David Glanz The collapse of Plan Barbarossa. Confrontation near Smolensk

In principle, it was clear from the very beginning that there would be a campaign to the East; Hitler was “programmed” for it. The question was different - when? On July 22, 1940, F. Halder received the task from the commander of the ground forces to think about various options operations against Russia. Initially, the plan was developed by General E. Marx, he enjoyed the special confidence of the Fuhrer, he proceeded from the general input received from Halder. On July 31, 1940, at a meeting with the Wehrmacht generals, Hitler announced the general strategy of the operation: two main attacks, the first in the southern strategic direction - towards Kyiv and Odessa, the second - in the northern strategic direction - through the Baltic states, towards Moscow; in the future, a two-pronged attack, from the north and south; later an operation to capture the Caucasus and the oil fields of Baku.

On August 5, General E. Marx prepared the initial plan, “Plan Fritz.” The main attack on it was from East Prussia and Northern Poland to Moscow. The main strike force, Army Group North, was to include 3 armies, a total of 68 divisions (of which 15 tank and 2 motorized). It was supposed to defeat the Red Army in the western direction, capture the northern part of European Russia and Moscow, then help the southern group in capturing Ukraine. The second blow was delivered to Ukraine, Army Group "South" consisting of 2 armies, a total of 35 divisions (including 5 tank and 6 motorized). Army Group South was supposed to defeat the Red Army troops in the southwestern direction, capture Kyiv and cross the Dnieper in the middle reaches. Both groups were supposed to reach the line: Arkhangelsk-Gorky-Rostov-on-Don. There were 44 divisions in reserve; they were to be concentrated in the offensive zone of the main attack group - “North”. main idea was in a “lightning war”, the USSR was planned to be defeated in 9 weeks (!) in a favorable scenario and in the case of the most unfavorable in 17 weeks.

Weaknesses of E. Marx's plan: underestimation of the military power of the Red Army and the USSR as a whole; overestimation of its capabilities, i.e. the Wehrmacht; tolerances in a number of enemy retaliatory actions, thus underestimating the ability of the military-political leadership in organizing defense, counterattacks, excessive hopes for the collapse of the state and political system, the economy of the state when the western regions were seized. Opportunities for restoring the economy and army after the first defeats were excluded. The USSR was confused with Russia in 1918, when, with the collapse of the front, small German detachments by rail were able to capture vast territories. A scenario was not developed in case a lightning war escalated into a protracted war. In a word, the plan suffered from adventurism bordering on suicide. These mistakes were not overcome even later.

Thus, German intelligence was unable to correctly assess the defense capability of the USSR, its military, economic, moral, political, and spiritual potential. Gross mistakes were made in assessing the size of the Red Army, its mobilization potential, and the quantitative and qualitative parameters of our Air Force and armored forces. Thus, according to Reich intelligence data, in the USSR the annual production of aircraft in 1941 amounted to 3500-4000 aircraft; in reality, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army Air Force received 17,745 aircraft, of which 3,719 were new designs.

The top military leaders of the Reich were also captivated by the illusions of the “blitzkrieg”; for example, on August 17, 1940, at a meeting at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Keitel called “a crime the attempt to create at the present time such production capacities that will give effect only after 1941. You can only invest in such enterprises that are necessary to achieve the goal and will give the corresponding effect.”

Further development

Further development of the plan was entrusted to General F. Paulus, who received the post of assistant chief of staff ground forces. In addition, Hitler involved generals in the work who were to become chiefs of staff of army groups. They had to independently investigate the problem. By September 17, this work was completed and Paulus could summarize the results. On October 29, he provided a memo: “On the main plan of the operation against Russia.” It emphasized that it was necessary to achieve surprise in the attack, and for this to develop and implement measures to disinformation the enemy. The need was pointed out to prevent the Soviet border forces from retreating, to encircle and destroy them in the border strip.

At the same time, development of a war plan was underway at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command. At the direction of Jodl, they were handled by Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg. By September 15, he presented his war plan, many of his ideas were included in the final war plan: to destroy the main forces of the Red Army with lightning speed, preventing them from retreating to the east, to cut off Western Russia from the seas - the Baltic and Black, to gain a foothold on such a line that would allow them to capture the most important regions of the European part of Russia, while becoming a barrier against its Asian part. This development already includes three army groups: “North”, “Center” and “South”. Moreover, Army Group Center received most of the motorized and tank forces and attacked Moscow, through Minsk and Smolensk. When the “North” group, which was attacking towards Leningrad, was delayed, the “Centre” troops, after capturing Smolensk, had to throw part of their forces towards the northern direction. Army Group South was supposed to defeat the enemy troops, encircling them, capture Ukraine, cross the Dnieper, and on its northern flank come into contact with the southern flank of Group Center. Finland and Romania were drawn into the war: a separate Finnish-German task force was supposed to advance on Leningrad, with part of its forces on Murmansk. The final frontier of the Wehrmacht's advance. The fate of the Union had to be determined, whether there would be an internal catastrophe in it. Also, as in the Paulus plan, much attention was paid to the factor of surprise of the attack.

Plan "Otto"

Subsequently, development continued, the plan was refined, and on November 19, the plan, codenamed “Otto,” was reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Brauchitsch. It was approved without significant comments. On December 5, 1940, the plan was presented to A. Hitler; the final goal of the offensive of the three army groups was identified as Arkhangelsk and the Volga. Hitler approved of it. From November 29 to December 7, 1940, a war game was held according to plan.

On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, the plan received the symbolic name “Barbarossa”. Emperor Frederick Redbeard was the initiator of a series of campaigns in the East. For reasons of secrecy, the plan was made only in 9 copies. For the sake of secrecy, the armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland should have received specific tasks only before the start of the war. Preparations for war were to be completed by May 15, 1941.

The essence of the Barbarossa plan

The idea of ​​“lightning war” and surprise strike. The final goal for the Wehrmacht: the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line.

Maximum concentration of forces ground forces and the Air Force. Destruction of the Red Army troops as a result of bold, deep and fast actions of tank “wedges”. The Luftwaffe had to eliminate the possibility of effective action by the Soviet Air Force at the very beginning of the operation.

The Navy performed auxiliary tasks: supporting the Wehrmacht from the sea; stopping the breakthrough of the Soviet Navy from the Baltic Sea; protecting your coastline; pin down the Soviet naval forces by their actions, ensuring shipping in the Baltic and supplying the northern flank of the Wehrmacht by sea.

Strike in three strategic directions: northern - Baltic states-Leningrad, central - Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow, southern - Kyiv-Volga. The main attack was in the central direction.

In addition to Directive No. 21 of December 18, 1940, there were other documents: directives and orders on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, camouflage, disinformation, preparation of a theater of military operations, etc. So, on January 31, 1941, a directive was issued OKH (General Staff of the Ground Forces) on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops, on February 15, 1941, an order was issued by the Chief of Staff of the High Command on camouflage.

A. Hitler personally had a great influence on the plan; it was he who approved the offensive by 3 army groups, with the goal of capturing economically important regions of the USSR, and insisted on special attention to the zone of the Baltic and Black Seas, including the Urals and the Caucasus in operational planning. He paid much attention to the southern strategic direction - grain from Ukraine, Donbass, the most important strategic importance of the Volga, oil from the Caucasus.

Strike forces, army groups, other groups

Huge forces were allocated for the strike: 190 divisions, of which 153 were German (including 33 tank and motorized), 37 infantry divisions of Finland, Romania, Hungary, two-thirds of the Reich Air Force, naval forces, air forces and naval forces of Germany's allies. Berlin left only 24 divisions in the reserve of the High Command. And even then, in the west and southeast, there remained divisions with limited strike capabilities, intended for protection and security. The only mobile reserve were two tank brigades in France, armed with captured tanks.

Army Group Center - commanded by F. Bock, it delivered the main blow - included two field armies - the 9th and 4th, two tank groups - the 3rd and 2nd, a total of 50 divisions and 2 brigades, supported 2nd Air Fleet. It was supposed to make a deep breakthrough south and north of Minsk with flank attacks (2 tank groups), to encircle a large group of Soviet forces, between Bialystok and Minsk. After the destruction of the encircled Soviet forces and reaching the line of Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk, two scenarios were considered: first, if Army Group North was unable to defeat the forces opposing it, tank groups should be sent against them, and the field armies should continue to move towards Moscow; second, if everything is going well with the “North” group, attack Moscow with all our might.

Army Group North was commanded by Field Marshal Leeb and included the 16th and 18th Field Armies, 4th Tank Group, a total of 29 divisions, supported by the 1st Air Fleet. She had to defeat the forces opposing her, capture the Baltic ports, Leningrad, and the bases of the Baltic Fleet. Then, together with the Finnish army and German units transferred from Norway, he will break the resistance of Soviet forces in the north of European Russia.

Army Group South, which fought south of the Pripyat marshes, was commanded by Field Marshal General G. Rundstedt. It included: the 6th, 17th, 11th field armies, the 1st Panzer Group, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies, the Hungarian mobile corps, with the support of the 4th Reich Air Fleet and the Romanian Air Force and Hungary. In total - 57 divisions and 13 brigades, of which 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades. Rundstedt was supposed to lead an attack on Kyiv, defeat the Red Army in Galicia, in western Ukraine, and capture crossings across the Dnieper, creating the preconditions for further offensive actions. To do this, the 1st Tank Group, in cooperation with units of the 17th and 6th armies, had to break through the defenses in the area between Rava-Russa and Kovel, going through Berdichev and Zhitomir, to reach the Dnieper in the Kyiv region and to the south. Then strike along the Dnieper in a southeastern direction to cut off the Red Army forces operating in Western Ukraine and destroy them. At this time, the 11th Army was supposed to create for the Soviet leadership the appearance of a main attack from the territory of Romania, pinning down the Red Army forces and preventing them from leaving the Dniester.

The Romanian armies (Munich plan) were also supposed to pin down Soviet troops and break through the defenses in the Tsutsora, New Bedraz sector.

The German Army Norway and two Finnish armies were concentrated in Finland and Norway, with a total of 21 divisions and 3 brigades, with the support of the 5th Reich Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force. Finnish units were supposed to pin down the Red Army in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions. When Army Group North reached the Luga River line, the Finns were supposed to launch a decisive offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and between Lakes Onega and Ladoga in order to connect with the Germans on the Svir River and the Leningrad region; they were also supposed to take part in the capture of the second capital of the Union , the city should (or rather, this territory, the city was planned to be destroyed, and the population “disposed of”) should pass to Finland. The German Army “Norway”, with the forces of two reinforced corps, was supposed to launch an attack on Murmansk and Kandalaksha. After the fall of Kandalaksha and access to the White Sea, the southern corps was supposed to advance north along the railway and, together with the northern corps, capture Murmansk, Polyarnoye, destroying Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula.

The general plan for Barbarossa, like the early designs, was opportunistic and built on several ifs. If the USSR is a “colossus with feet of clay”, if the Wehrmacht can do everything correctly and on time, if it is possible to destroy the main forces of the Red Army in the border “cauldrons”, if the industry and economy of the USSR cannot function normally after the loss of the western regions, especially Ukraine. The economy, army, and allies were not prepared for a possible protracted war. There was no strategic plan in case the blitzkrieg failed. As a result, when the blitzkrieg failed, we had to improvise.

Sources:
Suddenness of attack is a weapon of aggression. M., 2002.
The criminal goals of Hitler's Germany in the war against the Soviet Union. Documents and materials. M., 1987.
http://www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/History/Article/Pl_Barb.php
http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/index.html
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/manstein/index.html
http://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000019/index.shtml
http://katynbooks.narod.ru/foreign/dashichev-01.htm
http://protown.ru/information/hide/4979.html
http://www.warmech.ru/1941war/razrabotka_barbarossa.html
http://flot.com/publications/books/shelf/germanyvsussr/5.htm?print=Y

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At dawn on June 22, 1941, German troops unleashed a blow of colossal force against the Soviet Union

At dawn on June 22, 1941, German troops unleashed a blow of colossal force against the Soviet Union. After capturing almost all the continental countries of Western Europe and their resources, Hitler’s command began the main and decisive stage of the struggle to establish the complete dominance of Nazi Germany in Europe.

The military campaign in the West in May - June 1940 brought Germany not only the laurels of a quick victory. It was also marked by the first serious failure of the Wehrmacht, which had far-reaching political and strategic consequences: Hitler’s strategists were unable to take England out of the war and create, on the eve of the attack on the Soviet Union, all the conditions for solving the central problem of their strategy - eliminating the danger of a war on two fronts, which for decades, like a nightmare, dominated the minds of the German militarists.

