The Battle of Tsushima - briefly. Tsushima tragedy

-The situation from the point of view of Admiral Rozhdestvensky could be characterized as follows:

-the goal of the operation is the speedy arrival of the squadron in Vladivostok;-squadron losses should be kept to a minimum

-a fight with the Japanese fleet is undesirable;

the personnel of the squadron, after a continuous seven-month voyage in conditions “close to combat”, are in a state of extreme fatigue, the ships require repairs;

The squadron's combat training is insufficient:

-The Russian squadron surpasses the enemy squadron in the number of battleships, the total number of ships in the battle line is the same;

The Russian squadron is significantly inferior to the enemy in terms of light forces.

It follows that if engagement with the Japanese fleet is inevitable, it is advisable to take it as far as possible from Japanese naval bases in order to deny the enemy the opportunity to use the reserve, as well as a clear advantage in the auxiliary forces of the fleet.

Consequently, the squadron must bypass Japan from the east and break through to Vladivostok through the Kuril Straits, or, in extreme cases, through the Strait of La Peruse. Even the route through the Sangar Strait has to be considered unacceptable. The option with the Korean Strait is not subject to consideration at all.

-Nevertheless, just such a decision was made, and, probably, there were some reasons for this? Before looking for them, it is worth considering the operational situation from Admiral Togo's point of view:

-the long-sown seeds of rivalry between the army and navy, Togo’s clearly realized priority for the speedy development of the fleet for the Island Empire, all this leads him to the idea that the fleet must make a decisive contribution to the achievement of this victorious world; therefore the fleet must defeat the 2nd Pacific Squadron-a victory so loud that Russia, under the influence of psychological shock, immediately went to peace negotiations; a victory so impressive that the country’s top leadership has no doubt about the fleet’s decisive contribution to the won war; So, a conclusion that is not entirely consistent with the classic description of the Russian-Japanese war at sea: Rozhdestvensky was quite happy with a draw, He only needed a victory:

-the experience of fighting the 1st Pacific Squadron did not give Togo any reason to consider the combat training of Russian sailors to be insufficient; Rozhdestvensky’s authority as an artilleryman was quite high in naval circles: as for the disappointing results of the 2nd squadron’s firing off Madagascar, it is doubtful that Togo even knew about it (and if he did, he should have considered this information as misinformation); Russian artillery has always aroused the respect of its opponents: Russian armor-piercing shells were rightly considered the best in the world; Of course, Togo did not know about the “high humidity of pyroxylin” on Rozhestvensky Togo’s ships (and even now we do not have the slightest reason to believe that the percentage of unexploded Russian armor-piercing shells in the Tsushima battle was abnormally high).

In other words, Togo should have planned a victorious battle against a squadron that was comparable in its combat capabilities to his fleet. A decisive victory in such a situation is possible only if you manage to use all your combat capabilities and prevent the enemy from doing so. At the same time, it is extremely desirable to impose battle on the enemy before the 2nd squadron arrives in Vladivostok.

But how to intercept a squadron that has at least 4 possible routes? What could Togo do in this situation?

Possible actions: a) concentrate the squadron in the place where the enemy is likely to appear, 6) break the squadron into combat detachments, blocking all possible routes to Vladivostok, c) concentrate the squadron in the “center of the position”, with the help of auxiliary ships and reconnaissance ships, discover the route of the Russians and intercept them. The second option is unprofessional and should not be considered. The third one is actually unreal.

May on the Pacific coast of Japan is characterized by unstable weather with rain and fog. There is little hope that auxiliary vessels in such conditions will find the enemy in a timely manner (moreover, the main forces, and not some “Ural”, strenuously pretending to be an entire squadron). Difference in travel -5 knots - essential in a squadron battle, but it might not be enough to intercept. Even most likely it would not be enough.

In any case, Togo did not take this option, which was so tempting for the overwhelming majority of naval commanders. The only option left is a) - initially concentrate the fleet where the enemy will go. And pray that he goes there. But where? Sangarsky, Laperuzov, Kuril Straits-approximately equally likely (from Togo's point of view). But it’s very inconvenient to “catch” ships there-first of all, based on weather conditions, and secondly, because due to the same weather conditions, only the core of the fleet can take part in the operation: neither old destroyers, nor auxiliary cruisers, nor, finally, "Fuso" with "Chin" “Ien” cannot be dragged into the Kuril Straits.

The Tsushima Strait stands out in terms of probability (though in that it is - smallest).

At the same time, from all other points of view, the strait is ideal: it is located near the main base of the fleet (that is, all ships, even the most outdated and unseaworthy, can be used), it is wide, provides opportunities for squadron maneuver, and has relatively tolerable weather. If the Russian squadron comes here - all odds are on the side of the Japanese. If not, from the point of view of the interests of the fleet and the Empire, it is better to “negligently” let the enemy squadron into the base (and then begin blockade operations in a new circle), rather than demonstrate to the whole world the inability of the fleet to intercept and defeat the enemy. There is a difference between: “Well, we missed it...” and “We tried, but couldn’t.”

Quite

-it is likely that this is why the Japanese fleet is concentrating for operations in the Korea Strait.-directly on the approach to Vladivostok; the last option seems to be the most realistic; thus, the chances of meeting a Japanese squadron are approximately equal for any choice of route (here it is important to understand that Rozhestvensky, being a Russian, considered this war to be a continuous chain of mistakes and failures of Russian weapons; he was not able to understand the gravity of Japan’s situation and all the necessity for it resounding naval victory: therefore, he erroneously assumed that Togo would be enough to have a draw).

-any route other than the route through the Korean Strait will require additional coal loading, moreover, at sea, and extra days of travel; Taking into account the fact that both the crews and the officers are tired of being at sea for a long time, any delay in arriving at the base will be perceived extremely negatively by people and will probably be interpreted as the cowardice of the commander.

Surely it would be so. Nebogatov, whose relations with the personnel were normal, could, without causing acute discontent, send a squadron around Japan.

The image that Rozhdestvensky created for himself required him to lead the squadron to Vladivostok by the shortest route. But this analysis can be continued. Sending a squadron clearly inadequate for its tasks to the Pacific theater of operations, the Admiralty was obliged to put at its head an admiral of the Z.P. style. Rozhestvensky. In other words, the movement through the Korean Strait was predetermined back in October 1904

years in St. Petersburg. If Togo knew the personality traits of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, he could assess the psychological state in which the squadron would enter the Pacific Ocean. In this case, it would be much easier for him to make a decision to deploy the entire fleet in the Korea Strait...

Tsushima: analysis against myths

V. Kofman

There is still great interest in this battle, which is not surprising since Tsushima occupies a prominent place in naval history. The only general battle of the heyday of the pre-dreadnought armored fleet, due to its decisiveness and results, attracts the attention of many writers and researchers. Foreign experts believe that in terms of the amount of literature devoted to it, the battle in the Korea Strait ranks second after the Battle of Jutland.

However, quantity does not always provide sufficient quality, and the story of Tsushima is a prime example. There are quite objective circumstances for this. Naturally, the bulk of the literature on any battle is supplied by the former opponents themselves: often only they have access to eyewitness accounts, official reports, etc. Of course, “interested parties” are rarely completely objective, but the situation that developed with the Russo-Japanese War is truly unique.

Both participants in the battle were least interested in establishing the truth. The Japanese spent the entire war under a veil of secrecy and did not want anyone to take advantage of their experience, even their closest allies, the British. The Russian side did no better, indulging in unbridled criticism of everything that was connected with the fleet - people, ships, artillery... The most interesting materials were collected by British observers who were with the Togo squadron, who personally observed the battle and had access to Japanese materials. But the report of the English naval attaché Pakinham was never published in the open press, remaining in the possession of narrow circles of the Admiralty 1 . The works of French and German historians, often interesting in their conclusions, are purely secondary in their source materials. The current situation has led to the fact that a very narrow range of literature is usually used as initial factual material.

First of all, this is the official Japanese and Russian history of the war at sea. "Description of Naval Operations in 37-38 Meiji" is an excellent example of the Japanese approach to history. The book apparently does not contain any deliberate distortions. It contains absolutely unique material characterizing all the movements of the Japanese fleet before, during and after the battle, one glance at which evokes great respect for the activity of the fleet of the “land of the rising sun” and the intensity of the use of its ships. But it is futile to try to find in this four-volume edition even traces of an analysis of military operations. The description of the Tsushima battle itself is very laconic.

The domestic official history of actions at sea in the Russian-Japanese War, published for almost 10 years, by the time the volumes dedicated to the campaign of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron and the battle in the Korean Strait appeared, had finally “exhausted.” The description of the battle is quite superficial, there is no analysis of the actions of the parties, and all information related to the enemy is simply rewritten from Japanese “descriptions of military operations...” - in large blocks and without commentary. In general, in Russian official history there is a noticeable desire to pass this dark page as quickly as possible, without going into unnecessary details and reflections.

Of the “unofficial” works, the main place is occupied by 3 books: “Tsushima” by A.S. Novikov-Priboy, “On the Eagle” in Tsushima by V.P. Kostenko and “The Battle of Tsushima” from the “Reckoning” trilogy by Captain 2nd Rank Semenov. The documentary novel of the former battalion "Eagle" became a book for millions. The fate of more than one future naval historian was determined in childhood, after reading Tsushima. But in terms of the selection of material, Novikov-Priboy’s book is very secondary and is essentially a fictionalized compilation of well-known memoirs, the main place among which is occupied by the memoirs of V.P. Kostenko.

“On the Eagle in Tsushima” is the most interesting of this “trinity” of unofficial sources. Kostenko was one of the few “pure observers” on the Russian side and, perhaps, the only one who was fully qualified. But one should not overestimate the reliability of his description of the battle itself, and in particular the damage to the Eagle. He is still a very young man and by no means an artillery specialist. For obvious reasons, he made many mistakes in assessing the effect of enemy shells when he first got into battle, and what a battle!

Finally, the “official historian” of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Captain 2nd Rank Semenov, turned out to be a much more emotional witness than the naval engineer Kostenko. In "Reckoning" there are a lot of exclamations, a fair amount of reasoning, but very few facts. Usually presented as a “lawyer” for his patron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, Semenov did not cope with his task very well.

