AG "Kempf", which had 419 tanks and assault guns. However, thanks to the tenacity of the soldiers and commanders of the 6th Guards. And, already in the first two days, the offensive schedule of the GA “South” was disrupted, and its divisions suffered great damage. And most importantly, the strike force of the Civil Aviation Unit "South" was split. 4TA and AG "Kempf" failed to create a continuous breakthrough front, because AG Kempf was unable to cover the right wing of 4TA and their troops began to move in diverging directions. Therefore, 4TA was forced to weaken the strike wedge and direct greater forces to strengthen the right wing. However, a wider offensive front than in the north of the Kursk Bulge (up to 130 km) and more significant forces allowed the enemy to break through the Voronezh Front line in a strip of up to 100 km and enter the defense in the main direction up to 28 km by the end of the fifth day, while 66% of the armored vehicles in its corps failed.

On July 10, the second stage of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front began, the epicenter of the fighting shifted to Prokhorovka station. The battle for this resistance center lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943. On July 12, a frontal counterattack was carried out. For 10-12 hours in the area of ​​the station, about 1,100 armored units of the warring parties operated at different times in a 40 km area. However, it did not bring the expected results. Although the troops of the GA "South" were able to be kept in the army defense system, all formations of the 4th TA and AG "Kempf" retained their combat effectiveness. In the next four days, the most intense battles took place south of the station in the area between the Seversky and Lipovy Donets rivers, which was convenient for striking both the deep right flank of 4TA and the left wing of AG Kempf. However, it was not possible to defend this area. On the night of July 15, 1943, 2 SS Tank and 3 Tank surrounded four 69A divisions south of the station, but they managed to escape from the “ring”, although with heavy losses

On the night of July 16-17, the troops of the GA "South" began to retreat in the direction of Belgorod, and by the end of July 23, 1943, the Voronezh Front had pushed the GA "South" back approximately to the positions from which it had launched the offensive. The goal set for the Soviet troops during the Kursk defensive operation was fully achieved.

Oryol offensive operation

After two weeks of bloody battles, the Wehrmacht’s last strategic offensive was stopped, but this was only part of the Soviet command’s plan for the summer campaign of 1943. Now, it was important to finally take the initiative into our own hands and turn the tide of the war.

The plan for the destruction of German troops in the Orel area, codenamed Operation Kutuzov, was developed before the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, bordering the Oryol arc, were supposed to strike in the general direction of Orel, cut 2 TA and 9A GA "Center" into three separate groups, encircle them in the areas of Bolkhov, Mtsensk, Orel and destroy them.

To carry out the operation, part of the forces of the Western Front (commander Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), the entire Bryansk Front (Colonel General M.M. Popov) and the Central Front were involved. Breaking through enemy defenses was planned in five areas. The Western Front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the troops of the left wing - the 11th Guards A, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan - on Khotynets and the auxiliary one - on Zhizdra, and the Bryansk Front - on Orel (main attack) and Bolkhov (auxiliary). The Central Front, after completely stopping the 9A offensive, had to concentrate the main efforts of 70.13, 48A and 2 TA in the Krom direction. The start of the offensive was strictly linked to the moment when it became clear that strike group 9A was exhausted and tied up in battles on the borders of the Central Front. According to Headquarters, such a moment came on July 12, 1943.

A day before the offensive, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan conducted reconnaissance in force on the left flank of the 2nd TA. As a result, not only was the outline of the enemy's front line and its fire system clarified, but in some areas the German infantry was driven out of the first trench. THEIR. Bagramyan gave the order for the immediate start of a general offensive. The 1 tk introduced on July 13 completed the breakthrough of the second band. After which 5 Tank Corps began to develop an offensive bypassing Bolkhov, and 1 Tank Corps - towards Khotynets.

The first day of the offensive on the Bryansk Front did not bring tangible results. Operating on the main, Oryol direction, 3A of Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov and 63A of Lieutenant General V.Ya. By the end of July 13, Kolpakchi had broken through 14 km, and 61A of Lieutenant General P.A. Belova, in the Bolkhov direction, penetrated the enemy’s defenses only 7 km. The offensive of the Central Front, which began on July 15, did not change the situation. By the end of July 17, his troops had pushed back 9A only to the positions it occupied at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.