Therefore, after the defeat of France, the leadership of Germany was faced with a dilemma: whether to concentrate further efforts on withdrawing England from the war before the attack on the USSR, in order to completely get rid of any danger from the rear in the upcoming march to the East, or , leaving Great Britain aside for now, to unleash a new blow on the Soviet Union. To solve this problem, he had to weigh a number of political, economic and military-strategic factors. First of all, it was necessary to install:

Is the Wehrmacht capable of carrying out a quick military defeat of England, and if not, what are the possibilities for crushing the Soviet Union in the style of a blitzkrieg?

What position will the United States take in this case and how soon will it be able to deploy its military potential and actively intervene in the war on the European continent?

What are the possibilities and conditions for using the “Japanese factor” to jointly fight against the Soviet Union and divert the forces of England and the United States from the European continent?

Which military allies in Europe can we count on for the war against the USSR?

The search for a way out of the current strategic situation gave rise to certain hesitations in the military leadership of the Wehrmacht. At first, it began to seriously prepare for a landing operation against England. But from the very beginning, this operation instilled great doubts in the German generals. His desire to neutralize the British Isles in the most reliable way - by invasion - was opposed by gloomy thoughts. Most of all, Nazi strategists, having a campaign to the East in the future, feared, due to Germany’s weakness at sea, to suffer large material and human losses, as well as to lose strategic initiative as a result possible complications and failures during the landing.

Just a month and a half before the attack on the Soviet Union, the whole world was shocked by a sensation: on May 10, in England, near the family castle of Lord Hamilton, Hitler's party assistant Rudolf Hess landed by parachute. What could this mean? Did the Nazi leadership make a last desperate attempt to negotiate a truce with London before going to the East in order to protect their rear? Or even to involve England in the fight against hated Bolshevism? Did Hess fly to England at his own peril and risk or with the knowledge and instructions of Hitler? What was discussed at Hess's secret negotiations with the British? What results did they bring? To this day, this remains an unsolved mystery to the end and to the details.

In the summer of 1990, by the will of fate, I found myself directly involved in the intricacies of Hess’s flight. I had to come into contact - this time in a completely unexpected way - with one of the most intriguing and unsolved mysteries Second World War. It was in Cologne, where I participated in a Soviet-West German seminar. They called me on the phone. The voice on the phone said: “The son of Rudolf Hess is speaking to you - Wolf Rüdiger Hess. I would very much like to see you and convey to you information that may shed new light on my father's flight to England. I am ready to come to Cologne with my father's lawyer for Nuremberg trials Alfred Seidl at a time convenient for you."

When I heard these words, my breath was taken away. After all, how much paper has been written by historians and journalists about the mysterious flight of Hess! How many versions are associated with it! But clarity on this issue was never achieved. Will Wolf Hess finally lift the veil on a half-century-old secret? The fact that Hess chose me for such a conversation was obviously explained by the fact that in the political and scientific circles of Germany it was known that during the period of reforms of the Soviet system under Gorbachev, I held the post of chairman of the Scientific Advisory Council at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Wolf Hess hoped that he could persuade me to play some part in re-evaluating the purpose and significance of his father's mission in England.

The next day we met. Mr. W. Hess came with Seidl to Cologne from Munich. After brief greetings, he immediately got down to business. In his opinion, in historical literature and journalism there has been an incorrect interpretation of the “Hess mission” to England in 1941. It is usually portrayed as an attempt to make peace with the British in order to provide Germany’s rear for an attack on the Soviet Union and avoid a war on two fronts. In fact, the “Hess mission,” they say, was not of an anti-Soviet nature, but pursued far-reaching peacekeeping goals - to end the war altogether and conclude universal peace.

True, it was not so easy for Hess Jr. to find out from his father the true background of his mysterious flight. At all his meetings with his father in Spandau prison, representatives of the guards of the four powers were always present, recording every word of their conversation. Wolf Hess got the impression that his father was afraid of something and in every possible way avoided touching on the sensitive topic. Then Wolf Hess came up with the idea of ​​secretly delivering a note to his father with questions addressed to him. He gave me a copy of this note. The note was written in Gräfelfing on March 27, 1984 and, unnoticed by the guards, was transferred to Hess's prison cell by the French prison priest Charles Gabel, and then returned to Hess Jr. by him with his father's notes. Here is its content:

“In connection with my book, known to you under the title “My Father Rudolf Hess”, and in connection with your idea of ​​​​a press statement for the 90th anniversary, the following two questions are relevant:

1. Is it possible to proceed from the fact that if your peace flight to Great Britain on May 10, 1941 had been crowned with success in principle, that is, if Churchill had announced, for example, his readiness to convene a world peace conference, then the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 would not have taken place and thus would the Second World War with all its bloodshed and devastation be ended?

2. Is it at least possible to assume that after your successful return from Great Britain you would have used the full weight of your then very great prestige to carry out the policy indicated in paragraph 1? Please give me your comment on this sheet.”

To the first question, R. Hess answered: “It goes without saying. For sure." On the second - similarly: “Surely. It goes without saying. I can’t say more about it.” At the end of the sheet, Hess added: “Everything is already contained in your questions.” Hess made these notes in the presence of the priest Gabel.

According to Hess Jr., this note confirmed the version according to which his father's mission was to end the Second World War by convening a peace conference, but the British government did not react to Hess's proposals. In order not to appear in the eyes of the public as an opponent of the establishment of peace in Europe on the eve of Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, the British side, according to W. Hess, has to this day carefully hidden documents related to his father’s negotiations in England in May 1941 .and subsequently. V. Hess saw precisely this as the reason that access to documents shedding light on the mission of R. Hess would be opened only after 2017. Moreover, he believed that the British, fearing in recent years the release of Hess from prison and his publication of facts undesirable for English politics, they tried to remove the “prisoner of Spandau” by staging his suicide in August 1987. W. Hess wrote about this in his book “The Murder of Rudolf Hess.” He believed that his father did not hang himself with a cord from a table lamp, as the official version says, but was strangled. Some mysterious riddles of R. Hess were layered on top of others!

Frankly speaking, V. Hess’s note did not convince me, especially considering the very tendentious (to say the least) formulated questions. Is it possible to believe that Hess pursued peacemaking goals with his flight to England? Did he really strive at the last moment to put an end to the further expansion of the war and its transformation into a world war? Did he want to prevent Hitler from attacking the Soviet Union? How realistic was it at that time to convene a peace conference of all powers, including the Soviet Union?

To answer these questions, let us remember the situation in which Hess flew to England in May 1941. The spring of the German war machine, compressed to the limit, straightened out only by one third. But this was enough to defeat Poland and France, seize Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, the Balkan states and establish German dominance over virtually all of continental Europe, excluding the Soviet Union. By May 10, 1941, when Hess secretly flew to England, the German Wehrmacht was already preparing for another strike - this time against the Soviet Union. For this purpose, the German rear (elimination of France) and strategic flanks (subjugation of the Balkans and Scandinavia) were carefully prepared. Hitler and his entourage were firmly confident of a quick victory. In May 1941, the Fuhrer compared Russia to a “colossus with feet of clay.” After Stalin’s repressions against the color of the country’s military personnel, after the Soviet-Finnish war, which revealed the low combat capability of the Red Army, he had good reasons for such comparisons. A successful blitz campaign against the Soviet Union would bring Germany unlimited dominance over Europe. Could Hitler give up his previous conquests and the tempting prospects of the Barbarossa plan?

I think that Hitler would not be Hitler if he did this. Even on the eve of the attack on Poland and the outbreak of World War II, in one of his speeches to the generals, he expressed fear that “some scoundrel” would come up with peace proposals at the last moment and prevent him from throwing the Wehrmacht into battle. And here, after the dizzying military successes, Hess himself, the Fuhrer’s deputy in the party, plays the role of such a “rascal”! In May 1941, Hitler, at best, could agree to a deal with England if it recognized Germany’s dominant position in Europe and completely freed up its rear for the war against the USSR. Wolf Hess told me that on the eve of the flight, his father talked with Hitler for 4 hours. However, nothing is known about the content of the conversation. But we must assume that Hess made his flight with the knowledge of Hitler, although on May 13 the latter accused his deputy of treason and flight before the most decisive moment in the history of the German Empire - the attack on the Soviet Union. Analyzing the logic of behavior and the plans of Hitler’s headquarters, we can come to the conclusion that neither objectively nor subjectively the then leadership of Germany would have willingly agreed to convene a peace conference and end the war.

Well, what can we say about the position of the British government, Churchill personally? In London they were well aware that England could no longer have any deals with Hitler’s Germany. The sad example of the Munich Agreement spoke about this quite convincingly. Churchill was determined to wage war in the name of crushing the German power uncompromisingly, to the end, and if the situation forced it, even from the colonies. He perceived Hitler and his totalitarian regime as a mortal danger to England and had no doubt that in opposition to Nazi expansion, sooner or later a great coalition would emerge that would unite Great Britain, the USA, the Soviet Union and other states. In May 1941, Churchill already had accurate information about the impending Wehrmacht attack on the Soviet Union and even signaled this to Stalin. Give Hitler a free hand in the East, only to find himself in the position of his next victim? Churchill could not agree to this. This would be the height of state stupidity. Consequently, in England too, Hess’s mission was doomed to failure.

The solution to Hess's mystery is yet to come, when historians will have access to documents revealing the content of his negotiations in England. But it can still be considered that the main goal of Hess’s mission was to neutralize England during the war against the Soviet Union. Allen Martin, the official historiographer of the British Foreign Ministry, points out this in his book “Churchill’s Peaceful Trap”. He wrote that Churchill, wanting to mislead the Germans, made it clear to them that he was allegedly interested in negotiations with German representatives and in reconciliation with Germany. In fact, as a far-sighted politician, he was well aware that Hitler could not be given a free rear in the West in order to easily defeat the Soviet Union. He had no doubt that after completing this task, Hitler would turn against England. In this sense, Churchill was much wiser and far-sighted than Stalin, who freed Germany’s hands for war in the West with the 1939 Pact and was not aware of what this could turn out to be like in the future for the Soviet Union.

Regardless of the peaceful soundings actively carried out through many channels to search for possible agreements with England, the German leadership made a firm decision in mid-1940 to attack the Soviet Union. “If Russia is defeated,” Hitler said at a meeting at headquarters on July 31, 1940, “England will lose its last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Conclusion: in accordance with this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated.” The attack on the USSR, according to the calculations of the Nazi strategists, promised success only if it was possible to defeat the Red Army with lightning speed even before England, and also, as could be expected, the United States, launched extensive actions against Germany.

Therefore, assessing the possible line of strategic behavior of the Anglo-Saxon powers acquired special meaning for the Wehrmacht leadership. It could not help but notice how, during the second half of 1940 and the first half of 1941, the United States was evolving at an accelerating pace from neutrality friendly towards England to the position of its “non-combatant ally.” In August 1940, “preliminary” Anglo-American staff negotiations took place in London, and in September an agreement was reached on the transfer of 50 American destroyers to England. After the re-election of President Roosevelt in November 1940 for a third term, the American government, overcoming the resistance of isolationists within the country, began to openly pursue foreign policy under the motto: “Let's save America by helping Great Britain.”

The Anglo-American agreement adopted on March 27, 1941 laid the foundations for a joint global strategy of the United States and England in the war against Germany and Japan. It is characteristic that the Soviet Union was not assigned any role in them, although the State Department, back in January 1941, received the first data about the Wehrmacht’s upcoming campaign to the East, and subsequently this data was significantly multiplied. This position of the USA and England was explained not only by the inertia of their anti-Soviet policy, but also by their very low assessment of the military power of the Soviet Union. On June 14, the Joint Intelligence Committee concluded that Germany would need six weeks at most to take Moscow.

How did the German leadership evaluate the “US factor” on the eve of the attack on the Soviet Union? It undoubtedly took into account the obvious possibility of a collision with the United States, but believed that this would not happen earlier than 1942. The German military attache in Washington, General Betticher, reported on March 11, 1941 that the United States only in 1942 have reached full readiness for war. Hitler also shared this opinion. On March 30, 1941, at a meeting at headquarters, he stated that the maximum level of US production would be reached only in four years. Nazi strategists considered this period to be quite sufficient to not only crush the Soviet Union, but also to prepare for a global battle with the Anglo-Saxons.

As for England, according to the German command, it could not be any significant obstacle to Germany in the immediate future after the attack on the USSR. However, in the long term, and very near, it was capable of becoming a great threat to Germany’s strategic positions in Western and Southern Europe. This confronted the German leadership with the need to carry out military campaign against the Soviet Union in the shortest possible time.

In such conditions, coordination of strategic actions with its allies - Japan and Italy - became extremely important for Germany. This was the main goal of the Tripartite Pact concluded on September 27, 1940. German diplomacy made vigorous efforts to draw Japan into active actions in Southeast Asia and create in its person a counterbalance to England and the United States. In addition, the Nazi leadership hoped to receive support from her in the war against the Soviet Union, including in the form of an armed uprising in the Far East. These considerations formed the basis of OKW Directive No. 24 of March 5, 1941. The German leadership had certain hopes that the rapid defeat of the Soviet Union, along with the active participation of Japan on the side of Germany, would so change the balance of power on the world stage in favor of the Tripartite Pact, that it would force the United States to stay out of the war.