Only recently have several works appeared devoted to the analysis of the Tsushima battle, but, alas, abroad. They more fully reflect the actions of the Japanese squadron, but foreign authors encountered certain difficulties in selecting facts about the actions of the Russians, which is not surprising. The most interesting is their approach to the defeat of Rozhdestvensky - much softer and more sympathetic than in Russian literature.

Indeed, with the light hand of “critics of the autocracy,” the history of Tsushima will always be presented in an exceptionally gloomy and purely accusatory spirit. Depending on the direction of thought of the authors, and sometimes the “social order”, everyone was in the “dock”: the state leadership of Russia, the squadron commander, his officers, especially the artillerymen, and the inanimate participants of Tsushima - Russian guns, shells and ships.

Let's try to sequentially consider all the numerous “reasons”, real and imaginary, that led the Russian squadron to the bottom of the Korean Strait - after an almost round-the-world voyage of many months.

Strategy

The doom of the campaign of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron is completely obvious. However, before once again blaming the Russian leadership for the misfortunes of this war, it is necessary to remember all the strategic realities. The confrontation between Russia and Japan in the Far East turned out to be largely a “maritime affair.” The Mikado troops that landed in Korea and Manchuria were completely dependent on the reliability of sea communications with the mother country. And the landing itself could hardly have taken place with the dominance of the Russian fleet, and simply with more active actions of the Port Arthur squadron. But even when “the train had already left” and the expeditionary force moved across the expanses of Manchuria - towards Port Arthur and towards the main forces of the Russian army, the capture of its supply route could have influenced the entire course of the war. Therefore, the decision to send Rozhdestvensky’s forces (initially including only new battleships and cruisers) to the aid of the 1st Pacific Squadron blocked at its base was not only not senseless, but also perhaps the only active step. Having united, the Russian ships would have had a very noticeable superiority over the Japanese, which would partly compensate for the inconvenience of the strategic position.

And the inconvenience was truly monstrous. The two Russian bases, Vladivostok and Port Arthur, were separated by 1,045 miles. In reality, the fleet could only be based at one of these points. But Port Arthur is “locked” in the depths of the Gulf of Pechili, and Vladivostok freezes for 3.5 months a year. The repair capabilities of both ports cost each other, namely, they were practically non-existent. In such conditions, only a large advantage in strength gave a chance for active action and success.

As soon as Port Arthur fell and the ships of the 1st squadron were killed, the strategic position of the Russian naval forces in the Far East became hopeless. All momentum was lost. The constant delays of Rozhdestvensky's squadron led to the fact that the Japanese ships repaired all the damage, and the Russians gradually lost their combat effectiveness in the grueling tropical voyage. In such a situation, a bold strategic and political decision was required, but... there was none. The Russian government and naval command found themselves in a peculiar situation called “zugzwang” in chess - a forced sequence of moves. Indeed, recalling the 2nd Pacific Squadron halfway through meant not only admitting its military weakness, but also suffering a major political defeat, and most importantly, completely abandoning the attempt to quickly win the war by cutting off Japan's communications with Korea. But continuing the campaign just as consistently led to loss. Even if Rozhestvensky’s ships managed to safely pass the Tsushima trap, their future would look hopeless. It would have been almost impossible to operate from Vladivostok, far from Japanese communications, as part of a squadron. One or two patrol cruisers of the Japanese fleet were enough to warn Togo in time about the Russians’ exit. In addition, Vladivostok was easily blocked by mines, so the only thing Rozhdestvensky, who arrived safely there, could have done was to choose another day and another place to fight the Japanese fleet.

It has been repeatedly suggested that the commander of the Russian squadron could have “outflanked” the Japanese forces by trying to penetrate Vladivostok not directly through the Korea Strait, but by passing along the eastern coast of Japan, through the Sangar Strait or the La Perouse Strait.

The far-fetched nature of such reasoning is completely obvious. The actual cruising range of Russian battleships (taking into account the amount of coal and the state of the engine teams) was approximately 2500 miles (according to V.P. Kostenko). This means that it would require more than one loading of coal on the open sea, and not in the gentle tropical latitudes, but in the cold spring Pacific Ocean. In addition, such a large and slow squadron along the entire coast of Japan had practically no chance of passing unnoticed. The voyages of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment show how intense shipping was off its eastern coast. And for the full disclosure of such an adventure, one neutral steamer was enough, which could neither be sunk nor forced to remain silent. Togo could calculate further “moves” with great accuracy, and as a result, the Russian squadron would have been forced to take the battle in completely unfavorable conditions in the northern latitudes, with a high probability of taking the battle during a coal overload or insufficient supply.

Considerable difficulties would also arise when trying to pass through the northern straits. The 3 cruisers of the Vladivostok squadron spent unpleasant days when they could not enter the La Perouse Strait due to thick fog. In the end, Rear Admiral Jessen was forced to decide to go to the Sangar Strait. The Russian cruisers nevertheless reached Vladivostok safely with the last remaining fuel. It’s not hard to imagine what would have happened to Rozhdestvensky’s huge, clumsy squadron in a similar attempt! It is quite possible that some of its ships would have suffered the fate of the Bogatyr, which ran aground, but not near its shores, but right in the “lair of the Japanese tiger.” At the very least, one could expect a complete breakdown of the squadron.

If we assume the almost incredible thing that the Russian squadron made its way unnoticed along the entire length of Japan, then the passage through any of the straits could not remain secret. But even if Rozhdestvensky had successfully crossed La Perouse or the Sangar Strait, this would by no means save him from the battle. With a very likely early detection, Heihachiro Togo's fleet would have been waiting for him somewhere at the exit of one of the straits. The too low cruising speed of the Russian squadron doomed it to interception by the Japanese long before Vladivostok (the distance from Vladivostok to the La Perouse Strait is 500 miles, to the Sangar Strait - 400 miles, to the Togo anchorage at the southern tip of Korea or to Sasebo - 550 miles: cruising speed of Rozhdestvensky's ships - 8-9 knots, Japanese United Fleet - at least 10-12 knots). Of course, the battle would have taken place much closer to the Russian base, and small Japanese destroyers might not have been able to take part in it, but on the way to such a dubious successful outcome there were many pitfalls - literally and figuratively! Finally, as noted above, even the safe arrival of the squadron in Vladivostok did little to achieve success in the war. A rare and revealing case of strategic hopelessness!

Tactics

If the strategic failures of the 2nd Pacific Squadron’s campaign are usually attributed to the shapeless, poorly functioning “military and political machine of tsarism,” then the responsibility for the tactical decision of the Battle of Tsushima certainly lies with the commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Admiral Zinoviy Petrovich Rozhestvensky. There are more than enough reproaches against him. If we briefly summarize them, we can highlight the following main directions of the “possible cause” of the tactical defeat of Russian forces:

1) Rozhdestvensky chose the wrong time to pass through the Korean Strait, since the Russian squadron found itself at its narrowest point in the middle of the day; The order “not to interfere with Japanese negotiations” is also criticized.

2) To build the squadron, he chose the extremely inflexible and clumsy formation of a single wake column, without separating the 4 newest battleships and the Oslyabya into a separate detachment.

3) Rozhdestvensky’s orders for battle are minimal. He completely shackled the activity of the junior flagships and did not let anyone in on his plans - after the failure of the Suvorov and the injury of the commander, the Russian squadron was not under control.

4) The Russian commander missed the decisive moment in the very beginning of the battle, not “throwing himself” at the double formation of Japanese ships during the risky turn of Togo and generally behaved extremely passively.

It is not difficult to parry the first of the reproaches. It is unlikely that Rozhdestvensky, like any other sensible sailor, could count on the fact that his “armada” would be able to pass through the narrow strait undetected - day or night. If he had chosen the dark time of day to force the narrowness, he would still have been discovered by two Japanese patrol lines pushed forward and would have been attacked at night by destroyers. In this case, the artillery battle would have taken place the next morning, but the forces of the Russian squadron could have been weakened by one or more torpedo hits by this time. Obviously, the Japanese were counting on precisely this course of action of the Russian admiral, since he almost managed to deceive them. Both patrol lines of Japanese auxiliary cruisers were passed just in the dark, and if not for the more or less accidental discovery of the hospital Eagle carrying all the distinctive lights, Rozhdestvensky could have safely passed them. This arrangement of patrols was subsequently harshly criticized by the famous English naval historian Julian Corbett. However, this would not have allowed the Russian squadron to avoid morning detection by light cruisers of the third line, but perhaps it would have somewhat delayed the start of the battle, which would have taken place in the evening, followed by a completely life-saving night...

There is a second consideration, closely related to two other reproaches against Rozhdestvensky. And the reluctance to pass through a dangerous place at night, and the “primitive” formation in battle, and the extreme simplicity of the orders (which boiled down to indicating the course - NO-23 and the order to follow the maneuvers of the lead ship in a column) - all had their origin in the poor maneuverability training of the Russian squadron and bitter lessons battle in the Yellow Sea. The admiral had no doubt that it would be difficult for him to reassemble his ships scattered during the torpedo attacks in the morning, and he was absolutely right, as shown by the fate of the cruisers of the Enquist detachment, which safely lost the Russian squadron after the battle, although thereby avoiding the tragic fate of the remaining Russian ships. Any ambiguity in the order could lead to the same confusion that befell the 1st squadron after the death of its commander Vitgeft in the battle in the Yellow Sea. The order to follow the lead ship on the specified course is extremely clear: it is difficult to violate it without compelling reasons and the risk of being prosecuted for non-compliance. Indeed, given the results of the battles of the Arthurian squadron, it is difficult to blame Rozhdestvensky, who considered the disorder in command a more terrible enemy than the Japanese.

The most serious disagreements exist in assessing the tactical position and maneuvering of the enemy fleets in the first minutes of the Tsushima battle. According to some historians, Togo himself put himself in a hopeless position, and as a result of the cunning “deception” of Rozhdestvensky, who only had to reach out and pluck the fruits of victory. Others furiously criticize the Russian admiral for unnecessary changes at the critical moment of the beginning of the battle. To make the right decision, you must be guided by the facts. Below is a brief timeline of Tsushima describing the most important maneuvers and events of the artillery battle.