However, already on July 19, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Bolkhov group, because 11th Guards A broke through 70 km in a southern direction, stubbornly moving towards Bolkhov and 61A. This city was the “key” to Orel, so the warring parties began to build up their forces here. On July 19, the 3rd Guards TA of Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko advanced in the direction of the main attack of the Bryansk Front. Having repelled enemy counterattacks, by the end of the day it had broken through the second line of defense on the Oleshnya River. The grouping of the Western Front was also hastily strengthened. The significant superiority of forces, although not quickly, bore fruit. On August 5, 1943, one of the largest regional centers of the European part of the USSR, the city of Oryol was liberated by the troops of the Bryansk Front.

After the destruction of the group in the area of ​​Bolkhov and Orel, the most intense fighting took place on the Khotynets - Kromy front, and at the final stage of Operation Kutuzov, the heaviest fighting broke out for the city of Karachev, which covered the approaches to Bryansk, which was liberated on August 15, 1943.

On August 18, 1943, Soviet troops reached the German defensive line "Hagen", east of Bryansk. This concluded Operation Kutuzov. In 37 days, the Red Army advanced 150 km, a fortified bridgehead and a large enemy group were eliminated in a strategically important direction, and favorable conditions were created for an attack on Bryansk and further to Belarus.

Belgorod - Kharkov offensive operation

It received the code name “Commander Rumyantsev”, was carried out from August 3 to 23, 1943 by the Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Steppe (Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts and was the final stage of the Battle of Kursk. The operation was supposed to be carried out in two stages: in the first, to defeat the troops of the left wing of the Civil Aviation Administration "South" in the area of ​​​​Belgorod and Tomarovka, and then to liberate Kharkov. The Steppe Front was supposed to liberate Belgorod and Kharkov, and the Voronezh Front was to bypass them from the north-west and develop success towards Poltava. The main blow was planned to be delivered by the armies of the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area north-west of Belgorod in the direction of Bogodukhov and Valki, at the junction of 4 TA and AG "Kempf", to fragment them and cut off their path to retreat to the west and south-west. Launch an auxiliary attack on Akhtyrka with forces of 27 and 40A to block the movement of reserves to Kharkov. At the same time, the city was to be bypassed from the south by 57A of the Southwestern Front. The operation was planned on a front of 200 km and a depth of up to 120 km.

On August 3, 1943, after a powerful artillery barrage, the first echelon of the Voronezh Front - 6th Guards A under Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov and 5th Guards A under Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov crossed the Vorskla River, made a 5 km gap on the front between Belgorod and Tomarovka, through which the main forces entered - 1TA Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov and 5th Guards TA Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov. Having passed the breakthrough “corridor” and deployed into battle formation, their troops dealt a strong blow to Zolochev. By the end of the day, the 5th Guards TA, having gone 26 km deep into the enemy’s defenses, cut off the Belgorod group from the Tomarov group and reached the line with. Good Will, and the next morning it broke through to Bessonovka and Orlovka. And the 6th Guards. And on the evening of August 3rd they broke through to Tomarovka. 4TA offered stubborn resistance. From August 4, 5th Guards. The TA was pinned down by enemy counterattacks for two days, although according to the calculations of the Soviet side, already on August 5, its brigades were supposed to leave west of Kharkov and capture the city of Lyubotin. This delay changed the plan of the entire operation to quickly split the enemy group.

After two days of heavy fighting on the outskirts of Belgorod, on August 5, 1943, the 69th and 7th Guards A of the Steppe Front pushed the troops of AG Kempf to the outskirts and began an assault on it, which by evening ended with clearing the main part of it from the invaders. On the evening of August 5, 1943, in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, fireworks were given in Moscow for the first time during the war years.

On this day, a turning point came and in the Voronezh Front zone, in the auxiliary direction, the 40A of Lieutenant General K.S. went on the offensive. Moskalenko, in the direction of Boromlya and 27A Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko, who by the end of August 7 liberated Grayvoron and advanced to Akhtyrka.

After the liberation of Belgorod, the pressure on the Steppe Front also intensified. On August 8, 57A of Lieutenant General N.A. was transferred to him. Hagena. Trying to prevent the encirclement of his troops, E. von Manstein on August 11 launched counterattacks on the 1TA and 6th Guards A south of Bogodukhov with the forces of the 3rd Tank AG Kempf, which slowed down the pace of the advance of not only the Voronezh, but also the Steppe Front. Despite the stubborn resistance of AG Kempf, Konev’s troops continued to persistently advance towards Kharkov. On August 17, they started fighting on its outskirts.