The efforts of German diplomacy to drag Japan into the war against the USSR were unsuccessful. The Japanese ruling circles preferred not to aggravate relations with the Soviet Union in order to be able to develop expansion towards the southern seas. To this end, on April 13, 1941, they agreed to conclude a neutrality pact with the USSR, hoping to abandon it as soon as it became beneficial for Japan.

The German leadership showed much greater interest in involving European countries in the war against the Soviet Union. This primarily concerned Romania, Finland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Nazi diplomacy made great efforts to draw these countries into the Tripartite Pact. And she has achieved great success here. In addition, Germany sought rapprochement with Turkey on anti-Soviet grounds. On June 18, 1941, the German-Turkish Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed. Hitler sought to give the war against the USSR the character of a “crusade” and completely subordinate the resources and policies of the allies to the achievement of his strategic goals.

In Western Europe, the German leadership did not see a serious threat to itself in the near future. France - this traditional geopolitical and military counterweight to Germany on the European stage - was defeated, dismembered and powerless to accept anything, as Hitler noted on January 9, 1941. In case of possible complications in the West, it was planned to put into effect the Attila plan - the occupation of the Vichy part France. Scandinavia and the Balkans were under the fifth “axis”. Spain and Türkiye occupied positions of neutrality friendly towards Germany.

In general, the German leadership assessed the global and European political situation as extremely favorable for the war against the USSR. “Now,” Hitler said at a meeting of the generals on March 30, 1941, “there is an opportunity to defeat Russia, having a free rear. This opportunity will not come again so soon. I would be a criminal before the German people if I did not take advantage of this.”

Such political and strategic calculations, unsteady and adventuristic at their core, were based on the main flawed premise - an incorrect assessment of the political strength and military-economic power of the Soviet Union and the resilience of the Russian people. Speaking at a meeting of Wehrmacht leaders on January 9, 1941, Hitler said that “the Russian armed forces are a clay colossus without a head.” Other Wehrmacht leaders were close to this opinion. The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Brauchitsch, for example, painted a picture of military operations on the Eastern Front in front of the generals at a meeting on April 30, 1941: “Presumably large border battles, lasting up to 4 weeks. In the future, only minor resistance should be expected.” Bias had a fatal impact on Hitler's strategy, depriving it of the ability to soberly take into account the totality of the main factors and conditions of warfare, taken as they were in reality.

Based on an assessment of the general strategic position and forces of the Soviet state, the German leadership based the planning of the war against the USSR on the requirement for the fastest possible, lightning-fast defeat of its armed forces, before England and the United States were able to come to their aid. The statement of Field Marshal Keitel is characteristic in this regard: “When developing the operational-strategic plan for the war in the East, I proceeded from the following premises:

a) the exceptional size of Russia’s territory makes its complete conquest absolutely impossible;

b) to achieve victory in the war against the USSR it is enough to achieve
the most important operational-strategic line, namely the Leningrad-Moscow-Stalingrad-Caucasus line, which will exclude for Russia the practical possibility of providing military resistance, since the army will be cut off from its most important bases, primarily from oil;

c) to solve this problem, a quick defeat of the Red Army is necessary, which must be carried out within a time frame that does not allow the possibility of a war on two fronts.”

Nazi strategy attached such great importance to the time factor that Hitler insisted in July 1940 to attack the Soviet Union in the fall of that year. However, Keitel and Jodl considered this period completely unrealistic, due to the unpreparedness of the armed forces, areas of concentration and deployment of troops, and not suitable from the point of view of meteorological conditions.

On July 22, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Brauchitsch, after a meeting with Hitler, instructed the General Staff of the Ground Forces to begin developing a plan for an attack on the Soviet Union. On Halder’s instructions, the head of the department of foreign armies of the East, Colonel Kinzel, began researching the question of the most appropriate direction of the main attacks from the point of view of the nature and size of the grouping of Soviet troops. He came to the conclusion that the offensive should be carried out in the direction of Moscow from the north, adjacent to the coast of the Baltic Sea, and then, having achieved a huge strategic reach to the south, force Soviet troops in Ukraine to fight with an inverted front.

Even earlier, at the end of July, the chief of staff of the 18th Army, which was being transferred to the East, Major General Marx, was instructed to develop an operational-strategic plan for the military campaign against the Soviet Union. On August 5, he presented Halder with a completed operational-strategic development, called “PlanFritz”. It outlined two main strategic directions - Moscow and Kiev: “The main attack of the ground forces should be directed from Northern Poland and East Prussia to Moscow.” When the German military attache in the Soviet Union, General E. Köstring, was introduced to Marx’s ideas, he expressed disagreement that the capture of Moscow would be decisive for the victory over the Red Army. In his opinion, the presence of a strong industrial base in the Urals would allow the Soviet Union to continue active resistance, skillfully using existing and newly created communications. In subsequent disputes with the High Command of the Army (OKH) about the conduct of operations in the East, these considerations of Köstring occupied a certain place in the argumentation of Hitler and the leaders of the Supreme High Command (OKW).

At the beginning of September, the First Quartermaster and Permanent Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Paulus, was entrusted with the task, based on Marx's plan, of developing considerations regarding the grouping of troops for the war against the Soviet Union and the order of their strategic concentration and deployment. By September 17, he completed this work, after which he was instructed to summarize all the results of preliminary operational and strategic planning. This resulted in a memo from Paulus dated October 29. On its basis, the operational department of the General Staff drew up a draft directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of “Ost”. Independently of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, the OKW Operational Command Headquarters had been working since the beginning of September to draw up its own plan for the war against the USSR. His ideas differed significantly from the plans of the OKH.

In November-December, the General Staff of the Ground Forces continued to clarify and play out at staff exercises questions about the main strategic directions, the distribution of forces and means for the offensive, and also coordinated the results of this work with the headquarters of the Supreme High Command and Hitler “Studying all these issues - wrote General Filippi, “confirmed first of all the opinion that in the course of operations in the increasingly expanding, funnel-like territory to the east, there will not be enough German forces if it is not possible to decisively break the strength of Russian resistance to the line Kyiv - Minsk - Lake Peipus.”

On December 5, General Chief of the General Staff Halder outlined to Hitler the basics of the planned military campaign. Now three strategic directions have finally emerged - Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. Halder proposed to deliver the main blow north of the Pripyat region from the Warsaw region to Moscow. The operations were planned to be carried out by 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions. In addition, the use of the armed forces of Romania and Finland was envisaged. To concentrate and deploy these forces, Halder considered eight weeks necessary. He indicated that from the first days of April, or at the latest from the middle of this month, it would no longer be possible to hide Germany’s preparations for war from the Soviet Union.

Hitler, having approved this plan in principle, noted that the subsequent task was to, after the split of the Soviet front in the center and access to the Dnieper in the Moscow direction, turn part of the forces of the main central group to the north and defeat it in cooperation with the northern grouping of Soviet troops in the Baltic states. Along with this, he proposed as a primary task the defeat of the entire southern group of Soviet troops in Ukraine. Only after completing these strategic tasks on the flanks of the front, as a result of which the Soviet Union would find itself isolated from the Baltic and Black Seas and would lose its most important economic regions, did he consider it possible to begin the capture of Moscow

Thus, even during the planning of the war against the USSR, the German command revealed a different approach to solving the most important strategic problems. The first line (the concept of a “concentrated attack” on Moscow) was represented by the General Staff of the Ground Forces, the second (an offensive in divergent directions), which Hitler also adhered to, was the OKW headquarters.

For Hitler, the seizure of raw materials and food resources of the Soviet Union was of decisive importance. Probably, Goering also played a significant role in kindling in him the desire to achieve military-economic goals. As chairman of the council of ministers for the “defense” of the empire, in November 1940, he demanded from the head of the military-economic department of the OKB headquarters, General Thomas, to draw up a report for him, which would put forward a demand for the rapid mastery of the European part of Russia in connection with the worsening food situation of the empire and its difficulties with raw materials. It especially emphasized the need to “seize undestroyed valuable Russian economic regions in Ukraine and the oil sources of the Caucasus.”

One way or another, the point of view of the OKW headquarters prevailed and was reflected in the final directive No. 21 of the Supreme High Command, signed by Hitler on December 18 and received the code name “Barbarossa”, which seemed to give the war the symbolic meaning of a crusade.

The directive stated that after the dissection of the Soviet front in Belarus by the main German group advancing from the Warsaw region, “the preconditions would be created for the rotation of powerful units of mobile troops to the north so that, in cooperation with the northern group of armies advancing from East Prussia in in the direction of Leningrad, destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic states. Only after completing this urgent task, which should be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should operations begin to capture Moscow, an important center of communications and military industry.” In the south, it was planned to “timely occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk basin.”

On December 17, Hitler, in a conversation with Jodl on the Barbarossa plan, especially emphasized that in 1941 the Wehrmacht must solve “all continental problems in Europe, since after 1942 the United States will be able to enter the war.” Consequently , the main goal of Plan Barbarossa was to defeat the Soviet military in one short-lived campaign. Directive No. 21 required that preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union be completed by May 15, 1941.

Many former Wehrmacht generals and military historians of the Federal Republic of Germany tried to pass off Hitler’s decision to attack Moscow only after the defeat of Soviet troops in the Baltic states and Ukraine as the main and only flaw of the Barbarossa plan. They called this decision “incompatible with operational requirements.” But the viciousness of the Barbarossa plan cannot be reduced only to the issue of capturing Moscow. With the same right, one could now say that the attack on Moscow seemed impossible without eliminating the threat from the flank strategic groupings of Soviet troops. The main thing here is that the Barbarossa plan was beyond the strength of the Wehrmacht, and therefore turned out to be adventuristic, vicious at its core. At a meeting between Halder and the commander of the reserve army, General Fromm, on January 28, 1941, it was established that the prepared human reserves to make up for losses in the war against the USSR would only be enough until the fall of 1941, and the supply of fuel raises serious concerns. The troops were completely unprepared for operations in winter conditions. When the OKH presented its ideas about providing the army with winter uniforms to the High Command, Hitler rejected them on the grounds that the “Eastern Campaign” must end before the onset of winter. These ominous facts were not properly assessed by the German generals. At a meeting of commanders of army groups and armies at Halder on December 14, 1940, where the results of the headquarters games on the plan of attack on the Soviet Union were summed up, the unanimous conclusion was made that the Red Army would be defeated in a short-lived campaign that would take no more than 8 -10 weeks.

On January 31, the OKH issued a directive for strategic concentration and deployment based on Plan Barbarossa. To conduct operations, three army groups were created: “North”, “Center” and “South”. They were tasked with cutting through deep tank wedges the main forces of the Red Army located in the western part of the Soviet Union and destroying them, preventing the withdrawal of combat-ready troops into the “depths of Russian space.”

To carry out the Barbarossa plan, huge armed forces were deployed. By June 1941 they numbered a total of 7,234 thousand people. Of these, there were 5 million people in the ground forces and reserve army, 1,680 thousand in the Air Force, 404 thousand in the Navy, 150 thousand in the SS troops. By the time of the attack on the USSR, the ground forces had 209 divisions. Of these, 152 divisions and two brigades were allocated to carry out the Barbarossa plan. In addition, Germany's satellite countries fielded 29 divisions (16 Finnish, 13 Romanian) and 16 brigades (three Finnish, nine Romanian and four Hungarian) against the USSR, which included a total of 900 thousand soldiers and officers.

The main forces were concentrated in Army Group Center, which had the task of splitting the Soviet strategic defense front. The main bet was on the crushing power of a sudden strike by massive forces of tanks, infantry and aviation and on their lightning-fast rush to the most important centers of the Soviet Union. To support the ground forces operating against the Red Army, four air fleets were allocated. In addition, Germany's satellites deployed about 1 thousand aircraft against the Red Army.

To hide the preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, Keitel issued a special directive on February 15, 1941 to disinform the enemy. When it was no longer possible to conceal the preparations, the strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa was to be presented in the light of the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of war, with the aim of "diverting attention from the final preparations for the invasion of England." The Wehrmacht command spread misinformation about the non-existent “airborne corps” and seconded translators to the troops in English, gave the order to print topographical materials on England in large quantities, prepared a “cordon” of certain areas on the English Channel coast, Pas-de-Calais and Norway, placed false “rocket batteries” on the coast, etc.

On April 30, the date of the attack on the Soviet Union was postponed from May 15 to June 22 in connection with the operation to capture the Balkans. By this time, most of the troops that took part in the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece were transferred to the Barbarossa area of ​​operations. The enemy group deployed against the USSR was far superior to the forces of the Red Army opposing it. As of June 21, in the Soviet western districts there were 2.9 million people in all types of armed forces and branches of the military. About 4.2 million people were deployed against them in the German ground forces alone (including satellite armies). By the time of the attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler had enormous military-political and economic advantages. All of Western, Northern and Southern Europe, with the exception of England, lay with its economic and human resources at his feet.