5 hours of battle

The deployment of the Japanese squadron was simple and effective. Having received the first message about the discovery of a Russian squadron at about 5.00, Togo went to sea 2 hours later (at 7.10 am). By noon he crossed the Korean Strait from west to east and calmly awaited the enemy.

Rozhdestvensky obviously tried to outwit his opponent through several successive tactical changes. At night and early in the morning he sailed in close formation of two wake columns with auxiliary vessels between them, and at 9.30 he rebuilt the battleships into one column. Around noon, the Russian admiral made a second maneuver, ordering the 1st armored detachment to turn “sequentially” to the right by 8 points (at a right angle), and then another 8 points to the left. Confusion arose: "Alexander III" turned behind the flagship "consistently", and the next one in the ranks, "Borodino", began to turn "all of a sudden". The final verdict has not yet been made - which of them was wrong. Rozhdestvensky himself subsequently explained his plan as an attempt to line up the 4 most powerful ships in the front line by turning “all of a sudden.” However, there are many other explanations not for this supposed, but actually carried out maneuver (the most complete and elegant justification for Rozhdestvensky’s possible “tactical game” can be found in the article by V. Chistyakov). One way or another, the Russian squadron found itself in the formation of two columns, lined up with a ledge - the right one slightly ahead of the left. At about 2:40 p.m., the Japanese fleet appeared far ahead and to the right. It is interesting that both Russian reconstructions - from two columns to one, then again to two - remained unknown to Togo. Poor visibility and poor radio communications were the reason that the last information that the Japanese commander had about the Russian system was early in the morning. So the statements of observers on the Japanese side are quite understandable, indicating that the Russians are building as two parallel wake columns. It was in this formation that Rozhestvensky’s squadron marched early in the morning, and it was in this formation that it was expected to be seen.

Far ahead, Togo crossed the course of the Russian squadron from east to west and went on a counter course to cross the left, weakest Russian column. There is an opinion that he wanted to attack it, quickly defeat it, and then deal with the main forces of the enemy - 4 new battleships. This is hardly true: the entire course of the Tsushima battle shows that the Japanese admiral concentrated his fire on the most powerful Russian ships, quite rightly believing that only they could have a real influence on the course of the battle, and believing that the “old men” would not go anywhere anyway . In addition, an attack on a collision course could not have been included in Togo’s plans. Before his eyes stood the ghost of a battle in the Yellow Sea, when, having separated from the 1st Pacific Squadron on a counter course, the Japanese had to catch up with the enemy for 4 hours, losing almost the entire remainder of the daylight hours. The transition to the other side can be explained by a completely different reason, which for some reason the Tsushima researchers forget about. The fact is that the weather conditions on the fateful day of May 14 were bad: a strong southwest wind (5-7 points) created quite large waves and powerful fountains of spray. Under these conditions, the casemate system for arranging auxiliary artillery on Japanese battleships and armored cruisers became a significant drawback. Shooting from the casemates of the lower tier, where half of the Japanese 6-inch guns were located, which, as will be seen later, played a very important role, was difficult. In slightly worse conditions, the English armored cruisers Good Hope and Monmouth, “sisters” of Japanese ships of the same class, in the battle at Coronel could not fire at all from the guns of the lower casemates.

By moving to the western side of the Russian column, Togo gained an additional tactical advantage. Now the Russian ships were forced to fire against the wind and waves. 2

The deployment of forces was approaching a decisive moment. At about 1:50 p.m., Rozhdestvensky ordered a changeover - back into formation of one wake column. To quickly carry out the maneuver, the 1st armored detachment did not have enough superiority in speed and the distance between it and the 2nd detachment. There are many assessments of the “quality” of the latest change in the Russian formation - from one that completely ruined the beginning of the battle to one that was almost clearly carried out. It is only obvious that, to one degree or another, this maneuver prevented the alignment of the column of 12 armored ships. But at that time Togo was also engaged in, at first glance, very strange maneuvering exercises.

Ten minutes later (at 14.02), the detachments of Togo and Kamimura, maneuvering separately, but walking one after the other with a slight gap, having reached approximately abeam the head of the Russian column, began to turn “sequentially” to the left, almost on the opposite course, being less than 50 cables away from the Russian squadrons. Indeed, this maneuver looks very risky. However, Togo could rely on the same experience of the battle in the Yellow Sea, believing that Russian guns were unlikely to be able to inflict significant damage on his battleships in the 15 minutes that he needed for Kamimura’s last cruiser to set a new course. But the successful execution of such a maneuver promised many tactical advantages. The Japanese approached the head of the Russian squadron, enveloping it from the right. Their advantages in location relative to the wind and wave remained. This situation could be regarded as close to ideal and was certainly worth the risk.

Rozhdestvensky nevertheless gained a small and short-term advantage. Most of those who criticize his actions unanimously believe that the 1st Armored Detachment should have “rushed towards the enemy.” But, in essence, going to the head of the 2nd detachment, the Russian commander did just that. The expression “rush” sounds quite bold for ships that at that time had a speed of no more than 12 knots! In order to increase the speed, time was required comparable to the time of the Japanese maneuver. When attempting to maneuver independently, Russian battleships could completely lose formation. Rozhdestvensky had to fear like fire a repetition of the confusion that befell the 1st squadron at the decisive moment of the battle in the Yellow Sea. and chose to take a much more logical step, trying to realize his fleeting advantage: he opened fire in the wake column.

The first shot was fired from the Suvorov at 14.08 local time. It is convenient to count further events of the battle from this moment, taking it as the “zero point”.

Two minutes after the start of the battle, the Japanese opened fire. By this time, only Mikasa and Shikishima had set a new course. Some of the rear Japanese ships were forced to open fire even before the turning point - the general nervous tension of the beginning of the general battle had an effect.

It is often pointed out that at this moment Togo was almost in a hopeless situation, since his ships, turning “sequentially,” passed the same turning point, but which was easy to target. This is a gross mistake, since there was no central guidance system at that time, even within the same ship. Using the rangefinder data, an approximate distance was obtained, and then almost every gun or turret was targeted individually, monitoring the fall of its shells relative to the ship being fired upon. Shooting at an “imaginary” turning point on the open sea was probably even more difficult than at a real target. The only “damage” to the position of Togo’s ships at that moment was that only those of them that had already turned and were on a stable course could shoot accurately enough.

It is not for nothing that so much space is given to the initial minutes of the battle: it was during these moments that both Russian and Japanese ships received a large number of hits. In addition, it was in the first half hour of the battle that the fate of the flagships of the 1st and 2nd armored detachments of the 2nd Pacific Squadron - "Suvorov" and "Oslyabi" - was essentially decided.

Further events unfolded according to the same pattern: under Japanese fire, the Russian squadron leaned more and more to the right, quite naturally trying to get out of the head-covering position in which it found itself. But the significant, almost one and a half superiority in speed of the Japanese made it possible, moving along an arc of a large radius, to maintain tactical superiority, being in front and to the left of the Russian column.

Within 10 minutes after the opening of fire, the Oslyabya received its first significant damage, and 40 minutes later there was a severe fire on it. Around the same time, Rozhdestvensky was seriously wounded, and 50 minutes after the start of the battle, “Suvorov” left the formation. An hour after the first shot, the Oslyabya sank, and it became clear that the Russian squadron would no longer be able to win this battle by any means.

The further course of the battle consisted of a series of attempts by the Russian squadron to hide in fog and smoke. After 10-30 minutes, these efforts were countered by the ships of Togo and Kamimura, which, having restored contact, immediately went to the head of the enemy column. So, for the first time the squadrons separated 1:20 after the start of the battle. The second loss of contact occurred two and a half hours after the first shot, the third - another hour later. Before darkness fell - after 7 pm, the opponents had barely more than an hour of respite, and artillery fire continued for 4 hours.

It makes no sense to analyze in detail the tactics of the battle after the end of its first hour: the maneuvers of the Russian squadron were, as a rule, meaningful, but at the same time completely aimless. The Japanese, with enviable tenacity, “adjusted” to them, all the time maintaining an advantageous tactical position of covering the head of the enemy column. Both sides did their best. Only a huge superiority in speed allowed Togo to complete his task as he understood it. The behavior of the Russian commander in the initial stage of the battle certainly raises a number of questions, but the tactical decisions he made cannot in any way be considered reprehensible. Even left without control, the 2nd Pacific Squadron did not lose its “mind”; there was simply no real way out of this situation.

The disadvantages of the tactical situation did not prevent the Russian battleships from maintaining continuous fire until the very last moment. Therefore, critics of the unfortunate squadron, having dealt with its “incompetent commander,” usually move on to “the ineffectiveness of Russian artillery.”

Guns and shells

Russian artillery was accused of several “sins”: low weight of the projectile, insufficient rate of fire, etc. In this case, emotions often appear instead of arguments. Let's try to understand artillery technology using technical data (Table 1).

Indeed, Russian shells of the same caliber as Japanese ones are somewhat lighter, but this difference is not so great: for a 6-inch - 9%, for a 10-inch - only 1%, and only for a 12-inch - about 15%. But the difference in weight is compensated by a higher initial velocity, and the kinetic energy of Russian and Japanese 12-inch shells is exactly the same, and Russian 10- and 6-inch shells have an advantage over Japanese ones by about 20%.

A comparison of 8-inch guns is not indicative, since in Rozhdestvensky’s squadron only one ship had outdated guns of this caliber - the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov. A higher initial speed with equal energy provided a flatter firing trajectory at all real distances of the Tsushima battle.

The rate of fire is one of the most important factors, but it is not always determined only by technical capabilities. Thus, the relatively higher technical rate of fire of the English guns of Japanese battleships in real battle conditions turned out to be not at all important. Observers on both sides, Russian and English, unanimously describe the enemy's shooting as "exceptionally frequent", in contrast to the slowness on their part. Thus, Packinham points to the rapid fire of the Russians in comparison with the slow and careful fire of the Japanese. Psychologically, such conclusions are quite understandable. With the nervous tension that reigns at all combat posts, willy-nilly it seems that an eternity passes between shots from one’s own ship, while enemy shells, each of which brings death, perhaps to the observer himself, “rain down like hail.” In any case, in Russian historical literature there has long been a firmly established tradition of attributing a significant part of its failure to the “slow firing of the 2nd Pacific Squadron”. The truth can only be established by an objective method - by calculating the consumption of ammunition.