On August 18, GA "South" made a second attempt to stop the advance of the two fronts with a counterattack, now on the extended right flank of 27A. To repel it, N.F. Vatutin brought into battle the 4th Guards A, Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik. But it was not possible to quickly turn the situation around. The destruction of the Akhtyrka group dragged on until August 25.

On August 18, the offensive of 57A was resumed, which, bypassing Kharkov from the southeast, moved towards Merefa. In this situation, the capture of a resistance center in the forest northeast of Kharkov on August 20 by units 53A of Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov was important. Using this success, 69 A of Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin began to bypass the city from the north-west and west. During August 21, the 5th Guards TA corps concentrated in zone 53A, which significantly strengthened the right wing of the Steppe Front. A day later, the Kharkov-Zolochev, Kharkov-Lyubotin-Poltava and Kharkov-Lyubotin highways were cut, and on August 22, 57A reached the area south of Kharkov in the area of ​​the villages of Bezlyudovka and Konstantinovka. Thus, most of the enemy’s retreat routes were cut off, so the German command was forced to begin a hasty withdrawal of all troops from the city.

On August 23, 1943, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov. This event marked the victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk by the Red Army.

Results, significance

In the battle of Kursk, which lasted 49 days, about 4,000,000 people, over 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, and up to 12,000 aircraft took part on both sides. It became one of the most large-scale events of the Great Patriotic War, its significance goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. “The major defeat on the Kursk Bulge was the beginning of a mortal crisis for the German army,” wrote the outstanding commander Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. - Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk became three important stages in the fight against the enemy, three historical milestones on the path to victory over Nazi Germany. The initiative for action on the Soviet-German front - the main and decisive front of the entire Second World War - was firmly secured in the hands of the Red Army."

The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, became one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Soviet and Russian historiography divides the battle into Kursk defensive (July 5–23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3–23) offensive operations.

Front on the eve of the battle
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide, facing west, was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front - the so-called Kursk Bulge (or salient). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient.
For this purpose, a military operation codenamed Zitadelle (“Citadel”) was developed and approved in April 1943.
To carry it out, the most combat-ready formations were involved - a total of 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized ones, as well as a large number of individual units included in the 9th and 2nd field armies of Army Group Center, in the 4th 1st Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South.
The group of German troops numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft.
Since March 1943, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) had been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense and then launch a counteroffensive. Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began military operations not with an offensive, but with a defense. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts included more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft.
Troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky defended the northern front (the area facing the enemy) of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Vatutin– southern. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, three tank, three motorized and three cavalry corps (commander - Colonel General Ivan Konev).
The actions of the fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

Progress of the battle
On July 5, 1943, German attack groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. During the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk On July 12, the largest tank battle in the history of the war took place on the Prokhorovsky field.
Up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in it on both sides.
The battle near Prokhorovka station in the Belgorod region became the largest battle of the Kursk defensive operation, which went down in history as the Kursk Bulge.
The staff documents contain evidence of the first battle, which took place on July 10 near Prokhorovka. This battle was fought not by tanks, but by rifle units of the 69th Army, which, having exhausted the enemy, themselves suffered heavy losses and were replaced by the 9th Airborne Division. Thanks to the paratroopers, on July 11 the Nazis were stopped at the outskirts of the station.
On July 12, a huge number of German and Soviet tanks collided on a narrow section of the front, only 11-12 kilometers wide.
Tank units “Adolf Hitler”, “Totenkopf”, division “Reich” and others were able to regroup their forces on the eve of the decisive battle. The Soviet command did not know about this.
The Soviet units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were in a notoriously difficult position: the tank strike group was located between the girders southwest of Prokhorovka and was deprived of the opportunity to deploy the tank group to its full width. Soviet tanks were forced to advance in a small area limited on one side by the railway and on the other by the floodplain of the Psel River.