As a result of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Hitler in August 1939, Stalin placed the Soviet Union until June 22, 1941 in a position of complete international isolation. Associated with this were other mistakes and miscalculations that played a fatal role in the fate of the Soviet people. The pact allowed Hitler to launch a Wehrmacht attack against France without fearing for his rear in the East and to wage war on only one front. After Germany's defeat of France in May - June 1940, Soviet policy had to do everything possible to decisively move towards rapprochement with England and the USA and conclude an alliance with them, opposed to the Axis powers. There was everything for this the necessary conditions. Instead, Stalin chose to continue collaborating with Hitler. Until June 22, 1941, raw materials, food and oil flowed from the Soviet Union to Germany. And all this, despite the fact that reliable information flowed to Moscow through various channels - from Churchill, and from Benes, and from its own intelligence, and from other sources - that Germany was preparing for war against the Soviet Union .

But I. Stalin completely ignored these warnings, he brushed them aside. And in the highest military and government structures there was not a single person who would find the courage to describe to him the real state of affairs and the mortal danger looming over the country. Everyone adjusted to the opinion of I. Stalin, just to avoid falling out of favor with the leader. On June 14, 1941, a week before the start of Nazi aggression, TASS published a special statement in the central press, in which, under the authority of the Soviet government, it was announced that rumors about an allegedly impending German attack on the Soviet Union were unfounded. This statement disoriented the people and the army and cost the country dearly. The country's armed forces were not promptly prepared to repel aggression. The Soviet people had to pay heavily with their blood for Stalin’s amateurism and fatal mistakes.

By the end of 1941, German troops managed to reach close to Leningrad and Moscow and capture almost all of Ukraine. But this is where all the political, strategic and economic calculations of Hitler and his generals, based on the “lightning war” according to the Barbarossa plan, collapsed. The Soviet people, state bodies and military command were able to quickly recover from the first heavy defeats and stop the Wehrmacht's advance in stubborn battles. Back in mid-October, Hitler told his entourage: “On June 22 we opened the door, not knowing what was behind it.”

The December counter-offensive of the Red Army for the first time since the beginning of World War II forced the German command to switch to strategic defense by order of Hitler’s headquarters on December 8, 1941. The main goal of the Barbarossa plan was “to defeat Soviet Russia during a short-term lightning campaign.” - was not achieved. Germany faced the prospect of a protracted war in which it had no chance of winning.

Preparing for the struggle for dominance in Europe, Hitler's leadership tried to do everything possible to save the Wehrmacht from having to fight a war on two fronts. Thanks to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, concluded on August 23, 1939, it achieved neutrality for the Soviet Union to conduct military campaigns in the West. This allowed Hitler's war machine to easily deal with France. It seemed that the wildest dreams of the German General Staff had come true: the way for a military campaign to the East was open. But after June 22, 1941, something completely incomprehensible happened to them. Germany was unable to win on only one Soviet-German front! Before the landing of the Western allies in Normandy in 1944, the Wehrmacht suffered a crushing defeat in single combat with the Soviet Army. The fate of World War II and Nazi Germany was decided on the battlefields of the Soviet Union.

The battle between fascism and socialism ended in the defeat of fascism with its misanthropic, racist ideology. From the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole, another important conclusion follows: any policy of domination is inevitably doomed to death with catastrophic consequences for its bearers. In the Patriotic War, the Soviet people’s defense of both their national independence and the socialist way of life were closely intertwined. A complete distortion of this truth is the spiteful book by M. Solonin “June 22, or when the Great Patriotic War began” (M., 2006). The author believes that due to “Hitler’s stupid policy,” the war on our side acquired a domestic character only a few months after the ominous date of June 22, when the people realized that fascist Germany was bringing Russia not liberation from the Soviet socialist system, but national enslavement. And before that, they say, the majority of them welcomed the German troops in the hope that the Soviet system would be overthrown. Therefore, millions of Red Army soldiers surrendered or deserted at the beginning of the war. This is a complete distortion of historical facts.

From the history of the “European Troubles” of the last century, a general conclusion arises that is also relevant for our days. Due to the stupidity of the politicians of the European powers, who suffered from the syndrome of domination and internecine struggle, Europe became the source and battlefield of three world wars - two “hot” and one “cold”. As a result of the fatal weakening of its material and spiritual potential in these wars, it lost the 20th century to an overseas power - the United States. Being overseas and not experiencing the impact of wars on its own territory, the United States derived enormous geopolitical benefits from the confrontation between European powers. Ultimately, this allowed them to establish their dominance over the European continent and create a “pax americana” - an American unipolar world. But every dominance comes to an end. This is happening now with American hegemony.

David Glanz

The collapse of Plan Barbarossa. Confrontation near Smolensk. Volume I

© David M. Glantz 2010

© Translation, edition in Russian, ZAO Publishing House Tsentrpolygraf, 2015

© Artistic design, ZAO Publishing House Tsentrpoligraf, 2015

Preface

This paper examines the nature and consequences of the Battle of Smolensk - a series of military operations on the territory of the Smolensk region in the central part of Russia in the period from July 10 to September 10, 1941. The battle itself began three weeks after German troops on June 22, 1941 invaded the Soviet Union. The goal of the German invasion, codenamed Operation Barbarossa, was to crush and destroy the Red Army, overthrow the communist regime led by Joseph Stalin, occupy large parts of the Soviet Union and exploit the captured areas for the benefit of Nazi Germany. For ten weeks, the German Army Group Center fought intense battles in the Smolensk region with the troops of the Soviet Western Front, and subsequently the Central, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts. More than 900 thousand German soldiers took part in the fighting, supported by approximately 2 thousand tanks. They were opposed by a Red Army force of approximately 1.2 million soldiers, supported by approximately 500 tanks.

More than 60 years after the end of the war, most memoirists and military historians viewed the fighting in the Smolensk region in July, August and early September 1941 as nothing more than annoying “potholes” in the smooth path of the offensive operation code-named “Barbarossa”. The German armed forces and their allies launched Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, along a huge front stretching from the shores of the Barents Sea in the north to the Black Sea coast in the south. Using the well-proven strategy of lightning warfare and rapid tank attack tactics, the German invasion force crushed the Red Army formations defending the western border regions of the Soviet Union in a matter of weeks. After that, they rushed in northeastern and eastern directions, deep into the vast territory of the Soviet Union.

The battle for Smolensk began on July 10, 1941, when the troops of the German Army Group Center under Field Marshal Feodor von Bock crossed the Western Dvina and Dnieper and, in accordance with the Barbarossa plan, began operational operations to the east, towards the city of Smolensk. The battle actually ended on September 10, 1941. On this day, the 2nd Army of Army Group Center and the 2nd Tank Group launched an offensive to the south, which culminated in the encirclement and defeat of the Southwestern Front in the Kyiv area, one of the most severe defeats Red Army. Thus, the Battle of Smolensk was ten weeks of stubborn battles to seize the strategic initiative and victory on the territory of the Smolensk region of the RSFSR and the adjacent regions of the Byelorussian SSR and the RSFSR.

This study is “strictly documentary”, primarily because it is based on “ground control data”, in particular daily strategic, operational and tactical reports on forces that participated in combat operations. In this regard, this study is also unique because most studies describing the Soviet-German war as a whole or its individual battles or operations clearly lacked the aforementioned documentation and detail. This is especially important since the fighting on the territory of the Smolensk region in the height of the summer of 1941 also gave rise to many contradictions. This controversy stems, in part, from the fierce debate over the wisdom of German dictator Adolf Hitler's decision to delay Army Group Center's advance on Moscow from early September to early October 1941 in order to defeat large Red Army forces in the Kyiv area.

This study must be "documentary" in nature, since it challenges the generally accepted view that the fighting in the Smolensk region was nothing more than "potholes" in the smooth German path to Moscow. And unlike previous researchers, based on new archival materials, the author argues that the Battle of Smolensk had a much wider scope than previously thought, and made a much greater contribution to the defeat of the German Army Group Center on the outskirts of Moscow in early December 1941. Finally, the study is “documentary” because it restores in historical memory a largely “forgotten battle” - in particular, the massive September counter-offensive of the Red Army in the Smolensk region.

Since the study relies heavily on documentary sources to describe military operations and draw conclusions, it has an appropriate structure and content. Thus, it contains a frank, unvarnished account of the course and result of military operations in the Smolensk region, largely based on paraphrased versions of directives, orders, messages and critical assessments prepared by the headquarters of the troops participating in the hostilities of that period. In particular, documents prepared by the respective High Command of the parties (OKW, OKH and Headquarters) and headquarters at the army and sometimes division level are presented.

Because accuracy is absolutely important in justifying many of the conclusions of this study, a separate volume contains complete and accurate literal translations of virtually all the documents paraphrased in the two descriptive volumes. They are referenced in descriptive volumes with citations given in the corresponding appendix and a specific document number within each appendix. The inclusion of these documents is critical for two very good reasons. First, verbatim documentation is necessary to confirm the accuracy of the content of a given study. Secondly, the structure and content of these directives, orders, reports and criticisms, as well as the expressions used, recreate a unique personal portrait of the commander who prepared them. In particular, the clarity, conciseness, logic and style of these documents, or the lack of any of these, reflect the intelligence, skill and effectiveness of commanders (or lack thereof), as well as less tangible but no less important personal qualities such as ego, cruelty and fighting spirit.

In addition, the extremely detailed content of the two descriptive volumes, which must not only be read but also studied, emphasizes the importance of the maps, making them absolutely necessary elements for understanding the strategic and operational course of the Battle of Smolensk. Therefore, using German and Soviet archival maps from the period mentioned, I have included a sufficient number of general operational and regional maps to enable readers to follow the general progress of the fighting. However, since these maps do not show many tactical details to reflect and clarify the content of archival documents (whether paraphrased in the description or published in full in appendices), I have also included here many detailed daily maps from official documents of many German and Soviet military units.

Given the wealth of new archival material on which this research is based, I extend special thanks to the Government Russian Federation, which provided access to documents very important for the writing of my book. But in light of the incredible work that went into preparing these volumes, what is even more important is that, as in the past, my wife, Mary Ann, has provided me with tremendous support. Firstly, it was she who correctly predicted that my 30-day efforts to revise and expand the brief 100-page description of the Battle of Smolensk and turn it into a more extensive 200-page study would inevitably develop into a much more massive work. However, she deserves special thanks for her unconditional moral support during what I would call a six-month “virtual siege.” Secondly, in addition to the fact that she endured and put up with the recluse of her husband, who spent endless hours secluded in his office, surrounded by his favorite books, she endured many long hours checking and proofreading these volumes on behalf of a person (me, naturally) , whose impatience to quickly move on to new topics and tasks usually prevents him from engaging in such herculean, mundane and tedious tasks as “simple” proofreading.

However, I alone am ultimately responsible for any errors found in these volumes, whether factual or translational.

The essence of the falsification of Russian history begun by liberal-bourgeois circles - both homegrown and overseas - is to replace our common past, the biography of the people, and with it the biographies of millions of compatriots who dedicated their lives to the revival and prosperity of our Motherland, the struggle for her freedom from foreign domination. Falsification of history is an attempt to brazenly replace Russia itself. Anti-Sovietists chose the history of the heroic feat of the Soviet people, who liberated the world from German fascism, as one of the main objects of falsification. It is clear that sincere patriots of the Motherland do not accept this game of thimble-makers. Therefore, Pravda readers warmly approved the article published by the newspaper on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War by front-line soldier, Doctor of Philology, honorary professor of Tver State University Alexander Ognev and strongly recommended that the newspaper continue publishing his exposures of history falsifiers. Fulfilling the wishes of readers, the editorial board of Pravda decided to publish chapters of the study by Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation A.V. Ognev in the Friday issues of the newspaper.

Through the pages of the newspaper "Pravda", Alexander Ognev
2011-11-05 01:33

The crane of victory seemed like a bird in the hands of the Germans

What did Hitler and his generals count on when attacking the Soviet Union? The answer to this question can be found in Guderian’s memoirs: “The High Command thought to break the military power of Russia within 8-10 weeks, thereby causing its political collapse. It was so confident in the success of its crazy idea that the most important branches of the military industry were already switched to the production of other products in the fall of 1941. Even with the beginning of winter, they thought about withdrawing 60-80 divisions from Russia, deciding that the remaining divisions would be enough to suppress Russia during the winter.” Westphal wrote in the same spirit: “Hitler hoped that the Red Army would quickly collapse. Confident of his victory, he even ordered a reduction in the volume of military production.”