The numbers reveal a completely unexpected picture. 4 Japanese battleships - the main force of Admiral Togo - fired a total of 446 twelve-inch shells. This means that they fired on average 1 shot from a gun per 7 minutes of battle, with the technical ability to shoot at least 7 times more often! 4 There is nothing surprising in this: even when loading using mechanisms, the physical capabilities of people are simply not enough to maintain a high rate of fire for several hours. In addition, the Japanese had other reasons, which will be discussed later.

How were things on the Russian squadron? The battleship Nicholas I alone fired 94 shells at the enemy from two twelve-inch guns - 20 more than the Shikishima's four! "Eagle" fired at least 150 shells. It is unlikely that "Alexander III" and "Borodino", which fired until the very end of the battle, fired fewer shells than "Eagle", whose main caliber guns failed in the middle of the battle. Even the coastal defense battleships located at the very end of the column spent more than 100 shells each.

The simplest and most approximate calculation shows that Rozhdestvensky’s squadron fired over a THOUSAND large-caliber shells at the enemy - TWICE as many as the Japanese. But the outcome of the battle of the battleships was decided by large-caliber shells.

But it could also be that all Russian shells flew into the “milk”, and most of the Japanese ones hit the target? However, objective data refute this assumption. Reports from Japanese experts meticulously describe each hit on their ships, indicating the caliber of the projectile and the damage it caused. (Table 2.)

It would seem that even such an impressive number of hits pales in comparison to the success of the Japanese. After all, according to V.P. Kostenko, which has become widespread in Russian historiography, the “Eagle” alone was hit by 150 shells, of which 42 were 12-inch. But Kostenko, who was a young naval engineer during the Tsushima era, had neither the experience nor the time to accurately examine all the damage to the ship in those few hours of the morning of May 28 before the ship was delivered. Much was written down by him already in captivity from the words of the sailors. The Japanese and British had much more time and experience. "Eagle" was examined by them "in situ", immediately after the battle, and from numerous photographs. A special album was even released dedicated to the damage to the Russian battleship. The data of foreign experts differ somewhat, but even the number of hits given in the Japanese official history of the naval war is much less than that of Kostenko (Table 3.) 5.

It is obvious that the Eagle received no more than 70 hits, of which only 6 or 7 were 12-inch hits.

Expert data is indirectly confirmed by historical experience. In the battle of the Spanish and American squadrons off the coast of Cuba in 1898, in which the Spanish squadron was completely defeated, out of 300 large-caliber shells fired by US battleships, only 14 found the target (4.5% of hits). American ships in artillery and firing organization were not much different from the battleships of the Russian-Japanese War. The distances at which the battle took place were also similar - 15-25 cables. The largest battles of World War 1 took place over long distances, but fire control also improved significantly. In none of them did the number of shells hit exceed 5%. But even if we assume that the Japanese performed a miracle and achieved as much as 10% hits in Tsushima, this gives approximately the same number of Japanese shells that hit the target as the Russians - about 45.

The assumption remains that Russian ammunition is ineffective. The main argument has always been the relatively low content of explosives in them (1.5% of the total weight), its quality - high humidity and too tight a fuse. Against this background, Japanese, but in fact English, thin-walled high-explosive and “semi-armor-piercing” shells filled with potent “shimosa” seemed to look very advantageous. But you have to pay for everything. For an armor-piercing projectile to be effective, it must be durable, therefore thick-walled, and just as consistently it simply cannot have a large charge. Real armor-piercing naval artillery shells of almost all countries and at all times contained approximately 1% to 2% explosives and had an insensitive fuse with a large delay. It is necessary, otherwise the explosion will occur even before the armor is completely penetrated. This is exactly how the Japanese “suitcases” behaved, exploding when they hit any obstacle. It’s not for nothing that they NEVER penetrated any thick armor of Russian ships. The choice of pyroxylin is also not accidental - it is not as sensitive to impact as picric acid (“shimosa”), which in those days was simply not suitable for equipping armor-piercing shells. As a result, the Japanese never had them, much to the displeasure of their British “teachers.” Russian shells pierced rather thick armor: the Japanese counted 6 holes in 15-centimeter plates after the battle. Moreover, just after breaking through such thick armor, an explosion occurred, often causing quite a bit of damage. This is confirmed by one of the hits, which could, if not change the fate of the battle, then at least brighten up the defeat of the Russian fleet.

At 3 o'clock local time, just 50 minutes after the first shot, a Russian armor-piercing shell pierced the 6-inch frontal plate of the main battery turret of the battleship Fuji and exploded above the breech of the first gun. The force of the explosion threw overboard the heavy armor plate covering the rear of the turret. Everyone in it was killed or wounded. But, most importantly, the hot fragments ignited the powder charges. At the same time, over 100 kilograms of gunpowder “pasta” burst into flames. Fiery splashes flew in all directions. Another second - and Captain Packinham would have been able to observe from aboard the Asahi a terrible picture, which he nevertheless witnessed 11 years later in the Battle of Jutland, already with the rank of admiral, while being on the bridge of the battle cruiser New Zealand. A column of thick black smoke hundreds of meters high, a resounding thud, and debris flying into the air: all that remained of the ship when the ammunition detonated. English nitrocellulose gunpowder - cordite - was very prone to explosion when burned quickly. Such a difficult fate befell 3 British battlecruisers in Jutland. Now it is clear that “Fuji” was on the verge of death (the Japanese used the same cordite). But Togo’s ship was lucky: one of the fragments broke the hydraulic line, and the water gushing out under high pressure extinguished the dangerous fire.

Another “feature” of Japanese shells also had an impact in the Tsushima battle. A very sensitive fuse, combined with an easily detonating “filling”, led to the fact that the artillery of the Togo squadron suffered more from its own shells than from enemy fire. Japanese "suitcases" repeatedly exploded in gun barrels. Thus, on the flagship battleship Mikasa alone, at least 2 twelve-inch shells detonated in the bore of the right gun of the bow turret. If everything went well the first time and the fire continued, then at about 6 o’clock in the evening, on the 28th shot, the gun practically exploded. The explosion displaced the front turret roof plate and knocked out a nearby gun for 40 minutes. A similar incident occurred on the Shikishima: on the 11th shot, its own projectile destroyed the muzzle of the same right gun of the bow turret. The consequences were just as serious: the gun was completely out of action, the neighboring one was forced to stop firing for a while, and the roof of the tower was also damaged. Explosions in the barrels of the 8-inch guns of the armored cruiser Nissin had an even greater effect. After the battle, the Japanese claimed that Russian shells “cut off” the barrels of three of the four main caliber guns of this ship. The likelihood of such an event is negligible, and indeed, British officers who examined the damage to the Nissin discovered that this was the same result of the action of Japanese fuses. This list could be continued. There is no doubt that it was precisely the “premature explosions” with the failure of the guns that were one of the reasons for the relatively small number of large-caliber shells that Togo’s ships were able to fire. It is also known that the English “teachers” of the Japanese after Tsushima excluded shells with a charge of picric acid from the ammunition of their large-caliber guns, returning not even to pyroxylin, but to such a low-power, but at the same time insensitive explosive, like ordinary gunpowder.

The arguments in favor of certain aspects of the artillery equipment of the Russian and Japanese fleets could be continued, but I would like to have clearer quantitative characteristics to evaluate the result of an artillery battle.

The most objective criterion of damage caused by gunfire to ships of approximately the same class is the number of people incapacitated 6 . This indicator sums up numerous contradictory and often difficult to evaluate separately elements of combat power, such as shooting accuracy, quality of shells and armor reliability. Of course, individual hits can be more or less successful, but when there are a significant number of them, the law of large numbers comes into play. Particularly characteristic are losses on armored ships, on which most of the crew is protected by armor, and losses indicate only “real” hits.

It should be noted that this system for assessing the effectiveness of artillery is somewhat biased in favor of high-explosive projectiles, which produce a large number of small fragments, sufficient to injure or even kill a person, but unable to seriously damage the ship itself and thereby cause damage to his combat power. So the resulting result can in no way be beneficial for the Russian fleet, which did not have such shells.

What were the losses in people caused by artillery in the Battle of Tsushima? Among the Japanese, they are known to the accuracy of one person: 699 or 700 people, including 90 killed during the battle, 27 who died from wounds, 181 seriously and 401 relatively lightly wounded. The distribution of losses by units and individual ships is interesting (Table 4).

Data on losses on destroyers is not entirely complete: it is reliably known that at least 17 people were killed and 73 were wounded. The total for individual ships and detachments gives a slightly different result from the overall losses, but the discrepancies are not too significant and are quite understandable: some of those who died from wounds on individual ships could have been included in the lists of the dead; there is no data on several destroyers damaged in the night battle, etc. General patterns are more important. The ratio of killed to wounded on the heavily armored ships of Tōgō and Kamimura's units ranged from 1:6 to 1:5; on less protected light cruisers and destroyers this ratio drops to 1:4-1:3.

How significant were the Japanese losses in Tsushima? A very revealing comparison is with the number of casualties on Russian ships in the battle in the Yellow Sea, for which complete data is available. On 6 Russian battleships, 47 people were killed and 294 were wounded - almost exactly the same number as in one detachment of Togo! The heavily damaged Russian cruisers Askold, Pallada, Diana and Novik lost 111 people, including 29 killed.

Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from this comparison. Firstly, Japanese losses in Tsushima can be assessed as very serious. About 500 people in the main forces of the United Fleet alone were out of action - almost as many as both fleets lost in the Yellow Sea. It is also clear that in the Korean Strait the fire of Russian ships was distributed more evenly than a year earlier near Port Arthur, when of the Japanese ships only the flagship battleship Mikasa was badly damaged - 24 killed and 114 out of action. Apparently, despite Rozhestvensky’s strict order to fire at the enemy’s lead ship, the unfavorable tactical position of the Russian squadron forced individual ships to transfer fire to other targets. However, it was the two end ships of the Togo detachment that were most seriously damaged - its flagship "Mikasa" and "Nissin", which, when turning, "all of a sudden" became the lead ship several times (113 and 95 casualties, respectively) 7 . In general, in the battles with both the 1st and 2nd Pacific squadrons, the most severely damaged ship of those remaining afloat in both fleets was the Japanese Mikasa. The greatest severity of the battle fell, as one would expect, on the share of the main forces. Kamimura's detachment of armored cruisers suffered significantly less damage than Togo's other ships. Knowing the relative weakness of the armor of his cruisers, Kamimura tried whenever possible to evade the fire of the Russian battleships. In general, the role of this. The "flying squad" in the Battle of Tsushima is usually greatly exaggerated.