The Soviet T-34 tank under the command of Pyotr Skripnik was shot down. The crew, having pulled out their commander, took refuge in the crater. The tank was on fire. The Germans noticed him. One of the tanks moved towards the Soviet tankers to crush them under its tracks. Then the mechanic, in order to save his comrades, rushed out of the saving trench. He ran to his burning car and pointed it at the German Tiger. Both tanks exploded.
Ivan Markin first wrote about a tank duel in the late 50s in his book. He called the battle of Prokhorovka the largest tank battle of the 20th century.
In fierce battles, the Wehrmacht troops lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, went on the defensive, and on July 16 began to withdraw their forces.
July, 12 The next stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counter-offensive of Soviet troops.
5th of August As a result of operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev", Oryol and Belgorod were liberated; in the evening of the same day, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of this event for the first time during the war.
August 23 Kharkov was liberated. Soviet troops advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction and took up an advantageous position for launching a general offensive to liberate Left Bank Ukraine and reach the Dnieper. The Soviet Army finally consolidated its strategic initiative; the German command was forced to go on the defensive along the entire front.
In one of the largest battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War, more than 4 million people took part on both sides, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved.

Results of the battle
After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative into its own hands and continued its advance to the West.
After the Nazis failed to carry out their Operation Citadel, at the world level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
The fascists found themselves morally depressed, their confidence in their superiority disappeared.
The significance of the victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. It had a huge impact on the further course of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk forced the fascist German command to withdraw large formations of troops and aviation from the Mediterranean theater of operations.
As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces and the transfer of new formations to the Soviet-German front, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and their advance to its central regions, which ultimately predetermined the country’s exit from the war. As a result of the victory at Kursk and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, a radical change was completed not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire Second World War in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
For their exploits in the Battle of Kursk, more than 180 soldiers and officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals.
About 130 formations and units received the guards rank, more than 20 received the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, and Kharkov.
For its contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the Kursk region was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the city of Kursk was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.
On April 27, 2007, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Kursk was awarded the honorary title of the Russian Federation - City of Military Glory.
In 1983, the feat of Soviet soldiers on the Kursk Bulge was immortalized in Kursk - On May 9, a memorial to those killed during the Great Patriotic War was opened.
On May 9, 2000, in honor of the 55th anniversary of the victory in the battle, the Kursk Bulge memorial complex was opened.

The material was prepared according to TASS-Dossier data

Wounded Memory

Dedicated to Alexander Nikolaev,
the driver-mechanic of the T-34 tank, who carried out the first tank ramming in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The memory will not heal like a wound,
Let's not forget all the ordinary soldiers,
That they entered this battle, dying,
And they remained alive forever.

No, not a step back, look straight ahead,
Only the blood has drained from the face,
Just clenching your teeth stubbornly -
We will stand here until the end!

Let any price be the life of a soldier,
We will all become armor today!
Your mother, your city, the honor of a soldier
Behind the boyish thin back.

Two steel avalanches - two forces
They merged among the fields of rye.
No you, no me - we are one,
We came together like a steel wall.

There are no maneuvers, no formation - there is strength,
The power of rage, the power of fire.
And a fierce battle mowed down
Both armor and soldier names.

The tank is hit, the battalion commander is wounded,
But again - I'm in battle - let the metal burn!
Shouting over the radio feat is equal to:
- All! Farewell! I'm going to ram!

Enemies are paralyzed, the choice is difficult -
You won't believe your eyes right away.
A burning tank flies without a miss -
He gave his life for his homeland.

Only the black funeral square
Will explain to mothers and relatives...
His heart is in the ground, like fragments...
He remained always young.

...On the burnt land there is not a blade of grass,
Tank on tank, armor on armor...
And there are wrinkles on the foreheads of the commanders -
The battle has nothing to compare with in war...
The earthly wound will not heal -
His feat is always with him.
Because he knew when he was dying
How easy it is to die young...

In the memorial temple it is quiet and sacred,
Your name is a scar on the wall...
You stayed to live here - yes, that’s how it should be,
So that the earth does not burn in fire.

On this land, once black,
The burning trail does not let you forget.
Your torn heart of a soldier
In spring it blooms with cornflowers...