At the beginning of the war, the political and military leadership of Germany openly triumphed. On July 3, Halder wrote: "It will not be an exaggeration if I say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days."

On July 4, Hitler self-confidently declared that the USSR had practically already lost the war. By the end of September, he directed Army headquarters to prepare to disband 40 infantry divisions to use this manpower for industry. On October 9, he loudly proclaimed: “I speak about this only today because today I can say with absolute certainty: this enemy is defeated and will never rise again.”

The assessments of our ability to survive the war with Germany, which were given by foreign military and political figures, differed little from the statements of Hitler and his entourage. The British Joint Intelligence Committee predicted on June 9, 1941 that Germany would "take three to six weeks to capture Ukraine and Moscow, after which the complete collapse of the Soviet Union would follow." The chief of the imperial general staff, J. Dill, believed that “the Russians will be finished within six to seven weeks.” British Ambassador S. Cripps stated: “Russia will not resist Germany for more than three or four weeks.”

On June 23, US Secretary of War G. Stimson suggested that the Germans would be busy with the war with the USSR “for a minimum of one and a maximum of three months.” Naval Minister F. Knox believed that Germany would need “from six weeks to two months” to defeat Russia. Churchill stated: “Almost all authoritative military experts believed that the Russian armies would soon be defeated and would be basically destroyed. President Roosevelt was considered a very brave man when he declared in September 1941 that the Russians would hold the front and that Moscow would not be taken. The remarkable courage and patriotism of the Russian people confirmed the correctness of this opinion.”

In 1941, it seemed to many in the West that victory was already completely in Hitler’s hands, that the USSR, following the example of a number of “civilized” European nations, should have shown common sense, obediently raised its hands up and come to terms with the German victory and occupation. It seemed to them that everything had collapsed, nothing could stop the monstrous enemy and save the Soviet Union from final collapse.

The defeat of German troops that came close to Moscow in December 1941 was an unexpected “miracle” for foreigners. Until now, many foreigners cannot understand that the Russian miracle was hidden in the souls of our people, in their ineradicable desire to be unconquered, to defend the freedom and independence of their Motherland. Our victory was due to the high morale of the people, their unshakable fortitude, great patriotism and heroism. An enormous strain of mind and will, moral, spiritual and physical strength was demonstrated during the tragic struggle, which, it would seem, did not give any reason to expect success. But the Soviet people were approaching victory step by step.

Mass heroism of the Red Army

In the summer of 1941, the Wehrmacht, having inflicted a number of heavy defeats on the Red Army, was still unable to achieve decisive successes. From the first day of the war, it began to ruin the punctually laid out German plans. 485 border outposts were suddenly attacked, and not a single one of them surrendered to the enemy. Many fighters were surrounded, but fought until the last opportunity. The 41st Division, together with the border guards, held Rava-Russkaya for five days. A serious blow to German troops was dealt in the Przemysl area. Captured by the enemy on the night of June 23, it was liberated by the 99th Infantry Division and held until June 28.

Soviet troops heroically defended Brest for a whole month. In one of the rooms of the barracks of the Brest Fortress after the war, an inscription was found: “There were three of us, it was difficult for us, but we did not lose heart and will die as heroes. July 1941." The words of an unknown soldier were engraved on the brick wall of the Brest Fortress: “I am dying, but I am not giving up. Goodbye, Motherland. July 20, 1941." This inscription was made on the 29th (!) day of the war.

Writer S.S. Smirnov, having carefully investigated many unknown facts of the defense of the Brest Fortress, in newspaper publications, and then in his book “Brest Fortress”, paid tribute to many heroes. Among them is the brave commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment P.M. Gavrilov, who fully fulfilled his military duty, was captured unconscious after a shell explosion on July 23, 1941. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of January 30, 1957, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for heroism and courage. The same rank was received by border guard Lieutenant A.M. Kizhevatov, wounded several times, but continued to fight the enemy, went to blow up the bridge and died heroically. His mother, wife, and three small children were captured in 1942 and shot by the Nazis. The book by S. Smirnov reflects the heroic behavior of the regimental commissar E. Fomin, who was captured and shot by the Germans, the battalion commander of the 125th Infantry Regiment V.V. Shablovsky, Komsomol organizer S.M. Matevosyan, captain I.N. Zubachev, who died in captivity in 1944, secretary of the Komsomol organization of the headquarters of the 84th regiment A.M. Phil, a student of the regiment of the fourteen-year-old brave Petya Klypa and other defenders of the fortress.

Millions heroically fought the enemy Soviet people. “The troops of the 3rd Panzer Group,” wrote General G. Goth in July 1941, “suffered heavy losses. The morale of the personnel is depressed... The enemy appears everywhere and fiercely defends itself.” Guderian, in his work “The Experience of the War with Russia,” wrote that Russian generals and soldiers “did not lose their presence of mind even in the most difficult situation of 1941.”

General Blumentritt was amazed at what the German army encountered in Russia: “The behavior of the Russian troops, even in the first battles, was in striking contrast with the behavior of the Poles and Western allies in defeat. Even surrounded, the Russians continued to fight stubbornly.” In the first weeks of the war, Halder wrote in his “Military Diary”: “The tenacity of Russian formations in battle should be noted. There have been cases when garrisons of pillboxes refused to surrender and blew themselves up along with the pillboxes.” An officer of the Wehrmacht's 18th Panzer Army recorded with alarming surprise: “Despite the fact that we are advancing considerable distances, there is not the feeling that we have entered a defeated country that we experienced in France. Instead, there is resistance, resistance, no matter how hopeless it may seem.”

Is it possible to somehow reconcile these eloquent testimonies of German generals and officers and many of the above facts with Ivashchenko’s vile fabrications that “millions of soldiers and commanders went over to the Germans with weapons in their hands”?

More than 400 Soviet soldiers covered the embrasures of the pillboxes with their bodies, saving their comrades from the deadly fire. More than seventy of them were before Alexander Matrosov. Alexey Ochkin survived after such a feat; doctors saved him. He wrote an autobiographical novel, Embrasure, in which he explained the behavior of his hero. On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Victory, the English newspaper The Observer admitted: “The power of the most powerful army in the world was exhausted and finally broken by the self-sacrificing exploits of Russian soldiers.”

The Germans were unable to destroy the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dnieper, which was the main goal of the Barbarossa plan. They surrounded a number of Soviet divisions, but even when surrounded they continued to fight desperately. Our soldiers, fighting unequal battles with the enemy and even knowing that they would probably die, fought to the last opportunity, firmly believing that Russia would win. Without this holy faith we would not have won.

D. Bedny was expelled from the party and the Union of Soviet Writers in 1938 (he was reinstated in the party only after his death - in 1962). Two weeks before the war, at a meeting with readers in Kimry, as I remember, A. Fadeev was asked: “What is D. Bedny doing now?” After thinking a little, in a rather dry formal manner, but with a tinge of bitterness, he replied: “Demyan Bedny is writing something, no one publishes it. He lives by selling books from his library.” The war began - and his poems again appeared in central publications. In November 1941 he wrote:

Let the fight take over

Dangerous bend,

Let the Germans have fun

fascist chimera,

We will repel the enemies. I believe

to your people

Indestructible

thousand-year-old faith.

On July 9, 1941, “Red Star” reported on the heroic duel of the commander of the 45-mm gun, Sergeant Ivan Panfilenok, with German tanks. On June 25, 1941 - on his twentieth birthday - he knocked out 11 German tanks in the area of ​​the city of Lutsk, and in total his gun destroyed 17 tanks. Three other guns from his battery, which stood in the way of three enemy tank divisions, knocked out 30 tanks, but were destroyed along with their crews. Left alone, the sergeant fired for about an hour. He was seriously wounded. But the advance of the tank divisions was delayed for a day.

Six kilometers from Mogilev, along the Bobruisk highway, there is a chapel on a mound, by the road there is a sign: “Buinichskoye Field Memorial Complex.” Here the 388th regiment under the command of Colonel Kutepov destroyed 39 enemy tanks on July 12, 1941. This field became in the history of the Great Patriotic War a symbol of the defense of Mogilev, which delayed the breakthrough of German troops to Moscow. Mogilev held out for 23 days. The regional museum contains a note found 20 years after the end of the war in the rusted shell of a mine: “There are three of us left alive - Mikhail Fastin from Leningrad, me from Donbass and Vladimir from Zhitomir. Farewell, comrades! We are dying, but we are not giving up...” The last word was not completed and their lives ended.

On July 17, 1941, at the bridge over the Dobrost River near the village of Sokolnichi, young artilleryman Nikolai Vladimirovich Sirotinin volunteered to cover the withdrawal of our troops. From a gun hidden in the bushes, he shot at a column of German tanks and infantry walking at the 476th kilometer of the Moscow-Warsaw Highway. “He was wounded at the beginning of the battle, and he fired, bleeding... In a nearby birch forest, the Germans dug 57 graves for those killed in this duel with the Russian artilleryman.” An officer of the 4th Panzer Division, F. Henfeld, noted in his diary the speech of a German colonel, on whose orders “four officers lowered the hero’s body into a freshly dug grave... The colonel said in front of the grave that if all the Fuhrer’s soldiers fought like this Russian, we would conquer the whole world. They fired three times in volleys from rifles.”

General Lukin

Dissident Zh. Medvedev, bad knowledgeable about history Russia, found that in 1941 the Red Army really heroically “defended only cities that had some symbolic historical Russian military glory: Brest, Odessa, Sevastopol, Leningrad and Moscow. Kyiv, Minsk, Smolensk, Vilnius, Riga and many others surrendered without a fight.” He divided the cities strangely.

Our troops steadfastly defended Odessa for over two months, but it is a mistake to think that its historical past was more glorious than the history of the “mother of Russian cities” Kyiv, for which there was also a fierce battle in 1941. It is impossible to understand why Smolensk is classified as a city without “historical Russian military glory.” As I. Stadnyuk showed in his novel “War,” Stalin, upon learning that the Germans had entered Smolensk, indignantly said: “This is not a city, but a monument! Glory to the Russian army! More than three hundred years ago, the Poles could not take Smolensk for two years! Napoleon broke his teeth on it! And Red Marshal Timoshenko allowed the enemy to take Smolensk..."

Zh. Medvedev is deeply mistaken when he claims that Smolensk was surrendered to the enemy without a fight. The battle for the possession of this city lasted two months, during which, as G. Zhukov recalled, “the troops of the Red Army, the residents of the city and its environs showed the greatest resilience. There was a fierce struggle for every house and street, for every settlement.” On July 2, 1941, K. Simonov, driving through Smolensk, noted: “That evening I hardly saw any bombed buildings in Smolensk. But several central blocks were burned almost entirely. In general, a quarter of the city was burned. Apparently the Germans bombed here mainly with lighters.” On July 10, German troops approached the city, the Battle of Smolensk began, which lasted two months and ended on September 10.

The delay of the German offensive in the Smolensk area became an important strategic success for our troops. The 16th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Mikhail Fedorovich Lukin, played a big role in this. He was born on November 18, 1892 in the village of Poltukhino, Pogorelov-Gorodishchensky district, Kalinin region (now Zubtsovsky district, Tver region) into a peasant family. From his autobiography: “My father’s family consisted of ten people. Seven children. The farm had three acres of land, one horse, one cow, one pig and several sheep. There wasn’t enough of our own bread, and therefore my father went to work for the summer, and sometimes even for the winter.” Mikhail himself had to start labor activity at 14 years old. After graduating from college in the village, he entered the teacher's seminary in the city of Torzhok.

However, great financial difficulties forced him to leave his first year and go to St. Petersburg. There he worked as a “tavern boy”, a waiter in a restaurant, and sold ice cream in Tsarskoye Selo. Life in a peasant family, where Mikhail Fedorovich was accustomed to work from an early age, and subsequent difficult labor “universities” in St. Petersburg contributed to the strengthening of his persistent character, able to overcome life’s adversities. In 1913 he was drafted into the tsarist army, in 1916 he graduated from the 5th Moscow school of warrant officers, became an officer (lieutenant), commanded a company, fought at the front until November 1917, was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree, the order St. Anne, 4th degree, Order of St. Stanislaus, 3rd degree.

In 1918, M. Lukin voluntarily joined the Red Army, and in the same year he graduated from reconnaissance courses at the Field Headquarters of the Red Army. He joined the ranks of the CPSU(b) in 1919. During Civil War M. Lukin was assistant chief of staff of the division, commander of a regiment and brigade, then chief of staff of the division. For skillful command and courage he was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner.