It is much more difficult to determine the losses of the Russian squadron. The battleships "Suvorov", "Alexander III", "Borodino" and "Navarin" died very quickly, taking almost the entire crew to the bottom of the Korean Strait. It is impossible to document how many people on board were previously disabled by enemy shells. The issue of losses of the battleship Oslyabya is also not entirely clear. Among those rescued there are 68 wounded. It is difficult to say whether this figure is underestimated due to those victims who were wounded at the beginning of the battle and died along with the battleship, or, on the contrary, overestimated - due to those injured after death, in the water or after their rescue on the Donskoy and Bystroy. .

For the remaining Russian ships there is detailed data on losses in the daytime battle on May 14 (Table 5).

There were 9 killed and 38 wounded on the destroyers. The next day, in single battles with significantly superior enemy forces, "Admiral Ushakov", "Svetlana", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Buiny", "Grozny" and "Gromky" lost another 62 people killed and 171 wounded, but it is hardly fair to include these losses resulted from the artillery battle. This was no longer a fight. but just execution.

The most difficult thing remains - to estimate the losses of the battleships that died before the morning of May 15. "Navarin" was not too badly damaged in the daytime battle and had no more losses than the "Sisoi the Great" (66 people) or "Emperor Nicholas 1" (40 people) marching next to it in the ranks. Located closer to the head of the column than the "Eagle", the same type "Borodino" and "Emperor Alexander III" could have suffered slightly more from Japanese fire, but if we remember the possible total number of hits on Russian ships, it is unlikely that they received much more more shells. Undoubtedly, Rozhdestvensky's flagship, the Suvorov, suffered the most. At the very beginning of the battle, he was under concentrated fire from a large number of battleships, and then throughout. During all 5 hours of the daytime battle, already being out of formation of the Russian squadron, he repeatedly served as a target for various Japanese detachments. It is not for nothing that Rozhdestvensky’s long-suffering flagship serves in naval historical literature as a symbol of a ship’s stability in battle. It is clear that the losses on it must be very large. However, until the very last torpedo attack, the Suvorov was controlled and even tried to fire. According to the experience of the Russian-Japanese and the First World Wars, a ship that was “on its last legs” after an artillery battle and was about to sink, by that moment had lost no more than a third of its crew. This figure should be used to determine possible casualties on the Suvorov.

Putting the losses on "Alexander III" and "Borodino" at 1.5 times, and on "Suvorov" - 3 times more than on "Orel", we can assume that they cannot in any way be understated. In this case, the flagship of the Russian squadron should have lost 370 people killed and wounded, or about 40% of the entire crew. Although the Oslyabya was under concentrated fire from 5 or 6 ships, it was for a very short time, and its losses could not significantly exceed the losses on the Orel, which was fired upon by the Japanese for 5 hours. To summarize, we get a total approximate figure for the losses of the Russian squadron from artillery fire of 1,550 people. Losses among the detachments, actual and expected, are distributed as follows: 1st armored detachment no more than 1000 people, 2nd armored detachment - 345 people, 3rd and armored detachment - 67 people, cruisers - 248 people, destroyers - 37 people. With a high degree of certainty, we can say that the result lies between 1,500 and 2,000 sailors and officers out of action, which is 2-3 times more than the Japanese losses.

Comparing the losses of the parties allows us to quantify all the visible and invisible advantages of the Japanese. They turn out to be not that significant. Since the artillery battle of ships is a typical example of a system with negative feedback, which is usually expressed by a peculiar formula - “an artillery battle feeds on itself,” the losses of each of the opponents are proportional to the residual combat power of the other - for one of the opponents to inflict twice as many losses, double superiority is not required . A simple calculation shows that if we consider the Japanese fleet to be 20% stronger before the battle, 8 which is obviously quite reasonable, then all other factors of the battle: tactical maneuvering, shooting success, quality of shells and protection, etc. - give a superiority coefficient of 1.5-1.7 in favor of the Japanese. This is quite a bit, given the almost continuous position of the coverage of the head of the Russian column and the rapid failure of the Oslyabi and Suvorov. Such a calculation, if it contains some inaccuracies, is in any case always not in favor of Russian weapons. which will create a certain “charge of strength” for all reasoning. It is likely that the picture should look noticeably better for Rozhdestvensky’s squadron. At least based on the results of losses in an artillery battle, Japanese gunners and Japanese shells cannot be considered significantly superior to Russian ones.

After such a conclusion, a completely reasonable question arises: where did such a complete defeat come from, and why the results of Tsushima are so strikingly different from the results of the battle in Yellow Mors. Here it is worth recalling some features of naval battles. Any battle has its own “turning point”, up to which one of the opponents, although suffering greater losses than the others, still has a certain ability to resist. Then the "potentially defeated" either retreats, saving his frustrated forces for the next fight, or suffers a complete defeat, and the more he is exposed to the enemy, the greater the losses he suffers - while causing less and less damage to his enemy. This feature of any process, in particular a combat encounter, is called “negative feedback.” The effect of this general law is also noticeable at sea: up to a certain point, the more damaged enemy keeps his ships afloat, even if in a damaged state. This is exactly what the battle of the 1st Pacific Squadron in the Yellow Sea was like. According to tradition, it is believed that the Arthurian squadron, well sailed and having better training, almost achieved victory in this battle. In reality, the Russians fired fewer shells at the enemy - about 550 10 and 12 inch shells versus 600 Japanese 12 inch shells, achieving far fewer hits. Although the most damaged ship of both squadrons was Togo's flagship Mikasa, the rest of the Japanese battleships, as well as the cruisers, suffered very little damage, while the Russians were “evenly” and heavily beaten. "Tsesarevich", "Retvizan", "Peresvet", "Pobeda" and "Poltava" each received more than 20 hits; the appearance of the "Askold", which lost 59 people, differed little from the appearance of the Russian cruisers after Tsushima. There is a version that Togo was just about ready to stop the fight himself. Even if such a thought did occur to him, there are a lot of completely reasonable considerations in favor of such a decision. There is nothing to suggest that he intended to end the entire battle this way. Togo really had to take care of his ships: Japan threw all its forces into action, while the Russian fleet could, at least theoretically, receive significant reinforcements. There was night ahead. Japanese destroyers had already taken up their positions between the Russian squadron and Vladivostok - a position that did not allow them to effectively attack the Russian ships returning to Port Arthur. It would be a different matter if the Arthurian squadron had to “push through” this curtain on a collision course. Togo still had an advantage in the process. Most likely, in the morning he would have appeared before the Russian squadron in full combat readiness, as happened on May 15, 1905! But... none of this happened. The “critical point” was not passed. Turning away from the enemy, the Russians, having successfully repelled torpedo attacks as they retreated, returned to Port Arthur and scattered to neutral ports. The damage was partially corrected the night after the battle. In any case, the cheerful assumption that the battleships of the 1st squadron were ready to go into battle the next day, if not entirely fair, is not so far from the truth.

The battle between Togo and Rozhestvensky looks completely different. In the very first minutes of the battle, the opponents inflicted heavy damage on each other. But the start of the battle turned out to be extremely unsuccessful for the Russians: the battleship Oslyabya received exactly the damage that caused its immediate death, and the flagship Suvorov lost control and left the formation. The Japanese immediately received a significant head start: their 12 ships were opposed by only 10, four of which (Nakhimov and coastal defense battleships) were significantly weaker than any Japanese ship. The subsequent hours of artillery battle inflicted more and more defeats on the ships of both sides, but due to its relative weakness, the Russian squadron suffered more and more.

But even after 5 hours of the Tsushima battle, the position of the Russians did not outwardly look tragic. Not only Russian, but also Japanese ships were significantly damaged - the Mikasa received 10 twelve-inch shells - twice as much as the Eagle. According to some reports, the Japanese flagship may not have even been informed that it was the Oslyabya that had sunk - this was visible only from the end ships of its squadron, and even then the sinking ship was mistaken for a Zhemchug-class cruiser. It is unlikely that Togo was satisfied with the results of the battle at that moment. 5 hours of almost continuous fire and only one sunken ship! Night was falling. Another half hour - and the Russian fleet would have received the desired respite. Some of the damage could be repaired, and the battered squadron would have at least some chance.

But a “turning point” has arrived. In half an hour, from 7 to 7.30 pm, the Alexander and Borodino, two of the newest Russian battleships, sank. The first of them apparently simply exhausted the further possibility of resisting the continuous impact of enemy fire. Most likely, the same fate would have befallen “Eagle” if the battle had dragged on for another half hour. The fate of the Borodino turned into a cruel irony of a naval battle: the last salvo of the Fuji, which had so happily escaped destruction two hours earlier, caused a severe fire in the 152-mm turret of the Russian battleship, which apparently resulted in the detonation of the charges. In any case, the death of Borodino in Packinham’s description is very reminiscent of the instant “departure from the scene” of the British battlecruisers.

Literally in those same minutes, the fate of “Suvorov” was decided. Deprived of its own artillery and squadron support, the ship was attacked by torpedoes literally at point-blank range and sunk.

However, the “critical point” does not arise on its own; it is carefully prepared by enemy fire. What are the reasons for the difficult state in which the Russian battleships found themselves in the fifth hour of the battle, if the number of hits from large-caliber shells on both sides was approximately the same?

To explain, it is enough to familiarize yourself with the number of medium and small caliber shells fired by the Japanese. Togo and Kamimura's 12 ships fired more than 1,200 eight-inch, 9,450 six-inch, and 7,500 three-inch shells at their targets! Even if we assume that the probability of a hit from main caliber guns exceeds the similar probability for 8- and 6-inch guns by 1.5-2 times, this means that Russian ships took hits from at least THOUSANDS of Japanese “gifts” weighing 113 and 45 kilograms! 9 Undoubtedly, this was the very path that prepared them for the onset of the “turning point” of the Tsushima battle.