Elena Mukhamedshina

Tank counterattack. Still from the film “Liberation: Arc of Fire.” 1968

There is silence over the Prokhorovsky field. Only from time to time you can hear the bell ringing, calling parishioners to worship in the Church of Peter and Paul, which was built with public donations in memory of the soldiers who died on the Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoe, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melekhovo... These names now hardly say anything to the younger generation. And 70 years ago, a terrible battle was raging here; the largest oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area. Everything that could burn was burning; everything was covered in dust, fumes and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The earth was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Soviet guards and the elite of the Wehrmacht - the SS tank divisions - met head-on here.
Before the Prokhorovsky tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most critical moments.
But tank battles took on the largest scale in the Voronezh Front. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the Germans collided with three corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards Separate Tank Corps.
“LET'S HAVE DINNER IN KURSK!”
The fighting on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge actually began on July 4, when German units attempted to knock down military outposts in the zone of the 6th Guards Army.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning of July 5, when the Germans launched the first massive attack with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenführer Joseph Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and some officer shouted to him: “Let's have lunch in Kursk!”
But the SS men did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the defensive line of the 6th Army. Exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to eat dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, Task Force Kempf crossed the river. Seversky Donets and attacked the 7th Guards Army.
Tiger gunner of the 503rd heavy tank battalion of the 3rd Panzer Corps Gerhard Niemann: “Another anti-tank gun about 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew flees in panic, with the exception of one man. He leans towards the sight and shoots. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuver - and another gun is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time to the rear of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to work.”
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Tank Army took the main attack. In a few hours of battle, all that was left of its 538th and 1008th anti-tank fighter regiments, as they say, were only numbers. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the area between Syrtsev and Yakovlev on a front stretching five to six kilometers, the commander of the 4th German Tank Army, Hoth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive air and artillery strike.
Commander of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the gap and climbed a small hill where a command post was equipped. It was half past four in the afternoon. But it seemed that a solar eclipse had arrived. The sun disappeared behind clouds of dust. And ahead in the twilight bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and tracks clanged. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving damaged and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and went on the attack again.”
By the end of July 8, Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, retreated to the second army line of defense.
300 KILOMETER MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite violent protests from the commander of the Steppe Front, I.S. Koneva. Stalin gave the order to move the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of the troops of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, as well as to strengthen the Voronezh Front with the 2nd Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including T-34-501 medium tanks and T-70-261 light tanks. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march took place around the clock under the cover of aviation from the 2nd Air Army.
Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Pavel Rotmistrov: “Already at 8 o’clock in the morning it became hot, and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon, dust covered roadside bushes, wheat fields, tanks and trucks in a thick layer, the dark red disk of the sun was barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulling guns), armored infantry vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The soldiers' faces were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. It was unbearably hot. The soldiers were thirsty, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, stuck to their bodies. It was especially difficult for the driver mechanics during the march. The tank crews tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone would replace the drivers, and during short rest stops they would be allowed to sleep.”
The aviation of the 2nd Air Army so reliably covered the 5th Guards Tank Army on the march that German intelligence was never able to detect its arrival. Having traveled 200 km, the army arrived in the area southwest of Stary Oskol on the morning of July 8. Then, having put the material part in order, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer throw and, by the end of July 9, concentrated in the area of ​​Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky, strictly at the appointed time.
MAN MAIN CHANGES THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle broke out in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The main feature of the struggle that day was that the Soviet troops, repelling massive enemy attacks, themselves began to launch strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Tank Army.
As in previous days, the most fierce fighting broke out in the area of ​​the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division "Gross Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by individual companies and battalions of the Tigers and Ferdinands, were advancing. Units of the 1st Tank Army again bore the brunt of enemy attacks. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce fighting continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochan direction, where by the end of the day the Kempf army group broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, and the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned out by flamethrower tanks, we were unable to dislodge the group entrenched there from the northern part of the defensive line enemy force up to a battalion. The Russians settled in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and put up fanatical resistance.”
On the morning of July 9, a German strike force of several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive in a 10-kilometer area. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochan direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway to the east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main attack, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce fighting on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. From the Prokhorovka area, a wide strip of heights stretches in a northwestern direction, which dominate the surrounding area and are convenient for the operations of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of Army Group South was to launch three strong strikes in a comprehensive manner, which should have led to the encirclement and destruction of two groups of Soviet troops and to the opening of offensive routes to Kursk.