The crane of victory seemed After completing advanced training courses for command personnel at the Military Academy named after M.V. in 1926. Frunze Lukin served in various command and staff positions. Since 1939, he has been deputy commander of the Siberian Military District. In 1940 he was awarded military rank Lieutenant General In the same year, in Transbaikalia, on instructions from the command, he was able to quickly form, train well, and unite the 16th Army. In May 1941, due to the growing threat of a German attack, an order was received to transfer the 16th Army to the Kiev Special Military District. Arriving before his army on the Southwestern Front, he first fought near Shepetovka, where the main ammunition depots of the front were located. Here, on his own initiative, he began to command hastily assembled units. In the book “This is how the war began,” Marshal I. Bagramyan noted: “Lukin’s group took upon itself the entire blow of the fascist tank and motorized troops that broke through in the Ostrog-Shepetovsky direction and stopped them.” The Marshal was surprised and admired that the group, with its modest forces, withstood the onslaught of the fascist avalanche for a whole week. G. Zhukov noted: “For seven days Lukin held back the superior forces of the enemy. By the way, in the reports of that time, our units fighting near Shepetovka were called “General Lukin’s Operational Group”... To win seven expensive days from the enemy then was, of course, a feat.”

The current situation forced our high command to redirect the echelons with the 16th Army to the Smolensk-Moscow direction, where the Red Army suffered the most severe defeats. Lukin was also recalled to the Western Front.

On July 8, 1941, he arrived in Smolensk and led its defense. Here he again took command of the 16th Army, which deployed north-west of Smolensk and, in difficult conditions, together with the 20th Army, managed to stop the advance of enemy troops.

But soon the situation at the front changed dramatically. The Germans captured Vitebsk, reached the Dnieper, the Western Dvina, occupied Velizh, Demidov, Rudnya, and landed large troops near Dukhovshchina and Yartsev. Units of the 16th Army, deployed north-west of Smolensk, steadfastly resisted the enemy's advance. However, the city remained unprotected from the south and southwest. German troops managed to bypass Smolensk to deliver a powerful blow, capture Krichev, Pochinok, Yelnya, Glinka, and cut the railways leading to Roslavl and Sukhinichi. At the same time, the Germans were unable to take control of Smolensk right away. The courage, dedication, and tenacity of Soviet soldiers thwarted the plans of the fascist command.

Heroic defense of Smolensk

For the defense of Smolensk, Lieutenant General M. Lukin, together with the city authorities, hastily mobilized parts of the local garrison, Smolensk militias, a combined detachment of NKVD workers, and a battalion of cadets from the interregional police school. M. Lukin reported to Marshal S. Timoshenko: “129 p. d., composed of formed detachments that retreated from the front, and individual units of other divisions, has now become one of the most stable divisions.”

The troops of the 16th and 20th armies in July 1941, who heroically fought on the outskirts and in Smolensk itself with German troops, found themselves in an operational encirclement north-west of the city, but continued to resist stubbornly. Nevertheless, on July 16, the Germans, having a significant superiority in strength, almost completely captured Smolensk, but were unable to develop their success. Combining stubborn defense with decisive counterattacks, our troops stopped the advance of the powerful military group “Center”, which was rushing towards Moscow, and held it back in fierce battles for more than two months.

On July 8, German generals Brauchitsch and Halder reported to Hitler that out of 164 Russian rifle formations, 89 had been destroyed and only 46 were combat-ready. But already on July 23, Hitler told Brauchitsch that “in the face of stubborn resistance from the enemy and the determination of his leadership, operations with the setting of individual goals should be abandoned as long as the enemy has sufficient forces for a counterattack.” According to K. Simonov, “between these two quotes, one dated the eighth, the other the twenty-third of July, lies precisely the first stage of the fierce Smolensk battle, the course and results of which gave rise to the first disagreements in the German high command.”

The Battle of Smolensk included a series of fierce operations. The command of the Red Army tried to return Smolensk. On July 18, the Chief of the General Staff issued a directive “to conduct an operation to encircle and defeat the enemy in the Smolensk region... However, it was not possible to create conditions for the complete defeat of his Dukhovshchina group.” The combat log of the Western Front troops for July 19 records: “The 129th Division of the 16th Army fought for Smolensk during the night and by 6 o’clock in the morning captured the northwestern part of the city and the airfield.” Member of the Military Council of the Western Front N.A. Bulganin reported to Stalin on July 20: “During July 17-18, as a result of stubborn fighting, certain areas of the city passed from hand to hand. By the morning of July 19, the enemy captured most of the city. On July 19, our troops again occupied the northwestern part of the city with an attack.”

The troops of the Western Front were unable to fully implement the offensive plan of the Headquarters: the Germans had more forces. On July 28, Smolensk had to be abandoned. “The news of our loss of Smolensk was published only on August 13,” wrote K. Simonov. - But it should be remembered that almost this entire and subsequent period was associated with fierce battles in the Smolensk region, the end of which German military historians date only from the fifth to the eighth of August. Not only we, but also the Germans call this period a battle, confirming its importance during the entire summer campaign of 1941.”

For supply, replenishment and withdrawal of troops there was only one crossing across the Dnieper in the area of ​​​​the village of Solovyov, 15 kilometers south of Yartsev. In July-August, the military commandant of the Solovyov crossing was Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A.I. Lizyukov, who did a lot to prevent the enemy from quickly capturing the isthmus through which parts of our army, cut off from the main forces, were retreating. The fierce battles for Smolensk exhausted and weakened the strike forces of the Center group, detained the enemy for a long time, which allowed the Soviet command to prepare a new defensive line. However, by the end of July, the enemy managed to capture the crossings across the Dnieper east of the city, and our fighting divisions were surrounded.

At the beginning of August 1941, the 16th and 20th armies received orders to stop defending Smolensk and retreat to the eastern bank of the Dnieper. The group of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, which included tank units and troops of the 16th and 20th armies, managed to break through the encirclement ring with a coordinated offensive towards each other and reach the Solovyovskaya and Radchenskaya crossings.

On August 3, the most difficult crossing began. The pontoons installed by our sappers, on which people and equipment passed, were constantly subjected to artillery fire, and German aviation dominated the air, constantly bombing these pontoons. By mid-day, all bridges were destroyed. Our troops restored them only the next day, August 4, under the cover of thick fog. Having crossed to the eastern bank south of Yartsev, the armies of M. Lukin and P. Kurochkin united with the main forces of the front, occupied the defensive line and held these positions until October.

The Germans failed to defeat the encircled Soviet troops in the Smolensk area. German General G. Blumentritt sadly stated: “A large group of Russians was surrounded in the Smolensk area... And again this operation was not successful. At night, Russian troops left the encirclement and went east.”

The commander of the Western Front, Marshal S. Timoshenko, reported in September 1941 to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: “The pinning down of the 20th and 16th armies cost Army Group Center significant forces; it did not allow it to develop success from the Smolensk region in the direction of Dorogobuzh, Vyazma and ultimately proved decisive in re-establishing a continuous front of Soviet troops east of Smolensk, which stopped the enemy in the Western direction for more than two months.” These armies diverted significant forces of German troops.

Delaying the enemy's advance in the Moscow direction became a major strategic success for the Soviet troops. It allowed the Soviet command to gain time to prepare new large reserves and implement defensive structures near Moscow. A. Vasilevsky in his book “The Work of a Whole Life” stated: “Of the defensive battles of the Soviet troops carried out in the summer and autumn of 1941, the Battle of Smolensk occupies a special place. Along with the stubborn resistance offered to the enemy in the Luga area and the heroic struggle of Soviet troops in the South-Western direction, it marked the beginning of the breakdown of the “lightning war” against the Soviet Union and forced the enemy to make adjustments to the notorious “Barbarossa” plan. I. Konev wrote in his memoirs: “The Smolensk battle entered the annals of the Great Patriotic War like a bright page.”

On August 5, 1941, M. Lukin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for excellent leadership of our troops and personal courage. Vasilevsky noted: “Speaking about the battles near Smolensk, one cannot help but recall the heroic and tragic fate of General Mikhail Fedorovich Lukin. The personality of this extraordinary person is of great interest. His thoughts, his feelings, his fate allow us to better understand the complex interweaving of Russian history in the twentieth century.”

Confessions of German generals

The Germans met the tenacious tenacity of the Red Army almost everywhere. Our troops delayed the enemy on most sectors of the front for a day or two more than he expected. Manstein admitted: the “Dead Head” division in July in the Sebezh-Opochka region “suffered colossal losses... and after nine days three regiments had to be reduced into two.” On August 5, 1941, General Brand reported: “Enemy artillery activity has intensified. Fire control has improved. Our troops unanimously demand to increase the effectiveness of the fight against enemy artillery.”

Halder wrote on August 3, 1941: “Velikiye Luki. The failure of the offensive is explained by the fact that the 251st and, apparently, the 253rd infantry divisions were not ready for such a task. There can no longer be any talk of an offensive in this sector. We are forced to go on the defensive here... The task of reaching Toropets must be removed.” And here is the entry from August 5: “The Fuhrer stated... that the current development of the situation will lead, as in the last world war, to the stabilization of the fronts.” August 11: “What we are now doing is the last and at the same time dubious attempt to prevent the transition to trench warfare... The last forces have been thrown into battle.”

The German general K. Tippelskirch, a participant in the fascist campaign to the east, in his “History of the Second World War” highly appreciated the fortitude of the Soviet soldiers: “The Russians held on with unexpected firmness.”

with tenacity and perseverance, even when they were bypassed and surrounded. By doing this, they gained time and pulled together more and more reserves from the depths of the country for counterattacks, which were also stronger than expected... The enemy showed an absolutely incredible ability to resist.”

At the beginning of the war, due to the miscalculations of Stalin and the high command, due to poor training of soldiers and officers, we suffered defeats and suffered huge losses, but at the same time our soldiers fought courageously - otherwise we would not have won. A participant in the battles of 1941, the writer I. Stadnyuk “with complete conviction” asserted that “in the heavy unequal battles of 1941-1942, the Red Army laid the foundation for the victory of 1945.” Marshal I. Bagramyan said about the first months of 1941 that “this time was also the most heroic during the entire Great Patriotic War.”

These thoughts are confirmed by the confessions of German politicians and military leaders. Goebbels wrote on July 1, 1941: “The Russians are defending desperately... They are putting up stronger resistance than at first thought.” July 2: “The enemy’s resistance is cruel and desperate... Heavy, fierce fighting is taking place everywhere. The Red regime mobilized the people. To this we must also add the fabulous stubbornness of the Russians.” July 4: “However, the Russians are fighting very stubbornly and fiercely.”

Halder wrote on June 26: “Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere to the last man.” July 4: “The fighting with the Russians is extremely stubborn.” July 11: “The enemy is fighting fiercely and fanatically.” July 15: “Russian troops are fighting, as before, with the greatest fierceness.”

Fights in the sky

On the first day of the war, Soviet pilots shot down more than 200 German aircraft and carried out 16 ramming attacks. Early in the morning of June 22, 1941, 25 minutes after the start of the war, Lieutenant Ivan Ivanov rammed a Heinkel 111 near the city of Dubno. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On June 22, 1941, Lieutenant Pyotr Ryabtsev rammed an Me-109 over Brest and landed safely by parachute. He died on July 31, 1941. 25 pilots made two rams each, and Hero of the Soviet Union A. Khlobystov rammed the enemy three times. L. Zhukova in her book “Choosing a Ram” noted that 62 falcons air ram planes with swastikas were dropped from the sky... 233 rammers landed safely in their vehicles, 176 with a parachute, 11 were missing. 216 heroes died. A fiery ground ramming of an aircraft “on an accumulation of enemy manpower or military equipment was carried out by 503 pilots. On the first day of the war, three days before Nikolai Gastello, - Pyotr Chirkin. More than 10 heroes miraculously survived.”

In A. Kovalenko’s collection “Peaks of Courage”, three times Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Kozhedub explained to those who did not understand the motive of the fiery ram and considered it “an accidental fall on enemy positions”: “On October 12, 1943, I was shot down over the territory occupied by the enemy. No, I don’t think I’ll give up alive. Die with music! He chose the largest concentration of Germans and sent the burning plane there. Yes. I decided to repeat Gastello’s feat. But, fortunately, the flame was knocked down by the incoming air flow.”

The Museum of School No. 3 named after Nikolai Gastello in the village of Khlebnikovo near Moscow found one of the survivors - the fiery rammer Sergei Kolybin. He explained his action simply: “I realized that my lot was to die. I don’t want to be captured! He directed the burning plane into the very center of the enemy crossing of the Dnieper. Let the departing comrades in the regiment tell my relatives how I died.” But he was thrown out by an air current, the hero remained alive. The pilot was awarded the Order of Lenin for his feat. B. Kovzan went victoriously to ram four times, during the last one he lost an eye, but even after being injured, he continued to fight and shoot down the enemy in the sky.

“Soviet pilots ignored the sense of self-preservation,” stated Luftwaffe General W. Schwabedissen in the book “Stalin’s Falcons. Analysis of the actions of Soviet aviation 1941-1945.” He made the right conclusion: “The Russian Air Force, with its stubborn determination and gigantic sacrifices (remember their rams!), was able to prevent its complete destruction and lay the foundations for its future revival.”