The conclusions that naval experts made regarding medium-caliber guns are also not surprising, despite the seemingly significant results achieved with their help. It was the ability of battleships at the beginning of the century to “absorb” a large number of such shells that was one of the reasons for the appearance of “All-big-gun ships” - dreadnoughts. The ungrateful British considered that the role played by auxiliary artillery in Tsushima was clearly insufficient to achieve the maximum effect: Russian ships did not sink quickly enough. Their more conservative disciples expressed much greater "appreciation" for medium-caliber guns as well as armored cruisers, continuing to build ships with similar weapons for several years after the battle in the Korea Strait. 10

Let's return to Tsushima: the outcome of the battle was a foregone conclusion, but Togo did not calm down. He did not want to repeat the mistake he had made the year before in the Yellow Sea. Continuous attacks by numerous Japanese destroyers continued throughout the night. And here the actions of Togo’s ships cannot be considered particularly successful: out of 54 torpedoes fired almost point-blank, only 4 or 5 hit. But this was enough - “Navarin” died with the entire crew, except for 3 people, and the “wounded wounded” “Sisoy”, “Nakhimov” " and "Monomakh" the next morning were caught individually and scuttled by teams. Togo's significant superiority in speed allowed him to cut off all retreat routes for Nebogatov's detachment, which had retained a semblance of organization, and which "Eagle" joined. One can argue for a long time about the decision of the last Russian commander in this sad battle, but one thing is certain: his ships would no longer be able to cause any damage to the enemy. The last of the Russian ships that continued to fight, the obsolete cruiser Dmitry Donskoy, withstood a fierce battle. In a battle with an entire detachment of Japanese cruisers and destroyers on the evening of May 15, he lost 80 people killed and wounded. The battle is over. Rarely in maritime history has a winner been able to so fully realize all his advantages, successfully avoiding a possible response.

Sources and literature

On May 27-28, 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron was defeated by the Japanese fleet. “Tsushima” became a byword for fiasco. We decided to understand why this tragedy happened.

Long hike

Initially, the task of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was to help the besieged Port Arthur. But after the fall of the fortress, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was entrusted with the very vague task of independently gaining supremacy at sea, which was difficult to achieve without good bases.

The only major port (Vladivostok) was located quite far from the theater of military operations and had an infrastructure too weak for a huge squadron. The voyage, as is known, took place in extremely difficult conditions and was a feat in itself, since it was possible to concentrate an armada of 38 different types of ships and auxiliary vessels in the Sea of ​​Japan without losses in the ship's personnel or serious accidents.

The squadron command and ship commanders had to solve a lot of problems, from the difficult loading of coal on the high seas to the organization of leisure for crews who quickly lost discipline during long, monotonous stops. All this, naturally, was done to the detriment of the combat situation, and the ongoing exercises did not and could not give good results. And this is more the rule than the exception, since there are no examples in naval history when a squadron that made a long, difficult voyage away from its bases could achieve victory in a naval battle.

Artillery: pyroxylin against shimosa

Often in the literature dedicated to the Battle of Tsushima, the terrible high-explosive effect of Japanese shells, which exploded even upon impact with water, is emphasized, as opposed to Russian ammunition. In the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fired shells with a powerful high-explosive effect, causing great destruction. True, Japanese shells also had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

Thus, at Tsushima, the cruiser Nissin lost three of its four main caliber guns. Russian armor-piercing shells filled with wet pyroxylin had a less explosive effect, and often pierced light Japanese ships without exploding. Of the twenty-four 305 mm shells that hit the Japanese ships, eight did not explode. So, at the end of the day’s battle, Admiral Kammimura’s flagship, the cruiser Izumo, was lucky when a Russian shell from the Shisoi the Great hit the engine room, but, fortunately for the Japanese, did not explode.

The significant overload of Russian ships with large quantities of coal, water and various cargoes also played into the hands of the Japanese, when the main armor belt of most Russian battleships in the Battle of Tsushima was below the waterline. And high-explosive shells, which could not penetrate the armor belt, caused terrible damage in their scale, hitting the skin of the ships.

But one of the main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not even the quality of the shells, but the competent use of artillery by the Japanese, who concentrated fire on the best Russian ships. The unsuccessful start of the battle for the Russian squadron allowed the Japanese to very quickly disable the flagship "Prince Suvorov" and inflict fatal damage to the battleship "Oslyabya". The main result of the decisive day battle was the death of the core of the Russian squadron - the battleships Emperor Alexander III, Prince Suvorov and Borodino, as well as the high-speed Oslyabya. The fourth battleship of the Borodino class, Orel, received a large number of hits, but retained its combat effectiveness.

It should be taken into account that out of 360 hits from large shells, about 265 fell on the above-mentioned ships. The Russian squadron fired less concentratedly, and although the main target was the battleship Mikasa, due to the disadvantageous position, the Russian commanders were forced to transfer fire to other enemy ships.

Low speed

The advantage of Japanese ships in speed became a significant factor that determined the death of the Russian squadron. The Russian squadron fought at a speed of 9 knots; Japanese fleet - 16. However, it should be noted that most Russian ships could develop a much greater speed.

Thus, the four newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type were not inferior to the enemy in speed, and the ships of the 2nd and 3rd combat detachments could give a speed of 12-13 knots and the enemy’s advantage in speed would not be so significant.

By tying himself to slow-moving transports, which were still impossible to protect from attacks by light enemy forces, Rozhdestvensky untied the enemy’s hands. Having an advantage in speed, the Japanese fleet fought in favorable conditions, covering the head of the Russian squadron. The day's battle was marked by a number of pauses, when the opponents lost sight of each other and the Russian ships had a chance of breaking through. But again, the low squadron speed led to the enemy overtaking the Russian squadron. In the battles of May 28, low speed tragically affected the fate of individual Russian ships and became one of the reasons for the death of the battleship Admiral Ushakov and the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Svetlana.

Management crisis

One of the reasons for the defeat in the Tsushima battle was the lack of initiative of the squadron command - both Rozhestvensky himself and the junior flagships. No specific instructions were issued before the battle. In case of failure of the flagship, the squadron had to be led by the next battleship in formation, keeping the given course. This automatically negated the role of Rear Admirals Enquist and Nebogatov. And who led the squadron in the daytime battle after the flagship failed?

The battleships "Alexander III" and "Borodino" perished with their entire crew and who actually led the ships, replacing retired ship commanders - officers, and maybe sailors - this will never be known. In reality, after the failure of the flagship and the injury of Rozhdestvensky himself, the squadron fought virtually without a commander.

Only in the evening did Nebogatov take command of the squadron - or rather, what he could gather around him. At the outset of the battle, Rozhdestvensky began an unsuccessful restructuring. Historians argue whether the Russian admiral could have seized the initiative, taking advantage of the fact that the core of the Japanese fleet had to fight for the first 15 minutes, essentially doubling the formation and passing the turning point. There are different hypotheses... but only one thing is known - neither at that moment nor later did Rozhdestvensky take decisive action.

Night combat, searchlights and torpedoes

On the evening of May 27, after the end of the day's battle, the Russian squadron was subjected to numerous attacks by Japanese destroyers and suffered serious losses. It is noteworthy that only those single Russian ships that turned on searchlights and tried to shoot back were torpedoed. Thus, almost the entire crew of the battleship Navarin perished, and the Sisoy the Great, Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh, which were hit by torpedoes, sank on the morning of May 28.

For comparison, during the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904, the Russian squadron was also attacked by Japanese destroyers in the dark, but then, maintaining camouflage, successfully withdrew from the battle, and the night battle was marked by the useless consumption of coal and torpedoes, as well as the misadventures of the Japanese destroyers.

In the Battle of Tsushima, mine attacks, as during the Battle of the Yellow Sea, were poorly organized - as a result, many destroyers were damaged by Russian artillery fire or as a result of accidents. Destroyers No. 34 and No. 35 were sunk, and No. 69 sank after a collision with Akatsuki-2 (formerly Russian Resolute, illegally captured by the Japanese in neutral Chefu).

Battle of Tsushima. Hike to the bottom of the Sea of ​​Japan

The Russo-Japanese War is rightfully considered one of the most tragic pages in the history of our state. Were the main reasons for the defeat the failures of Russian diplomacy, the spinelessness and indecision of the tsarist commanders, the remoteness of the theater of operations, or was it all due to the unfavorability of Lady Luck? A bit of everything. Almost all the key battles of this war took place under the banner of doom and excessive passivity, which resulted in complete defeat. The Battle of Tsushima, in which the forces of the 2nd Pacific Squadron of the Russian Empire clashed with the forces of the Japanese Fleet, is an example of this.

The war for Russia did not start as successfully as planned. The blockade in Port Arthur of the 1st Pacific Squadron, the loss of the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" in the battle of Chemulpo became the reasons for St. Petersburg's attempts to radically change the situation in the theater of operations. Such an attempt was the preparation and departure of the 2nd and then the 3rd Pacific squadron. Literally halfway across the world, 38 warships passed, accompanied by auxiliary transports, loaded with provisions so that the waterlines were thoroughly under water, worsening the already weak armor protection of Russian ships, which were covered with armor by only 40%, while the Japanese were covered by 60%. %.

Commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky

Initially, the squadron’s campaign was considered by many theoreticians of the Russian fleet (for example, Nikolai Lavrentievich Klado) to be already losing and unpromising. Moreover, all personnel - from admirals to ordinary sailors - felt doomed to failure. The news of the fall of Port Arthur and the loss of almost the entire group of the 1st Pacific Squadron added to the futility of the squadron in Madagascar. Having learned about this on December 16, 1904, the squadron commander, Rear Admiral Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky, tried to convince his superiors with the help of telegrams that it was advisable to continue the campaign, but instead received orders to wait for reinforcements in Madagascar and attempt to break through to Vladivostok by any means.

It is not customary to discuss orders, and on May 1, 1905, the squadron, which had already reached Indochina by that time, headed for Vladivostok. It was decided to break through the Tsushima Strait - the closest route, since the Sangarsky and La Perouse straits were not considered due to their remoteness and problems with navigation support.