To develop the success, it was planned to introduce fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 were urgently transferred from Donbass to Kharkov. The German command scheduled the start of the attack on Kursk from the north and south for the morning of July 11.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counter-offensive with the aim of encircling and defeating enemy groups advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorovsky directions. Formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main group of SS tank divisions in the Prokhorovsk direction. The start of the general counteroffensive was scheduled for the morning of July 12.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than everyone else, clearly expecting the attention of the Soviet command to be diverted to other directions, the main group launched an offensive in the Prokhorovsk direction - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS Corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, awarded the highest award of the Third Reich "Oak leaves to the Knight's Cross".
By the end of the day, a large group of tanks from the SS Reich Division managed to break through to the village of Storozhevoye, posing a threat to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was sent in. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main strike group of the 4th German Tank Army, having launched an offensive on a front of only about 8 km, reached the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
The second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Gross Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions - achieved even less success. Our troops successfully repulsed their attacks.
However, northeast of Belgorod, where the Kempf army group was advancing, a threatening situation had arisen. The enemy's 6th and 7th tank divisions broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 km from the main group of SS tank divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the Kempf army group, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was sent: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to begin the planned counter-offensive two hours earlier, although preparations for the counter-offensive were not yet completed. However, the situation forced us to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROKHOROVKA
At 8.30 on July 12, Soviet strike groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the 4th German Tank Army. However, due to the German breakthrough to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards armies to eliminate the threat to their rear and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops launched an attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: “Artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten again.”
Manstein threw all his available forces into repelling the attacks of the Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike force of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle broke out on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 broke out on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikino. This strip of terrain measuring up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth was captured by the enemy as a result of intense fighting during July 11. The main enemy group deployed and operated on the bridgehead as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand vehicles. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command delivered its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from Rotmistrov's observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed head-on into the battle formations of the Nazi troops, literally piercing the enemy’s battle formation with a swift through attack. The Nazis, obviously, did not expect to encounter such a large mass of our combat vehicles and such a decisive attack. Control in the enemy's advanced units was clearly disrupted. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived of their fire advantage in close combat, which they enjoyed at the beginning of the offensive in a clash with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield swirled with smoke and dust, and the ground shook with powerful explosions. The tanks ran at each other and, having grappled, could no longer disperse, they fought to the death until one of them burst into flames or stopped with broken tracks. But even damaged tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.”
West of Prokhorovka along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Tank Corps went on the offensive. His tank brigades disrupted the battle formations of the advancing enemy tank units, stopped them and began to move forward themselves.
Deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I only saw what was, so to speak, within the boundaries of my tank battalion. The 170th Tank Brigade was ahead of us. With tremendous speed, it wedged itself into the location of the heavy German tanks that were in the first wave, and the German tanks penetrated our tanks. The tanks were very close to each other, and therefore they literally shot at point-blank range, simply shooting at each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes—sixty-five vehicles.”
Radio operator of the command tank of the Adolf Hitler tank division, Wilhelm Res: “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. In our area they were prevented by an anti-tank ditch. At full speed they flew into this ditch, due to their speed they covered three or four meters in it, but then seemed to freeze in a slightly inclined position with the gun raised up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired directly at point-blank range.”
Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the landing along the railway, and literally at a distance of a hundred meters I saw a Tiger tank, which stood sideways to me and fired at our tanks. Apparently he knocked out quite a few of our vehicles, since the vehicles were moving sideways towards him, and he fired at the sides of our vehicles. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile and fired. The tank caught fire. I fired again and the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I had no time for them. I bypassed this tank, then knocked out the T-III tank and the Panther. When I knocked out the Panther, you know, there was a feeling of delight that you see, I did such a heroic deed.”
The 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railroad and highway southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps' combat log, the attack began without artillery bombardment of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover. This enabled the enemy to open concentrated fire on the corps’ combat formations and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this, in turn, enabled the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tank fire from the spot.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly one T-34 broke through and moved straight towards us. Our first radio operator began handing shells to me one at a time so that I could put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander above kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer and closer. And only after the fourth – “Shot” – did I hear: “Thank God!”
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 had stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower he had, as if stamped, 5-centimeter holes located at the same distance from each other, as if they had been measured with a compass. The battle formations of the parties were mixed up. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy from close ranges, but they themselves suffered heavy losses.”