On the night of August 8, 1941, 12 of our DB-Z bombers, rising from the island of Saaremaa, flew to Berlin, dropped bombs on it and returned to base. The Germans announced that they were bombed by the British, but they mockingly reported that their planes were resting that night. Until September 4, Soviet aviation bombed Berlin more than ten times, dropping 311 tons of bombs on it.

The book “World War 1939-1945” published in Germany says: “The losses of German aviation were not as insignificant as some thought. In the first 14 days of fighting, even more aircraft were lost than in any of the subsequent periods of time. From June 22 to July 5, the German Air Force lost 807 aircraft of all types, and during the period from July 6 to July 19 - 477.” According to Soviet data, from June 22 to July 10, 752 enemy aircraft were shot down in air battles and 348 were destroyed at airfields, a total of 1,100. According to German data, in the first incomplete month of fighting, the Germans lost almost 1,300 aircraft, and losses since the beginning of the war were 31 December 1941 amounted to 3827 aircraft.

On July 22, 1941, German aircraft began night raids on Moscow, which lasted until November. A secret UNKVD report dated July 23, 1941 reported: “As a result of the raid... in Moscow and the region... bombs caused 1,141 fires, a significant part of which were extinguished in a timely manner.” On the approaches to the capital and in battles above it, 278 aircraft were shot down. By December 1, 1941, the number of German aircraft on the Eastern Front had decreased from 4,980 aircraft to 2,830. The same situation existed in tank units. V. Goncharov writes: “The most difficult thing for the Germans was the catastrophic loss of tanks... From June to November 1941, the Wehrmacht irretrievably lost 2,326 tanks (more than a third of the entire fleet) and about 800 armored vehicles.”

Churchill assessed the heroic struggle of the peoples of the USSR against fascism in this way: “When the hour of their trials struck on June 22, 1941, they turned out to be much stronger than Hitler imagined.” The American Shirer came to a significant conclusion: “One thing cannot be emphasized enough: no matter how terrible the Russian winter was and no matter how indisputable it is that the Soviet troops were better prepared for it than the Germans, the factor that determined the outcome of the battle was not the weather, but fierce resistance Soviet troops, their indomitable will not to give up."

David Glanz

The collapse of Plan Barbarossa. A thwarted blitzkrieg. Volume II

American military historian Colonel David Glantz explores the causes and consequences of the Battle of Smolensk, which was a series of military operations that unfolded in Central Russia in the area of ​​Smolensk. For more than two months, the troops of the Western, Central, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts of the Red Army fought with the forces of the German Army Group Center. This difficult confrontation ended in a strategic victory for the Red Army. Reproducing the events near Smolensk, Glanz uses exclusively documentary materials. In the course of the study, he comes to the conclusion that the damage inflicted on the Wehrmacht by the Red Army during the counter-offensive in this area was so significant that it determined and hastened the defeat of Germany at the gates of Moscow in December 1941. Which, in turn, contributed to the failure of the operation “ Barbarossa" and the eventual collapse of the Wehrmacht.

The narrative is illustrated by authentic German tactical maps. The appendix provides comprehensive information about the state of the Wehrmacht and Red Army troops.

David Glanz

The collapse of Plan Barbarossa. A thwarted blitzkrieg. Volume 2

© David M. Glantz 2011

© Translation, edition in Russian, ZAO Publishing House Tsentrpolygraf, 2015

© Artistic design, ZAO Publishing House Tsentrpoligraf, 2015

Preface

The study presented to the reader’s attention is devoted to the causes and consequences of the Battle of Smolensk - a series of military operations that unfolded in Central Russia in the Smolensk region from July 10 to September 10, 1941. If we approach this topic in general, then the fighting in this area took place for three weeks after Adolf Hitler's German Third Reich attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The goal of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, was to crush the Red Army, destroy the Soviet Union, overthrow Stalin's communist regime, and conquer most of the territory of the Soviet Union and the exploitation of the aforementioned territories by Nazi Germany. For more than two months in the Smolensk region, the forces of the Wehrmacht Army Group Center confronted the forces of the Western Front of the Red Army, as well as the Central, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts. In total, over 900 thousand soldiers and officers took part in the hostilities on the German side, operating with the support of about 2 thousand tanks, on the Soviet side - approximately 1.2 million soldiers and officers, supported by over 500 tanks.

In all the years that have passed since the end of World War II, most authors of numerous military memoirs and military historians have considered the Smolensk battle of July, August and early September 1941 as nothing more than episodic battles, a kind of “hole” on the generally smooth road of an offensive operation under codename "Barbarossa". On June 22, 1941, Hitler's Wehrmacht, on a broad front from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, began to implement this sinister plan. Using the time-tested strategy and tactics of blitzkrieg, or “blitzkrieg”, that is, the delivery of powerful attacks by tank groups (with air supremacy - Ed.), the invading German forces were able to defeat the Red Army units defending the western border areas within a few weeks Soviet Union and, having completed the defeat, began to delve into the vast strategic depths of the Soviet Union, moving in the northeastern and eastern directions. The Battle of Smolensk began on July 10, 1941, when the forces of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, having crossed the Western Dvina and Dnieper, in accordance with the Barbarossa plan, began delivering a lightning strike in the Smolensk direction. The Battle of Smolensk ended on September 10, 1941, when the 2nd Army and the 2nd Tank Army Group Center began an offensive in the southern direction, which ended with the encirclement and defeat of the Southwestern Front of the Red Army in the Kyiv region, one of the heaviest in the battle. history of the Red Army. And the Battle of Smolensk, on the contrary, means battles that lasted for more than two months, culminating in a victory (strategic - Ed.) of the Red Army in the Smolensk region.

This study of the war in Russia in the summer of 1941 is strictly documentary in nature. The author’s decision to resort to this method of presenting material is, first of all, dictated by the fact that for the first time after the end of the Soviet-German war he decided to use, figuratively speaking, “ground data control,” namely, tracking primary sources that record the course of the fighting of the parties , both in strategic and operational-tactical aspects. This study is also unique because most historians who dealt with the topic of the Soviet-German war, when studying the events of the mentioned war as a whole or its periods, for various reasons, did not have the opportunity to resort to the above method. The importance of this study can hardly be overestimated also because the fighting in the Smolensk direction in the summer of 1941 caused and still causes a lot of controversy. In particular, there is a heated debate about whether Adolf Hitler’s decision to suspend the advance of Army Group Center towards Moscow from early September to early October 1941 for the sake of defeating the Red Army forces concentrated in the Kiev direction was reasonable.

This study is based solely on documents also because the author sets himself the difficult task of refuting the popular opinion that the Battle of Smolensk is just an episode, albeit an unfortunate one, but insignificant in comparison with the lightning-fast advance of the Germans to Moscow. However, calling on new archival materials for help, this study, on the contrary, proves that the Battle of Smolensk was much more significant in scale than previously thought, that it seriously disrupted the plans of Army Group Center and ultimately contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the first sobering blow that was delivered by the Russians to Army Group Center at the gates of Moscow in early December 1941. Finally, the proposed study is documentary also because it restores a significant, albeit half-forgotten battle in the chronology of the war, that is, a large-scale counteroffensive The Red Army in September 1941 near Smolensk.

Because this study relies heavily on “ground control” data to describe combat operations, its conclusions, structure, and content are based on reliable primary source documents. This is an unvarnished narrative about the course and outcome of military operations near Smolensk, which is based on excerpts from directives, orders, reports and critical assessments of the headquarters of both participants in the battles.

In particular, the study includes documents ranging from the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) and Stavka (the Soviet Supreme High Command) and further to the headquarters of the front, armies and even divisions.

Since accuracy is an indisputable factor in the value of research, one of its volumes has been specially allocated by the author for the publication of documents translated with maximum accuracy in their complete form, cited in fragments in the remaining volumes. To facilitate use, when necessary, there are appropriate footnotes in the margins indicating the document number and the corresponding attachment. This is very important for two very serious reasons. First, word-for-word translation of documents is necessary to confirm the accuracy of the study content. Secondly, the structure and content of the mentioned directives, orders, reports and critical analyzes, as well as their language, present the reader with unique portraits of the commanders who compiled the above documents. In other words, the authenticity of the language, the laconicism and logic of the wording of documents, or, on the contrary, the lack of the listed signs, reflect the flexibility of the mind, the competence of the commanders (or the lack thereof), and also outline their inherent, although much less pronounced, but this does not make any difference. less important traits, such as selfishness, ruthlessness and their moral state for a given period.

It should also be mentioned that the extremely detailed account of the course of hostilities, occupying two volumes, which were later destined to become not only books for reading, but also material for serious study, required the inclusion of a fairly large amount of cartographic material, without which it is difficult to imagine active visual perception of the course of hostilities in the Battle of Smolensk in both strategic and operational-tactical aspects. Therefore, the author decided to include operational maps of different coverage in both volumes. But since the mentioned maps do not provide a sufficiently complete opportunity to reflect a number of tactical details, as well as explain the content of archival materials (placed in the form of excerpts and published in full in additions), in the author’s opinion, it was necessary to include a cartographic array of detailed daily maps German and Soviet command as a supplement to combat reports, orders and directives.

Taking into account the huge volume of new archival materials that formed the basis of this research, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the government of the Russian Federation, which provided me with access to the documents most important for the work on the research.

David M. Glanz
Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Introduction

In the context of events

Apparently, in the summer of 1941, Germany, led by its Fuhrer Adolf Hitler, simply decided to repeat the brilliant military exploits of the recent past, only this time attacking the mighty Soviet Union. Two years earlier, in September 1939, the fledgling German Wehrmacht had destroyed the Polish army in just a month, and as a result the country was cynically divided between Germany and the Soviet Union

Just six months later, in April 1940, the Wehrmacht occupied Denmark and Norway in a few days (in Norway the fighting continued until June 10 - Ed.), followed by a new success - the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg on May 10, and then To France. Once again the blitzkrieg proved the superiority of the Germans. The Wehrmacht, holding a deadly spear in its hand - tank and motorized forces and the terrifying Junkers-87 Stuka dive bombers - struck terror into the French and British, forcing the latter to hastily evacuate the remaining forces on the European continent through Dunkirk. The shocked world watched as German troops entered Paris and as the French government pleaded for an armistice after seven weeks of war. And in April 1941, only a small part of the German armed forces conquered Yugoslavia. And in just four days. A couple of weeks later, Greece also fell.

After Germany's defeats inflicted on Europe's largest and best-armed armies, Hitler's troops invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and few, if any, believed that the Red Army of the Soviet Union would survive an armed struggle against the Wehrmacht, which was stronger than them. , by all accounts, there was none in Europe. And in fact, when developing his Barbarossa plan, Hitler proceeded from the fact that the Soviet Union, led by the ruthless communist dictator Joseph Stalin, would inevitably collapse as soon as the Wehrmacht defeated the main groups of the Red Army concentrated in the western border regions of the Soviet Union, that is, on A 250–450-kilometer strip of territory between the western border of the Soviet Union and the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers.

Hitler considered his idea absolutely correct for three main reasons. Firstly, the Red Army showed itself extremely unsuccessfully during the so-called “winter war” with Finland in November 1939 - March 1940. Having survived the difficulties and frustration of plans in the first stage of this war, the Soviet Union still managed to achieve a limited victory in its second stages only at the cost of obvious numerical superiority. Secondly, after Stalin in the first half of the 1930s. concentrated in his hands essentially unlimited power as a result of bloody purges and the elimination of all his potential political opponents in 1937–1938. he also purged the Soviet armed forces, the highest command level officer corps, physically eliminating or throwing thousands, if not tens of thousands of officers into camps. As a result, the surviving and free officer cadres of the Red Army were appointed to command positions, for which they were often simply not suitable, and those who were suitable did not show initiative, fearing the fate of their comrades who died during the purges. Third, and this was the most important factor, Hitler reasoned as follows: if the Wehrmacht could advance 300 km in less than 30 days to defeat the Poles, 320 km in approximately seven weeks to defeat the armed forces of France and the Netherlands, and 200–300 km in about two weeks to crush Yugoslavia and Greece, then he will somehow defeat the Red Army, advancing 250–450 km to the Western Dvina and Dnieper in four, or at most five, weeks. Moreover, after this there would have been only 450 km left to the Stalinist capital, so Hitler had no doubt that his Wehrmacht would easily reach Moscow in three months, counting from the beginning of the German invasion, that is, around October, in other words, before the beginning of winter in Russia.