Tsushima Strait

Some battleships, such as the Imperator Nicholas I, were armed with outdated artillery and were forced to use extremely smoky gunpowder, which caused the ship to become clouded with smoke after several salvos, making further shooting significantly more difficult. Coastal defense battleships “Admiral Ushakov”, “Admiral Apraksin” and “Admiral Senyavin”, based on the name of their type, were not intended for long voyages at all, since this class of ships was created to protect coastal fortifications and was more often jokingly called “battleship, guarded shores."

A large number of transport and auxiliary ships should not have been dragged into battle at all, since they did not bring any benefit in battle, but only slowed down the squadron and required a significant number of cruisers and destroyers for their protection. Most likely, they should have split up, going to a neutral port, or tried to go to Vladivostok by long detours. The camouflage of the Russian squadron also left much to be desired - the bright yellow pipes of the ships were a good reference point, while the Japanese ships were olive-colored, which is why they often blended into the water surface.

Coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

On the eve of the battle, on May 13, it was decided to conduct exercises in order to increase the maneuverability of the squadron. Based on the results of these exercises, it became clear that the squadron was not at all ready for coordinated maneuvers - the column of ships was constantly being destroyed. The situation with “all of a sudden” turns was also unsatisfactory. Some ships, not understanding the signal, made turns “sequentially” at this time, introducing confusion into the maneuver, and when, on a signal from the flagship battleship, the squadron moved into front formation, complete confusion resulted.

During the time spent on maneuvers, the squadron could have passed the most dangerous part of the Tsushima Strait under the cover of darkness and, perhaps, it would not have been seen by Japanese reconnaissance ships, but on the night of May 13-14, the squadron was spotted by the Japanese reconnaissance cruiser Shinano -Maru.” I would like to note that, unlike the Japanese fleet, which was actively conducting reconnaissance operations, the Russian squadron was sailing almost blindly. It was forbidden to conduct reconnaissance due to the danger of revealing the location to the enemy.

The curiosity of the moment reached the point that it was forbidden to pursue enemy reconnaissance cruisers and even interfere with their telegraphing, although the auxiliary cruiser "Ural" had a wireless telegraph capable of interrupting Japanese reports about the location of the Russian squadron. As a result of such passivity of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Heihachiro Togo, knew not only the location of the Russian fleet, but also its composition and even tactical formation - enough to start the battle.

Battleship "Emperor Nicholas I"

Almost the entire morning of May 14, the Japanese reconnaissance cruisers followed a parallel course, only towards noon the fog hid Rozhdestvensky’s squadron from their view, but not for long: already at 13:25 visual contact was established with the Japanese squadron, which was moving across.

The lead battleship was the Mikasa, flying the flag of Admiral Togo. It was followed by the battleships Shikishima, Fuji, Asahi and the armored cruisers Kassuga and Nisshin. Following these ships, six more armored cruisers set out: Izumo, under the flag of Admiral Kamimura, Yakumo, Asama, Azuma, Tokiwa and Iwate. The main Japanese force was followed by numerous auxiliary cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admirals Kamimura and Uriu.

The composition of the Russian squadron at the time of the meeting with enemy forces was as follows: squadron battleships “Prince Suvorov” under the flag of Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, “Emperor Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”, “Oslyabya” under the flag of Rear Admiral Felkerzam, who long before the battle, he died of a stroke, unable to withstand the hardships and trials of a long campaign, “Sisoy the Great”, “Nicholas I” under the pennant of Rear Admiral Nebogatov.

Admiral Togo

Coastal defense battleships: “Admiral General Apraksin”, “Admiral Senyavin”, “Admiral Ushakov”; armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov"; cruisers "Oleg" under the flag of Rear Admiral Enquist, "Aurora", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Vladimir Monomakh", "Svetlana", "Izumrud", "Pearl", "Almaz"; auxiliary cruiser "Ural".

Destroyers: 1st detachment - “Bedovy”, “Bystry”, “Buiny”, “Brave”; 2nd squad - “Loud”, “Terrible”, “Brilliant”, “Impeccable”, “Cheerful”. Transports "Anadyr", "Irtysh", "Kamchatka", "Korea", tugboats "Rus" and "Svir" and hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma".

The squadron marched in the marching formation of two wake columns of warships, between which there was a detachment of transports, guarded on both sides by the 1st and 2nd detachments of destroyers, while delivering a speed of at least 8 knots. Behind the squadron were both hospital ships, thanks to the bright lighting of which the squadron was spotted the day before.

Tactical formation of the Russian squadron before the battle

Although the list looks impressive, only the first five warships were a serious fighting force, capable of competing with Japanese battleships. In addition, the overall speed of 8 knots was due to the slowness of transports and some outdated battleships and cruisers, although the main body of the squadron could produce almost twice as much speed.

Admiral Togo was going to undertake a cunning maneuver, turning around in front of the very nose of the Russian squadron, while concentrating fire on the lead battleships - knocking them out of the line, and then knocking out those following the lead ones. Auxiliary Japanese cruisers and destroyers were supposed to finish off disabled enemy ships with torpedo attacks.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s tactics consisted, to put it mildly, of “nothing.” The main directive was to break through to Vladivostok, and in the event of loss of control of the flagship battleships, their place was taken by the next one in the column. Also, the destroyers “Buiny” and “Bedovy” were assigned to the flagship battleship as evacuation ships and were obliged to save the vice admiral and his headquarters in the event of the death of the battleship.

Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Iosifovich Behr in his youth

By 13:50 shots were fired from the main caliber guns of the Russian battleships at the lead Japanese "Mikasa", the answer was not long in coming. Taking advantage of Rozhdestvensky's passivity, the Japanese surrounded the head of the Russian squadron and opened fire. The flagships “Prince Suvorov” and “Oslyabya” suffered the most. After half an hour of battle, the battleship Oslyabya, engulfed in fire and a huge list, rolled out of the general formation, and after another half hour it turned upside down with its keel. Along with the battleship, its commander died, Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Iosifovich Behr, who until the last led the evacuation of sailors from the sinking ship. The entire crew of mechanics, engineers and stokers who were in the very depths of the battleship also died: during the battle, the engine room should have been covered with armor plates to protect it from fragments and shells, and during the death of the ship, the sailors assigned to lift these plates fled.

Soon the battleship "Prince Suvorov" jumped out of action, engulfed in flames. The battleships Borodino and Alexander III took their place at the head of the squadron. Closer to 15:00, the water surface was shrouded in fog, and the battle stopped. The Russian squadron headed north, having by that time also lost hospital ships sailing at the tail of the squadron. As it turned out later, they were captured by light Japanese cruisers, thereby leaving the Russian squadron without medical assistance.

The last minutes of the life of the battleship Oslyabya

After 40 minutes the battle resumed. The enemy squadrons came to fairly close distances, which led to even faster destruction of Russian ships. The battleships “Sisoi the Great” and “Eagle”, having more dead crew members on board than living crew members, could barely keep up with the main forces.

By half past four in the afternoon, the 2nd Pacific Squadron headed northeast, where it linked up with cruisers and transports that were fighting against the stray cruiser detachments of the Japanese Admiral Uriu. Meanwhile, the wounded Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his entire staff were removed from the battleship "Prince Suvorov", which miraculously stayed afloat, by the destroyer "Buiny". The bulk of the crew refused to leave the battleship and, having only small-caliber stern guns in service, continued to fight off enemy attacks. After 20 minutes, "Prince Suvorov", surrounded by 12 enemy ships, was shot almost point-blank from mine vehicles and sank, taking the entire crew with it to the bottom. In total, 17 torpedoes were fired at the battleship during the battle, only the last three hit the target.

Surrounded but not broken “Prince Suvorov”

An hour and a half before sunset, unable to withstand a large number of hits and unable to fend off the increasing list, the lead battleships Borodino and Alexander III sank one after another. Later, the only survivor from the Borodin crew, sailor Semyon Yushchin, was rescued from the water by the Japanese. The crew of the Alexander III was completely lost along with the ship.

Battleship Borodino during sea trials

With the onset of dusk, Japanese destroyers entered the action. Due to their stealth and large numbers (about 42 units), the destroyers were selected at critically close distances to Russian ships. As a result, during the night battle, the Russian squadron lost the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, the battleships Navarin, Sisoy the Great, Admiral Nakhimov and the destroyer Bezuprechny. The crews of “Vladimir Monomakh”, “Sisy the Great” and “Admiral Nakhimov” were lucky - almost all the sailors of these ships were rescued and captured by the Japanese. Only three people were rescued from the Navarin, and not a single one from the Impeccable.

Night attacks by Japanese destroyers on a scattered Russian squadron

Meanwhile, a detachment of cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Enquist, having lost the cruiser Ural and the tugboat Rus during the battle, persistently tried to head north. This was hindered by the almost non-stop attacks of Japanese destroyers. As a result, unable to withstand the pressure and having lost sight of all the transports and cruisers except the Aurora and Oleg, Enquist took these cruisers to Manila, where they were disarmed. Thus, the most famous “ship of the revolution” was saved.

Rear Admiral Oskar Adolfovich Enquist

Starting on the morning of May 15, the 2nd Pacific continued to suffer losses. In an unequal battle, having lost almost half of its personnel, the destroyer Gromky was destroyed. The former royal yacht “Svetlana” could not stand the battle “one against three”. The destroyer "Bystry", seeing the death of "Svetlana", tried to escape the pursuit, but, unable to do this, washed ashore on the Korean Peninsula; his crew was captured.

Closer to noon, the remaining battleships Emperor Nicholas I, Orel, Admiral General Apraksin and Admiral Senyavin were surrounded and surrendered. From the point of view of combat capabilities, these ships could only die heroically without causing any damage to the enemy. The crews of the battleships were exhausted, demoralized and had no desire to fight against the main forces of the Japanese armored fleet.

The fast cruiser Izumrud, which was accompanying the surviving battleships, broke out of the encirclement and broke away from the chase sent, but as bold and glorious as its breakthrough was, the death of this cruiser was just as inglorious. Subsequently, the crew of the Emerald, already off the coast of their homeland, got lost and, constantly tormented by the fear of pursuit by Japanese cruisers, in a fever, ran the cruiser aground and then blew it up. The tortured crew of the cruiser reached Vladivostok by land.