From the documents of the Central Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tiger formation and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm shell hit his T turret -34, and the other penetrated the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver, Sergeant Nikolaev, and radio operator Zyryanov. They took cover in a crater, but still one of the Tigers noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and aimed it straight at the Tiger. Both tanks exploded upon collision.”
The impact of Soviet armor and new tanks with a full set of ammunition thoroughly shook Hauser's battle-weary divisions, and the German offensive stopped.
From the report of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the Kursk Bulge region, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky, to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks within an hour.”
As a result of the counteroffensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS tank divisions “Totenkopf” and “Adolf Hitler” to the northeast was thwarted; these divisions suffered such losses that they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Units of the SS tank division "Reich" also suffered heavy losses from attacks by units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the breakthrough area of ​​the Army Group "Kempf" south and southeast of Prokhorovka, fierce fighting also continued throughout the day on July 12, as a result of which the attack of the Army Group "Kempf" to the north was stopped by tankers of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army .
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, to the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. At one point, he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burnt-out Panther, rammed by a T-70 tank. A few tens of meters away stood a Tiger and a T-34 locked in a deadly embrace. “This is what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, vary dramatically in different sources. Manstein, in his book “Lost Victories,” writes that in total, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. The collection “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Actions and Military Conflicts” talks about 1,600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German tank losses was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book “The Citadel. Battle of Kursk". If we put his diagram into a table, we get the following picture: (see the table for the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Tank Army in the period July 4–17, 1943).
Cross's data differs from Soviet sources, which may be understandable to a certain extent. Thus, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce battles that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (Kross had 244).
But there are also completely incomprehensible discrepancies in the numbers. For example, aerial photography taken on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of ​​Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division “Great Germany” from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Cross, on July 7, 48 Tank lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. According to Soviet sources, as a result of bombing attacks on concentrated enemy troops (SS Great Germany and 11th TD) on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area of ​​the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It was German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots that were burning. According to Cross, on July 9 there were no losses at all in the German 4th Tank Army, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought stubbornly, overcoming fierce resistance from Soviet troops. But it was precisely by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the attack on Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about Cross's data for July 10 and 11, according to which there were no losses in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was on these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce fighting, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that Hero of the Soviet Union Guard Sergeant M.F. accomplished his feat. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess Soviet losses in the tank battle of Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps for July 12, of the 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th Tank Corps dated July 13, 1943, corps losses amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their original strength. Thus, it is possible to obtain a more or less accurate figure for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the battle of Prokhorovka against the SS divisions “Adolf Hitler” and “Totenkopf” - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for the German losses at Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic discrepancy in the numbers.
According to Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and broken military equipment began to be removed from the battlefields, more than 400 broken and burned German tanks were counted in a small area southwest of Prokhorovka, where an oncoming tank battle unfolded on July 12. Rotmistrov claimed in his memoirs that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people killed.
But in the late 1990s, German military historian Karl-Heinz Friser published sensational data he obtained after studying German archives. According to these data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. Thus, the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps states that enemy losses included 68 tanks (it is interesting to note that this coincides with Cross’s data). A combat report from the headquarters of the 33rd Guards Corps to the commander of the 5th Guards Army dated July 13, 1943 states that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past 24 hours. It is further reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy removed his damaged tanks, the number of which exceeded 200 vehicles. The 18th Tank Corps chalked up several dozen destroyed enemy tanks.
One can agree with Cross’s statement that tank losses are generally difficult to calculate, since disabled vehicles were repaired and went into battle again. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps lost at least over 100 tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka (excluding the losses of the SS Reich Panzer Division, which operated south of Prokhorovka). In total, according to Cross, the losses of the 4th German Tank Army from July 4 to July 14 amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916 at the start of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein’s report, claims that in the period from July 5 to July 13, the German 4th Tank Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Tank Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the parties in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of Soviet troops against the 4th German Tank Army and the Kempf Army Group, are estimated as follows. On the Soviet side, 500 were lost, on the German side - 300 tanks and self-propelled guns. Cross claims that after the Battle of Prokhorov, Hauser's sappers blew up damaged German equipment that was beyond repair and standing in no man's land. After August 1, German repair shops in Kharkov and Bogodukhov accumulated such a quantity of faulty equipment that they had to be sent even to Kyiv for repairs.
Of course, the German Army Group South suffered its greatest losses in the first seven days of fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorovsky battle lies not even in the damage caused to the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers dealt a powerful blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.