1 – Velikiye Luki; 2 – Daugavpils; 3 – Polotsk; 4 – Vitebsk; 5 – Orsha; 6 – Monastery; 7 – Borisov; 8 – Minsk; 9 – Mogilev; 10 – Gomel

And the one who bore the main responsibility for ensuring that Hitler did not miscalculate was Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, a very knowledgeable commander German group Army Center, the most powerful of the three army groups involved in Plan Barbarossa. Von Bock's Army Group, which included two of the four tank groups, was tasked with invading the Soviet Union from the territory of German-occupied Poland and, with a swift blow, crushing the opposing Red Army forces, moving east along the Western (Moscow) Axis, crushing the remaining forces along the way. Soviet troops, capturing Minsk and Smolensk, and after that reach the finish line - to the Soviet capital Moscow.

Launching a surprise attack on June 22, 1941, von Bock's Army Group soon greatly exceeded Hitler's expectations. During the first ten days of Operation Barbarossa, the forces of Army Group Center, led by the 3rd and 2nd Panzer Groups, managed to cut, encircle and defeat three Soviet armies, the 3rd, 4th and 10th (as well as part of the 13th th Army. - Ed.), thereby scattering or capturing over half a million soldiers and officers of the Red Army and capturing the capital of Belarus, Minsk (fell on June 28). After this, in just a week, German tank forces - numerous motorized corps of tank groups - reached the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, advancing on a broad front from Polotsk in the north to Rogachev in the south. By July 7, the main task set by Hitler was completed in just over two weeks (see map 1). Not at all embarrassed by the collision with the new forces of the Red Army at the border of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, Army Group Center moved uncontrollably in an eastern direction, crossing two large water barriers along the way, putting to flight five Soviet armies (16, 19, 20, 21 and 22) and captured the city of Smolensk, after which it surrounded three more enemy armies (16, 19 and 20) north of the city. Having captured Smolensk on July 16, von Bock's forces advanced approximately 500 km in 25 days of fighting, breaking all records of rapid advance set by the Wehrmacht during the campaigns in Europe (see Map 2). And up to main goal operation - Moscow - thus only 300 km remained. That is, based on the previous rate of advance - 20 km per day and 140 km per week, taking into account pauses for rest, equipment repairs and replenishment of supplies, von Bock was separated from Moscow by 2-3 weeks.

1 – Vitebsk; 2 – Spirituality; 3 – Smolensk; 4 – Yelnya; 5 – Orsha; 6 – Pochinok; 7 – Spaso-Demensk; 8 – Roslavl; 9 – Bryansk

Although von Bock was forced to pause Army Group Center's advance on Moscow for about two weeks to crush the three Soviet armies encircled around Smolensk, his forces were able to capitalize on the pause by attacking and defeating large Red Army forces. armies that threatened Army Group Center on the northern and southern flanks. Even during the planning of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler drew the attention of his commanders to the fact that these successful actions of Army Group Center on the flanks were the key to the further success of the operation. In accordance with the Fuehrer's directives, approximately half of the infantry forces of Field Marshal Günther von Kluge's 4th "Panzer" Army and Colonel General Adolf Strauss's 9th Army, reinforced by four tank and motorized divisions, were reduced between July 16 and August 6, 1941. encirclement ring near Smolensk. At the same time, most of Colonel-General Hermann Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group and Colonel-General Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group provided an "external encirclement line" northeast and southeast of Smolensk to contain Soviet forces from the outside. The remaining forces of Hoth and Guderian continued to narrow the encirclement. Ultimately, the battles along the "outer encirclement line" involved nine of Hoth's and Guderian's armored and motorized divisions, which were opposed by the five small, hastily assembled Soviet armies (29th, 30th, 19th, 24th and 28th) that GHQ and Western Front command deployed along Army Group Center, deciding to create the so-called eastern front northeast and east of Smolensk, as well as southeast of Yelnya.

While fierce fighting raged along the “outer encirclement line,” attempts were made to envelop the northern and southern flanks of Army Group Center. In the northern sector, approximately half of Strauss's 9th Army, supported by one panzer and one motorized division from Panzergruppe Hotha, defended the group's northern flank, capturing the Nevel area. In the southern sector, Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs's 2nd Army, supported by two tank and one motorized divisions from Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, managed to push Soviet forces away from the southern flank of Army Group Center to the area of ​​Rogachev and Zhlobin and to the Sozh River. And in the first week of August, Guderian's tanks and motorized infantry struck Soviet forces north from Roslavl and began to advance towards Smolensk. In just six days, Guderian's forces managed to encircle and destroy the bulk of the seven divisions of the group of forces under the command of Kachalov. The relatively easy victories of Strauss and Guderian on the northern and southern flanks of Army Group Center did not surprise Hitler at all (see map 3). In fact, when developing a strategy for the war in the East, the Fuhrer always emphasized swift and effective strikes on the flanks, preferring them, in his opinion, to bloody frontal battles with the forces of the Red Army along the Moscow Axis.

1 – Vitebsk; 2 – Dorogobuzh; 3 – Smolensk; 4 – Mosalsk; 5 – Lyudinovo; 6 – Mogilev; 7 – Chausy; 8 – Bryansk; 9 – Novozybkov

Thus, by the end of the first week of August, Hitler, his OKW, his OKH, and Field Marshal von Bock had every reason to be proud of Army Group Center's victories. it during the first month and a half of the war in Russia, during Operation Barbarossa. In a fantastically short period after brilliant victories in the border areas, von Bock's Army Group Center destroyed the forces of the second echelon of the Red Army at the Western Dvina and Dnieper, captured Smolensk, long considered the eastern gate of Moscow, resulting in the Western Front of the Red Army under the command of the Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Tymoshenko lost over 600 thousand soldiers and officers killed, wounded, missing or captured.

Celebrating this truly “Feat of Hercules,” Hitler himself, most of his generals and German soldiers did not expect anything other than an early German victory based on blitzkrieg tactics and the continuation of the triumphal march of German troops to Moscow.

Despite the Wehrmacht's victories in the sector of Army Group Center in the first month and a half of the war, individual events indicated that future victories would not be so easy. The most important sign was the collapse of Hitler's calculations that the Soviet Union would inevitably fall after the Wehrmacht destroyed most of the Red Army west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper. By July 10, this assumption turned out to be completely wrong. Although von Bock's army group defeated three of the four field armies of the Soviet Western Front (3rd, 4th and 10th) by the end of June, but, having reached the above two rivers on July 7, von Bock suddenly discovered five more Soviet armies (16th, 19th , 20, 21 and 22), who nevertheless showed him, albeit insufficient, but still stubborn resistance. Four weeks later, after the encirclement and almost complete defeat of three of these five armies (16th, 19th and 20th) at Smolensk on August 6, von Bock was clearly perplexed to find five more out-of-nowhere Soviet armies at the front of his army group (24 , 28, 29, 30th and Yartsev group), which, like a phoenix from the ashes, emerged from the rear of the Red Army and united with the so far intact 13th, 21st and 22nd armies. In addition, another surprise awaited him: having somehow escaped the attention of German intelligence, several more armies were being formed in the deep rear of the USSR (31st, 33rd and 43rd). The Germans were firmly convinced that the Russians were finished after the battles on the outskirts of Smolensk, but in fact, such appearances of fresh Russian forces as if out of nowhere would haunt the Germans until the very end of 1941.

The second indicator that alarmed the German generals back in early August was the conclusion that the war in the East differed significantly from previous wars on the Western Front in several ways. important aspects. First of all, the battles of the first six weeks of the war demonstrated that the “eastern kilometers” look completely different from the “western ones”. A very poorly developed road network, coupled with a wider railway gauge, made offensive operations extremely difficult.

After the rains, the dirt roads turned into impassable mud, and the difference in the width of the railway gauge forced the Wehrmacht to change it to the European standard as it moved eastward. A headache for the German supply units, along with the need to restore blown up bridges, was the constant interruption of military supplies for German troops moving east. The situation described most strongly affected the tank and motorized units and formations of both tank groups of von Bock, which, according to the generally accepted blitzkrieg tactics, were far removed from the infantry and other formations of Army Group Center. Simply put, the acute shortage of fuel hit the combat readiness of the forces deeply wedged into enemy territory. And finally, although this could hardly serve as a serious reason for limiting the combat effectiveness and maneuverability of the Wehrmacht at least until October 1941, the Russian climate with its sharp seasonal temperature changes also aggravated the interruptions in troop supply.

In operational terms and to a lesser extent in tactical terms, due to all the difficulties described above with the supply of troops, the Wehrmacht was still unable to constantly maintain the frantic pace of the blitzkrieg in such a vast theater of military operations, which was also distinguished by the almost complete absence of appropriate infrastructure. As a result, reality cast doubt on another key German forecast regarding the successful operational prospects of Operation Barbarossa, which was based precisely on the lightning war that had proven itself superbly on the Western Front. The result is a clear lack of easy and quick victories in the East. And when the Germans finally became convinced of this around mid-July, the Wehrmacht was actually forced to switch to a certain “special way” of conducting all offensive operations - first a powerful leap forward, then long periods of rest, repair of equipment and recuperation.

The third indicator - the Germans' assessment of the Red Army itself, its commanders and rank and file also turned out to be untenable, which caused them a lot of problems in the future. In this regard, the Germans were based on the impressions and experience of past years, the actions of the Red Army in Poland in September 1939 and in Finland from the end of November 1939 to March 1940. It was then that the Germans formed the opinion that the Red Army would never cannot withstand either tank attacks or dive bomber raids, and cannot withstand battles with battle-tested German soldiers. And although this opinion was partly based on objective analysis, it was mainly based on the dogmas of Nazi ideology about “inferior peoples” who were not capable of raising and training real officers and commanders, not inferior to the German ones. The aforementioned assessment was capped by another idea: they say that the Red Army, its officers and soldiers, and perhaps even entire categories of the population of the Soviet Union (Belarusians, Ukrainians and other nationalities, especially the peoples of the Caucasus region) hate both Stalin and the communist system itself. Therefore, the Germans reasoned, at any favorable opportunity, these officers and soldiers would lay down their arms, surrender, or simply disappear, lost in the endless expanses of Russia.

By early August, however, these assumptions turned out to be completely unfounded. Although the soldiers of the Red Army actually surrendered or deserted in the hundreds (which cannot be said about the officers), tens and even hundreds of thousands fought heroically, showing miracles of courage, often sacrificing their lives in battle. And I must say, this to a large extent cooled the ardor of many Wehrmacht soldiers and officers, depriving them of the illusion of a quick, bloodless and easy victory in Russia.

However, despite all the difficulties experienced by the Germans, the political leadership and military command of the Soviet Union, officers and soldiers of the Red Army in July and early August 1941 were subjected to unprecedented tests, they were faced with terrifying, seemingly insoluble problems. The period from the end of June, all of July and the beginning of August was marked by successive catastrophes, unprecedented crises for the Red Army. And the most serious of the problems, which subsequently required colossal efforts to make up for them, was the loss of officer corps, which led to its reduction to one third of the peacetime officer staff and occurred in just the first month and a half of the war. Overall it's probably we're talking about about the losses of at least 1.5 million soldiers and officers - a figure that steadily increased and eventually reached almost 3 million people by the end of August 1941. Since the fierce fighting throughout this period increasingly deprived the Red Army of its best and most trained soldiers, they They were replaced by unfired and very superficially trained reservists and conscripts from all over the Soviet Union. In the current situation, the high command of the Red Army was faced with the need to begin intensive training of young officers and soldiers, and they had to be trained directly on the battlefield, in battles with heavily armed enemy soldiers who had accumulated combat experience in Europe. The astonishingly long list of destroyed or almost destroyed Soviet armies, at least to some extent compensated by new reinforcements, served as proof of the current catastrophic situation.

The situation was further aggravated by the fact that a significant part of the Red Army officers were “political commissars,” that is, purely ideological, but not command cadres, many of whom, including representatives of the generals, survived the purges of the late 1930s. and were forced to take command of units and formations, having neither the appropriate skills nor education, and even under the conditions of the “lightning war” tactics and strategy imposed by the Germans. As a result, after what they experienced in the 30s. Stalin's purges several years before the war, the command of the Red Army in 1941 underwent another “purge” - a “purge by fire” during the first six weeks of the war. This purely Darwinian process of “natural selection”, that is, the mastery of the science of combat on the battlefield, was fraught with the death of both themselves and their subordinates - ordinary soldiers forced to carry out their orders, which were not always reasonable and justified by military necessity. And on the contrary, what is most surprising, the battles in July and early August also demonstrated that among the large officer corps of the Red Army, extremely heterogeneous in composition, there were still those who were able to prove command skills in a combat situation and in As a result, he understood how to destroy the enemy and, at the same time, survive himself. There were many of these among the high command. Therefore, in addition to the outstanding commander Zhukov and others, such as Timoshenko, Konev, Rokossovsky, Kurochkin and Pliev, there were other generals who survived the July-August meat grinder and in the future led their fronts, armies and corps to victory. Konev and Rokossovsky, the most notable of the survivors at that time, led some of the most important fronts of the Red Army - the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Belorussian fronts, which were ultimately destined to victoriously complete the Berlin operation in April - May 1945.