The cruiser "Izumrud", blown up by the crew in Vladimir Bay

By the evening, the commander-in-chief of the squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, who by that time was on the destroyer Bedovy with his headquarters, also surrendered. The last losses of the 2nd Pacific Squadron were the death in battle of the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" near the island of Dazhelet and the heroic death of the battleship "Admiral Ushakov" under the command of Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklouho-Maclay, the brother of the famous traveler and discoverer of Australia and Oceania. The commanders of both ships were killed.

On the left is the commander of the battleship "Admiral Ushakov", captain 1st rank Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklukho-Maclay. Right tocommander of the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" captain 1st rank Ivan Nikolaevich Lebedev

The results of the Battle of Tsushima for the Russian Empire were disastrous: the squadron battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Emperor Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Oslyabya” were killed in battle from enemy artillery fire; coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov; cruisers "Svetlana", "Dmitry Donskoy"; auxiliary cruiser "Ural"; destroyers “Gromky”, “Brilliant”, “Impeccable”; transports “Kamchatka”, “Irtysh”; tugboat "Rus".

The squadron battleships Navarin and Sisoy the Great, the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, and the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh were killed in battle as a result of torpedo attacks.

The destroyers Buiny and Bystry and the cruiser Izumrud were destroyed by their own personnel due to the impossibility of further resistance to the enemy.

The squadron battleships “Emperor Nicholas I” and “Eagle” surrendered to the Japanese; coastal battleships "Admiral General Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin" and the destroyer "Bedovy".

Scheme with the presumable designation of the places of destruction of ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

The cruisers Oleg, Aurora, and Zhemchug were interned and disarmed in neutral ports; transport "Korea"; tugboat "Svir". The hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma" were captured by the enemy.

Only the cruiser Almaz and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny managed to break through to Vladivostok. Suddenly, a heroic fate befell the Anadyr transport, which independently returned to Russia and later managed to fight in World War II.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron of the Russian fleet, out of 16,170 people, lost 5,045 people killed and drowned. 7282 people were captured, including 2 admirals. 2,110 people went to foreign ports and were interned. 910 people managed to break through to Vladivostok.

The Japanese suffered significantly fewer losses. 116 people were killed and 538 wounded. The fleet lost 3 destroyers. Of these, one was sunk in battle - presumably by the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" - during the night phase of the battle. Another destroyer was sunk by the battleship Navarin, also while repelling night mine attacks. The remaining ships escaped with only damage.

The crushing defeat of the Russian fleet gave rise to a whole chain of scandals and trials of the perpetrators. During the trial of the Naval Court of the Kronstadt port in St. Petersburg in the case of the surrender to the enemy of the ships of Rear Admiral Nebogatov's detachment: the battleships "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Eagle" and the coastal defense battleships "General-Admiral Apraksin" and " Admiral Senyavin, Rear Admiral Nebogatov, the commanders of the ships that surrendered, and 74 officers of the same 4 ships were put on trial.

At the trial, Admiral Nebogatov took the blame upon himself, justifying his subordinates down to the sailors. After holding 15 hearings, the court passed a verdict according to which Nebogatov and the ship captains were sentenced to death with a petition to Nicholas II to replace it with imprisonment in a fortress for 10 years; the flag captain of the headquarters of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, captain 2nd rank Cross, was sentenced to imprisonment in the fortress for 4 months, senior officers of the ships “Emperor Nicholas I” and “Admiral Senyavin” captain 2nd rank Vedernikov and captain 2nd rank Artschvager - for 3 months; senior officer of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral General Apraksin", Lieutenant Fridovsky - for 2 months. All the others were acquitted. However, less than a few months passed before Nebogatov and the ship commanders were released early by decision of the emperor.

Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov

Rear Admiral Enquist, who almost treacherously led the cruisers away from the battlefield, received no punishment at all and was dismissed from service with a promotion to vice admiral in 1907. The head of the defeated squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, was acquitted due to being seriously wounded and almost unconscious at the time of surrender. Under pressure from public opinion, Emperor Nicholas II was forced to dismiss from service his uncle, the chief head of the fleet and the Naval Department, General Admiral Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who became famous more for his active social life in Paris than for his competent leadership of the Imperial Navy.

Another unpleasant scandal is associated with the colossal problems of the Russian fleet in the field of shells. In 1906, the battleship Slava, which was still on the stocks at the time of the formation of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, took part in the suppression of the Sveaborg uprising. During the uprising, the battleship fired its main caliber guns at the Sveaborg fortifications. After the uprising was suppressed, it was noticed that none of the shells fired from the Slava exploded. The reason for this was the substance pyroxylin, which was very susceptible to the influence of moisture.

Battleship "Slava", 1906

The battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron also used shells with pyroxylin, moreover: before the long voyage, a decision was made to increase the amount of moisture in the squadron's ammunition shells in order to avoid involuntary detonation. The consequences were quite predictable: the shells did not detonate even when they hit Japanese ships.

Japanese naval commanders used the explosive substance shimosa for their shells, shells with which often exploded right in the bores. When they hit Russian battleships or even when they came into contact with the water surface, such shells exploded almost one hundred percent and produced a colossal amount of fragments. As a result, a successful hit by a Japanese shell caused great destruction and often caused a fire, while a Russian pyroxylin shell left behind only a smooth hole.

A hole from a Japanese shell in the hull of the battleship "Eagle" and the battleship itself after the battle

The 2nd Pacific Squadron was not ready for battle either tactically or in terms of weapons, and in fact went to voluntary suicide in the Sea of ​​Japan. War provides costly and important lessons, and the Battle of Tsushima is one of them. Any weakness, any slackness, any letting things take their course leads to approximately the same results. We must learn to appreciate the lessons of the past - the most comprehensive conclusions must be drawn from each defeat. First of all, in the name and for our future victories.

At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, many victories of the Japanese army occurred due to the advantage of the Japanese fleet over the Russian Pacific squadron. The Japanese army and navy were located in a more compact territory, did not experience difficulties in transporting supplies, and also received guidance from the general staff more quickly. Vladivostok and especially Port Arthur had limited supplies of ammunition and equipment at their disposal. Under these conditions, it was decided to equip the 2nd Pacific Squadron and send it from the Baltic to the Far East.

The main reason for equipping the 2nd Pacific Squadron was the acute shortage of ships in the Russian Pacific Fleet. Due to the lack of shipbuilding and ship repair in the Far Eastern ports, the loss of any ship became irrevocable. Another reason was the breakdown of communications between Primorye and Port Arthur. The establishment of Japanese control over the Korean Peninsula and over the Korean and Tsushima Straits at the very beginning of the war severed the most important communication, the Port Arthur-Harbin railway. The third reason for the deployment of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which accelerated its preparation and dispatch, was the death of the flagship cruiser Petropavlovsk and the commander of the ships located in Port Arthur, Admiral Stepan Makarov. Now the Russian fleet in the Far East needed not only additional forces, but also a new commander.

Route of Rozhdestvensky's squadron. Losses before meeting the enemy

The first detachment of the new squadron under the command of Admiral Rozhestvensky left the port of Libau on October 2 (15), 1904. It included the battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Emperor Alexander III”, “Borodino” and “Eagle”. The flagship of the squadron was the battleship Prince Suvorov. Two weeks later, several civilian ships flying commercial flags left Odessa. They were supposed to meet the squadron and accompany it, providing the necessary fuel and food. Leaving the Black Sea Straits, one part of these ships went west and met the squadron in Tangier, while the other turned southeast, passed through the Suez Canal and stopped in the north of Madagascar on January 8, 1905. The next day, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron approached Madagascar, having circled the African continent from the south.

By that time it became known that Port Arthur had fallen and the 1st Pacific Squadron had been defeated. Nevertheless, the 2nd squadron continued its journey to the east. Three auxiliary (“catch-up”) detachments were sent to help her. At the end of April, off the coast of French Indochina, Rozhestvensky's squadron united with the last catching-up detachment under the command of Rear Admiral Nebogatov.

In early May, when the squadron approached the East China Sea, the escort ships stopped at the Shanghai port, and the squadron itself turned northwest to the Tsushima Strait, which separated Korea and Japan.

Battle of Tsushima

On April 27 (May 14), 1905, the 2nd Pacific squadron, consisting of 38 ships, took on a Japanese squadron of 89 ships. After the fall of Port Arthur, the goal of the Russian fleet was to break through the Tsushima Strait and pass to Vladivostok. The teams, tired from the 220-day journey, fought heroically, but had no chance of winning. In the 20th minute of the battle, the flagship was hit, and the squadron commander was seriously wounded. In fact, control of the fleet was lost. The remaining ships in service followed the planned course, but could not break away from the pursuit of the Japanese fleet. By evening, the Russian fleet had lost four ships. At night, the Japanese attacked the Russian fleet with torpedoes and disabled two more ships. On the morning of April 28 (May 15), the battle resumed. The fastest of the ships tried to break away from the Japanese fleet, but due to lack of fuel they did not reach the Russian shores and were blown up by their crews. Only three ships (Almaz, Bravy and Grozny and one auxiliary ship (Anadyr) reached Vladivostok). Six more ships were interned in neutral ports. The remaining ships were either sunk or captured.

Results of the Battle of Tsushima

The months-long passage across three oceans, in which the best ships of the Baltic Fleet were involved, turned out to be a waste of money and effort. The crushing defeat, which claimed the lives of thousands of sailors, undermined the authority of the military command, the government and the institution of the monarchy. The Battle of Tsushima took place while revolution was raging in Russia. Events in the Far East provoked unrest in the Black Sea Fleet, including on the battleship Potemkin.

The commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky, was interned and returned to Russia after the war. He continued to serve in the General Staff, but under public pressure he was soon forced to resign and he himself ensured that he was brought to trial. A naval court acquitted the admiral, and he spent the rest of his days leading the life of a recluse. The commanders who surrendered to the Japanese were sentenced to long prison terms, but received a royal pardon a few months later.

After Tsushima, the last hopes for the restoration of the Pacific Fleet collapsed. Japan unconditionally dominated the Yellow and Sea of ​​Japan. The Battle of Tsushima pointed out to the Russian command the need to sign a peace treaty. Peace negotiations began two months after the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Strait.